C.F.R. » Title 20 » CHAPTER VI—OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR › SUBCHAPTER B—FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT OF 1969, AS AMENDED › PART 718—STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING COAL MINERS' TOTAL DISABILITY OR DEATH DUE TO PNEUMOCONIOSIS › Subpart D—Presumptions Applicable to Eligibility Determinations

20 C.F.R. § 718.305

Presumption of pneumoconiosis

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(a) Applicability. This section applies to all claims filed after January 1, 2005, and pending on or after March 23, 2010.

(b) Invocation. (1) The claimant may invoke the presumption by establishing that—

(i) The miner engaged in coal-mine employment for fifteen years, either in one or more underground coal mines, or in coal mines other than underground mines in conditions substantially similar to those in underground mines, or in any combination thereof; and

(ii) The miner or survivor cannot establish entitlement under § 718.304 by means of chest x-ray evidence; and

(iii) The miner has, or had at the time of his death, a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment established pursuant to § 718.204, except that § 718.204(d) does not apply.

(2) The conditions in a mine other than an underground mine will be considered “substantially similar” to those in an underground mine if the claimant demonstrates that the miner was regularly exposed to coal-mine dust while working there.

(3) In a claim involving a living miner, a miner's affidavit or testimony, or a spouse's affidavit or testimony, may not be used by itself to establish the existence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment.

(4) In the case of a deceased miner, affidavits (or equivalent sworn testimony) from persons knowledgeable of the miner's physical condition must be considered sufficient to establish total disability due to a respiratory or pulmonary impairment if no medical or other relevant evidence exists which addresses the miner's pulmonary or respiratory condition; however, such a determination must not be based solely upon the affidavits or testimony of any person who would be eligible for benefits (including augmented benefits) if the claim were approved.

(c) Facts presumed. Once invoked, there will be rebuttable presumption—

(1) In a miner's claim, that the miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, or was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis at the time of death; or

(2) In a survivor's claim, that the miner's death was due to pneumoconiosis.

(d) Rebuttal—(1) Miner's claim. In a claim filed by a miner, the party opposing entitlement may rebut the presumption by—

(i) Establishing both that the miner does not, or did not, have:

(A) Legal pneumoconiosis as defined in § 718.201(a)(2); and

(B) Clinical pneumoconiosis as defined in § 718.201(a)(1), arising out of coal mine employment (see § 718.203); or

(ii) Establishing that no part of the miner's respiratory or pulmonary total disability was caused by pneumoconiosis as defined in § 718.201.

(2) Survivor's claim. In a claim filed by a survivor, the party opposing entitlement may rebut the presumption by—

(i) Establishing both that the miner did not have:

(A) Legal pneumoconiosis as defined in § 718.201(a)(2); and

(B) Clinical pneumoconiosis as defined in § 718.201(a)(1), arising out of coal mine employment (see § 718.203); or

(ii) Establishing that no part of the miner's death was caused by pneumoconiosis as defined in § 718.201.

(3) The presumption must not be considered rebutted on the basis of evidence demonstrating the existence of a totally disabling obstructive respiratory or pulmonary disease of unknown origin.

