The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . workers’ compensation law provided for an occupational diseases cause of action pursuant to section 440.151 . . . Under section 440.151, a claimant was under the obligation to produce medical testimony to support the . . . Prior to enactment of the “heart-lung” statute, an occupational disease claim under section 440.151 enjoyed . . . Of interest, section 440.151 specifically excluded the presumption of section 440.26 from application . . . requirement on the part of the claimant to put on further proof meeting the requirements of section 440.151 . . .
. . . Section 440.151(1), Florida Statutes (1969).” Hoppe v. . . .
. . . See § 440.151(l)(a), Fla. . . .
. . . proven that viral gastroenteritis was an occupational disease in the manner contemplated by section 440.151 . . . Specifically, there is no requirement to put on proof meeting the requirements of section 440.151, Florida . . . entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits for other “occupational diseases” as provided for in section 440.151 . . .
. . . Stat. (2009); see also § 440.151(3) (defining “disablement,” for purposes of determining compensation . . .
. . . .” § 440.151(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . . But once compensability is established, nothing in section 440.151, or elsewhere in chapter 440, conditions . . . Indeed, the occupational disease is treated as if it were “an injury by accident.” § 440.151(l)(a), Fla . . .
. . . See § 440.151(1), Fla. . . .
. . . We conclude that the trial court erred because it did not apply the provisions of section 440.151(5), . . . The relevant Florida statute, section 440.151, entitled “Occupational Diseases,” is somewhat lengthy. . . . For purposes of the issue on appeal, the critical subsection of section 440.151 is subsection (5). . . . Applying Section 440.151(5) to Determine the Insurer Responsible for the Employee’s Claim for Benefits . . . Accordingly, we conclude that this case is resolved by the clear language of section 440.151(5). . . .
. . . The issue here is whether section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1991), may be read as contemplating the . . . Pursuant to section 440.151, claimant became disabled in late 1992, when he became “incapacitated ... . . . See § 440.151(3), Fla. Stat. (1991); City of Port Orange v. . . . That statute is section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1991), which is entitled “Occupational diseases.” . . . Because I can find no support in section 440.151 for the result reached by the majority, respectfully . . . (citing § 440.151(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991) and (1997)) (other citations omitted). See also Fla. . . . his work in the last occupation in which injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease.... ” § 440.151 . . . Section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1997), provides in pertinent part: (l)(a) Where the employer and employee . . .
. . . It is under the occupational disease provisions of section 440.151,Florida Statutes, that Claimant seeks . . . In reviewing section 440.151,and the applicable case law interpreting the statute, three points emerge . . . One, we do not look beyond section 440.151 to define its relevant terms. . . . A claimant either meets the requirements for coverage under section 440.151,or he does not. . . . See § 440.151(3), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . . , partially or totally, because of an occupational disease, from performing her or his work ...,” § 440.151 . . . Stat. (2003); see also § 440.151(l)(a), Fla. . . . In doing so, it relies on section 440.151, Florida Statutes (2002), which provides that “the disablement . . . or his work in the last occupation in which injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease-” § 440.151 . . . A fundamental flaw in the majority’s analysis is its assumption that the 2002 version of section 440.151 . . . Accordingly, this case is governed by the 2003 version of section 440.151 (effective October 1, 2003) . . . majority’s conclusion that a permanent impairment is not a disability for purposes of either section 440.151 . . .
. . . Irwin Yacht & Marine Corp., 398 So.2d 902, 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); § 440.151(2), Fla. . . .
. . . alternate theory of compens-ability was that hepatitis C is an occupational disease pursuant to section 440.151 . . . Irwin Yacht & Marine Corp., 398 So.2d 902, 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 198Í); see also § 440.151(2), Fla. . . .
. . . Section 440.151(6) extends the period of time to report an occupational disease to ninety days. . . .
. . . Under section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes, the carrier on risk at the time of the last injurious exposure . . .
