The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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However, once a court has made an initial child custody determination under section 61.514, that court has "exclusive, continuing jurisdiction" over the determination until:Along these lines, Florida law treats the establishment of a parenting plan, (which of course includes a time-sharing schedule) as being equivalent to a custody determination. See § 61.046(14)(c), Fla. Stat. (defining "parenting plan" and stating that an "order incorporating a parenting plan under this part is a child custody determination under part II of this chapter," the UCCJEA). "The subject matter involved in the question of custody of minor children is the children themselves ...." Dorman v. Friendly, 1 So.2d 734, 736 (Fla. 1941). Once the circuit court acquires jurisdiction over the child in a dispute over custody issues, then, the child "is the ward of the court," and the court's "first consideration to be observed is the welfare of the child[]." Id. The circuit court undoubtedly had jurisdiction over both C.S. and the petition filed by Miller. See § 61.514( 1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (outlining, as part of the UCCJEA, the exclusive means by which a circuit court can establish "jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination," based on the child's home state); see also § 61.503(4), (7), (8), Fla. Stat. (defining "child custody proceeding," "home state," and… The Father argues the trial court erred in dismissing his petition because the minor child's "habitual residence" was Florida within six months preceding his petition as the Mother and minor child's move to Michigan was merely a temporary absence. Section 61.514 "is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this state." § 61.514(2), Fla. Stat. Section 61.514(1)(a) provides Florida has jurisdiction over a child custody action if Florida was the home state of the minor child on the date the petition was filed or was the home state of the minor child within six months before the petition was filed. See § 61.514(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Section 61.503(7) defines a minor child's home state as "the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least 6 consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding." § 61.503(7), Fla. Stat. Section 61.503(7) further states a "period of temporary absence" is included in the relevant six-month period, but a period of temporary absence is not defined.If there is no previous child custody determination that is entitled to be enforced under this part, and a child custody proceeding has not been commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under ss. 61.514 – 61.516, a child custody determination made under this section remains in effect until an order is obtained from a court of a state having jurisdiction under ss. 61.514 – 61.516. If a child custody proceeding has not been or is not commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under ss. 61.514 – 61.516, a child custody determination made under this section becomes a final determination if it so provides and this state becomes the home state of the child.Section 61.514 sets forth the provisions regarding a court's initial child custody jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. Section 61.514(1)(a) states:Section 61.514(1) provides the circumstances under which "a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination." Relevant to this case, a Florida court has jurisdiction to make such a determination only ifIn 2002, the Florida Legislature adopted provisions of the UCCJEA, as codified in chapter 61, Florida Statutes. See Steckler v. Steckler, 921 So. 2d 740, 742 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). Pursuant to the initial child custody provision of the UCCJEA, as set forth in section 61.514, Florida Statutes, jurisdiction to determine initial custody matters is vested in the "home state" of the child. Arjona v. Torres, 941 So. 2d 451, 454 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). "Home state" is defined as "the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least [six] consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding." § 61.503(7), Fla. Stat. In computing the requisite six-month period, "[a] ... temporary absence of [a parent or person acting as a parent] is part of the period." Id.; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-54 (West). Moreover, "[t]he state with home state jurisdiction over the child has [jurisdictional] priority under the UCCJEA." Baker v. Tunney, 201 So. 3d 1235, 1237 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) ; see also § 61.514, Fla. Stat.; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-65 (West).We also affirm the trial court's ruling on its personal jurisdiction over Edwards, although its ultimate rationale was flawed. See Butler v. Yusem , 44 So. 3d 102, 105 (Fla. 2010) (stating that under tipsy coachman doctrine, appellate court may affirm trial court's decision where it "reaches the right result, but for the wrong reason"). The trial court correctly noted that it did not need personal jurisdiction over Edwards to make an initial custody determination over the child. See § 61.514( 3), Fla. Stat. (2020). But the trial court erroneously concluded that Edwards sought affirmative relief in her pro se answer. If a litigant requests affirmative relief in her responsive pleading, then she consents to personal jurisdiction. See id . § 48.193(4); Mason v. Hunton , 816 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Florida's longarm statute describes affirmative relief as "causes of action unrelated to the transaction forming the basis of the plaintiff's claim." § 48.193(4), Fla. Stat.; see Sampson Farm Ltd. P'ship v. Parmenter , 238 So. 3d 387, 391–92 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). The conditions Edwards outlined to provide her acceptance to Codrington's proposed parenting plan did not… Because the circuit court did not comply with section 61.528 by giving the former husband notice, the ex parte order domesticating the North Carolina order is void. See Renovaship, Inc. v. Quatremain , 208 So. 3d 280, 285 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) ("The general principle of law is well-settled: a final judgment entered without adequate notice of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard is void." (footnote omitted)). Accordingly, the circuit court should have granted the former husband's motion to vacate the ex parte order. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)(4) (providing that a court may relieve a party from a final order that is void). We reverse the order denying the former husband's motion to vacate and remand with directions for the circuit court to vacate the ex parte order and comply with the procedure required by section 61.528. On remand, the former husband will have an opportunity to challenge the North Carolina court's jurisdiction under sections 61.514 through 61.523.In the present case, the circuit court found that it lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJEA because Florida was not the child's home state. We agree with the circuit court that Mr. Stone did not allege sufficient facts to establish that Florida was the child's home state under sections 61.503(7) and 61.514( 1)(a). At the time Mr. Stone filed his custody proceeding in Florida on September 9, 2019, he and his family had been living in Japan for the preceding ten months. However, we note that the UCCJEA grants several exceptions to the home state jurisdictional requirement, such as when a court of another state does not have jurisdiction or has declined to exercise its jurisdiction. See § 61.514( 1)(c), (d) ; see also, e.g., Hindle, 33 So. 3d at 785 (holding that under the UCCJEA the Florida court had subject matter jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination even though Florida was not the child's home state where the mother and the child had lived in several states in the six months prior to their arrival in Florida and the commencement of the paternity action and no other state had jurisdiction); Arjona, 941 So. 2d at 455 (noting that Florida could… . . . Pursuant to the initial child custody jurisdiction provision of the UCCJEA, codified in section 61.514 . . . Tunney, 201 So. 3d 1235, 1237 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (citation omitted); see also § 61.514, Fla. . . .
