The 2023 Florida Statutes
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Section 61.519 sets forth the requirements of how a Florida court is to proceed where there are simultaneous child custody proceedings in another state. Section 61.519(1) states, in relevant part, that "a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under ss. 61.514-61.524 if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child has been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this part ...." (emphasis added).Finally, the record reflects that, once paternity testing was complete, the New Jersey tribunal determined the child had resided in Florida for eleven months preceding the filing of the petition. Consequently, it deferred to the Florida court and declined to exercise further jurisdiction. See § 61.519( 1) Fla. Stat. ("[A] court of [Florida] may not exercise its [home state] jurisdiction ... [if] a proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been commenced in a court of another state [properly exercising] jurisdiction ... unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a court of this state is a more convenient forum under s. 61.520."); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-70 (West). Under these circumstances, we conclude Florida retained "jurisdictional priority," and the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction was proper. See § 61.514(1)(a), Fla. Stat.; M.A.C. v. M.D.H., 88 So. 3d 1050, 1054 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) ("[T]he home state determination under section 61.514(1)(a) allows for Florida to exercise jurisdiction if, at any time within the six months preceding the filing of the petition, Florida qualified as the home… In March 2016, when the child was fifteen months old, the maternal grandmother filed with the Florida court a motion for judicial communication with the Oregon court pursuant to section 61.519, Florida Statutes (2015). The maternal grandmother's motion alleged she was seeking to argue that Florida, not Oregon, had initial custody jurisdiction. The Florida court granted the maternal grandmother's motion for judicial communication and scheduled a hearing with the Oregon court.We conclude that the circuit court prematurely denied Mr. Stone the opportunity to prove that Japan had declined to exercise its jurisdiction over the custody issue and that Florida was the more appropriate forum for either an initial custody determination or a modification of custody. See Douglas v. Johnson, 65 So. 3d 605, 607-08 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (reversing and remanding for a full evidentiary hearing where the mother was denied procedural due process by the trial court's failure to give her the opportunity to raise and develop the issue of subject matter jurisdiction). At a minimum, the court should have stayed the proceedings and communicated with the Japanese court to determine whether custody proceedings in Japan had been terminated. See § 61.519(1), (2); London v. London, 32 So. 3d 107, 110-11 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (reversing for further proceedings where the trial court never communicated with the foreign court as required by section 61.519).The grandmother also filed a motion for judicial communication with the Oregon court pursuant to section 61.519, Florida Statutes (2015). The grandmother filed the motion for judicial communication to clarify that Florida had initial custody jurisdiction.Unbeknownst to Father, Mother filed a paternity petition in New York shortly after her return. Two days later, Father filed a paternity petition in Florida, alleging that Mother had absconded with Child to New York. Unaware of the New York petition, the Florida court entered an initial order establishing a temporary time-sharing schedule. A Florida court may not exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJEA if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding in Florida, a child custody proceeding concerning the child had been commenced in another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with the UCCJEA, unless the court of the other state terminated or stayed the proceeding because Florida is a more convenient forum. § 61.519(1), Fla. Stat. (2017).Nonetheless, the mother contends that Florida, thereafter, improperly exercised jurisdiction, as in the absence of a formal termination of the California proceedings, the California case remained concurrently active. See § 61.519( 1), Fla. Stat. (2018) ("[A] court of [Florida] may not exercise its [home state] jurisdiction ... [if] a proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been commenced in a court of another state [properly exercising] jurisdiction ... unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a court of this state is a more convenient forum under s. 61.520."). We agree that, under the broad statutory definition promulgated in section 61.503(4), Florida Statutes (2018), the temporary emergency proceeding constituted an earlier-initiated child custody proceeding. Nevertheless, California's act of transferring the case necessarily evidenced a declination to further exercise temporary jurisdiction, and the ensuing acceptance of transfer by Florida entailed a de facto, contemporaneous termination of the temporary proceedings. See e.g., In re Am. President Lines, Ltd., 929 F.2d 226 (6th Cir. 1991) (discussing… Section 61.519, Florida Statutes (2013), which governs the trial court's jurisdiction in simultaneous proceedings, states:Under the UCCJEA the Miccosukee Tribe is treated as a state in the United States. Section 61.519, Florida Statutes (2012), covers situations where there are simultaneous custody proceedings in this state and in another state. That statute provides that “a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under ss. 61.514–61.524 if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this part.” § 61.519(1), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Additionally, Section 61.505, Florida Statutes (2012), states that a custody determination pertaining to an Indian child made by a tribal court must be recognized by Florida if the determination was “made by the tribe under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with jurisdictional standards of [the UCCJEA].” § 61.505, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Under those sections, if the Tribal Court in this case had substantially complied with the requirements of the UCCJEA, it would have jurisdiction and not the court of the State of Florida.Under the UCCJEA the Miccosukee Tribe is treated as a state in the United States. Section 61.519, Florida Statutes (2012), covers situations where there are simultaneous custody proceedings in this state and in another state. That statute provides that "a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under ss. 61.514-61.524 if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this part." § 61.519(1), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Additionally, Section 61.505, Florida Statutes (2012), states that a custody determination pertaining to an Indian child made by a tribal court must be recognized by Florida if the determination was "made by the tribe under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with jurisdictional standards of [the UCCJEA]." § 61.505, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Under those sections, if the Tribal Court in this case had substantially complied with the requirements of the UCCJEA, it would have jurisdiction and not the court of the State of Florida.. . . See § 61.519(1), Fla. . . .
