The 2023 Florida Statutes
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A traffic stop is “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment if the officers had “probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. Under Florida law, “drivers of vehicles shall obey the directions of every [traffic control] device” and failure to do so “is a noncriminal traffic infraction.” Fla. Stat. § 316.089(3), (5). Traffic control devices are “[a]ll signs, signals, markings, and devices . . . placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction for the purpose of regulating, warning, or guiding traffic.” Fla. Stat. § 316.003(50).Compare Fla. Stat. §316.003(87)(a), which defines “highway” as ““[t]he entire width between the boundary lines of every way or place of whatever nature when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular traffic” with Fla. Stat. §316.003(87)(b), which defines a “private” highway-which requires a written agreement concerning traffic control jurisdiction-as “[t]he entire width between the boundary lines of any privately owned way or place used for vehicular travel by the owner and those having express or implied permission from the owner, but not by other persons, or any limited access road owned or controlled by a special district, whenever, by written agreement entered into under s. 316.006(2)(b) or (3)(b), a county or municipality exercises traffic control jurisdiction over said way or place.” See also Fla. Stat. §316.003(64), which similarly defines a “private road or driveway” as “any privately owned way or place used for vehicular travel by the owner and those having express or implied permission from the owner, but not by other persons.”Section 316.003, in turn, references motorized bicycles only within the definition of "BICYCLE."(e) Authorized emergency vehicle, as defined in s. 316.003; orA limited-access facility is a "street or highway especially designed for through traffic and over, from, or to which owners or occupants of abutting land or other persons have no right or easement, or only a limited right or easement." 2010 Fla. Stat. § 316.003(19).Furthermore, the tolls were properly assessed under rule 14-100.005, which provides that tolls may be assessed on "a vehicle [that] passes through a toll collection facility." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 14-100.005(3). The definition of "vehicle" is "[e]very device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks." § 316.003(75), Florida Statutes (2010). This definition has remained unchanged since 2010, and clearly includes trailers that are drawn upon a highway. See id. Therefore, the trial court erred by holding that the Department's current method of assessing tolls on trailer owners was illegal.The complaint describes the mobility device as a "750 watt[ ]" "bike." (Doc. 1 at 3-5). Like those other motorized bicycles, an "electric assistive personal mobility device" is specifically excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle" under section 316.003( 44) of Florida Statutes, but not excluded from the definition under section 322.01(27). See Meister, 849 So. 2d at 1128-29. Even though Chapter 316 does not require a valid driver's license for an "electric assistive personal mobility device," Fla. Stat. § 316.2068(2), it is the exception rather than the rule and so Plaintiff's arrest may have still been objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Diaz, 854 F.3d 197, 203-04 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that an arrest based on an objectively reasonable mistake of law is still lawful under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Hawkins, 830 F.3d 742, 746 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014)) (same); see also Manners v. Cannella, 891 F.3d 959, 969 (11th Cir. 2018) ("Probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity." (citation and quotations… or should have known that the motor vehicle had been stolen. Definitions. Give if applicable. § 316.003, Fla. Stat. "Authorized emergency vehicles" are vehicles of the fire department (fire patrol), police
§ 316.003(8 1 3 ), Fla. Stat.2011 - 316.003 Definitions.. . . Both terms are further defined in section 316.003. See § 316.003(39) ; § 316.003(53), Fla. . . . . § 316.003(99), Fla. Stat. . . . . § 316.003(99), Fla. Stat. . . . Stat. § 316.003( 12 68 ), Fla. . . . Stat. § 316.003( 53 81 ), Fla. . . .
. . . Personal delivery devices, mobile carriers, and special mobile equipment are defined in § 316.003, Fla . . . Personal delivery devices, mobile carriers, and special mobile equipment are defined in § 316.003, Fla . . .
. . . The Arajes requested the following jury instruction based on sections 316.003(34) and 316.091(2): Members . . .
. . . See § 316.003 (1), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . . § 316.003, Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . 2018, it was undecided whether the courts would use the definitions of "driver" and "vehicle" in § 316.003 . . .
