Home
Menu
Call attorney Graham Syfert at 904-383-7448
Personal Injury Lawyer
Florida Statute 440.151 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 440.151 Case Law from Google Scholar
Statute is currently reporting as:
Link to State of Florida Official Statute Google Search for Amendments to 440.151

The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XXXI
LABOR
Chapter 440
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 440.151
440.151 Occupational diseases.
(1)(a) Where the employer and employee are subject to the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law, the disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease as hereinafter defined shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident, notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, and the employee or, in case of death, the employee’s dependents shall be entitled to compensation as provided by this chapter, except as hereinafter otherwise provided; and the practice and procedure prescribed by this chapter shall apply to all proceedings under this section, except as hereinafter otherwise provided. Provided, however, that in no case shall an employer be liable for compensation under the provisions of this section unless such disease has resulted from the nature of the employment in which the employee was engaged under such employer, was actually contracted while so engaged, and the nature of the employment was the major contributing cause of the disease. Major contributing cause must be shown by medical evidence only, as demonstrated by physical examination findings and diagnostic testing. “Nature of the employment” means that in the occupation in which the employee was so engaged there is attached a particular hazard of such disease that distinguishes it from the usual run of occupations, or the incidence of such disease is substantially higher in the occupation in which the employee was so engaged than in the usual run of occupations. In claims for death under s. 440.16, death must occur within 350 weeks after last exposure. Both causation and sufficient exposure to a specific harmful substance shown to be present in the workplace to support causation shall be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
(b) No compensation shall be payable for an occupational disease if the employee, at the time of entering into the employment of the employer by whom the compensation would otherwise be payable, falsely represents herself or himself in writing as not having previously been disabled, laid off or compensated in damages or otherwise, because of such disease.
(c) Where an occupational disease is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity, not itself compensable, or where disability or death from any other cause, not itself compensable, is aggravated, prolonged, accelerated or in anywise contributed to by an occupational disease, the compensation shall be payable only if the occupational disease is the major contributing cause of the injury. Any compensation shall be reduced and limited to such proportion only of the compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease were the sole cause of the disability or death as such occupational disease, as a causative factor, bears to all the causes of such disability or death, such reduction in compensation to be effected by reducing the number of weekly or monthly payments or the amounts of such payments, as under the circumstances of the particular case may be for the best interest of the claimant or claimants. Major contributing cause must be demonstrated by medical evidence based on physical examination findings and diagnostic testing.
(d) No compensation for death from an occupational disease shall be payable to any person whose relationship to the deceased, which under the provisions of this Workers’ Compensation Law would give right to compensation, arose subsequent to the beginning of the first compensable disability, save only to afterborn children of a marriage existing at the beginning of such disability.
(e) No compensation shall be payable for disability or death resulting from tuberculosis arising out of and in the course of employment by the Department of Health at a state tuberculosis hospital, or aggravated by such employment, when the employee had suffered from said disease at any time prior to the commencement of such employment.
(2) Whenever used in this section the term “occupational disease” shall be construed to mean only a disease which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation, process, or employment, and to exclude all ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed, unless the incidence of the disease is substantially higher in the particular trade, occupation, process, or employment than for the general public. “Occupational disease” means only a disease for which there are epidemiological studies showing that exposure to the specific substance involved, at the levels to which the employee was exposed, may cause the precise disease sustained by the employee.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in this section, “disablement” means disability as described in s. 440.02(15).
(4) This section shall not apply to cases of occupational disease in which the last injurious exposure to the hazards of such disease occurred before this section shall have taken effect.
(5) Where compensation is payable for an occupational disease, the employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease, and the insurance carrier, if any, on the risk when such employee was last so exposed under such employer, shall alone be liable therefor, without right to contribution from any prior employer or insurance carrier; and the notice of injury and claim for compensation, as hereinafter required, shall be given and made to such employer; provided, however, that in case of disability from any dust disease the only employer and insurance carrier liable shall be the last employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the disease for a period of at least 60 days.
(6) The time for notice of injury or death provided in s. 440.185(1) shall be extended in cases of occupational diseases to a period of 90 days.
History.s. 1, ch. 22852, 1945; s. 1, ch. 23921, 1947; s. 11, ch. 25035, 1949; s. 3, ch. 28241, 1953; s. 1, ch. 65-116; ss. 19, 35, ch. 69-106; ss. 10, 24, ch. 74-197; s. 23, ch. 78-300; ss. 11, 124, ch. 79-40; s. 21, ch. 79-312; s. 43, ch. 89-289; s. 56, ch. 90-201; s. 52, ch. 91-1; s. 111, ch. 97-103; s. 53, ch. 99-5; s. 210, ch. 99-8; s. 19, ch. 2003-412; s. 97, ch. 2023-8.

