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C.F.R.Title 24Chapter I—Office of Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity, Department of Housing and Urban DevelopmentPart 100—Discriminatory Conduct Under the Fair Housing ActSubpart G—Discriminatory Effect

24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2026)

Discriminatory effect prohibited

Edition and currency
eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTeCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026 ACTIVE · 36 IN 5Y cited 2013–2026 71citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 71 opinions since 2013, 36 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (c)(1) (2 cases).

Liability may be established under the Fair Housing Act based on a practice's discriminatory effect, as defined in paragraph (a) of this section, even if the practice was not motivated by a discriminatory intent. The practice may still be lawful if supported by a legally sufficient justification, as defined in paragraph (b) of this section. The burdens of proof for establishing a violation under this subpart are set forth in paragraph (c) of this section.

(a) Discriminatory effect. A practice has a discriminatory effect where it actually or predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons or creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.

(b) Legally sufficient justification. (1) A legally sufficient justification exists where the challenged practice:

(i) Is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3612, or defendant, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3613 or 3614; and

(ii) Those interests could not be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.

(2) A legally sufficient justification must be supported by evidence and may not be hypothetical or speculative. The burdens of proof for establishing each of the two elements of a legally sufficient justification are set forth in paragraphs (c)(2) and (3) of this section.

(c) Burdens of proof in discriminatory effects cases. (1) The charging party, with respect to a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 3612, or the plaintiff, with respect to a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 3613 or 3614, has the burden of proving that a challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.

(2) Once the charging party or plaintiff satisfies the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the respondent or defendant has the burden of proving that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent or defendant.

(3) If the respondent or defendant satisfies the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the charging party or plaintiff may still prevail upon proving that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.

(d) Relationship to discriminatory intent. A demonstration that a practice is supported by a legally sufficient justification, as defined in paragraph (b) of this section, may not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional discrimination.