. . . or a child custody determination has been made by, a court of a state having jurisdiction under ss. 61.514 . . .
. . . See §61.514(1), Fla. Stat; §61.516, Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . established a Florida residency for the parties or their children under sections 61.021, 61.503(4), and 61.514 . . . Lande, 2 So.3d 378, 381 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); then citing § 61.514(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010))). . . .
. . . jurisdiction to determine custody matters is generally limited to the “home state” of the child, § 61.514 . . .
. . . .” § 61.514, Fla. Stat. (2016). . . .
. . . .” § 61.514(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in paragraph (a), paragraph (b), or paragraph (c). § 61.514 . . . See §§ 61.514, 61.520, Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .
. . . original jurisdiction over the minor children listed below under the [UCCJEA] ... specifically, section 61.514 . . . Order, citing sections 61.514 and 61.519, Florida Statutes (2013), and arguing that the trial court did . . . Perhaps the trial court may have incorrectly applied the “home state” rule based on section 61.514, Florida . . . absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state. § 61.514 . . . Since section 61.519 expressly states that the court may not exercise jurisdiction under sections 61.514 . . .
. . . Barnes, 124 So.3d 994, 996 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (recognizing home state jurisdiction under § 61.514(l) . . .
. . . That statute provides that “a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under ss. 61.514- . . .
. . . . § 61.514(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011); see also Lande v. Lande, 2 So.3d 378, 381 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). . . . This court has concluded that “section 61.514(l)(a) permits the exercise of home state jurisdiction if . . .
. . . However, even if the trial court did have jurisdiction pursuant to section 61.514, Florida Statutes, . . .
. . . vested with subject matter jurisdiction to hear child custody matters when the requirements of section 61.514 . . . Under section 61.514(l)(a), a circuit court has jurisdiction if this state is the child’s home state. . . . determination if 1) the court would have jurisdiction to make an initial determination under section 61.514 . . . otherwise provided in s. 61.517, a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under ss. 61.514 . . .
. . . F.S. 61.514(l)(a) is also applicable. . . . Section 61.514 “unequivocally limits jurisdiction to determine initial custody matters (except for temporary . . . Section 61.514(1) states as follows: (1) Except as otherwise provided in s. 61.517 [the section dealing . . . The language in the jurisdiction provision of section 61.514(l)(a), which provides for jurisdiction at . . . appears to touch upon this issue in the third paragraph of its order, the court references section 61.514 . . .
. . . Analysis We turn first to the “[ijnitial child custody jurisdiction” issue as outlined in section 61.514 . . .
. . . .” § 61.514(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . . Statutes provides, in pertinent part: A court of this state which is exercising jurisdiction under ss. 61.514 . . .
. . . Lande, 2 So.3d 378, 381 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); see also § 61.514(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .
. . . See § 61.514(2), Fla. . . . have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in paragraph (a), paragraph (b), or paragraph (c). § 61.514 . . . Home State Analysis We begin our analysis with section 61.514(l)(a), Florida Statutes, which provides . . . We believe this reasoning is sound and thus hold that section 61.514(l)(a) permits the exercise of home . . .
. . . However, at issue in this appeal is the trial court’s application of section 61.514 to the facts presented . . . This record supports the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to sections 61.514(l)(a), 61.514 . . . The UCCJEA defines a Florida court's jurisdiction over child custody determinations thusly: 61.514 Initial . . . live in this state; (b) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under paragraph (a) ... § 61.514 . . .
. . . .” § 61.514(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . . home state jurisdictional requirement when “[a] court of another state does not have jurisdiction § 61.514 . . . in the six months prior to their arrival in Florida and the commencement of the paternity action. § 61.514 . . . As a result, because no court of any other state would have had jurisdiction under section 61.514, the . . . As this paternity action was commenced in November 2003, the applicable statute is section 61.514, Florida . . .