[78 FR 59114, Sept. 25, 2013]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 142 cases (40 in the last 5 years), 1988–2026 · leading case: Antelope Coal Co./Rio Tinto Energy Am. v. Goodin, 743 F.3d 1331 (10th Cir. 2014).
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Antelope Coal Co./Rio Tinto Energy Am. v. Goodin, 743 F.3d 1331 (10th Cir. 2014). · cites it 15× “Specifically, it argues 20 C.F.R. § 718.305 (d), 1 a rule limiting the type of evidence that may be used for rebuttal, should not apply to coal mine operators like Antelope.”
West Virginia CWP Fund v. Page Bender, Jr., 782 F.3d 129 (4th Cir. 2015). · cites it 11× “§ 921 (c)(4) and 20 C.F.R. § 718.305 . 2 After considering the medical evidence, the ALJ concluded that the operator had not rebutted the presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis by “ruling out” any causal relationship between Bender’s pneumoconiosis and his…”
Helen Mining Co v. James Elliott, Sr., 859 F.3d 226 (3rd Cir. 2017). · cites it 11× “See 20 C.F.R. § 718.305 (d)(1) (2013). For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the Benefits Review Board’s conclusion that operators are subject to the regulation’s rebuttal standard because the regulation permissibly fills a statutory gap in the legislation.”
Zurich Am. Ins. Grp. v. Duncan Ex Rel. Duncan, 889 F.3d 293 (6th Cir. 2018). · cites it 10× “" 20 C.F.R. § 718.305 (b)(2). Raymond worked only in surface mines or coal-preparation plants during his career, so the ALJ relied on this regulation to determine whether Raymond's mining employment was "substantially similar" to underground mining.”
Island Creek Coal Co. v. Larry Young, 947 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2020). · cites it 8× “§ 921 (c)(4); 20 C.F.R. § 718.305 (b)(1), (c)(1). If Young was entitled to benefits under the Act, Island Creek, Young’s last coal-mine employer, would be obligated to provide them.”
Lois Blakley, Widow of Morris Blakley v. Amax Coal Co., & Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, United States Dep't of Labor, 54 F.3d 1313 (7th Cir. 1995). · cites it 10× “20 C.F.R. §§ 718.305 (c), 718.204(c)(4). The ALJ then held that Am ax rebutted this presumption by showing that: (1) Blakley did not have pneumoconiosis; and (2) even if he did have the disease, it did not arise in whole or in part from dust exposure during his coal mine…”
Helen Hillibush, Widow of Edward Hillibush, Deceased v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Benefits Review Bd., 853 F.2d 197 (3rd Cir. 1988). · cites it 8× “Hillibush was not entitled to the presumption afforded by 20 C.F.R. § 718.305 (b) (1987) 2 that her husband had suffered from a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment.”
Island Creek Coal Co. v. Melyndia Bryan, 937 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2019). · cites it 2× “20 C.F.R. § 718.305 (d)(1)(i)–(ii); 30 U.”
Energy West Mining Co. v. Est. of Blackburn, 857 F.3d 817 (10th Cir. 2017). · cites it 5× “§ 921 (c)(4); 20 C.F.R. § 718.305 (b)-(c). 6 The burden would then shift to Energy West to disprove one of these three elements.”
Cent. Ohio Coal Co. v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, 762 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2014). · cites it 5× “” 20 C.F.R. § 718.305 (b)(1) (implementing 30 U.”
Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Herskel Stallard, 876 F.3d 663 (4th Cir. 2017). · cites it 3× “§ 921 (c)(4); see also 20 C.F.R. § 718.305 (b). The ALJ then concluded that: (1) the medical evidence demonstrated that Stallard suffered from a disabling lung disease; and (2) Westmoreland failed to rebut the • statutory presumption that Stallard’s disease was caused by…”
Big Branch Resources, Inc. v. John Ogle, 737 F.3d 1063 (6th Cir. 2013). · cites it 3× “§ 921 (c)(4) and 20 C.F.R. § 718.305 applied. Jt. App’x at 289 (ALJ Dec.”
Show all 142 citing cases →
— 20 C.F.R. § 718.305(a) — 2 cases
Westmoreland Coal Co., Inc v. DOWCP, 548 F. App'x 840 (4th Cir. 2013).
Mascarenas v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, U.S. Dept. of Labor, 52 F.3d 338 (10th Cir. 1995).
— 20 C.F.R. § 718.305(d)(1) — 2 cases
Antelope Coal Co./Rio Tinto Energy Am. v. Goodin, 743 F.3d 1331 (10th Cir. 2014). “Specifically, it argues 20 C.F.R. § 718.305 (d), 1 a rule limiting the type of evidence that may be used for rebuttal, should not apply to coal mine operators like Antelope.”
Antelope Coal Co./Rio v. Goodin (10th Cir. 2014).
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