Home
Jacksonville Location Phone Call/Texting Policy How do Fees Work?
Criminal Defense DUI Defense Foreclosure Defense Copyright Workers Compensation Attorney Jacksonville Personal Injury Lawyer
Florida Statutes Georgia Code Jacksonville Accident Attorney Real Estate Attorney Jacksonville Florida Criminal Lawyer Jacksonville Notary Public
Menu
904-383-7448
Florida Statute 44.102 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 44.102 Case Law from Google Scholar
Statute is currently reporting as:
Link to State of Florida Official Statute Google Search for Amendments to 44.102

The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
Title V
JUDICIAL BRANCH
Chapter 44
MEDIATION ALTERNATIVES TO JUDICIAL ACTION
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 44.102
44.102 Court-ordered mediation.—
(1) Court-ordered mediation shall be conducted according to rules of practice and procedure adopted by the Supreme Court.
(2) A court, under rules adopted by the Supreme Court:
(a) Must, upon request of one party, refer to mediation any filed civil action for monetary damages, provided the requesting party is willing and able to pay the costs of the mediation or the costs can be equitably divided between the parties, unless:
1. The action is a landlord and tenant dispute that does not include a claim for personal injury.
2. The action is filed for the purpose of collecting a debt.
3. The action is a claim of medical malpractice.
4. The action is governed by the Florida Small Claims Rules.
5. The court determines that the action is proper for referral to nonbinding arbitration under this chapter.
6. The parties have agreed to binding arbitration.
7. The parties have agreed to an expedited trial pursuant to s. 45.075.
8. The parties have agreed to voluntary trial resolution pursuant to s. 44.104.
(b) May refer to mediation all or any part of a filed civil action for which mediation is not required under this section.
(c) In circuits in which a family mediation program has been established and upon a court finding of a dispute, shall refer to mediation all or part of custody, visitation, or other parental responsibility issues as defined in s. 61.13. Upon motion or request of a party, a court shall not refer any case to mediation if it finds there has been a history of domestic violence that would compromise the mediation process.
(d) In circuits in which a dependency or in need of services mediation program has been established, may refer to mediation all or any portion of a matter relating to dependency or to a child in need of services or a family in need of services.
(3) All written communications in a mediation proceeding, other than an executed settlement agreement, shall be exempt from the requirements of chapter 119.
(4) The chief judge of each judicial circuit shall maintain a list of mediators who have been certified by the Supreme Court and who have registered for appointment in that circuit.
(a) Whenever possible, qualified individuals who have volunteered their time to serve as mediators shall be appointed. If a mediation program is funded pursuant to s. 44.108, volunteer mediators shall be entitled to reimbursement pursuant to s. 112.061 for all actual expenses necessitated by service as a mediator.
(b) Nonvolunteer mediators shall be compensated according to rules adopted by the Supreme Court. If a mediation program is funded pursuant to s. 44.108, a mediator may be compensated by the county or by the parties.
(5)(a) When an action is referred to mediation by court order, the time periods for responding to an offer of settlement pursuant to s. 45.061, or to an offer or demand for judgment pursuant to s. 768.79, respectively, shall be tolled until:
1. An impasse has been declared by the mediator; or
2. The mediator has reported to the court that no agreement was reached.
(b) Sections 45.061 and 768.79 notwithstanding, an offer of settlement or an offer or demand for judgment may be made at any time after an impasse has been declared by the mediator, or the mediator has reported that no agreement was reached. An offer is deemed rejected as of commencement of trial.
History.—s. 2, ch. 87-173; s. 2, ch. 89-31; s. 2, ch. 90-188; s. 2, ch. 93-161; s. 10, ch. 94-134; s. 10, ch. 94-135; s. 44, ch. 94-164; s. 18, ch. 96-406; s. 2, ch. 97-155; s. 2, ch. 99-225; s. 2, ch. 2002-65; s. 1, ch. 2004-291; s. 31, ch. 2005-236.
Note.—Former s. 44.302.

