DG v. State, 661 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). · Go Syfert
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DG v. State, 661 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
97 citation events (78 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Shaffer v. Scarborough (flmd, 2025-01-23)
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 33 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shaffer v. Scarborough
M.D. Fla. · 2025 · confidence medium
See D.A.W. v. State, 945 So. 2d 624, 627 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (finding an officer had no probable cause to arrest the defendant for obstruction when despite his verbal harassment and noting the officer’s use of the legal phrase, “exciting the riot,” was unsupported since there was no evidence the defendant made any statements encouraging anyone to take action against the officer); J.G.D. v. State, 724 So. 2d 711 , 711–12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (holding no probable cause to arrest for obstruction existed despite an officer’s order directing the defendant to leave an apartment complex, despi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ghandour v. CITY OF MIAMI DADE
S.D. Fla. · 2024 · confidence medium
On the question of whether the officer was performing a legal duty, “it is important to distinguish between a police officer ‘in the lawful execution of any legal duty’ and a police officer who is merely on the job.” D.G. v. State, 661 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) LU JING v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
See A.W. v. State, 82 So. 3d 1136, 1138 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Jay v. State, 731 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). “[I]t is important to distinguish between a police officer ‘in the lawful execution of any legal duty’ and a police officer who is merely on the job.” D.G. v. State, 661 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Devin Lee Bass v. State of Florida (3×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
The dissent cites cases holding, for example, that an officer is executing a legal duty if he asks “for assistance with an ongoing emergency.” Dissent at 12-13 (quoting D.G. v. State, 661 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)); accord S.G. v. 8 State, 252 So. 3d 323, 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“Legal duties include things like serving process, legally detaining a person, or asking for assistance in an emergency situation.”); Brandful v. State, 858 So. 2d 367, 370 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“[I]nvestigating a complaint constitutes the lawful execution of a legal duty.”); Francis v. State, 736 So.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) D.L.S. v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
D.G. v. State, 661 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); R.E.D. v. State, 903 So. 2d 206, 207 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) D.L.S. v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); R.E.D. v. State, 903 So.2d 206, 207 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).
cited Cited as authority (rule) A.R. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) I.M. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) C.W. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Jay, 731 So.2d at 776 ; D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) CW v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Jay, 731 So.2d at 776 ; D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James T. DeRosa vs Sheriff of Collier County, FL, Shaun M. George (2×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla.Dist.Ct.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) M.M. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
“If a police officer is not engaged in executing process on a person, is not legally detaining that person, or has not asked the person for assistance with an ongoing emergency that presents a serious threat of imminent harm to person or property, the person’s words alone can rarely ... rise to the level of obstruction.” D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DeRosa v. Rambosk
M.D. Fla. · 2010 · confidence medium
See e.g., J.G.D. v. State, 724 So.2d 711, 711-12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (holding police did not have probable cause to arrest defendant for obstruction despite defendant’s “loud and profane” protests, and despite the gathering of an “unruly crowd”); State v. Dennis, 684 So.2d 848, 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (holding police did not have probable cause to arrest defendant for obstruction when defendant was yelling street term “ninety nine” which means police were in the area while undercover *1298 officers were attempting drug bust of drug dealer); D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Legnosky
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
In D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), while concluding that the defendant’s words alone in that particular case did not constitute obstruction, this court explained the following “general proposition” applicable to section 843.02: If a police officer is not engaged in executing process on a person, is not legally detaining that person, or has not asked the person for assistance with an ongoing emergency that presents a serious threat of imminent harm to person or property, the person’s words alone can rarely, if ever, rise to the level of an obstruction.
cited Cited as authority (rule) SAUZ v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
James v. State, 903 So.2d 1003, 1004 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (citing D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d *228 DCA 1995)); see also Fournier, 731 So.2d at 76 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) SNJ v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
See D.A.W. v. State, 945 So.2d 624, 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Francis, 736 So.2d at 99 ; D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) S.N.J. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
See D.A.W. v. State, 945 So.2d 624, 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Francis, 736 So.2d at 99 ; D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rodriguez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
See A.F. v. State, 912 So.2d 374, 376 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding that the State could not prosecute the defendant for giving a false name to an officer because the officer did not have a well-founded suspicion to detain him for suspected trespassing); D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (noting that a person does not have to tell officers his or her correct identity unless the person is legally detained).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) KA v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
