Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

1960). [4] Constitution of Florida, Art. IV, § 30. [5] State ex rel. Hollywood Jockey Club, Inc., v

...169, 451 P.2d 848, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 916, 90 S.Ct. 239, 24 L.Ed.2d 194; New Jersey, State v. DiPaolo, 1961, 34 N.J. 279, 168 A.2d 401, cert. denied 368 U.S. 880, 82 S.Ct. 130, 7 L.Ed.2d 80; New Mexico, State v. Upton, 1955, 60 N.M. 205, 290 P.2d 440; New York, § 30.05 Penal Law 1965; North Carolina, State v....

necessary indefiniteness of meaning. See 11 id. § 30:5. Similarly, "since there is a presumption that

146 A.L.R. 1417; and 30 Am. Jur., Interference § 30. [5] City Builders' Finance Co. v. Stahl, 90 Fla

...ulevard South." There is no indication that this survey was ever recorded or that any other lots were conveyed with reference to it. We consider the recorded 1893 Kauser map controlling in this cause. [8] 2 R. Boyer, Florida Real Estate Transactions § 30.05 (1984)....

...he public street, it is only logical that acceptance followed an offer. To think that there could be an acceptance in the absence of an offer is illogical. [11] 2 R. Boyer, Florida Real Estate Transactions § 30.07 (1984). [12] Id. [13] Id. [14] Id. § 30.05....

P. Trawick, Jr., Trawick’s Fla. Prac. & Proc., § 30:5 (2015 ed.); 13 Fla. Jur.2d Creditors’ Rights §

possible interpretations could be present. Id. at § 30:5. An ambiguity “does not exist merely because a

Padovano, 2 Fla. Prac. Appellate Practice § 30:5, n. 31 (2015 ed.). The Supreme Court of Florida

...Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court concludes that the offer to dedicate was accepted by virtue of the .failure of the taxing authority to assess taxes upon the property platted as streets; Boyer, Florida Real Estate Transactions, Section 30.05; Am.Jur....

Philip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice § 30:5 (2016 ed.) (footnote omitted). I agree with Judge

Stat. Ann. § 50a-109; 710 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 30/5-15; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:4249. As with Georgia's

...Authorized Personnel Only.” 751 S.W.2d at 909 . Milton admitted that he did not work at the store, that he had seen- the sign, and that he did not have permission to go into the prohibited area. Id. He was convicted of criminal trespass in violation of Texas Penal Code Annotated section 30.05(a) (West 1988), which provided: A person commits an offense if he enters or remains on property or in a building of another without effective consent and he: (1) had notice that the entry was forbidden; or (2) received notice to depart but failed to do so....

...In upholding Milton’s conviction, the Texas appellate court correctly ■ observed that to hold otherwise “would be giving an absurd interpretation to the legislative intent behind the: statute:” In order for this' court to hold that appellant’s action did not amount to criminal trespass under § 30.05, we would be giving an absurd interpretation to the legislative intent behind the statute....

achieve these ends broadly in two ways. First, section 30-5 of the Ordinance categorically USCA11 Case:

generally, Trawick, Florida Practice and Procedure, § 30-5. Here, six days after being served with process

J. Padovano, 2 Fla. Prac., Appellate Practice § 30:5 (2023 ed.) (noting that parties must seek certiorari

...Authorized Personnel Only.” 751 S.W.2d at 909. Milton admitted that he did not work at the store, that he had seen the sign, and that he did not have permission to go into the prohibited area. Id. He was convicted of criminal trespass in violation of Texas Penal Code Annotated section 30.05(a) (West 1988), which provided: A person commits an offense if he enters or remains on property or in a building of another without effective consent and he: (1) had noti...

...ed that to hold otherwise “would be giving an absurd interpretation to the legislative intent behind the statute:” In order for this court to hold that appellant’s action did not amount to criminal trespass under § 30.05, we would be giving an absurd interpretation to the legislative intent behind the statute....