F.S. 44.102 on Google Scholar

F.S. 44.102 on Casetext

Amendments to 44.102


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 44.102
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 44.102.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

10 Cases from Casetext:Date Descending

U.S. Supreme Court11th Cir. - Ct. App.11th Cir. - MD FL11th Cir. - ND FL11th Cir. - SD FLFed. Reg.Secondary Sources - All

  1. LP Graceville, LLC v. Odum

    335 So. 3d 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022)
    There is no overlap between an order compelling arbitration of a claim pursuant to section 682.03, Florida Statutes ; and a referral to mediation or arbitration under rules of civil procedure like 1.700. The statutory provisions of chapter 682 effectuate a policy that courts uphold and enforce contractual agreements to arbitrate. The mediation and arbitration rules are adjunct to the Legislature's separate policy in favor of voluntary dispute resolution, as set out in chapter 44, Florida Statutes. See, e.g. , § 44.102( 1), Fla. Stat. (providing for court-ordered mediation in accordance with "rules of practice and procedure adopted by the Supreme Court"); § 44.103(1) (providing for court-ordered, nonbinding arbitration in accordance with "rules of practice and procedure adopted by the Supreme Court"); cf. § 44.104, Fla. Stat. (providing for "voluntary binding arbitration" by written agreement, "in lieu of litigation," after a "civil dispute" has arisen). The two processes are mutually exclusive, so the trial court's referral to arbitration under rule 1.700 was in direct contravention of this court's mandate affirming its earlier order compelling arbitration and staying…

  2. Alvarez v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp.

    325 So. 3d 231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021)
    Section 44.102, Florida Statutes, permits a court to order parties to engage in mediation and provides that "[c]ourt-ordered mediation shall be conducted according to rules of practice and procedure adopted by the Supreme Court." Areizaga v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Hillsborough Cnty., 935 So. 2d 640, 643 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citation omitted). Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.720, governing mediation procedures, expressly authorizes the imposition of sanctions upon a party as a penalty for failing to appear at a duly noticed mediation conference. Fredericks v. Sturgis, 598 So. 2d 94, 96 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) ; Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.720(f).
    PAGE 234

  3. Brickell Fin. Servs. Motor Club v. Rd. Transp., LLC

    298 So. 3d 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 1 times
    At an evidentiary hearing on the motion to enforce settlement, the buyer objected to testimony regarding the parties’ mediation communications, based on section 44.102(3), Florida Statutes (2001), which then provided:
    PAGE 70

  4. Everglades Law Ctr. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist.

    290 So. 3d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 3 times
    The trial court relied on sections 44.405(1) and 44.102(3) as the statutory bases for exempting the Shade Meeting transcript from disclosure. Section 44.405(1) states: "(1) Except as provided in this section, all mediation communications shall be confidential . A mediation participant shall not disclose a mediation communication to a person other than another mediation participant or a participant's counsel ." § 44.405(1), Fla. Stat. (2017) (emphasis added). Section 44.102(3) states: "All written communications in a mediation proceeding, other than an executed settlement agreement, shall be exempt from the requirements of chapter 119." § 44.102(3), Fla. Stat. (2017) (emphasis added). Section 44.102(3) is a particularly key provision, since it expressly provides an exemption from chapter 119.
    PAGE 129

  5. Delisle v. Crane Co.

    258 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2018)   Cited 16 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution prohibits one branch of government from exercising any of the powers of the other branches. Further, article V, section 2(a) provides this Court the exclusive authority to "adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts." Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. The Legislature may only repeal the rules of this Court by "general law enacted by two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the legislature." Id. First, the amendment was not written to repeal Frye or Marsh but to overrule this Court's decision. See Fla. HB 7015, preamble (2013) (available at www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2013/7015) ("the Florida Legislature intends to prohibit in the courts of this state pure opinion testimony as provided in Marsh ...". The vote here did not meet the requirement. The House passed the bill with a majority, 70 to 41 (or 58.3% of the membership). The Senate passed the bill with more than the necessary two-thirds vote, 30 to 9 (or 75% of the membership). Id. We have previously found that the Legislature exceeded its authority in adopting statutes we found to infringe on the authority of this Court to determine matters of practice or…

