The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . Likewise, we found the time requirements established by the Legislature in section 44.102, Florida Statutes . . .
. . . the-rule regarding-.confidentiality should be -amended in deference--to- the 1993 amendment- -to section 44.102 . . . mediation-- sessions- for the pur-pose-of-in-vestigating complaints-filed against media-ter&—Section 44.102 . . . the rule regarding confidentiality should be amended in deference to the 1993 amendment to section 44.102 . . . Section 44.102(4) specifically provides that “the disclosure of an otherwise privileged communication . . .
. . . cases, including referral of cases to mediation on a case-by-case basis in accordance with section 44.102 . . . on a case by case basis, whether the case should be referred to mediation in accordance with section 44.102 . . . on a case-by-case basis, whether a case should be referred to mediation in accordance with section 44.102 . . .
. . . Sections 44.302 and 44.304, Florida Statutes, were later renumbered as sections 44.102 and 44.104, Florida . . .
. . . The court stated “[rjather than providing for an award of fees, section 44.102(6) alters the time limits . . . Therefore, in finding the statute unconstitutional, the Kneal-ing court was persuaded by section 44.102 . . . Id. at 595-96 (quoting § 44.102, Fla. Stat. (1993)). . . . Section 44.102(6)(b) allows a party to make an offer of judgment after mediation ends. . . . Accordingly, we read section 44.102(6) as setting forth only procedural requirements. . . .
. . . Section 44.102(2)(a) and (b) set forth the circumstances under which courts are required to or merely . . . The only requirement for mediation is contained in section 44.102, but that statute, similar to rule . . . mediation shall be conducted according to rules of practice and procedure adopted by the Supreme Court.” § 44.102 . . . In other words, the legislature implicitly stated that section 44.102 and rule 1.710(b) do not conflict . . .
. . . In an earlier appeal of this case, we held that the settlement privilege contained in section 44.102( . . .
. . . Relying on section 44.102(3), Florida Statutes (2001), the Sunset Association moved for sanctions, complaining . . . Section 44.102(3), Florida Statutes (2001), reads in pertinent part: “Each party involved in a court-ordered . . . Section 44.102(3) grants a privilege to “each party involved in a mediation proceeding” to refuse to . . . As a result it is clear that it was not a violation of section 44.102(3) for the developer to have disclosed . . .
. . . claims that the trial court exceeded its authority in considering evidence in violation of section 44.102 . . . See § 44.102(3), Fla. Stat. (2000); DR Lakes, Inc. v. . . .
. . . settlement, buyer objected to any testimony as to what occurred at the mediation hearing based on section 44.102 . . . There is, of course, no confidentiality as to “an executed settlement agreement.” § 44.102(3). . . .
. . . Specifically, in Knealing, we found that section 44.102, Florida Statutes (1993), which only altered . . .
. . . In Knealing, the supreme court found section 44.102(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), which allows a party . . . The court stated “[rjather than providing for an award of fees, section 44.102(6) alters the time limits . . . Therefore, in finding the statute unconstitutional, the Knealing court was persuaded by section 44.102 . . . The court held that it could not apply that reasoning to section 44.102(6) because of its purely procedural . . .
. . . See § 44.102(2), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . . See § 44.102(3)-(4), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 44.102(1). . . .
. . . Disclosing this information was in violation of section 44.102(3), Florida Statutes (2000), which makes . . . The petitioner further argued that “section 44.102(3) establishes an unavoidable presumption of contamination . . . Section 44.102(3) does in fact give each party to the mediation the privilege to refuse to disclose and . . . Section 44.102(3) reads as follows: Each party involved in a court-ordered mediation proceeding has a . . .
. . . This rule was amended to reconcile, where possible, sections 44.102(6) (formerly 44.102(5)(b)), 45.061 . . . The reporting requirements are intended to ensure the confidentiality provided for in section 44.102( . . .
. . . Specifically, in Knealing, we found that section 44.102, Florida Statutes (1993), which only altered . . .
. . . hearing petitioner’s underlying motion, the trial court properly referred it to mediation, see section 44.102 . . .
. . . $125,000 demand for judgment (the 1996 demand) on Perry, C & S, and Ryder jointly, pursuant to sections 44.102 . . .
. . . the rule regarding confidentiality should be amended in deference to the 1993 amendment to section 44.102 . . . Section 44.102(4) specifically provides that “the disclosure of an otherwise privileged communication . . .
. . . See section 44.102(3), Florida Statutes (1999), which provides in pertinent part: Each party involved . . .
. . . In the committee notes, it states that rule 1.442 was amended to reconcile, where possible, sections 44.102 . . . (6) (formerly 44.102(5)(b)), 45.061, 78.082, and 768.89, Florida Statutes, and the decisions of the Florida . . .
. . . This much is made abundantly clear to me by subsection (b) of section 44.102, which states: “Sections . . . See § 44.102, Fla. Stat. (1995). . See Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.700-1.750. . . . .
. . . prejudice was an unduly harsh sanction for a violation of the non-disclosure requirements of section 44.102 . . . confidentiality stipulation, and that the acts of appellant ran “afoul of the statutory language of Fla.Stat. 44.102 . . . Section 44.102(3), Florida Statutes (1993), provides in relevant part: Each party involved in a court-ordered . . . Section 44.102(3) not only provides that communications in a mediation proceeding shall be confidential . . .