. . . The pre-2012 version of section 316.003 defined "motor vehicle" as "(21) Motor vehicle. . . . In 2012, however, the legislature amended section 316.003(21), defining "motor vehicle" as: (21) Motor . . . For purposes of s. 316.1001, "motor vehicle" has the same meaning as in s. 320.01(1)(a). § 316.003(21 . . . July 1, 2012, to Dec 31, 2012) (currently renumbered as § 316.003(40) ). . . . The 2012 amendment to the section 316.003(21) definition arguably created an ambiguity between the requirements . . .
. . . . § 316.003(87), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . review contemplated is "of information from a traffic infraction detector," id. , which, as section 316.003 . . . Id. § 316.003(87). . . .
. . . . § 316.003(75), Fla. Stat. . . . Stat. § 316.003(75) . Fla. Stat. . . . Stat. § 316.003(53) , Fla. Stat. . . . Stat. § 316.003(75) , Fla. Stat. . . . Stat. § 316.003(53) , Fla. . . .
. . . Tropical Trailer sued the Department for erroneously interpreting sections 316.003(21) and 316.1001, . . . Tropical Trailer asserted that its trailérs were not “motor vehicles” within the meaning Of section 316.003 . . . Tropical Trailer argued that an amendment to section 316.003(21), Florida Statutes (2011), which became . . . Ch. 2012-174, Laws of Fla.; see § 316.003(21), Fla. . . .
. . . See, e.g., § 316.003(57), Fla. . . .
. . . . § 316.003(46) (“Operator” means ”[a]ny person who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle . . .
. . . . § 316.003(95), Fla. Stat. . . . “Willfully” means intentionally, knowingly, and purposely. § 316.003(2), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . See § 316.003, Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . Newton also suggested that the loader was classified as special mobile equipment under section 316.003 . . . incidentally operated or moved over a highway, including, but not limited to ... bucket loaders.” § 316.003 . . . (3)(a) (defining “motor vehicle” for purpose of seat belt regulation as a “vehicle as defined in s. 316.003 . . .
. . . . § 316.003(87). . . .
. . . Section 316.003, Florida Statutes, contains ninety-three definitions applicable to chapter 316. . . . In section 316.003(77), a moped is defined as a vehicle which has a seat or saddle, has less than two . . . In section 316.003(21), a motor vehicle is defined to specifically exclude bicycles, motorized scooters . . . In section 316.003(22), a motorcycle is defined as á vehicle which has a seat or saddle and has no more . . . See § 316.003(21), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . See §§ 316.003, 322.01, Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .
. . . . § 316.003(75), Fla. Stat. . . . Stat. § 316.003(75), Fla. Stat. . . . Stat. § 316.003(75), Fla. Stat. . . . Stat. § 316.003(75), Fla. Stat. . . . Stat. § 316.003(75), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . . § 316.003, Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . only if the motorized bicycle fell within the definition of motorized bicycle set forth in section 316.003 . . . definition of “motorized bicycle,” which is included within the definition of a “bicycle” found in section 316.003 . . . any device -generally recognized as a- bicycle though equipped with two front or two rear wheels_ § 316.003 . . . moved solely by human power, motorized wheelchairs, and motorized bicycles as defined in [section] 316.003 . . .
. . . . § 316.003(75). . . . Stat. § 316.003(53) “Street or highway” means the entire width between boundary lines of every way or . . . Stat. § 316.003(75) “Vehicle” means every device, in, upon, or by which any person or property is or . . . Give as applicable. § 316.003(75), Fla. Stat. . . . “Willfully” means intentionally, knowingly, and purposely. § 316.003(2), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . words and phrases used in the various sections of chapter 316, Florida Statutes, are found in section 316.003 . . . meanings respectively ascribed to them in this section, except where the context otherwise requires.” § 316.003 . . . the lateral line, of a roadway and the adjacent property lines, intended for use by pedestrians.” § 316.003 . . . frontage thereon, for a distance of 300 feet or more, is occupied by buildings in use for business.” § 316.003 . . .
. . . . § 316.003(28) (defining pedestrian); id. § 316.130 (describing detailed regulations for pedestrians . . .
. . . . § 316.003(26), Fla. Stat.’(2013). . . . statutory definitions in 2005, when the accident in this case occurred, contained identical language. §§ 316.003 . . .
. . . Stat. 316.003(75) “Vehicle” means every device, in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may . . . Give if applicable. § 316.003(2), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . . § 316.003(21). . . . Stat. § 316.003(21). . . . Stat. § 316.003(^2). . . . Stat. § 316.003(53). . . .