. . . Accordingly, under section 61.514, Florida Statutes (2008), of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction . . .
. . . another state unless a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under s. 61.514 . . . jurisdiction is that “a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under s. 61.514 . . . Therefore, section 61.514(l)(a) is satisfied. . . . as otherwise provided in s. 61.517,a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under ss. 61.514 . . . that would have given a Florida court jurisdiction jo make an initial determination (under section 61.514 . . .
. . . See § 61.514(3), Fla. Stat. (2008); Brulte v. Brulte, 967 So.2d 1087 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). . . .
. . . and the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter”); § 61.514 . . . See § 61.514(l)(a), Fla. . . .
. . . determination if Florida “is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding,” § 61.514 . . . children’s “home state,” section 61.519, prohibits Florida from exercising its jurisdiction under section 61.514 . . . child has already commenced in another state having jurisdiction in substantial conformity with section 61.514 . . . provides in relevant part: (1) [A] court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under ss. 61.514 . . . Section 61.514 provides: (1)Except as otherwise provided in s. 61.517, a court of this state has jurisdiction . . .
. . . a child custody determination because Florida was not the child’s home state, as defined in section 61.514 . . . See § 61.514, Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .
. . . modify a child custody decree unless it had jurisdiction to make an initial determination under section 61.514 . . . Florida cannot exercise jurisdiction under any of the provisions of section 61.514. . . .
. . . another state unless a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under s. 61.514 . . . Although section 61.516 also authorizes modification if Florida has initial jurisdiction under section 61.514 . . . They provide: 61.514 Initial child custody jurisdiction.- (1) Except as otherwise provided in s. 61.517 . . .
. . . See § 61.514(3), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . .
. . . Section 61.514, titled “Initial child custody jurisdiction,” provides in relevant part: (1) Except as . . . Rather, Alabama had jurisdiction to make the initial custody determination pursuant to section 61.514 . . . See § 61.514(1).(a). . . . child custody proceeding has not been commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under ss. 61.514 . . . remains in effect until an order is obtained from a court of a state having jurisdiction under ss. 61.514 . . .
. . . that would have given a Florida court jurisdiction to make an initial determination (under section 61.514 . . . determines that the child [and] the child’s parents ... do not presently reside in the other state”); § 61.514 . . .
. . . Section 61.514, Florida Statutes (2005), of the UCCJEA, unequivocally limits jurisdiction to determine . . . Section 61.514, Florida Statutes (2005), provides as follows: Initial child custody jurisdiction.— (1 . . . Section 61.514 of the UCCJEA provides that, except under limited exceptions, Florida has jurisdiction . . . ,” due, in part, to the “significant connections” that the child and one parent has with Florida. § 61.514 . . . See § 61.514(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005); see also Nesa v. . . .
. . . We conclude that, under sections 61.514, 61.515 and 61.516, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine . . .
. . . no longer had jurisdiction over the issue of child support (apparently based on sections 61.515 and 61.514 . . .
. . . See § 61.514, Fla. Stat.; Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-6-216. . . .
. . . further provides, in pertinent part: A court of this state which is exercising jurisdiction under §§ 61.514 . . . acting as a parent no longer reside in the state that issued the initial custody determination); § 61.514 . . .
. . . Father argues that, under the UCCJA, section 61.514, Florida Statutes, prior to exercising jurisdiction . . .
. . . Florida was never the home state of the minor child, Florida can have jurisdiction only if, under section 61.514 . . .
. . . Under the provisions of section 61.514, Florida Statutes (2004), the circuit court was without jurisdiction . . . the meaning of section 61.503(13), Florida Statutes (2004), so there is no jurisdiction under section 61.514 . . . in Broward County “concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships.” § 61.514 . . . Section 61.514(1) is “the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by . . . a court of this state.” § 61.514(2); see also Mainster v. . . .
. . . . § 61.514(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . .
. . . otherwise provided in s. 61.517, a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under ss. 61.514 . . .
. . . in which the father had to obtain an order from a court having jurisdiction to modify under section 61.514 . . . petitioner to obtain an order from a court having jurisdiction under the criteria specified in ss. 61.514 . . . determination is pending in a court of another state having jurisdiction to modify the determination under ss. 61.514 . . .
. . . subject matter jurisdiction over T.S., his child, under the Uniform Custody Jurisdiction Act, section 61.514 . . . The Department argues that the trial court has jurisdiction under section 61.514(l)(b), Florida Statutes . . . Florida can only have jurisdiction under these circumstances if, under section 61.514(l)(b), no other . . .
. . . See § 61.514, Fla. Stat. (2002); Feriole v. Feriole, 468 So.2d 1090, 1091 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). . . .
. . . Culbro Corp., 1977-Trade Cases ¶ 61.514 (S.D.N.Y.1977). . . . .