Florida Statutes
Fla. Stat. § 319.28 (2025)
Transfer of ownership by operation of law.
✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session
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319.28 Transfer of ownership by operation of law.—
(1)(a) In the event of the transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle or mobile home by operation of law as upon inheritance, devise or bequest, order in bankruptcy, insolvency, replevin, attachment, execution, or other judicial sale or whenever the engine of a motor vehicle is replaced by another engine or whenever a motor vehicle is sold to satisfy storage or repair charges or repossession is had upon default in performance of the terms of a security agreement, chattel mortgage, conditional sales contract, trust receipt, or other like agreement, and upon the surrender of the prior certificate of title or, when that is not possible, presentation of satisfactory proof to the department of ownership and right of possession to such motor vehicle or mobile home, and upon payment of the fee prescribed by law and presentation of an application for certificate of title, the department may issue to the applicant a certificate of title thereto.
(b) When the application for a certificate of title is made by an heir of a previous owner who died intestate, it shall not be necessary to accompany the application with an order of a probate court if the applicant files with the department an affidavit that the estate is not indebted and the surviving spouse, if any, and the heirs, if any, have amicably agreed among themselves upon a division of the estate. If the previous owner died testate, the application shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the will, if probated, and an affidavit that the estate is solvent with sufficient assets to pay all just claims or, if the will is not being probated, by a sworn copy of the will and an affidavit that the estate is not indebted.
(c) If the previous owner died testate and the application for a certificate of title is made by, and accompanied by an affidavit attested by, a Florida-licensed attorney in good standing with The Florida Bar, such affidavit shall, for purposes of paragraph (a), establish a presumption of ownership, absent information received to the contrary, and right of possession to the motor vehicle or mobile home, so long as the affidavit sets forth the rightful heir or heirs and the attorney attests in the affidavit that such heir or heirs are lawfully entitled to the rights of ownership and possession of the motor vehicle or mobile home. It is not necessary for the application for certificate of title filed under this paragraph to be accompanied by a copy of the will or other testamentary instrument.
(d) If a surviving spouse who would be entitled to issuance of a certificate of title under paragraph (b) wishes to dispose of the vehicle rather than retaining it for his or her own use, the surviving spouse shall not be required to obtain a certificate of title in his or her own name, but may assign to the transferee the certificate of title which was issued to the decedent. An application for a certificate of title by an applicant taken through such a surviving spouse under this paragraph shall be accompanied by the same documentation as would an application by a surviving spouse under paragraph (b), which documentation shall be supplied to the transferee by the surviving spouse.
(e) A mobile home that is repossessed is exempt from registration if the mobile home is not transferred or titled for occupancy.
(2)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), only an affidavit by the person, or agent of the person, to whom possession of such motor vehicle or mobile home has so passed, setting forth facts entitling him or her to such possession and ownership, together with a copy of the journal entry, court order, or instrument upon which such claim of possession and ownership is founded, shall be considered satisfactory proof of ownership and right of possession.
(b) In case of repossession of a motor vehicle or mobile home pursuant to the terms of a security agreement or similar instrument, an affidavit by the party to whom possession has passed stating that the vehicle or mobile home was repossessed upon default in the terms of the security agreement or other instrument shall be considered satisfactory proof of ownership and right of possession. At least 5 days prior to selling the repossessed vehicle, any subsequent lienholder named in the last issued certificate of title shall be sent notice of the repossession by certified mail, on a form prescribed by the department. If such notice is given and no written protest to the department is presented by a subsequent lienholder within 15 days after the date on which the notice was mailed, the certificate of title shall be issued showing no liens. If the former owner or any subsequent lienholder files a written protest under oath within such 15-day period, the department shall not issue the certificate of title for 10 days thereafter. If within the 10-day period no injunction or other order of a court of competent jurisdiction has been served on the department commanding it not to deliver the certificate of title, the department shall deliver the certificate of title to the applicant or as may otherwise be directed in the application showing no other liens than those shown in the application. Any lienholder who has repossessed a vehicle in this state in compliance with the provisions of this section must apply to a tax collector’s office in this state or to the department for a certificate of title pursuant to s. 319.323. Proof of the required notice to subsequent lienholders shall be submitted together with regular title fees. Any person found guilty of violating any requirements of this paragraph shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(c) If the applicant for a certificate of title under this section cannot produce satisfactory proof of ownership and right of possession, he or she may submit such evidence as he or she may have, and the department may thereupon, if it finds the evidence sufficient, issue a certificate of title.