  6. In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules for Certified & Court-Appointed Mediators

    202 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 2016)   Cited 2 times
    1995 Revision: The Committee believed the rule regarding confidentiality should be amended in deference to the 1993 amendment to section 44.102, Florida Statutes, that engrafted an exception to the general confidentiality requirement for all mediation sessions for the purpose of investigating complaints filed against mediators. Section 44.102(4)specifically provides that "the disclosure of an otherwise privileged communication shall be used only for the internal use of the body conducting the investigation" and that "[Prior] to the release of any disciplinary files to the public, all references to otherwise privileged communications shall be deleted from the record."
    PAGE 823

  7. Morejon v. F & M Real Estate, Inc.

    162 So. 3d 356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)
    ii. The presiding judge may sua sponte evaluate and determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a case should be referred to mediation in accordance with section 44.102, Florida Statutes and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.700(a).
    PAGE 359

  8. Toiberman v. Tisera

    998 So. 2d 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 5 times
    Sections 44.302 and 44.304, Florida Statutes, were later renumbered as sections 44.102 and 44.104, Florida Statutes, respectively.
    PAGE 6

  9. Massey v. David

    979 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 2008)   Cited 24 times
    Rather than providing for an award of fees, section 44.102(6) alters the time limits for making and accepting an offer of judgment. Section 44.102(6)(a) tolls the time periods of section 768.79 as incorporated into Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 from the date of the order of mediation until the mediation is complete. The result is that a party may have more than the thirty days required by section 768.79 and rule 1.442 to accept an offer. Section 44.102(6)(b) allows a party to make an offer of judgment after mediation ends. As a result, a party may have less than the thirty days required by section 768.79 and rule 1.442 to consider and accept an offer. We have held that the time limits for acceptance of an offer of judgment, like those provided in section 44.102(6), are procedural. Accordingly, we read section 44.102(6) as setting forth only procedural requirements.
    PAGE 939

  10. Areizaga v. Board of County Com'rs

    935 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 2 times
    Section 16.60 says nothing about when mediation is appropriate or required. It appears to concern disputes that have not reached the stage of a court action. The only requirement for mediation is contained in section 44.102, but that statute, similar to rule 3.852( l)(3), states that "[c]ourt-ordered mediation shall be conducted according to rules of practice and procedure adopted by the Supreme Court." § 44.102(1). In other words, the legislature implicitly stated that section 44.102 and rule 1.710(b) do not conflict but rather must be applied in harmony.
    PAGE 643

    Cases from cite.case.law:

    DELISLE, v. CRANE CO., 258 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2018)

    . . . Likewise, we found the time requirements established by the Legislature in section 44.102, Florida Statutes . . .

    In AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT- APPOINTED MEDIATORS, 202 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 2016)

    . . . the-rule regarding-.confidentiality should be -amended in deference--to- the 1993 amendment- -to section 44.102 . . . mediation-- sessions- for the pur-pose-of-in-vestigating complaints-filed against media-ter&—Section 44.102 . . . the rule regarding confidentiality should be amended in deference to the 1993 amendment to section 44.102 . . . Section 44.102(4) specifically provides that “the disclosure of an otherwise privileged communication . . .

    I. MOREJON L. v. F M REAL ESTATE, INC. N. A., 162 So. 3d 356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

    . . . cases, including referral of cases to mediation on a case-by-case basis in accordance with section 44.102 . . . on a case by case basis, whether the case should be referred to mediation in accordance with section 44.102 . . . on a case-by-case basis, whether a case should be referred to mediation in accordance with section 44.102 . . .

    A. TOIBERMAN, v. J. TISERA,, 998 So. 2d 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

    . . . Sections 44.302 and 44.304, Florida Statutes, were later renumbered as sections 44.102 and 44.104, Florida . . .

    MASSEY, v. F. DAVID,, 979 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 2008)

    . . . The court stated “[rjather than providing for an award of fees, section 44.102(6) alters the time limits . . . Therefore, in finding the statute unconstitutional, the Kneal-ing court was persuaded by section 44.102 . . . Id. at 595-96 (quoting § 44.102, Fla. Stat. (1993)). . . . Section 44.102(6)(b) allows a party to make an offer of judgment after mediation ends. . . . Accordingly, we read section 44.102(6) as setting forth only procedural requirements. . . .