. . . Order, citing sections 61.514 and 61.519, Florida Statutes (2013), and arguing that the trial court did . . . Simultaneous Proceedings in Arizona Section 61.519, Florida Statutes (2013), which governs the trial . . . court of the other state because a court of this state is a more convenient forum under s. 61.520. § 61.519 . . . Since section 61.519 expressly states that the court may not exercise jurisdiction under sections 61.514 . . .
. . . Section 61.519, Florida Statutes (2012), covers situations where there are simultaneous custody proceedings . . . commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this part.” § 61.519 . . .
. . . See §§ 61.519, 61.522, Fla. Stat. On March 27, 2012, Mr. . . .
. . . We find that, pursuant to section 61.519(1), Florida Statutes (2011), the trial court currently lacks . . . Section 61.519(1), Florida Statutes (2011), provides: Except as otherwise provided in s. 61.517, a court . . . While section 61.519(2) provides a means by which a Florida trial court may seek approval from a foreign . . .
. . . foreign jurisdiction — a New York family court and a New York supreme court — as authorized by section 61.519 . . . Pursuant to section 61.511(2), and section 61.519, Col. . . . Johnson’s counsel objected, stating that the hearing was only pursuant to section 61.519 to determine . . . of the simultaneous proceedings in New York, he also initiated the telephonic hearing under section 61.519 . . . verbatim memoriali-zation of any communication between two or more individuals or entities. .Section 61.519 . . .
. . . Section 61.516 must be read in pari materia with section 61.519, which applies due to the simultaneous . . . Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 829 So.2d 891, 898 (Fla.2002)). 61.519. . . . face, grants the Florida court the authority to proceed with modification, “the provisions of section 61.519 . . . London’s petition and remand for the trial court to comply with section 61.519’s communication requirements . . . The order on appeal is silent on the matter. .Both sections 61.519 and 61.530 are titled “Simultaneous . . .
. . . through communication between the Florida court and the Washington court in accordance with section 61.519 . . .
. . . Although it appears that Florida is the children’s “home state,” section 61.519, prohibits Florida from . . . Section 61.519, titled “Simultaneous proceedings,” provides in relevant part: (1) [A] court of this state . . .
. . . See § 61.519(1), Fla. Stat. The trial court’s rulings must be affirmed. . . .
. . . 2005 in Mexico before his wife filed for dissolution in Florida on December 13, 2005, that section 61.519 . . . Section 61.519, Florida Statutes (2005), provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Simultaneous proceedings . . . Arjona argues that pursuant to section 61.519 because his dissolution proceeding was commenced in Mexico . . . Thus, the communication requirement of section 61.519 has no application in the instant case. . . .
. . . The Florida court ostensibly relied on the enforcement provisions of the act, sections 61.519 and 61.530 . . . Section 61.519(1), relating to the course of action to be followed by a court in which a modification . . . Section 61.519(3) provides three alternatives to the court considering a petition to modify a child custody . . . In our judgment, the provisions of section 61.519 should be considered in pari materia with those of . . . greater discretion on the enforcing court to proceed with enforcement of a custody order than section 61.519 . . .
. . . See Crippen, 610 So.2d at 687; § 61.519, Fla. Stat. . . . Section 61.519(1), Florida Statutes, provides that a Florida court should not exercise jurisdiction at . . .
. . . One of the provisions of the UCCJEA, section 61.519(1), provides: Except as otherwise provided in s. . . .