. . . had satisfactorily established that he suffered from an occupational disease, as defined in section 440.151 . . . contributing cause of the disease, due to the unique provisions applicable to such diseases under section 440.151 . . . meet his burden to prove the disease with which he is afflicted met the standards required by section 440.151 . . . which now requires medical proof that the employment be the major contributing cause of the disease. § 440.151 . . .
. . . As the JCC observed: It is clear that in cases of occupational disease as defined in FS 440.151, the . . . The authority for this conclusion is found in the language of FS 440.151, as explained in Cote. . . . See § 440.151(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). And see Cote v. . . .
. . . See § 440.151(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . .
. . . See § 440.151(l)(a), Fla. . . .
. . . See § 440.151(l)(a), Fla. . . .
. . . See § 440.151(1)-(3), Fla. Stat. (1993); Wuesthoff Memorial Hosp. v. . . .
. . . Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the provisions of section 440.151(b), which precluded payment of . . . significantly, the workers’ compensation law in effect when Martin was decided included in section 440.151 . . . In combining sections 440.15(5)(a) and 440.151(l)(b), see Ch. 90-201, § 20, Laws of Fla., the Legislature . . .
. . . employer’s or carrier’s right to apportionment or deduction pursuant to ss. 440.02(1), 440.15.5(b), and 440.151 . . .
. . . distinction between a “repetitive trauma injury” and an “occupational disease” as defined by section 440.151 . . . Heinley was “injuriously exposed to the hazards of [what Chubb alleged was an occupational] disease.” § 440.151 . . . s assertion that carpal tunnel syndrome was an “occupational disease” within the meaning of section 440.151 . . . substantially higher in the particular trade, occupation, process, or employment than for the general public. § 440.151 . . .
. . . result of his chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), an occupational disease pursuant to section 440.151 . . . Section 440.151(l)(a) provides that the disability of an employee as the result of an occupational disease . . . the JCC’s rejection of its argument that Wise’s injury must not only satisfy the criteria of section 440.151 . . . Based upon our reading of the plain language of section 440.151(l)(a), we conclude that so long as an . . . Our conclusion is supported by section 440.151(l)(e), which provides that in cases where the combination . . .
. . . An occupational disease, according to section 440.151(2), Florida Statutes (1969), is “a disease which . . . Section 440.151(3), Florida Statutes (1969). . . . Section 440.151(1), Florida Statutes (1969). . . . time he became “actually incapacitated, partially or totally, because of an occupational disease.” § 440.151 . . .
. . . “[O]ccupational disease theory is derived from section 440.151, Florida Statutes, which provides a doctrinal . . .
. . . However, occupational disease theory is derived from section 440.151, Florida Statutes, which pi’ovides . . .
. . . . § 440.151(5) adopting the last injurious exposure theory of trigger with respect to occupational diseases . . .
. . . Harry Harmon Insulation, 511 So.2d 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (section 440.151(a), Florida Statutes, which . . .
. . . . § 440.151(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1991). . . . See, e.g., § 440.151, Fla. Stat. (occupational diseases); Festa v. . . .
. . . claims’ findings that Claimant sustained a disabling occupational disease within the meaning of section 440.151 . . . medical testimony is legally sufficient to support the award for chromate sensitivity under section 440.151 . . . necessary that a Claimant present evidence of a positive patch test to satisfy the requirements of section 440.151 . . .
. . . workers’ compensation law, the JCC determined that the last injurious exposure rule set forth in section 440.151 . . . Aetna argues that section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1989), provides a more restrictive test for an occupational . . . argues, the legislature provided a more lenient method of proving employer/carrier liability in section 440.151 . . .
. . . See § 440.151, Fla.Stat. (1945). . . . See § 440.151(2). . . . See § 440.151(l)(a). . . .
. . . Occupational diseases are governed by section 440.151, Florida Statutes, and the statute creates several . . . Section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes, establishes that the employer and carrier at risk when the claimant . . . In accordance with Sunshine Truck, to properly apply section 440.151(5) in the circumstances of the present . . .