"On the question of whether the officer was performing a legal duty, `[i]t is important to distinguish between a police officer `in the lawful execution of any legal duty' and a police officer who is merely on the job.'" Id. (quoting D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) K.A. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
“On the question of whether the officer was performing a legal duty, ‘[i]t is important to distinguish between a police officer ‘in the lawful execution of any legal duty’ and a police officer who is merely on the job.’ ” Id. (quoting D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Donovan George Davis v. Philip B. Williams
11th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Florida courts have generally held, with very limited exceptions, that physical conduct must accompany offensive words to support a conviction under § 843.02. 9 See Francis v. State, 736 So.2d 97, 99 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1999) (holding that defendant’s actions of physically blocking the officer’s path to investigate- a beating in another room constituted obstruction under § 843.02); State v. Dennis, 684 So.2d 848, 849 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996) (holding police did not have probable cause to arrest defendant for obstruction when defendant was yelling street term “ninety nine” which means poli…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) St. James v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
In D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), this court stated that a suspect can commit the offense of obstructing a police officer without violence by providing false information to a police officer during a valid arrest or Terry stop, but the court noted that "[t]his rule . . . does not obligate a person to give his or her correct identity to an officer unless that person is legally detained." Here, St.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) R.E.D. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
In D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), the court provides three legal duties, when coupled with words alone, which will result in obstruction of justice, (1) serving process; (2) legally detaining a person; or (3) asking for assistance.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ellen Storck v. City of Coral Springs
11th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
On the question of whether an officer was performing a legal duty for purposes of a conviction under § 843.02, “ ‘it is important to distinguish between a police officer in the lawful execution of any legal duty and a police officer who is merely on the job.’ ” Jay, 731 So.2d at 775 (internal citation omitted) (quoting D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) J.V. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
In D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), the defendant was found by the trial court to have violated section 843.02, because he was yelling and encouraging his mother not to allow the police to search their house.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Francis v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
State v. Dennis, 684 So.2d 848, 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Wilkerson v. State, 556 So.2d 453, 456 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. den., 564 So.2d 1088 (Fla.1990).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Jay v. State (5×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
On the question of whether the officer was performing a legal duty, "[i]t is important to distinguish between a police officer `in the lawful execution of any legal duty' and a police officer who is merely on the job." D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)(defendant's verbal protests and refusal to answer police questions during a search for robbery suspect held not an obstruction of justice).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fournier v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Under section 843.02, Florida Statutes (1995), a conviction for resisting arrest without violence requires that "(1) the officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty; and (2) the action by the defendant constituted obstruction or resistance of that lawful duty." S.G.K. v. State, 657 So.2d 1246, 1247 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). "[T]he use of mere words can be a violation of section 843.02 when a suspect provides false information to a police officer during a valid arrest or Terry stop." D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (footnote omitted).
discussed Cited "see" Christian Powell v. Bobby Haddock
11th Cir. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 765 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995)) (holding that verbal protests and refusal to answer questions did not constitute a violation of § 843.02).
cited Cited "see" Burdess v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Heather Olson v. Jason Whitfield
11th Cir. · 2018 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., D.G., 661 So. 2d at 75–77 (holding that, where officers were investigating suspect for burglary, his loud and obnoxious protests, refusal to answer questions, and encouraging his mother not to cooperate with the officers was not obstruction); Miller, 667 So. 2d at 326–27 (holding that, where 9 Case: 17-11172 Date Filed: 06/12/2018 Page: 10 of 12 officer had been called to respond to domestic violence allegations, suspect’s loud arguing and cursing with police and others, which continued despite police ordering him to calm down, was not disorderly conduct).6 Therefore, the Dist…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Heather Olson v. Jason Whitfield
11th Cir. · 2018 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., D.G., 661 So. 2d at 75–77 (holding that, where officers were investigating suspect for burglary, his loud and obnoxious protests, refusal to answer questions, and encouraging his mother not to cooperate with the officers was not obstruction); Miller, 667 So. 2d at 326–27 (holding that, where 9 Case: 17-11172 Date Filed: 06/12/2018 Page: 10 of 12 officer had been called to respond to domestic violence allegations, suspect’s loud arguing and cursing with police and others, which continued despite police ordering him to calm down, was not disorderly conduct).6 Therefore, the Dist…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sanchez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence low
But merely giving the police false information generally will not support a criminal conviction, not even a misdemean- or conviction for resisting an officer without violence, § 843.02, commonly referred to as “obstruction.” See W.W. v. State, 993 So.2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); see also D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (obstructive conduct, rather than words, is generally necessary to support an obstruction conviction).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
D.G., Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
94-04063.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Jun 21, 1995.
661 So. 2d 75
Altenbernd.
Published