(3) A dealer of industrial equipment who conducts a repossession, as defined in s. 493.6101(22), of such equipment is not subject to licensure as a recovery agent or recovery agency if the dealer is regularly engaged in the sale of the equipment for a particular manufacturer, the lender is affiliated with that manufacturer, and the dealer uses his or her own employees to make such repossessions.
History.—s. 9, ch. 23658, 1947; ss. 1, 2, ch. 23723, 1947; s. 7, ch. 25150, 1949; s. 8, ch. 28184, 1953; s. 1, ch. 61-446; s. 6, ch. 65-190; ss. 24, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 13, ch. 82-134; s. 10, ch. 83-218; s. 344, ch. 95-148; s. 9, ch. 95-333; s. 15, ch. 96-413; s. 257, ch. 99-248; s. 113, ch. 2002-20; s. 14, ch. 2010-223; s. 24, ch. 2012-181; s. 24, ch. 2013-160; s. 1, ch. 2024-272.
Arrestable Offenses under F.S. 319.28
M = misdemeanor · F = felony · degree: F=1st S=2nd T=3rd§319.28(1b)PUBLIC ORDER CRIMESVIOL OF DOC REQ FOR REPOSSESSED MOTOR VEHICLES
§319.28(2b)PUBLIC ORDER CRIMESFAIL TO TRANSF OWNERSHIP VEH M/H
§319.28(2b)PUBLIC ORDER CRIMESFAILURE TO DISCLOSE VEH SOLD WAS REPOSSESSED
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 23
cases, 1952–2016 · leading case: Bell-Tel Fed. Credit Union v. Kalter, 292 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2002).
Woodard v. Chesley (In re Chesley), 550 B.R. 903 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2016). “By its terms, the statute is subject to two statutory exceptions, including one for transfers by operation of law, in Fla. Stat § 319.28, which include transfers by “inheritance, devise or bequest, order in bankruptcy, insolvency, replevin, attachment, execution, or other…”
Bowen v. Taylor-Christensen, 98 So. 3d 136 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). “§ 319.28, Fla. Stat. (2012). Had Appellee desired to make a gift of something more than a co-ownership interest in the car, so as to avoid future responsibility, all he needed to do was direct the salesman to make his wife the sole owner.”
In Re Diaz, 416 B.R. 902 (Bankr. S.D. Florida 2009). “Specifically, the court held that Fla. Stat. § 319.28 (2)(b) expressly recognizes that ownership transfers to the secured creditor upon repossession since the statute states in relevant part: In case of repossession of a motor vehicle .”
In Re Zajni, 403 B.R. 891 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008). “Citing to TL-23(I) of the DMV Procedures Manual 4 , the court noted that the DMV has interpreted § 319.28 as “providing ‘for the transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle by operation of law, to include repossession of a motor vehicle for non-fulfillment of a contract,’ as long…”
Tidewater Fin. Co. v. Curry (In Re Curry), 347 B.R. 596 (6th Cir. BAP 2006). “However, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Florida certificate of title statute, Fla. Stat. § 319.28 , expressly mandated that ownership transfers upon repossession.”
In re: Laquita Curry v. (6th Cir. BAP 2006). “However, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Florida certificate of title statute, Fla. Stat. § 319.28 , expressly mandated that ownership transfers upon repossession.”