. . . definition of “vehicle” is amended to delete the reference to “bicycles” and “mopeds,” citing section 316.003 . . . Stat. § 316.003(75). . . . Stat. § 316.003(21). . . . Stat. § 316.003(53). . . . Definitions. § 316.003(21) Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . . § 316.003(53)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007); see also § 322.01(38), Fla. Stat. (2007); Mattingly v. . . .
. . . authorized emergency vehicle” in instruction 13.1 to conform to the definition of that phrase in section 316.003 . . . See § 316.003, Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 316.003, Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . See § 316.003(26), Fla. . . . section 319.22(2), Florida Statutes (2005), and was not a conditional sale vendor as set forth in section 316.003 . . . of a conditional sales agreement, the contract "vendee,” not the “vendor,” is deemed the "owner." § 316.003 . . . The majority also cites to the definition of owner found in section 316.003(26), Florida Statutes, which . . .
. . . . § 316.003(87), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . .
. . . For instance, section 316.003(12), Florida Statutes (2004), defines a farm tractor as “[a]ny motor vehicle . . .
. . . . § 316.003. . . . Id. § 316.003(27). . . . Id. § 316.003(49). . . . Id. § 316.003(52). . . . Id. § 316.003(23). . . .
. . . . § 316.003(3) and 49 U.S.C. § 30127(a)(1). . . . Stat. § 316.003(3), which provides that "[a]ny motor vehicle designed for carrying more than 10 passengers . . . Stat. § 316.003(3). . . . .
. . . See §§ 316.003(12) & 322.01(19), Fla. Stat. (2008); Festival Fun Parks, LLC v. . . .
. . . Compare § 316.003(75), Fla. . . . (emphasis added); and § 316.003(57), Fla. . . . Give as applicable. § 316.003(75), Fla. . . .
. . . ” in instruction 13.1 are vehicles of the Florida Department of Corrections, as provided by section 316.003 . . .
. . . vehicles moved solely by human power, motorized wheelchairs, and motorized bicycles as defined in s. 316.003 . . . bicycle is defined, in part, as a vehicle not capable of exceeding a speed of twenty miles per hour. § 316.003 . . . miles per hour, whereas here it was alleged that the vehicle could not exceed thirty miles per hour. § 316.003 . . .
. . . . § 316.003(75), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . vehicles moved solely by human power, motorized wheelchairs, and motorized bicycles as defined in section 316.003 . . .
. . . vehicles moved solely by human power, motorized wheelchairs, and motorized bicycles as defined in s. 316.003 . . . vehicle” that is potentially relevant here, are defined within the definition of “bicycle” in section 316.003 . . .
. . . Defense counsel pointed out to the court that section 316.003 defines residential and business districts . . .
. . . (citing to sections 316.003(68) and 320.01(22), Florida Statutes (1983)). . . . Section 316.003(21), Florida Statutes, defines a “motor vehicle” as “any self-propelled vehicle not operated . . . vehicles moved solely by human power, motorized wheelchairs, and motorized bicycles as defined in s.316.003 . . .
. . . Specifically, Lloyd's cites to § 316.003(53), Fla. Stat. (2003); § 322.02(38), Fla. . . .
. . . . § 316.003(42) (defining “roadway” as “[t]hat portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily . . . Stat. § 316.003(28), contains no exception for anyone, including members of the media. . . .
. . . vehicles moved solely by human power, motorized wheelchairs, and motorized bicycles as defined in s. 316.003 . . .
. . . See §§ 316.003(17), 316.122, 816.151(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . .
. . . Traffic control devices are defined in section 316.003(16), Florida Statutes (2000), as follows: "All . . .
. . . vehicle maneuver here at issue, since appellant did not “stop” his vehicle within the meaning of section 316.003 . . .
. . . Stat. 316.003(42): "Roadway — the portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular . . .
. . . .” § 316.003(25), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998) (emphasis added). . . . Optional-Definitions — F.S. 316.003(26) 4* “Operator” means any^-person-who is in actual- physical control . . . highway, or who is exercising control over or steer-ing-a-vehicle being towed by a motor vehielfe- F.S. 316.003 . . . (2). & 316.003(21-) 2^‘Motor vehicle” means any-vehicle which is self-propelled — (and—every vehicle . . .
. . . See § 316.003(53)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .
. . . Definitions; give as applicable F.S. 316.003(75) “Vehicle” is any device in, upon, or by which any person . . . Definitions; give as applicable 316.003(75) “Vehicle” is any device in, upon, or by which any person . . . Definitions; give as applicable 316.003(75) “Vehicle” is any device in, upon, or by which any person . . .
. . . vehicles moved solely by human power, motorized wheelchairs, and motorized bicycles as defined in section 316.003 . . . chapter entitled “Uniform Traffic Control” a motor vehicle is defined as excluding bicycles and mopeds, § 316.003 . . . A motorized bicycle is referred to in the definition of a bicycle in section 316.003(2), Florida Statutes . . .
. . . Appellant argues that the trial court should have used the definition of “roadway” found in section 316.003 . . . As the term “highway” is specifically defined in sections 322.01(38) and 316.003(53), Florida Statutes . . .
. . . driver’s license ...,” and the definition of a “motor vehicle” is found in both § 322.01(26) and § 316.003 . . . vehicles moved solely by human power, motorized wheelchairs, and motorized bicycles as defined in s. 316.003 . . . The subject vehicle is also not a motorized bicycle under § 316.003(2), which defines a motorized bicycle . . . Section 316.003(77) defines a moped as: Any vehicle with pedals to permit propulsion by human power, . . . The “go-ped” is not a moped as defined under § 316.003(77), as it has no pedals to permit propulsion . . .
. . . .” § 316.003(2) & (21), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . The tricycle was a “bicycle” within the meaning of section 316.003(2), Florida Statutes (1989). . . . . § 316.003(2), (75), Fla. Stat. (1989). . . . because Jamie was not a “pedestrian,” defined as “[a]ny person afoot,” at the time of the accident. § 316.003 . . .
. . . See § 316.003(10); State v. Mahoy, 575 So.2d 779 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). . . .
. . . , Interstate 95 (“1-95”), at the time the ear was stopped. 1-95 is a limited access facility (see § 316.003 . . . excluded; or they may be freeways open to use by all customaiy forms of street and highway traffic. § 316.003 . . .
. . . Even section 316.003(21), Florida Statutes (1993), the traffic statute relied upon by appellant, notes . . .
. . . .” § 316.003(23), Fla.Stat. (1989). . . . clearly included within the general definition of an official traffic control device under section 316.003 . . .
. . . .” § 316.003(25), Fla.Stat. (1987). . . .
. . . F S 316.003(75) “Normal faculties” mean those faculties of a person, such as the ability to see, hear . . . Give as applicable F S 316.003(75) “Normal faculties” mean those faculties of a person, such as the ability . . .
. . . See, e.g., §§ 316.003(26); 320.01(3); 324.021(9); 627.732(3), Fla.Stat. (1989). . . .
. . . . § 316.003(78), Fla.Stat. (1989). . . . but not including buses operated by common carriers in urban transportation of school children.” § 316.003 . . .
. . . Section 316.003(25), Florida Statutes (1989), defines the term “operator” as used in chapter 316 to mean . . . Section 316.003(29), Florida Statutes (1989), defines the term “person” as, “Any natural person, firm . . .
. . . Legislature for traffic control purposes as any motor vehicle with a capacity of 10 passengers or more § 316.003 . . .
. . . F.S. 316.003(53) (a) and (b) provides as follows: “(53) STREET OR HIGHWAY. — (a) The entire width between . . . S. 316.003(53)(a); and b. because there is specific authorization to issue handicapped parking citations . . . contemplates private roads rather than streets or highways which have been defined pursuant to F.S. 316.003 . . .
. . . F.S. 316.003(33). 4. . . .
. . . Parker suggested that the legislature substitute the language in Chapter 316, § 316.003(54) into Chapter . . . This definition, which was almost identical to the definition in 316.003(54) (Chapter 316 used the words . . . he should look to Chapter 316 because shopping mall parking lots clearly were included under Section 316.003 . . . Section 316.003(54) had been amended and moved to 316.003(53) and was now written in more detail. . . .
. . . We disagree and affirm the trial court in its conclusion that reading section 316.003(43), Florida Statutes . . .
. . . . § 316.003(48), Fla.Stat. (1987). . . .
. . . During the charge conference, appellant’s counsel requested jury instructions based on sections 316.003 . . .