F.S. 440.151 on Google Scholar

F.S. 440.151 on Casetext

Amendments to 440.151


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 440.151
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 440.151.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE v. RATLIFF,, 217 So. 3d 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . workers’ compensation law provided for an occupational diseases cause of action pursuant to section 440.151 . . . Under section 440.151, a claimant was under the obligation to produce medical testimony to support the . . . Prior to enactment of the “heart-lung” statute, an occupational disease claim under section 440.151 enjoyed . . . Of interest, section 440.151 specifically excluded the presumption of section 440.26 from application . . . requirement on the part of the claimant to put on further proof meeting the requirements of section 440.151 . . .

SCHERER, v. VOLUSIA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 171 So. 3d 135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Section 440.151(1), Florida Statutes (1969).” Hoppe v. . . .

SMITH, v. CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH POLICE DEPT., 143 So. 3d 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See § 440.151(l)(a), Fla. . . .

WALTERS, v. STATE DOC DIVISION OF RISK MANAGEMENT,, 100 So. 3d 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . proven that viral gastroenteritis was an occupational disease in the manner contemplated by section 440.151 . . . Specifically, there is no requirement to put on proof meeting the requirements of section 440.151, Florida . . . entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits for other “occupational diseases” as provided for in section 440.151 . . .

ROCHA, v. CITY OF TAMPA, 100 So. 3d 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Stat. (2009); see also § 440.151(3) (defining “disablement,” for purposes of determining compensation . . .

CITY OF PEMBROKE PINES v. ORTAGUS, Jr., 50 So. 3d 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . .” § 440.151(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . . But once compensability is established, nothing in section 440.151, or elsewhere in chapter 440, conditions . . . Indeed, the occupational disease is treated as if it were “an injury by accident.” § 440.151(l)(a), Fla . . .

FULLER, v. OKALOOSA CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, 22 So. 3d 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See § 440.151(1), Fla. . . .

FIDELITY AND GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY, v. POLK COUNTY, 20 So. 3d 383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . We conclude that the trial court erred because it did not apply the provisions of section 440.151(5), . . . The relevant Florida statute, section 440.151, entitled “Occupational Diseases,” is somewhat lengthy. . . . For purposes of the issue on appeal, the critical subsection of section 440.151 is subsection (5). . . . Applying Section 440.151(5) to Determine the Insurer Responsible for the Employee’s Claim for Benefits . . . Accordingly, we conclude that this case is resolved by the clear language of section 440.151(5). . . .

ORANGE COUNTY FIRE RESCUE v. JONES,, 959 So. 2d 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . The issue here is whether section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1991), may be read as contemplating the . . . Pursuant to section 440.151, claimant became disabled in late 1992, when he became “incapacitated ... . . . See § 440.151(3), Fla. Stat. (1991); City of Port Orange v. . . . That statute is section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1991), which is entitled “Occupational diseases.” . . . Because I can find no support in section 440.151 for the result reached by the majority, respectfully . . . (citing § 440.151(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991) and (1997)) (other citations omitted). See also Fla. . . . his work in the last occupation in which injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease.... ” § 440.151 . . . Section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1997), provides in pertinent part: (l)(a) Where the employer and employee . . .

CITY OF PORT ORANGE PGCS, v. SEDACCA,, 953 So. 2d 727 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . It is under the occupational disease provisions of section 440.151,Florida Statutes, that Claimant seeks . . . In reviewing section 440.151,and the applicable case law interpreting the statute, three points emerge . . . One, we do not look beyond section 440.151 to define its relevant terms. . . . A claimant either meets the requirements for coverage under section 440.151,or he does not. . . . See § 440.151(3), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . . , partially or totally, because of an occupational disease, from performing her or his work ...,” § 440.151 . . . Stat. (2003); see also § 440.151(l)(a), Fla. . . . In doing so, it relies on section 440.151, Florida Statutes (2002), which provides that “the disablement . . . or his work in the last occupation in which injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease-” § 440.151 . . . A fundamental flaw in the majority’s analysis is its assumption that the 2002 version of section 440.151 . . . Accordingly, this case is governed by the 2003 version of section 440.151 (effective October 1, 2003) . . . majority’s conclusion that a permanent impairment is not a disability for purposes of either section 440.151 . . .

