29 C.F.R. § 1606.7

Speak-English-only rules

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(a) When applied at all times. A rule requiring employees to speak only English at all times in the workplace is a burdensome term and condition of employment. The primary language of an individual is often an essential national origin characteristic. Prohibiting employees at all times, in the workplace, from speaking their primary language or the language they speak most comfortably, disadvantages an individual's employment opportunities on the basis of national origin. It may also create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation based on national origin which could result in a discriminatory working environment. 7 Therefore, the Commission will presume that such a rule violates title VII and will closely scrutinize it.

7 See CD 71-446 (1970), CCH EEOC Decisions ¶ 6173, 2 FEP Cases, 1127; CD 72-0281 (1971), CCH EEOC Decisions ¶ 6293.

(b) When applied only at certain times. An employer may have a rule requiring that employees speak only in English at certain times where the employer can show that the rule is justified by business necessity.

(c) Notice of the rule. It is common for individuals whose primary language is not English to inadvertently change from speaking English to speaking their primary language. Therefore, if an employer believes it has a business necessity for a speak-English-only rule at certain times, the employer should inform its employees of the general circumstances when speaking only in English is required and of the consequences of violating the rule. If an employer fails to effectively notify its employees of the rule and makes an adverse employment decision against an individual based on a violation of the rule, the Commission will consider the employer's application of the rule as evidence of discrimination on the basis of national origin.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 43 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1986–2022 · leading case: Montes v. Vail Clinic, Inc., 497 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2007).
Montes v. Vail Clinic, Inc., 497 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2007). · cites it 2× “1980) (noting that while “[n]either the statute nor common understanding equates national origin with the language that one chooses to speak[, language may be used as a covert basis for national origin discrimination”); 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (a) (observing that English-only…”
Pacheco v. New York Presbyterian Hosp., 593 F. Supp. 2d 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). · cites it 3× “3d at 1171 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (a)). But, the EEOC guidelines also provide that “[a]n employer may have a rule requiring that employees speak only in English at certain times where the employer can show that the rule is justified by business necessity.”
Estenos v. PAHO/WHO Fed. Credit Union, 952 A.2d 878 (D.C. 2008). · cites it 2× “29 C.F.R § 1606.7. [12] Although such requirements are subject to scrutiny, they may not ultimately be grounds for discrimination under Title VII if justified under the "bottom line" concept.”
Priscilla Garcia Maricela Buitrago United Food & Com. Workers Int'l Union, Afl-Cio v. Spun Steak Co., a California Corp., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993). · cites it 3× “See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (a) & (b) (1991). Under the EEOC’s scheme, an employer must always provide a business justification for such a rule.”
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Sephora USA, LLC, 419 F. Supp. 2d 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). · cites it 6× “” 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (b). 9 The “certain times” guideline set out in § 1606.”
Velasquez v. Goldwater Mem'l Hosp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). · cites it 3× “See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1991). The regulations provide that an English-only rule that is applied “only at certain times,” is permissible only insofar as the employer is able to demonstrate that the rule is justified by a business necessity.”
Cosme v. Salvation Army, 284 F. Supp. 2d 229 (D. Mass. 2003). · cites it 3× “29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 . With respect to more limited rules, the regulations provide that “[a]n employer may have a rule requiring that employees speak only in English at certain times where the employer can show that the rule is justified by business necessity.”
Maldonado v. City of Altus, OK., 433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2006). “7(a), presumptively constituting a Title VII violation; and (2) an English-only rule that applies only at certain times does not violate Title VII if the employer can justify the rule by showing business necessity, § 1606.”
Rubio Ex Rel. Z.R. v. Turner Unified Sch. Dist. No. 202, 453 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D. Kan. 2006). · cites it 2× “EEOC, Speak-English-Only rules, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 . English-only workplace policies may “create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation, and intimidation” that creates a discriminatory environment.”
Long v. First Union Corp. of Virginia, 894 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Va. 1995). · cites it 2× “See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (a) & (b) (1991). The EEOC has determined that an English only policy may “create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation based on national origin which could result in a discriminatory working environment”.”
Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (M.D. Ala. 1998). · cites it 2× “, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (a) (EEOC regulations) (English only rules limit “opportunities on the basis of national origin”); 44 24 C.”
Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (11th Cir. 1999). “29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (a). 27 These agency regulations in concert with *511 Lau reinforce the district court’s conclusion of law that Appellants’ English-only policy violates Title VI by creating an adverse, disproportionate impact on non-English speaking Alabama residents who wish…”
— 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) — 1 case
Barber v. Lovelace Sandia Health Sys., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1313 (D.N.M. 2005).
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