Carson v. Miller, 370 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1979). · Go Syfert
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Carson v. Miller, 370 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1979). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
49 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Miami-Dade County v. Dr. David Fintan Garavan (fladistctapp, 2026-03-25)
Treatment trajectory · 1979 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1979 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miami-Dade County v. Dr. David Fintan Garavan
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
See City of Miami Beach v. Rocio Corp., 404 So. 2d 1066, 1069 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (“The plain language of a statute must be read to mean what it says.”); Carson v. Miller, 370 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 1979) (same); Phil’s Yellow Taxi Co. v. Carter, 134 So. 2d 230, 232 (Fla. 1961) (same).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) & SC13-1028 License Acquisitions, LLC v. Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC and Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation v. Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC
Fla. · 2014 · confidence medium
Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1982)); see also Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984); Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, 434 So. 2d at 882 ; Carson v. Miller, 370 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 1979). “ ‘[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.’ ” Inv.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) License Acquisitions, LLC v. Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC
Fla. · 2014 · confidence medium
Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So.2d 1071, 1073 (Fla.1982)); see also Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984); Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, 434 So.2d at 882 ; Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla.1979). “ ‘[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.’ ” Inv.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fla. Dept. of Bus. Reg. v. Invest. Corp.
Fla. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984); Department of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So.2d 879, 882 (Fla.1983); Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla. 1979); State ex rel.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hannah v. Newkirk
Fla. · 1996 · confidence medium
This Court has consistently held that unambiguous statutory language must be accorded its plain meaning. *114 See Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla. 1979).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jenkins v. STATE, DEPT. OF HEALTH & REHAB. SERVICES
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
See Public Health Trust of Dade City v. Lopez, 531 So.2d 946, 949 (Fla. 1988); Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984); Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla. 1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion
Fla. · 1992 · confidence medium
Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So.2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1982); Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla. 1979); Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976); McDonald v. Roland, 65 So.2d 12, 14 (Fla. 1953).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Refined Sugars Inc. v. Southern Commodity Corp.
S.D. Fla. · 1988 · confidence medium
Accordingly, courts interpreting the scope of acts covered by the statute are guided by the primary rule of statutory construction that “unambiguous statutory language must be accorded its plain meaning,” Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla.1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Public Health Tr. of Dade Cty. v. Lopez
Fla. · 1988 · confidence medium
See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984); Department of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So.2d 879, 882 (Fla. 1983); Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla. 1979); State ex rel.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roush v. State
Fla. · 1982 · confidence medium
Since the language pertaining to theft is of such a clear and concise nature, this Court is guided by the rule that "unambiguous statutory language must be accorded its plain meaning." Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla. 1979).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Florida College v. Wilsher
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
Rowe v. State, 394 So.2d 1059 at 1059 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla.1979); 30 Fla.Jur.
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1979); Phil's Yellow Taxi Co. v. Carter, 134 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1961); Gilmore v. Civil Service Board of Santa Rosa County, 528 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
cited Cited "see" Pizzarelli v. Rollins
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10 (Fla.1979).
cited Cited "see, e.g." STATE OF FLORIDA v. ANDREW SCOTT CROSE
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Carson v. Miller, 370 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1979); Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." James Barry Wright v. City of Miami Gardens, etc. (2×)
Fla. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Carson v. Miller, 370 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1979); Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Barnett Bank v. State Dept. of Revenue
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1979); Ross v. Gore, 48 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1950).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Holly v. Auld
Fla. · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1979); Ross v. Gore, 48 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1950).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1981 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g ., Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10 , 11 (Fla. 1979).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Dale CARSON, Etc., et al., Appellants,
v.
Richard Franklin MILLER, et al., Appellees.
55220.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Apr 12, 1979.
370 So. 2d 10
Per Curiam.
Cited by 47 opinions  |  Published

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Gary L. Conover, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellants.

William J. Sheppard, Jacksonville, for appellees.

[*11] PER CURIAM:

We have for resolution the following question certified from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to section 25.031, Florida Statutes (1977), and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.510:

WHETHER THE RULE PROPOSED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 951.23(2)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES.

We hold that this question must be answered in the negative.

Section 951.23(2)(b) provides:

The Department of Offender Rehabilitation is ... directed to adopt rules and regulations prescribing standards and requirements with reference to ... the number of county and municipal prisoners who may be housed therein per specified unit of floor space....

Appellant Wainwright, Secretary of the Department of Offender Rehabilitation, asserts that rule 33-8.02(10) of the Florida Administrative Code satisfies the statute by requiring that

[t]he Secretary shall ascertain the maximum numbers of prisoners ... that can properly be housed in any detention facility... . The Officer-in-Charge ... shall thereafter insure that the actual prisoner populations do not exceed such maximum numbers; provided, however, that the Secretary may authorize exceptions or modifications when in his opinion there is good cause for such action.

The assertion is untenable.

Section 951.23(2)(b) requires that "standards and requirements" governing the density of detention populations be prescribed by rules adopted in the manner specified in section 120.54, Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.). The Department did not discharge its rulemaking duty by delegating to the Secretary authority to "ascertain" proper housing capacities of the state's detention facilities. We have consistently held that unambiguous statutory language must be accorded its plain meaning. Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1976); McDonald v. Roland, 65 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1953); A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157 (1931); Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693 (1918).

In carrying out its rulemaking duty, the Department is not obliged to establish a single uniform square footage requirement for all existing county and municipal detention facilities, without regard for variables such as cell sizes, dayroom sizes, recreational area sizes, open cell block areas, individual cell block areas, or common open areas. Section 951.23(2)(b) requires the promulgation of "standards" which are determinative of population densities in varying situations, and the choice of a particular scheme satisfying the statute is left to the Department, to whose action this Court would accord a strong presumption of regularity. See Florida Citrus Commission v. Gift, Inc., 91 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1956). Yet plainly the Department must act by rules.

Rule 33-8.02(10), as proposed by the Secretary of Offender Rehabilitation, does not comply with the requirements of section 951.23(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1977). The certified question posed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is answered in the negative.

It is so ordered.

ENGLAND, C.J., BOYD, OVERTON, SUNDBERG and ALDERMAN, JJ., and SMITH, Associate Justice, concur.

ADKINS, J., dissents.