    AREIZAGA, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY,, 935 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

    . . . Section 44.102(2)(a) and (b) set forth the circumstances under which courts are required to or merely . . . The only requirement for mediation is contained in section 44.102, but that statute, similar to rule . . . mediation shall be conducted according to rules of practice and procedure adopted by the Supreme Court.” § 44.102 . . . In other words, the legislature implicitly stated that section 44.102 and rule 1.710(b) do not conflict . . .

    BRANDSMART U. S. A. OF WEST PALM BEACH, INC. v. DR LAKES, INC. a M., 901 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

    . . . In an earlier appeal of this case, we held that the settlement privilege contained in section 44.102( . . .

    YACHT CLUB SOUTHEASTERN, INC. v. SUNSET HARBOUR NORTH CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., 843 So. 2d 917 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

    . . . Relying on section 44.102(3), Florida Statutes (2001), the Sunset Association moved for sanctions, complaining . . . Section 44.102(3), Florida Statutes (2001), reads in pertinent part: “Each party involved in a court-ordered . . . Section 44.102(3) grants a privilege to “each party involved in a mediation proceeding” to refuse to . . . As a result it is clear that it was not a violation of section 44.102(3) for the developer to have disclosed . . .

    FELDMAN, v. KRITCH, 824 So. 2d 274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

    . . . claims that the trial court exceeded its authority in considering evidence in violation of section 44.102 . . . See § 44.102(3), Fla. Stat. (2000); DR Lakes, Inc. v. . . .

    DR LAKES INC. a M. v. BRANDSMART U. S. A. OF WEST PALM BEACH, a, 819 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

    . . . settlement, buyer objected to any testimony as to what occurred at the mediation hearing based on section 44.102 . . . There is, of course, no confidentiality as to “an executed settlement agreement.” § 44.102(3). . . .

    OGLESBY- DORMINEY v. LUCY HO S RESTAURANT LUCY HO S BAMBOO GARDEN, INC., 815 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

    . . . Specifically, in Knealing, we found that section 44.102, Florida Statutes (1993), which only altered . . .

    ESTATE OF CORT, v. BROWARD COUNTY SHERIFF, 807 So. 2d 736 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

    . . . In Knealing, the supreme court found section 44.102(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), which allows a party . . . The court stated “[rjather than providing for an award of fees, section 44.102(6) alters the time limits . . . Therefore, in finding the statute unconstitutional, the Knealing court was persuaded by section 44.102 . . . The court held that it could not apply that reasoning to section 44.102(6) because of its purely procedural . . .

    VITAKIS- VALCHINE, v. L. VALCHINE,, 793 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

    . . . See § 44.102(2), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . . See § 44.102(3)-(4), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 44.102(1). . . .

    ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY, v. JONES,, 789 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 2001)

    . . . Disclosing this information was in violation of section 44.102(3), Florida Statutes (2000) , which makes . . . The petitioner further argued that “section 44.102(3) establishes an unavoidable presumption of contamination . . . Section 44.102(3) does in fact give each party to the mediation the privilege to refuse to disclose and . . . Section 44.102(3) reads as follows: Each party involved in a court-ordered mediation proceeding has a . . .

    AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 773 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2000)

    . . . This rule was amended to reconcile, where possible, sections 44.102(6) (formerly 44.102(5)(b)), 45.061 . . . The reporting requirements are intended to ensure the confidentiality provided for in section 44.102( . . .

    GRIP DEVELOPMENT, INC. v. COLDWELL BANKER RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE, INC., 788 So. 2d 262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

    . . . Specifically, in Knealing, we found that section 44.102, Florida Statutes (1993), which only altered . . .

    NEUNZIG, v. CORNETT,, 761 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

    . . . hearing petitioner’s underlying motion, the trial court properly referred it to mediation, see section 44.102 . . .

    C S CHEMICALS, INC. v. D. McDOUGALD,, 754 So. 2d 795 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

    . . . $125,000 demand for judgment (the 1996 demand) on Perry, C & S, and Ryder jointly, pursuant to sections 44.102 . . .

    IN RE AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT- APPOINTED MEDIATORS, 762 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2000)

    . . . the rule regarding confidentiality should be amended in deference to the 1993 amendment to section 44.102 . . . Section 44.102(4) specifically provides that “the disclosure of an otherwise privileged communication . . .

    ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY, v. JONES,, 750 So. 2d 114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

    . . . See section 44.102(3), Florida Statutes (1999), which provides in pertinent part: Each party involved . . .

    CSR PARTNERSHIP, a C. d b a s v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 741 So. 2d 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

    . . . In the committee notes, it states that rule 1.442 was amended to reconcile, where possible, sections 44.102 . . . (6) (formerly 44.102(5)(b)), 45.061, 78.082, and 768.89, Florida Statutes, and the decisions of the Florida . . .

    CITY OF DELRAY BEACH, v. KEISER,, 699 So. 2d 855 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

    . . . This much is made abundantly clear to me by subsection (b) of section 44.102, which states: “Sections . . . See § 44.102, Fla. Stat. (1995). . See Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.700-1.750. . . . .

    PARANZINO, v. BARNETT BANK OF SOUTH FLORIDA, N. A., 690 So. 2d 725 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

    . . . prejudice was an unduly harsh sanction for a violation of the non-disclosure requirements of section 44.102 . . . confidentiality stipulation, and that the acts of appellant ran “afoul of the statutory language of Fla.Stat. 44.102 . . . Section 44.102(3), Florida Statutes (1993), provides in relevant part: Each party involved in a court-ordered . . . Section 44.102(3) not only provides that communications in a mediation proceeding shall be confidential . . .

    E. MURPHY v. D. TUCKER,, 689 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

    . . . The offer of judgment was purportedly made pursuant to section 44.102, Florida Statutes (1995). . . . Puleo, 675 So.2d 593 (Fla.1996), the Florida Supreme Court declared section 44.102 unconstitutional. . . . In doing so, it noted that section 44.102 did not provide a substantive basis for an award of fees; it . . . 45.061, or an offer or demand for judgment pursuant to s. 768.79, respectively, shall be tolled _ § 44.102 . . .

    GULLIVER ACADEMY, INC. v. BODEK, 694 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1997)

    . . . Specifically, in Knealing, we found that section 44.102, Florida Statutes (1993), which only altered . . .

    In AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 682 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1996)

    . . . This rule was amended to reconcile, where possible, sections 44.102(6) (formerly 44.102(5)(b)), 45.061 . . .

    HEDERGOTT, v. MOON L., 678 So. 2d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

    . . . impasse on April 13, 1995, and on the next day, the Moons made an offer of judgment “pursuant to § 44.102 . . . (1989), allowed a party thirty days to accept the offer, no such time limitation appears in section 44.102 . . . In Knealing, an offer of judgment was served eleven days prior to trial, pursuant to section 44.102(6 . . . In holding section 44.102(6) unconstitutional, the Florida Supreme Court stated, “Based on our conclusion . . . that section 44.102(6) is unconstitutional, we hold that an offer of judgment made after an unsuccessful . . .

    KNEALING, v. PULEO J., 675 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1996)

    . . . certified the following question to be of great public importance: DO THE TIME REQUIREMENTS IN SECTION 44.102 . . . The district court’s question is based upon its conclusion that section 44.102(6)(b) enlarges the time . . . Section 44.102(6)(b) allows a party to make an offer of judgment after mediation ends. . . . Accordingly, we read section 44.102(6) as setting forth only procedural requirements. . . . section 44.102(6)(a) violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. . . .

    DYNASTY EXPRESS CORPORATION d b a A- v. T. WEISS,, 675 So. 2d 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

    . . . defendant served upon plaintiff an offer of judgment in the amount of $270,000 pursuant to section 44.102 . . . motion was denied and this appeal followed. / Defendant’s offer of judgment was made pursuant to section 44.102 . . . The provisions of section 768.79, Florida Statutes, are applicable to offers made pursuant to section 44.102 . . .

    ONG v. MIKE GUIDO PROPERTIES,, 668 So. 2d 708 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

    . . . Specifically, the Ongs argued (1) that pursuant to the terms of section 44.102(6)(a), the thirty-day . . . He maintains that, by enacting section 44.102(6)(a), the legislature unconstitutionally infringed upon . . . We must first determine whether Guido is correct that the tolling provisions of section 44.102(6)(a) . . . Applying these definitions, we conclude that section 44.102(6)(a)’s tolling provision is intended to . . . Section 44.102(5), Florida Statutes (1991) was later renumbered 44.102(6), Florida Statutes (1993), but . . .