FLAMILY, v. CITY OF ORLANDO, 924 So. 2d 78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . Irwin Yacht & Marine Corp., 398 So.2d 902, 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); § 440.151(2), Fla. . . .

SEMINOLE COUNTY GOVERNMENT Co. v. BARTLETT,, 933 So. 2d 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . alternate theory of compens-ability was that hepatitis C is an occupational disease pursuant to section 440.151 . . . Irwin Yacht & Marine Corp., 398 So.2d 902, 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 198Í); see also § 440.151(2), Fla. . . .

POLK COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS v. ROSS,, 911 So. 2d 854 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . Section 440.151(6) extends the period of time to report an occupational disease to ninety days. . . .

CITY OF MARY ESTHER v. McARTOR,, 902 So. 2d 942 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . Under section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes, the carrier on risk at the time of the last injurious exposure . . .

CITY OF COOPER CITY FLORIDA MUNICIPAL INS. TRUST FLORIDA LEAGUE OF CITIES, v. FARTHING,, 905 So. 2d 925 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . had satisfactorily established that he suffered from an occupational disease, as defined in section 440.151 . . . contributing cause of the disease, due to the unique provisions applicable to such diseases under section 440.151 . . . meet his burden to prove the disease with which he is afflicted met the standards required by section 440.151 . . . which now requires medical proof that the employment be the major contributing cause of the disease. § 440.151 . . .

C. JAMES, Sr. v. ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC., 864 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . As the JCC observed: It is clear that in cases of occupational disease as defined in FS 440.151, the . . . The authority for this conclusion is found in the language of FS 440.151, as explained in Cote. . . . See § 440.151(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). And see Cote v. . . .

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION RSKCO, v. S. BROWN,, 863 So. 2d 364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . See § 440.151(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . .

B. MICHELS, v. ORANGE COUNTY FIRE RESCUE, 819 So. 2d 158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . See § 440.151(l)(a), Fla. . . .

B. MICHELS, v. ORANGE COUNTY FIRE RESCUE, 804 So. 2d 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . See § 440.151(l)(a), Fla. . . .

LRMC v. BRITT,, 767 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . See § 440.151(1)-(3), Fla. Stat. (1993); Wuesthoff Memorial Hosp. v. . . .

J. IRVING, v. AMETEK, INC., 756 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the provisions of section 440.151(b), which precluded payment of . . . significantly, the workers’ compensation law in effect when Martin was decided included in section 440.151 . . . In combining sections 440.15(5)(a) and 440.151(l)(b), see Ch. 90-201, § 20, Laws of Fla., the Legislature . . .

SPECIAL DISABILITY TRUST FUND, v. MEYER USA,, 721 So. 2d 421 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . employer’s or carrier’s right to apportionment or deduction pursuant to ss. 440.02(1), 440.15.5(b), and 440.151 . . .

ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIES INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. f k a v. FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY CHUBB GROUP,, 707 So. 2d 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . distinction between a “repetitive trauma injury” and an “occupational disease” as defined by section 440.151 . . . Heinley was “injuriously exposed to the hazards of [what Chubb alleged was an occupational] disease.” § 440.151 . . . s assertion that carpal tunnel syndrome was an “occupational disease” within the meaning of section 440.151 . . . substantially higher in the particular trade, occupation, process, or employment than for the general public. § 440.151 . . .

WATKINS ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTORS v. WISE,, 698 So. 2d 294 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . result of his chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), an occupational disease pursuant to section 440.151 . . . Section 440.151(l)(a) provides that the disability of an employee as the result of an occupational disease . . . the JCC’s rejection of its argument that Wise’s injury must not only satisfy the criteria of section 440.151 . . . Based upon our reading of the plain language of section 440.151(l)(a), we conclude that so long as an . . . Our conclusion is supported by section 440.151(l)(e), which provides that in cases where the combination . . .

HOPPE, v. CITY OF LAKELAND, 691 So. 2d 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . An occupational disease, according to section 440.151(2), Florida Statutes (1969), is “a disease which . . . Section 440.151(3), Florida Statutes (1969). . . . Section 440.151(1), Florida Statutes (1969). . . . time he became “actually incapacitated, partially or totally, because of an occupational disease.” § 440.151 . . .