In Re Johnson, 328 B.R. 234 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005). “The Court then looked to Florida’s Title Certificate Statute and concluded under Fla. Stat. § 319.28 , titled “Transfer of Ownership by Operation of Law”, “ownership passes when the creditor repossesses the vehicle.”
Estis v. Credit Union of Johnson Cnty. (In Re Estis), 311 B.R. 592 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004). “at 1359 (citing Fla. Stat. § 319.28 (1)(a) and (2)(b)). 38 .”
Cox v. Dep't of High. Saf., 881 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). “The DHSMV argued that the case should be dismissed because the truck had been returned to the lienholder, which had issued an affidavit of repossession under section 319.28, Florida Statutes (2002). Cox replied that returning the truck to the lienholder was not an option under…”
In Re Menasche, 301 B.R. 757 (Bankr. S.D. Florida 2003). “Fla. Stat. § 319.28 is titled, Transfer of Ownership by Operation of Law.”
Bell-Tel Fed. Credit Union v. Kalter, 292 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2002). “See Fla. Stat. § 319.28 (l)(a) (“In the event of the transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle .”
In Re Garcia, 276 B.R. 699 (Bankr. S.D. Florida 2002). “Fla. Stat. § 319.28 (l)(a) (1999)(emphasis added).”
— 319.28(1) — 1 case
In Re Zajni, 403 B.R. 891 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008). “Citing to TL-23(I) of the DMV Procedures Manual 4 , the court noted that the DMV has interpreted § 319.28 as “providing ‘for the transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle by operation of law, to include repossession of a motor vehicle for non-fulfillment of a contract,’ as long…”
— 319.28(1)(b) — 1 case
In Re Shunnarah, 268 B.R. 657 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001).
— 319.28(2)(b) — 6 cases
In Re Shunnarah, 268 B.R. 657 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001).
In Re Garcia, 276 B.R. 699 (Bankr. S.D. Florida 2002). “Fla. Stat. § 319.28 (l)(a) (1999)(emphasis added).”
In Re Zajni, 403 B.R. 891 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008). “Citing to TL-23(I) of the DMV Procedures Manual 4 , the court noted that the DMV has interpreted § 319.28 as “providing ‘for the transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle by operation of law, to include repossession of a motor vehicle for non-fulfillment of a contract,’ as long…”
In Re Diaz, 416 B.R. 902 (Bankr. S.D. Florida 2009). “Specifically, the court held that Fla. Stat. § 319.28 (2)(b) expressly recognizes that ownership transfers to the secured creditor upon repossession since the statute states in relevant part: In case of repossession of a motor vehicle .”
In Re Iferd, 225 B.R. 501 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1998).
— 319.28(b) — 1 case
In re Martinez, 283 B.R. 326 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001).
— 319.28(l)(a) — 3 cases
In Re Garcia, 276 B.R. 699 (Bankr. S.D. Florida 2002). “Fla. Stat. § 319.28 (l)(a) (1999)(emphasis added).”
In Re Zajni, 403 B.R. 891 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008). “Citing to TL-23(I) of the DMV Procedures Manual 4 , the court noted that the DMV has interpreted § 319.28 as “providing ‘for the transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle by operation of law, to include repossession of a motor vehicle for non-fulfillment of a contract,’ as long…”
Salema Bell Young, Individually & on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. C. Robbie Robinson, D/B/A Robbie & Son Paint & Body Shop, 585 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1978).
— 319.28(l)(b) — 3 cases
Bell-Tel Fed. Credit Union v. Kalter (In Re Kalter), 257 B.R. 93 (M.D. Fla. 2000).
In Re Ragan, 264 B.R. 776 (Bankr. S.D. Florida 2001).
In Re Garcia, 276 B.R. 699 (Bankr. S.D. Florida 2002). “Fla. Stat. § 319.28 (l)(a) (1999)(emphasis added).”
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