Robert E. Jagger, Public Defender, and Roberts J. Bradford, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, Clearwater, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Anne E. Sheer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

ALTENBERND, Judge.

D.G. appeals an order adjudicating him delinquent for obstructing a police officer without violence. We reverse because the state failed to prove that D.G.'s verbal protests crossed the threshold from protected free speech to conduct that obstructed the officers in the "execution of legal process" or in the "lawful execution of any legal duty." § 843.02, Fla. Stat. (1993). See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987).

In the early morning hours of October 3, 1994, officers of the St. Petersburg Police Department were investigating an automobile burglary near D.G.'s home. The victim told the officers that the burglar's name was "Steve," and that the burglar knew D.G. and spent time at D.G.'s home. Because the[*76] victim reported that the burglar had left the scene of the crime in the general direction of D.G.'s home, the police went to D.G.,'s house.

At least three officers entered the yard between 3 and 4 a.m. with flashlights. As they searched the curtilage, they knocked on the doors and windows to wake the occupants. D.G.'s mother came outside the house. Shortly thereafter, D.G. came outside, protesting loudly and obnoxiously. He refused to answer the officers' questions, but never threatened anyone. The officers arrested D.G. for disorderly conduct because he refused to stop yelling after several warnings.

In the delinquency petition, the charge was changed to obstructing an officer without violence. Only the back-up officer testified at the adjudicatory hearing. He emphasized that at the time of the investigation he did not know whether the yelling teenager was the burglary suspect, "Steve," because the victim had generally described the burglar as a young white male. This generic description also fits D.G. The officer explained that D.G. interfered with the investigation by yelling and by encouraging his mother not to cooperate with the police. The trial court found that D.G.'s protests rose to the level of a violation of section 843.02.

The state does not argue that the police had a valid basis to perform an investigatory stop of D.G. or to enter his home without a warrant. See § 901.151, .19, Fla. Stat. (1993). The police investigation at this home was a citizen encounter involving a verbally uncooperative citizen. D.G.'s decision to exercise his First Amendment rights with such enthusiasm during the early hours of the morning may reflect youthful indiscretion, but his actions do not constitute disorderly conduct or obstruction of a police officer in the performance of a legal duty. See L.A.T. v. State, 650 So.2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).

This case demonstrates two common difficulties in applying section 843.02 to verbal conduct that allegedly "resist[s], obstructs[s], or oppose[s] any officer ... in the lawful execution of any legal duty." § 843.02. First, in the heat of the moment, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish protected speech from fighting words. Second, in evaluating a citizen's verbal response to a police officer, it is important to distinguish between a police officer "in the lawful execution of any legal duty" and a police officer who is merely on the job. It is understandable that a police officer in good faith may see an obstruction where another citizen sees an appropriate protest.

It has been suggested that words alone can never "obstruct" a police officer and that this statute proscribes only conduct that physically opposes an officer in the performance of lawful duties. See Wilkerson v. State, 556 So.2d 453 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 564 So.2d 1088 (Fla. 1990). In Wilkerson, a bystander protested police efforts to arrest drug suspects. The First District affirmed the conviction because the bystander's conduct involved physical opposition to the police, in addition to yelling and cursing.

On the other hand, there are cases holding that the use of mere words can be a violation of section 843.02 when a suspect provides false information to a police officer during a valid arrest or Terry[1] stop. See Rumph v. State, 544 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Caines v. State, 500 So.2d 728 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). This rule, however, does not obligate a person to give his or her correct identity to an officer unless that person is legally detained. Steele v. State, 537 So.2d 711 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).

These cases, and other Florida cases, seem to support the following general proposition: If a police officer is not engaged in executing process on a person, is not legally detaining that person, or has not asked the person for assistance with an ongoing emergency that presents a serious threat of imminent harm to person or property, the person's words alone can rarely, if ever, rise to the level of an obstruction. Thus, obstructive conduct rather than offensive words are normally required to support a conviction under this statute. See, e.g., R.S. v. State, 531 So.2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Johnson v. State, 433 So.2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983);[*77] English v. State, 293 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). See also S.D. v. State, 627 So.2d 1261 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (holding that defendant's verbal and nonverbal conduct could not be construed as failure to assist officer in performance of duties where officer did not request defendant for assistance). See generally Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, What Constitutes Obstructing or Resisting an Officer, in the Absence of Actual Force, 44 A.L.R.3d 1018 (1972). Such obstructive conduct was not established in this case.

Accordingly, we reverse the order that adjudicated D.G. delinquent for obstructing an officer.

Reversed.

FRANK, C.J., and LAZZARA, J., concur.

1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).