MALT BROTHERS I, LTD. v. STATE FARM INSURANCE CO. K- KM, 654 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . “[O]ccupational disease theory is derived from section 440.151, Florida Statutes, which provides a doctrinal . . .

CITY OF ORLANDO v. LEMAY,, 652 So. 2d 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . However, occupational disease theory is derived from section 440.151, Florida Statutes, which pi’ovides . . .

In CELOTEX CORPORATION, CELOTEX CORPORATION, v. AIU INSURANCE COMPANY,, 152 B.R. 647 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993)

. . . . § 440.151(5) adopting the last injurious exposure theory of trigger with respect to occupational diseases . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. PRESTRESS DECKING CORP. Co., 611 So. 2d 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . Harry Harmon Insulation, 511 So.2d 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (section 440.151(a), Florida Statutes, which . . .

ZUNDELL, v. DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 609 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . . § 440.151(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1991). . . . See, e.g., § 440.151, Fla. Stat. (occupational diseases); Festa v. . . .

MARTIN COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD v. McINTOSH,, 605 So. 2d 166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . claims’ findings that Claimant sustained a disabling occupational disease within the meaning of section 440.151 . . . medical testimony is legally sufficient to support the award for chromate sensitivity under section 440.151 . . . necessary that a Claimant present evidence of a positive patch test to satisfy the requirements of section 440.151 . . .

AETNA LIFE CASUALTY COMPANY, v. SCHMITT, 597 So. 2d 938 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . workers’ compensation law, the JCC determined that the last injurious exposure rule set forth in section 440.151 . . . Aetna argues that section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1989), provides a more restrictive test for an occupational . . . argues, the legislature provided a more lenient method of proving employer/carrier liability in section 440.151 . . .

TOKYO HOUSE, INC. v. HSIN CHU, 597 So. 2d 348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . See § 440.151, Fla.Stat. (1945). . . . See § 440.151(2). . . . See § 440.151(l)(a). . . .

EASTERN AIRLINES, INC. GAB v. CRITTENDEN Co., 596 So. 2d 112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . Occupational diseases are governed by section 440.151, Florida Statutes, and the statute creates several . . . Section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes, establishes that the employer and carrier at risk when the claimant . . . In accordance with Sunshine Truck, to properly apply section 440.151(5) in the circumstances of the present . . .

KEENER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY v. L. SIMPSON,, 578 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . Workers’ Compensation Law F.S. 440.151 establishes that compensability of diseases that are incurred . . . Finally, section 440.151(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1989), states: The presumptions in favor of claimants . . . portion of the question was responded to. .The doctrine of last injurious exposure as set forth in § 440.151 . . . the majority has misinterpreted the effect of the last-injurious-exposure rule, codified at Section 440.151 . . .

GLASROCK HOME HEALTH CARE v. LEIVA,, 578 So. 2d 776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . See, § 440.151, F.S. (1989); Lake v. Irwin Yacht, supra. . . . Section 440.151(2), Florida Statutes (1989), provides in pertinent part: The term “occupational disease . . . occupational disease shall be treated as an injury by accident, provided certain conditions are met. § 440.151 . . .

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, v. STENHOLM,, 577 So. 2d 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . that cryptococcal meningitis is not a disease compensable as an occupational disease under section 440.151 . . .

SIMON SEZ, INC. v. FERRER,, 567 So. 2d 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . is often an occupational disease did not satisfy the claimant's burden of proof set forth in section 440.151 . . .

WUESTHOFF MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, v. B. HURLBERT,, 548 So. 2d 771 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . Section 440.151(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), provides that disablement or death from an “occupational . . . Section 440.151(2) further defines “occupational disease” as one “which is due to causes and conditions . . .

WOOD, v. HARRY HARMON INSULATION, 511 So. 2d 690 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . The first concerns the “last injurious exposure” requirement of section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes. . . . Moreover, the e/c asserted that death benefits were barred by the 350-week limitation in section 440.151 . . . We now turn to the question of the constitutionality of the time limitation contained in section 440.151 . . . Section 440.151(l)(a) requires, for death benefits to be payable, that death result from an occupational . . . Section 440.151(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1973), provides: Where the employer and employee are subject . . .

DAYRON CORPORATION v. MOREHEAD,, 509 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 1987)

. . . . § 440.151, Fla.Stat. (1985). . . .

COTE, v. COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC., 502 So. 2d 500 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . Section 440.151(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1974), provides that “disablement ... resulting from an occupational . . .