. . . The offer of judgment was purportedly made pursuant to section 44.102, Florida Statutes (1995). . . . Puleo, 675 So.2d 593 (Fla.1996), the Florida Supreme Court declared section 44.102 unconstitutional. . . . In doing so, it noted that section 44.102 did not provide a substantive basis for an award of fees; it . . . 45.061, or an offer or demand for judgment pursuant to s. 768.79, respectively, shall be tolled _ § 44.102 . . .
. . . Specifically, in Knealing, we found that section 44.102, Florida Statutes (1993), which only altered . . .
. . . This rule was amended to reconcile, where possible, sections 44.102(6) (formerly 44.102(5)(b)), 45.061 . . .
. . . impasse on April 13, 1995, and on the next day, the Moons made an offer of judgment “pursuant to § 44.102 . . . (1989), allowed a party thirty days to accept the offer, no such time limitation appears in section 44.102 . . . In Knealing, an offer of judgment was served eleven days prior to trial, pursuant to section 44.102(6 . . . In holding section 44.102(6) unconstitutional, the Florida Supreme Court stated, “Based on our conclusion . . . that section 44.102(6) is unconstitutional, we hold that an offer of judgment made after an unsuccessful . . .
. . . certified the following question to be of great public importance: DO THE TIME REQUIREMENTS IN SECTION 44.102 . . . The district court’s question is based upon its conclusion that section 44.102(6)(b) enlarges the time . . . Section 44.102(6)(b) allows a party to make an offer of judgment after mediation ends. . . . Accordingly, we read section 44.102(6) as setting forth only procedural requirements. . . . section 44.102(6)(a) violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. . . .
. . . defendant served upon plaintiff an offer of judgment in the amount of $270,000 pursuant to section 44.102 . . . motion was denied and this appeal followed. / Defendant’s offer of judgment was made pursuant to section 44.102 . . . The provisions of section 768.79, Florida Statutes, are applicable to offers made pursuant to section 44.102 . . .
. . . Specifically, the Ongs argued (1) that pursuant to the terms of section 44.102(6)(a), the thirty-day . . . He maintains that, by enacting section 44.102(6)(a), the legislature unconstitutionally infringed upon . . . We must first determine whether Guido is correct that the tolling provisions of section 44.102(6)(a) . . . Applying these definitions, we conclude that section 44.102(6)(a)’s tolling provision is intended to . . . Section 44.102(5), Florida Statutes (1991) was later renumbered 44.102(6), Florida Statutes (1993), but . . .
. . . the rule regarding confidentiality should be amended in deference to the 1993 amendment to section 44.102 . . . Section 44.102(4) specifically provides that “the disclosure of an otherwise privileged communication . . .
. . . The issues concern, inter alia, the relationship between sections 44.102 and 768.79, Florida Statutes . . . However, section 44.102, Florida Statutes (1993) (Court-ordered mediation), provides in pertinent part . . . We hold that by specifically referencing section 768.79 in section 44.102(6), the legislature left no . . . The provisions of section 768.79 and section 44.102(6)(b) are, in fact, consistent with one another in . . . was error for the trial court to determine that the Púleos’ offer was untimely, based upon section 44.102 . . .
. . . Second, the court relied on section 44.302(2), Florida Statutes (1989) [subsequently renumbered § 44.102 . . .
. . . . § 44.102(3) and that pursuant to Fla. . . . Fla.Stat. § 44.102(3) provides that: Each party involved in a court-ordered mediation proceeding has . . .
. . . Our conclusion here is not altered by Florida Statutes Section 44.102(5)(b), (1991), which provides: . . . offeror failed to inform offeree at time it served its demand for judgment that it intended to rely on § 44.102 . . . Since the Caruanas’ offer did not indicate an intent to rely on § 44.102(5)(b), they may not now benefit . . . This subsection is now § 44.102(6)(b). . . .
. . . Section 44.102(3), Fla.Stat. (1989); Robbie v. City of Miami, 469 So.2d 1384 (Fla.1985); Izadi v. . . .
. . . None of the demands for judgment served by FMHS on Nordyne referred to section 44.102. . . . Section 44.102(5)(b), which was added to a statute dealing with court-ordered mediation effective October . . . To the extent that section 44.102(5)(b) purports to amend both section 45.061 and section 768.79, it . . . We believe that section 44.102(5)(b) likewise intrudes upon the rulemaking power of the judicial branch . . . Accordingly, in our opinion, the provisions of section 44.102(5)(b) must yield to those of section 768.79 . . .
. . . Hudson, 600 So.2d 7 (Pla. 4th DCA 1992); § 44.102(3), Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .
. . . Section 44.102(3), Florida Statutes (1991), contains the following: Notwithstanding the provisions of . . . the disclosure itself, but argues essentially that the mere act of disclosure or violation of section 44.102 . . .
. . . Section 44.102(3), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1990). . . .
. . . Professional Conduct for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators, 604 So.2d 764, 768 (Fla.1992); § 44.102 . . .
. . . Statutory References § 44.102(3), Fla.Stat. §§ 90.501-510, Fla.Stat. . . .
. . . Section 44.102(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), the statutory court-ordered mediation provision, provides . . .
. . . SANCTIONS Section 44.102, Florida Statutes, permits a court to order parties to engage in mediation. . . .