(1) Upon all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway, except as follows:
(a) When overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction under the rules governing such movement;
(b) When an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left of the center of the highway; but any person so doing shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portion of the highway within such distance as to constitute an immediate hazard;
(c) Upon a roadway divided into three lanes for traffic under the rules applicable thereon; or
(d) Upon a roadway restricted to one-way traffic as indicated by official traffic control devices.
(2) Upon all roadways any vehicle proceeding at less than the normal speed of traffic at the time and place and under the conditions then existing shall be driven in the right-hand lane then available for traffic or as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway, except when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction or when preparing for a left turn at an intersection or into a private road or driveway.
(3) Upon any roadway having four or more lanes for moving traffic and providing for two-way movement of traffic, no vehicle shall be driven to the left of the center line of the roadway, except when authorized by official traffic control devices designating certain lanes to the left side of the center of the roadway for use by traffic not otherwise permitted to use such lanes or except as permitted under subsection (1)(b) of this section. However, this subsection (3) does not prohibit the crossing of the center line in making a left turn into or from an alley, private road, or driveway when such movement can be made in safety and without interfering with, impeding, or endangering other traffic lawfully using the highway.
(4) Any person who violates any provision of this section commits a class A traffic infraction.
Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2357, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-4-901 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-4-1001 was relocated to § 42-4-1101.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
14
cases, 1975–1995 · leading case:
Olinyk v. People, 642 P.2d 490 (Colo. 1982).
Olinyk v. People, 642 P.2d 490 (Colo. 1982).
· cites it 42× “Section 42-4-1001, C.R.S.1973 prohibited any person from driving “at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions then existing.”
People v. Dover, 790 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1990).
· cites it 41× “Dover, not guilty of speeding in violation of section 42-4-1001(1), 17 C.R.S. (1989 Supp.”
People v. McNeese, 892 P.2d 304 (Colo. 1995).
· cites it 6× “For example, section 42-4-1001, 17 C.R.S. (1989 Supp.), dealing with speed regulations, uses the term "unlawful" outside of the criminal context.”
People v. Hizhniak, 579 P.2d 1131 (Colo. 1978).
· cites it 8× “The ordinance in question is essentially identical to the state statute regulating speed limits, section 42-4-1001, et seq., C.R.S. 1973 (1976 Supp.”
People v. Peterson, 734 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1987).
· cites it 10× “The respondent was convicted of violating section 42-4-1001,17 C.R.S. (1984), by traveling over the posted speed limit of twenty-five miles per hour for trucks weighing 10,000 pounds or more, gross vehicle weight.”
Smith v. Charnes, 649 P.2d 1089 (Colo. 1982).
· cites it 3× “Section 42-4-1001, C.R.S.1973 (1981 Supp.”
City of Greenwood Vill. Ex Rel. State v. Fleming, 643 P.2d 511 (Colo. 1982).
· cites it 3× “” In granting the motion to dismiss the municipal court held that speeding was a crime under state statute, section 42-4-1001, C.R. S.1973 (1981 Supp.”
People v. Hampton, 619 P.2d 48 (Colo. 1980).
· cites it 3× “In the same trial, the defendant was also convicted of speeding, section 42-4-1001, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.”
People v. Lewis, 745 P.2d 668 (Colo. 1987).
· cites it 5× “, § 42-4-1001(1), (3), (7)(a), 17 C.R.S. (1984).”
People v. Driver, 539 P.2d 1248 (Colo. 1975).
· cites it 5× “Section 42-4-1001, C.R.S. 1973. The top speed under the statutes was, “Seventy miles per hour on surfaced, four-lane highways.”
People v. Sosbe, 789 P.2d 1113 (Colo. 1990).
· cites it 2× “Section 42-4-1001, 17 C.R.S. (1989 Supp.) prohibits driving at a speed in excess of the speed limit.”
Thomas v. People, 895 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1995).
· cites it 2× “5)(a) (DUI per se); driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, in violation of section 42-4-1202(l)(a); and speeding, in violation of section 42-4-1001, 17 C.R.S. (1993). Prior to trial, McMullin moved to suppress the results of his breath test.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1001(1) — 2 cases
People v. Dover, 790 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1990).
“Dover, not guilty of speeding in violation of section 42-4-1001(1), 17 C.R.S. (1989 Supp.”
People v. Lewis, 745 P.2d 668 (Colo. 1987).
“, § 42-4-1001(1), (3), (7)(a), 17 C.R.S. (1984).”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1001(2) — 1 case
Olinyk v. People, 642 P.2d 490 (Colo. 1982).
“Section 42-4-1001, C.R.S.1973 prohibited any person from driving “at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions then existing.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1001(2)(a) — 1 case
Olinyk v. People, 642 P.2d 490 (Colo. 1982).
“Section 42-4-1001, C.R.S.1973 prohibited any person from driving “at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions then existing.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1001(2)(e) — 2 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1001(7) — 1 case
People v. Hizhniak, 579 P.2d 1131 (Colo. 1978).
“The ordinance in question is essentially identical to the state statute regulating speed limits, section 42-4-1001, et seq., C.R.S. 1973 (1976 Supp.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1001(7)(b) — 2 cases
Olinyk v. People, 642 P.2d 490 (Colo. 1982).
“Section 42-4-1001, C.R.S.1973 prohibited any person from driving “at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions then existing.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1001(7)(f) — 1 case
People v. Hizhniak, 579 P.2d 1131 (Colo. 1978).
“The ordinance in question is essentially identical to the state statute regulating speed limits, section 42-4-1001, et seq., C.R.S. 1973 (1976 Supp.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1001(7)(i) — 4 cases
Olinyk v. People, 642 P.2d 490 (Colo. 1982).
“Section 42-4-1001, C.R.S.1973 prohibited any person from driving “at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions then existing.”
People v. Lewis, 745 P.2d 668 (Colo. 1987).
“, § 42-4-1001(1), (3), (7)(a), 17 C.R.S. (1984).”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1001(8) — 1 case
People v. Dover, 790 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1990).
“Dover, not guilty of speeding in violation of section 42-4-1001(1), 17 C.R.S. (1989 Supp.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1001(8)(a) — 2 cases
People v. Dover, 790 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1990).
“Dover, not guilty of speeding in violation of section 42-4-1001(1), 17 C.R.S. (1989 Supp.”
People v. McNeese, 892 P.2d 304 (Colo. 1995).
“For example, section 42-4-1001, 17 C.R.S. (1989 Supp.), dealing with speed regulations, uses the term "unlawful" outside of the criminal context.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1001(l)(a) — 1 case
People v. Dover, 790 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1990).
“Dover, not guilty of speeding in violation of section 42-4-1001(1), 17 C.R.S. (1989 Supp.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.