    In AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT- APPOINTED MEDIATORS, 661 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1995)

    . . . the rule regarding confidentiality should be amended in deference to the 1993 amendment to section 44.102 . . . Section 44.102(4) specifically provides that “the disclosure of an otherwise privileged communication . . .

    PULEO J. v. KNEALING,, 654 So. 2d 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

    . . . The issues concern, in ter alia, the relationship between sections 44.102 and 768.79, Florida Statutes . . . However, section 44.102, Florida Statutes (1993) (Court-ordered mediation), provides in pertinent part . . . We hold that by specifically referencing section 768.79 in section 44.102(6), the legislature left no . . . The provisions of section 768.79 and section 44.102(6)(b) are, in fact, consistent with one another in . . . was error for the trial court to determine that the Púleos’ offer was untimely, based upon section 44.102 . . .

    R. McKINLAY, v. R. McKINLAY, a k a, 648 So. 2d 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

    . . . Second, the court relied on section 44.302(2), Florida Statutes (1989) [subsequently renumbered § 44.102 . . .

    GORDON, v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES LTD., 641 So. 2d 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

    . . . . § 44.102(3) and that pursuant to Fla. . . . Fla.Stat. § 44.102(3) provides that: Each party involved in a court-ordered mediation proceeding has . . .

    WRIGHT, v. T. CARUANA,, 640 So. 2d 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

    . . . Our conclusion here is not altered by Florida Statutes Section 44.102(5)(b), (1991), which provides: . . . offeror failed to inform offeree at time it served its demand for judgment that it intended to rely on § 44.102 . . . Since the Caruanas’ offer did not indicate an intent to rely on § 44.102(5)(b), they may not now benefit . . . This subsection is now § 44.102(6)(b). . . .

    KLOSTER CRUISE, LTD. v. HUGGETT,, 631 So. 2d 383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

    . . . Section 44.102(3), Fla.Stat. (1989); Robbie v. City of Miami, 469 So.2d 1384 (Fla.1985); Izadi v. . . .

    NORDYNE, INC. v. FLORIDA MOBILE HOME SUPPLY, INC., 625 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

    . . . None of the demands for judgment served by FMHS on Nordyne referred to section 44.102. . . . Section 44.102(5)(b), which was added to a statute dealing with court-ordered mediation effective October . . . To the extent that section 44.102(5)(b) purports to amend both section 45.061 and section 768.79, it . . . We believe that section 44.102(5)(b) likewise intrudes upon the rulemaking power of the judicial branch . . . Accordingly, in our opinion, the provisions of section 44.102(5)(b) must yield to those of section 768.79 . . .

    COHEN, v. COHEN,, 609 So. 2d 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . Hudson, 600 So.2d 7 (Pla. 4th DCA 1992); § 44.102(3), Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

    L. FABBER, v. D. WESSEL,, 604 So. 2d 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . Section 44.102(3), Florida Statutes (1991), contains the following: Notwithstanding the provisions of . . . the disclosure itself, but argues essentially that the mere act of disclosure or violation of section 44.102 . . .

    CHABAD HOUSE- LUBAVITCH OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, INC. v. BANKS, 602 So. 2d 670 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . Section 44.102(3), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1990). . . .

    M. EVANS, v. STATE, 603 So. 2d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . Professional Conduct for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators, 604 So.2d 764, 768 (Fla.1992); § 44.102 . . .

    PROPOSED STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT- APPOINTED MEDIATORS, 604 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1992)

    . . . Statutory References § 44.102(3), Fla.Stat. §§ 90.501-510, Fla.Stat. . . .

    H. HUDSON, v. P. HUDSON,, 600 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . Section 44.102(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), the statutory court-ordered mediation provision, provides . . .

    FREDERICKS, v. E. STURGIS, J., 598 So. 2d 94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . SANCTIONS Section 44.102, Florida Statutes, permits a court to order parties to engage in mediation. . . .