[88 FR 19500, Mar. 31, 2023]
The 20 cases that cite 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENMhany Mgmt., Inc. v. Cnty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 2016).
cites § 100.500 5×cited by 220 cases
Where it cites § 100.500
“” 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (c). Under this framework, the first two steps are substantially the same as in our case law: First, a plaintiff or charging party must come forward with a prima facie case; and second, the defendant or respondent may rebut the prima facie case by proving…”
The case’s holding
Voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal activities does not render a case moot unless the defendant demonstrates no reasonable expectation of recurrence and the effects are completely eradicated.
Later courts cite it for
“resolves all ambiguities and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” · 11 citing courts
cites § 100.500 19×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 100.500
“We adopt the standard announced in recently enacted Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) regulations regarding the burdens of proof in disparate impact housing discrimination cases, see 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 , and remand to the district court for application of this…”
Later courts cite it for
“prevail upon proving that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory inter- ests supporting the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.” · 3 citing courts
3
GREENInclusive Cmtys. Proj., Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2019).
cites § 100.500 3×cited by 320 cases
Where it cites § 100.500
“See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 ; The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.”
The case’s holding
A disparate impact claim requires a complaint to allege facts demonstrating a robust causal connection between a challenged policy and the resulting discriminatory effect.
Later courts cite it for
“matters of which judicial notice may be taken under federal rule of evidence 201.” · 47 citing courts
4
GREENAvenue 6E Investments, LLC v. City of Yuma, 818 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 2016).
cites § 100.500 2×cited by 60 cases
Where it cites § 100.500
“”); see also 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (c) (setting forth burden-shifting framework for disparate-impact claims under the FHA).”
The case’s holding
Community animus can support a finding of discriminatory motives by government officials even if the officials do not personally hold such views.
Later courts cite it for
“forbids actions by private or governmental bodies that create a discriminatory effect upon a protected class or perpetuate housing segregation without any concomitant legitimate reason.” · 6 citing courts
5
GREENBorum v. Brentwood Vill., LLC, 218 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2016).
cites § 100.500 4×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 100.500
“” 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (c)(1). Once the plaintiff makes such a showing, the “defendant has the burden of proving that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent or *22 defendant.”
Later courts cite it for
“familial status' means one or more individuals (who have not attained the age of 18 years) being domiciled with ... a parent or another person having legal custody of such ... individuals,' or the parent's designee.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENLiana Revock v. Cowpet Bay West Condo. As, 853 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2017).
cites § 100.500 1×cited by 125 cases
Where it cites § 100.500
“2003), superseded by regulation on other grounds, 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (c) (2016), as recognized in Mhany Mgmt.”
The case’s holding
A claim for interference under the Fair Housing Act requires proof that a plaintiff exercised a protected right, the defendant's conduct constituted interference, and a causal connection exists.
Later courts cite it for
“we consider as affidavits walters and kromenhoek's sworn verified complaints, to the extent that they are based upon personal knowledge and set out facts that would be admissible in evidence.” · 5 citing courts
7
GREENBurbank Apts. Tenant Ass'n v. Kargman, 48 N.E.3d 394 (Mass. 2016).
cites § 100.500 2×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 100.500
“” Inclusive Communities, supra at 2514, quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (c)(1) (2014). The Supreme Court emphasized the need to balance the interests of both property owners and protected classes by requiring a rigorous examination on the merits at the pleading stage.”
Later courts cite it for
“while 'detailed factual allegations' are not required at the pleading stage, mere 'labels and conclusions' will not survive a motion to dismiss.” · 10 citing courts
8
GREENAvenue 6E Investments, LLC v. City of Yuma, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1040 (D. Ariz. 2017).
cites § 100.500 5×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 100.500
“2009); see also 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (c) (setting forth burden-shifting framework for disparate-impact claims under the FHA).”
Later courts cite it for
“evidence of discriminatory intent can bolster a disparate impact case” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENConn. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Corelogic Rental Prop. Solutions, LLC, 369 F. Supp. 3d 362 (D. Conn. 2019).
cites § 100.500 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 100.500
“The only court to address this Guidance deemed it "an interpretive rule" which clarifies how disparate impact claims under 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 apply to situations where a housing provider takes an adverse action based on an individual's criminal history.”
Later courts cite it for
“because it determined who was qualified to occupy a housing unit.” · 1 citing court
10
GREENRhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights v. Graul, 120 F. Supp. 3d 110 (D.R.I. 2015).
cites § 100.500 3×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 100.500
“24 C.F.R. § 100.500 . The burden on the plaintiff is to show that the policy has “a discriminatory effect [because] it actually or predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons .”
Later courts cite it for
“context . . . of housing discrimination, a wide enough contrast between the way a policy burdens members of a protected group as opposed to non-members is cognizable as a disparate impact.” · 3 citing courts
11
GREENSw. Fair Hous. Council v. Mdwid, 17 F.4th 950 (9th Cir. 2021).
cites § 100.500 1×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 100.500
“24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2014). Although the Supreme Court mentioned this regulation in Inclusive Communities, see 576 U.”
The case’s holding
A prima facie disparate-impact claim requires robust causality showing the challenged policy, rather than other factors, caused the disproportionate effect.
Later courts cite it for
“bars discriminatory housing policies and practices” · 6 citing courts
cites § 100.500 4×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 100.500
“” 24 CFR §100.500 (c)(1) (2014). If a statistical discrepancy is caused by factors other than the defendant’s policy, a plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case, and there is no liability.”
Later courts cite it for
“a plaintiff bringing a disparate-impact claim challenges practices that have a 'disproportionately adverse effect on minorities' and are otherwise unjustified by a legitimate rationale.” · 39 citing courts
13
cites § 100.500 3×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 100.500
“15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 ) (“Disparate-Impact Rule” or “Rule”), providing for liability based on disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA” or the “Act”), Pub.”
Later courts cite it for
“the terms after the 'because of ' clauses in the fha supply the prohibited motivations for the intentional acts . . . that the act makes unlawful.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENNat'l Fair Hous. All. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 261 F. Supp. 3d 20 (D.D.C. 2017).
cites § 100.500 1×cited by 17 cases
Summary
No passage or summary on file for this case yet.
15
GREENJean Robert Saint-Jean v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., 129 F.4th 124 (2d Cir. 2025).
cites § 100.500 1×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 100.500
“56 less discriminatory effect") with 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (c)(3) (a plaintiff may prevail by proving that the interests "could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect").”
The case’s holding
Equitable tolling may delay a Fair Housing Act limitations period until plaintiffs knew or had reason to know of systemic racial discrimination, even without fraudulent concealment by the defendant.
Later courts cite it for
“second circuit has explicitly clarified that 'fraudulent concealment is not essential to equitable tolling,” · 3 citing courts
16
GREENNat'l Fair Hous. All. v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 294 F. Supp. 3d 940 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
cites § 100.500 1×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 100.500
“2017) (citing 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (c) ; Inclusive Communities , 135 S.”
17
REDFrancis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 917 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2019).
cites § 100.500 1×cited by 8 cases
Superseded by Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc. (2021): the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's own en banc opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 100.500
“"), superseded by regulation on other grounds , 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (c). Section 3604(b) of the FHA provides that "it shall be unlawful .”
Later courts cite it for
“whether a landlord may be liable under the fha for failing to take prompt action to address a racially hostile housing environment created by one tenant targeting another, where the landlord knew of the discriminatory conduct and had the power to correct it.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 100.500 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 100.500
“” 24 CFR §100.500 (c)(1) (2014). If a statistical discrepancy is caused by factors other than the defendant’s policy, a plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case, and there is no liability.”
The case’s holding
Disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, but a claim based on statistical disparity fails if the plaintiff cannot identify a specific policy causing that disparity.
19
GREENMhany Mgmt. Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of Garden City, 985 F. Supp. 2d 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
cites § 100.500 1×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 100.500
“15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2013)). In establishing a prima facie case for such a claim, a “plaintiff must show: (1) the occurrence of certain outwardly neutral practices, and (2) a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on persons of a particular type…”
Later courts cite it for
“because such an injunction merely prohibits what is already prohibited, further relief, perhaps in the form of affirmative relief, appears appropriate.” · 1 citing court
20
GREENGray v. Seterus, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 3d 865 (D. Or. 2017).
cites § 100.500 1×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 100.500
“24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (a). Upon such showing, the burden shifts to Defendants to show a legally sufficient' justification.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
201320192026

One bar per year. Tallest: 8 cases in 2024. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
D.D.C.82d Cir.5E.D. La.55th Cir.4D. Conn.4N.D. Ill.4D. Md.49th Cir.3

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 30 courts in all.

By subsection
(b)(1)(i)1 case
Fair Hous. Ctr. of Cent. Indiana, Inc. v. M&J Mgmt. Co., No. 1:22-cv-00612 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 19, 2024).
(c)(1)2 cases
Treece v. Perrier Condo. Owners Ass'n, 519 F. Supp. 3d 342 (E.D. La. 2021).
Noel v. City Of New York, No. 1:15-cv-05236 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2023).

Show all 71 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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