HAMILTON, v. STAMAS YACHTS, 496 So. 2d 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . See, Section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1983). As to exposure, in Festa v. . . .

H. SLEDGE, v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, 497 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . Stringer, 392 So.2d 1294 (Fla.1980); and Section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1985) (“the disablement or . . . substantially higher in the particular trade, occupation, process or employment than for the general public.” § 440.151 . . .

KEENE CORPORATION v. O. BAHL,, 476 So. 2d 789 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . commissioner’s finding that the claimant’s illness was an occupational disease within the meaning of Section 440.151 . . . The version of Section 440.151 which is applicable in this case is that found in Florida Statutes, 1971 . . . Section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes (1971) provides in part: “(5) Where compensation is payable for . . . Section 440.151(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1971) provides: "(a) Where the employer and employee are subject . . .

STRUCTURAL SYSTEMS, INC. v. P. WORTHEN,, 463 So. 2d 502 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . See Section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1979). . . .

E. PFEIFFER, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 436 So. 2d 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . he argues, his coronary condition should be treated as an occupational disease pursuant to Section 440.151 . . . failed to show that Pfeiffer’s condition was an “occupational disease” within the meaning of Section 440.151 . . .

HODGEN, v. BURNUP SIMS ENGINEERING, 420 So. 2d 885 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . husband’s fatal heart attack should have been com-pensable as an occupational disease pursuant to Section 440.151 . . .

KING MOTOR COMPANY v. POLLACK,, 409 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . Subsection 440.151(2), Florida Statutes (1977), provides: Whenever used in this section the term ‘occupational . . . One final consideration in reviewing an award based on occupational disease is that Section 440.151(3 . . .

SUNSHINE TRUCK PLAZA CAMP OIL COMPANY, v. TUCKER, 395 So. 2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . Section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes (1979), states: Where compensation is payable for an occupational . . .

BROWARD INDUSTRIAL PLATING, INC. v. WEIBY, 394 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . Under § 440.151, Fla.Stat., the following elements must be proven by a claimant to show that he is entitled . . . See § 440.151(l)(a) and (2). See also Florida State Hospital v. . . . See § 440.151(l)(e). In this case, the claim did not fall within the provisions of that statute. . . . that the claimant’s illnesses are not occupational diseases within the highly restrictive terms of § 440.151 . . .

FLORIDA STATE HOSPITAL v. POTTER,, 391 So. 2d 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . erred in determining that the claimant’s illness was an occupational disease within the meaning of § 440.151 . . . Subsection 440.151(2), Fla.Stat. (1977), provides that: Whenever used in this section the term “occupational . . . Under the provisions of Subsection 440.151(l)(e), Fla.Stat. (1977), the presumption that the claim comes . . .

POINSETTA GIFTS Co. v. EVANS,, 393 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . beekeeperlike, to an occupational disease of aggravated antibody response to insect serum, Section 440.151 . . .

AMERICAN BERYLLIUM COMPANY v. W. STRINGER,, 392 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 1980)

. . . An occupational disease, according to section 440.151(2), Florida Statutes (1969), is “a disease which . . . Section 440.151(3), Florida Statutes (1969). . . . Section 440.151(1), Florida Statutes (1969). . . .

PLANTATION CONSTRUCTION COMPANY v. AYERS,, 385 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . . § 440.151(3), Florida Statutes. See Manzo v. Gem Tile Corp., 3 FCR 187 (1958); Meyer v. . . . that it cannot be contended that claimant is suffering from an “occupational disease,” under Section 440.151 . . .

DORIC FOOD COMPANY s v. ALLEN,, 383 So. 2d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . “Except as limited by Sec. 440.151(1)(b) and Sec. 440.02(19) F.S.A. this presumption makes the employer . . .

CAST CRETE CORPORATION R. P. v. DUNCAN,, 383 So. 2d 245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . Under § 440.151(1)(a), Florida Statutes, for a claimant to be compensated for an “occupational disease . . .

W. RIPPLE, v. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., 291 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 1974)

. . . . § 440.151, F.S.A., which provides in part: “(l)(e) The presumptions in favor of claimants established . . .

PHELPS, v. GUNITE CONSTRUCTION AND RENTALS, INCORPORATED,, 279 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1973)

. . . . § 440.151, F. S.A. . . . Morrison Food Services, 245 So.2d 234 (Fla.1971), that Fla.Stat. § 440.151, F.S.A., requires a greater . . .