. . . Workers’ Compensation Law F.S. 440.151 establishes that compensability of diseases that are incurred . . . Finally, section 440.151(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1989), states: The presumptions in favor of claimants . . . portion of the question was responded to. .The doctrine of last injurious exposure as set forth in § 440.151 . . . the majority has misinterpreted the effect of the last-injurious-exposure rule, codified at Section 440.151 . . .
. . . See, § 440.151, F.S. (1989); Lake v. Irwin Yacht, supra. . . . Section 440.151(2), Florida Statutes (1989), provides in pertinent part: The term “occupational disease . . . occupational disease shall be treated as an injury by accident, provided certain conditions are met. § 440.151 . . .
. . . that cryptococcal meningitis is not a disease compensable as an occupational disease under section 440.151 . . .
. . . is often an occupational disease did not satisfy the claimant's burden of proof set forth in section 440.151 . . .
. . . Section 440.151(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), provides that disablement or death from an “occupational . . . Section 440.151(2) further defines “occupational disease” as one “which is due to causes and conditions . . .
. . . The first concerns the “last injurious exposure” requirement of section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes. . . . Moreover, the e/c asserted that death benefits were barred by the 350-week limitation in section 440.151 . . . We now turn to the question of the constitutionality of the time limitation contained in section 440.151 . . . Section 440.151(l)(a) requires, for death benefits to be payable, that death result from an occupational . . . Section 440.151(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1973), provides: Where the employer and employee are subject . . .
. . . . § 440.151, Fla.Stat. (1985). . . .
. . . Section 440.151(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1974), provides that “disablement ... resulting from an occupational . . .
. . . See, Section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1983). As to exposure, in Festa v. . . .
. . . Stringer, 392 So.2d 1294 (Fla.1980); and Section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1985) (“the disablement or . . . substantially higher in the particular trade, occupation, process or employment than for the general public.” § 440.151 . . .
. . . commissioner’s finding that the claimant’s illness was an occupational disease within the meaning of Section 440.151 . . . The version of Section 440.151 which is applicable in this case is that found in Florida Statutes, 1971 . . . Section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes (1971) provides in part: “(5) Where compensation is payable for . . . Section 440.151(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1971) provides: "(a) Where the employer and employee are subject . . .
. . . See Section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1979). . . .
. . . he argues, his coronary condition should be treated as an occupational disease pursuant to Section 440.151 . . . failed to show that Pfeiffer’s condition was an “occupational disease” within the meaning of Section 440.151 . . .
. . . husband’s fatal heart attack should have been com-pensable as an occupational disease pursuant to Section 440.151 . . .
. . . Subsection 440.151(2), Florida Statutes (1977), provides: Whenever used in this section the term ‘occupational . . . One final consideration in reviewing an award based on occupational disease is that Section 440.151(3 . . .
. . . Section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes (1979), states: Where compensation is payable for an occupational . . .
. . . Under § 440.151, Fla.Stat., the following elements must be proven by a claimant to show that he is entitled . . . See § 440.151(l)(a) and (2). See also Florida State Hospital v. . . . See § 440.151(l)(e). In this case, the claim did not fall within the provisions of that statute. . . . that the claimant’s illnesses are not occupational diseases within the highly restrictive terms of § 440.151 . . .
. . . erred in determining that the claimant’s illness was an occupational disease within the meaning of § 440.151 . . . Subsection 440.151(2), Fla.Stat. (1977), provides that: Whenever used in this section the term “occupational . . . Under the provisions of Subsection 440.151(l)(e), Fla.Stat. (1977), the presumption that the claim comes . . .
. . . beekeeperlike, to an occupational disease of aggravated antibody response to insect serum, Section 440.151 . . .
. . . An occupational disease, according to section 440.151(2), Florida Statutes (1969), is “a disease which . . . Section 440.151(3), Florida Statutes (1969). . . . Section 440.151(1), Florida Statutes (1969). . . .