. . . “Motor vehicle” is defined in Florida Statute 316.003(21) as “any self-propelled vehicle. . .but not . . . F.S. 316.003(75) defines vehicle as “every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or . . .
. . . See §§ 316.003(21), 316.003(49), Fla.Stat. (1985). . . .
. . . . § 316.003(53), Street or Highway. . . .
. . . See §§ 316.003(26) and 324.021(9), Fla.Stat. (1985). In Palmer v. R.S. . . .
. . . defendant did not have actual physical control of a vehicle, as the term “vehicle” is defined by Section 316.003 . . .
. . . engines, road rollers, such vehicles as run only upon a track, bicycles, or mopeds as defined in s. 316.003 . . .
. . . See § 316.003(21), Fla. . . . Stat. (1985) (“motor vehicle” is “[a]ny vehicle which is self-propelled ... ”; § 316.003(76), Fla.Stat . . . [Emphasis added]. § 316.003(49), Fla.Stat. (1985). . . .
. . . . § 316.003(21). See also M.J.S. v. Florida, 453 So.2d 870, 870-71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). . . . Stat.Ann. § 316.003(76). See also Fla.Stat. Ann. §§ 320.01, 322.01, 520.02(7). . . .
. . . .-01(2), Florida Statutes (1985), and not a moped as defined in section 316.003(2), Florida Statutes . . .
. . . of Section 316.238(1), Florida Statutes, in conjunction with the definitional provisions of Section 316.003 . . . Section 316.003, Florida Statutes, which defines words and phrases used in Chapter 316, the State Uniform . . . oncoming traffic applies only to drivers on a roadway, which is a specifically defined term under Section 316.003 . . .
. . . an outside agency, we cannot say that she had actual physical control of a vehicle as defined by § 316.003 . . .
. . . .-003(76), Fla.Stat. (1985) (defining a “vehicle”) with § 316.003(21), Fla.Stat. (1985) (defining a “ . . . A “vehicle” is defined in section 316.003(76), Florida Statutes (1985), as: [ejvery device, in, upon, . . . Under the Florida Statutes, a bicycle is defined as a vehicle. § 316.003(2). . . . actual physical control of, any “vehicle,” and since a bicycle is a “vehicle” as defined in section 316.003 . . . Accordingly, the order under review is Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. . § 316.003(2) . . .
. . . Definitions Give as applicable F.S. 316.003(76) “Vehicle” is any device, in, upon, or by which any person . . .
. . . apply to bicycles, as they were expressly excepted from the definition of a “vehicle”, under Section 316.003 . . .
. . . A roadway is defined by section 316.003(43), Florida Statutes (1983), as “that portion of a highway improved . . .
. . . STATEMENT OF THE LA W: F.S. 316.003(24) [F.S. 1985], defines “official traffic control devices” as including . . .
. . . definitions provided under the No-Fault Act (section 627.732(1)), the Traffic Control Law (section 316.003 . . .
. . . definitions provided under the No-Fault Act (section 627.732(1)), the Traffic Control Law (section 316.003 . . .
. . . Section 316.003(21), Florida Statutes, defines motor vehicle as “any vehicle which is self-propelled” . . .
. . . The legislature has recently specifically so defined it in section 316.003(68), Florida Statutes (1983 . . .
. . . profession, or occupation in this state, except a nonresident migrant farm worker as defined in s. 316.003 . . . (62), in every case where a nonresident, except a nonresident migrant farm worker as defined in s. 316.003 . . .
. . . court answered this question in the negative, finding that a moped is a bicycle as defined in section 316.003 . . . (2), Florida Statutes (1981), and not a vehicle as defined in section 316.003(64). . . . designed and required to be licensed for use on the highways of this state except mopeds, as defined in s. 316.003 . . . Section 316.003(2), Florida Statutes (1982), reads as follows: BICYCLE. — Any device propelled by human . . . Section 316.003(64), Florida Statutes (1981), reads as follows: VEHICLE. — Any device, in, upon, or by . . .
. . . “Motor vehicle” is defined in section 316.003(21), Florida Statutes (1983), as “any vehicle which is . . . In subsection 316.003(75), Florida Statutes (1983), “vehicle” is defined as [e]very device, in, upon, . . . Obviously, by enacting section 316.003(49), the legislature does not consider vehicles for construction . . . The state argued that because sections 316.003(21) and 322.01 provide definitions which broadly include . . .