H. BROOKS, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 255 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1971)

. . . . § 440.151, F.S.A., which provides that disablement resulting from an occupational disease shall be . . . (Emphasis supplied) Fla.Stat. § 440.151(2), F.S.A., contains the following provision: “[T]he term ‘occupational . . .

NORMAN, v. MORRISON FOOD SERVICES, 245 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1971)

. . . establish other types of compensation claims, will not meet the requirements of Florida Statutes, § 440.151 . . . The foregoing evidence is inadequate, under Florida Statutes § 440.151, F.S.A., and the cases heretofore . . . disposed to afford the claimant additional opportunity to meet the requirements of Florida Statutes § 440.151 . . . Fla.Stat. § 440.151(2), F.S.A. . Fla.Stat. § 440.151(1) (a), F.S.A. . . .

RICHARDSON, v. HONEYWELL, INC. Co., 188 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1966)

. . . resulting in the claimant’s disability was an occupational disease as that term is defined in F.S.A. 440.151 . . . However, in 1945, Section 440.151, F.S.A. was added to the statutory law, which expanded the definition . . . of “accident” to cover occupational diseases, as follows: “440.151 Occupational Diseases— “(1) (a) Where . . . of life to which the general public is exposed,” which disease is made "an injury by accidenf’ by § 440.151 . . .

R. C. JORDAN, v. FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,, 183 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1966)

. . . injury so as to require apportionment between the two injuries, as required by Sec. 440.02(19), or Sec. 440.151 . . .

WESLEY S, INC. v. J. CARAMELLO, 156 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1963)

. . . finding of 27vi per cent disability of the body as a whole and in the alternative argue that under Sec. 440.151 . . .

C. WOLFE, d b a v. NEAL, 156 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1963)

. . . Attention was drawn to the provisions of Sec. 440.151(1) (a) Florida Statutes, F.S. . . .

GORDON, v. WALGREEN S DRUG STORE, 149 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1963)

. . . Second, F.S. 440.151(2), F.S.A., defines an occupational disease as one which “is due to causes and conditions . . .

L. MURRAY, v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, 138 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1962)

. . . In his original application he claimed compensation for injury from an occupational disease, Sec. 440.151 . . . The language we have quoted inclines us to the belief that the two sections, Secs. 440.02(19) and 440.151 . . .

MARTIN COMPANY v. CARPENTER, 132 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1961)

. . . Sec. 440.151(1) (b), F.S.A. provides that no compensation shall be paid for an occupational disease if . . . Except as limited by Sec. 440.151(1) (b) and Sec. 440.02(19) F.S.A. this presumption makes the employer . . .

G. CONNER, v. RINER PLASTERING COMPANY, W. Co. Co. U. S. Co. Co. Co., 131 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1961)

. . . deputy stated that the petitioner was permanently disabled and that except for the provisions of Section 440.151 . . . Section 440.151(3) defines disablement as “the event of an employee’s becoming actually incapacitated . . . tyith logic and reason, we nevertheless disagree with the interpretation which he placed upon Section 440.151 . . .

B. LEONARD, v. COOK PRUITT MASONRY, INC., 126 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1960)

. . . Deputy intended to find that the claimant was permanently totally disabled within the meaning of Section 440.151 . . .

JOHNNIE S PRODUCE COMPANY, v. BENEDICT JORDAN,, 120 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1960)

. . . . §§ 440.151(1) (c) and 440.151(5), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., and in cases involving the acceleration or aggravation . . .

HYATT, v. ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY,, 121 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1960)

. . . the occupational disease of asbestosis, as is required before compensation can be paid under section 440.151 . . . a claim is satisfied and the requirement of notice within ninety days to the employer under section 440.151 . . . the employee’s benefits are to be measured by the law in effect at the time of his disability, does § 440.151 . . .

McLEAN, v. J. MUNDY, Co. Co. Co. Co., 81 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1955)

. . . whose employment the employee was last injuriously'exposed to the hazards of such disease,” Section 440.151 . . .

MUNDY v. McLEAN, 72 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1954)

. . . . § 440.151, insofar as the same is applicable to the facts of this case. . . .

BODENHOFER v. SMITH PLUMBING CO., 1 Fla. Supp. 170 (Fla. Industrial Comm'n 1949)

. . . The workmen’s compensation law provides as follows: Section 440.151 (1) (a) F.S.A. . . . Hillsboro Club constituted an “injurious” exposure, within the meaning of the provisions of section 440.151 . . .