. . . . § 440.151(3), Florida Statutes. See Manzo v. Gem Tile Corp., 3 FCR 187 (1958); Meyer v. . . . that it cannot be contended that claimant is suffering from an “occupational disease,” under Section 440.151 . . .
. . . “Except as limited by Sec. 440.151(1)(b) and Sec. 440.02(19) F.S.A. this presumption makes the employer . . .
. . . Under § 440.151(1)(a), Florida Statutes, for a claimant to be compensated for an “occupational disease . . .
. . . . § 440.151, F.S.A., which provides in part: “(l)(e) The presumptions in favor of claimants established . . .
. . . . § 440.151, F. S.A. . . . Morrison Food Services, 245 So.2d 234 (Fla.1971), that Fla.Stat. § 440.151, F.S.A., requires a greater . . .
. . . . § 440.151, F.S.A., which provides that disablement resulting from an occupational disease shall be . . . (Emphasis supplied) Fla.Stat. § 440.151(2), F.S.A., contains the following provision: “[T]he term ‘occupational . . .
. . . establish other types of compensation claims, will not meet the requirements of Florida Statutes, § 440.151 . . . The foregoing evidence is inadequate, under Florida Statutes § 440.151, F.S.A., and the cases heretofore . . . disposed to afford the claimant additional opportunity to meet the requirements of Florida Statutes § 440.151 . . . Fla.Stat. § 440.151(2), F.S.A. . Fla.Stat. § 440.151(1) (a), F.S.A. . . .
. . . resulting in the claimant’s disability was an occupational disease as that term is defined in F.S.A. 440.151 . . . However, in 1945, Section 440.151, F.S.A. was added to the statutory law, which expanded the definition . . . of “accident” to cover occupational diseases, as follows: “440.151 Occupational Diseases— “(1) (a) Where . . . of life to which the general public is exposed,” which disease is made "an injury by accidenf’ by § 440.151 . . .
. . . injury so as to require apportionment between the two injuries, as required by Sec. 440.02(19), or Sec. 440.151 . . .
. . . finding of 27vi per cent disability of the body as a whole and in the alternative argue that under Sec. 440.151 . . .
. . . Attention was drawn to the provisions of Sec. 440.151(1) (a) Florida Statutes, F.S. . . .
. . . Second, F.S. 440.151(2), F.S.A., defines an occupational disease as one which “is due to causes and conditions . . .
. . . In his original application he claimed compensation for injury from an occupational disease, Sec. 440.151 . . . The language we have quoted inclines us to the belief that the two sections, Secs. 440.02(19) and 440.151 . . .
. . . Sec. 440.151(1) (b), F.S.A. provides that no compensation shall be paid for an occupational disease if . . . Except as limited by Sec. 440.151(1) (b) and Sec. 440.02(19) F.S.A. this presumption makes the employer . . .
. . . deputy stated that the petitioner was permanently disabled and that except for the provisions of Section 440.151 . . . Section 440.151(3) defines disablement as “the event of an employee’s becoming actually incapacitated . . . tyith logic and reason, we nevertheless disagree with the interpretation which he placed upon Section 440.151 . . .
. . . Deputy intended to find that the claimant was permanently totally disabled within the meaning of Section 440.151 . . .
. . . . §§ 440.151(1) (c) and 440.151(5), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., and in cases involving the acceleration or aggravation . . .
. . . the occupational disease of asbestosis, as is required before compensation can be paid under section 440.151 . . . a claim is satisfied and the requirement of notice within ninety days to the employer under section 440.151 . . . the employee’s benefits are to be measured by the law in effect at the time of his disability, does § 440.151 . . .
. . . whose employment the employee was last injuriously'exposed to the hazards of such disease,” Section 440.151 . . .
. . . . § 440.151, insofar as the same is applicable to the facts of this case. . . .
. . . The workmen’s compensation law provides as follows: Section 440.151 (1) (a) F.S.A. . . . Hillsboro Club constituted an “injurious” exposure, within the meaning of the provisions of section 440.151 . . .