Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Because the injured insured is statutorily prohibited from recovering these costs from the tortfeasor whose wrongful conduct caused the injury or death, he or she is relegated to payment of these necessary costs from his or her insurance carrier unless the statutorily-imposed threshold of permanency is established. § 627.737, Fla....

...Bill Wagner, Tampa for amicus curiae — Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Barry Scott Richard, Deputy Atty. Gen., for intervenor. DEKLE, Justice. This appeal comes to us directly from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County and involves the constitutional validity of F.S. §§ 627.737 and 627.738, F.S.A., these being the portions of the 1972 Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act (hereinafter referred to as the "no-fault" insurance act) providing for tort immunity in certain specified circumstances....

...Because the Lasky car was a 1958 Ford, its replacement value did not meet the $550.00 "threshold" requirement of our no-fault insurance law as to property damage. Mrs. Lasky's injuries did not include any compound fracture or other injury which would bring her within the provisions of § 627.737(2) allowing her to recover damages for pain and suffering, etc., in the traditional tort action; if she comes within these provisions at all, it must be by virtue of the one thousand dollar medical expense "threshold" provision of F.S. § 627.737(2), F.S.A....

...specifically finding the statutes in question to be constitutionally valid in the face of appellant's challenge; this direct appeal ensued. CONSTITUTIONALITY Appellants here present a many-faceted attack upon the constitutional validity of both F.S. § 627.737, F.S.A....

...ion invalid on grounds that it unconstitutionally denied the right of access to the courts under Art. I, § 21, Fla. Const. Kluger v. White, 281 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973). We now hold, however, that, with one exception, the personal injury aspects of F.S. § 627.737, F.S.A., are valid and constitutional....

...t this requirement. This provides a reasonable alternative to the traditional action in tort. In exchange for his previous right to damages for pain and suffering (in the limited class of cases where recovery of these elements of damage is barred by § 627.737), with recovery limited to those situations where he can prove that the other party was at fault, the injured party is assured of recovery of his major and salient economic losses from his own insurer....

...n insurer of medical costs, lost wages, etc., while foregoing the right to recover in tort for these same benefits and (in a limited category of cases) the right to recover for intangible damages to the extent covered by the required insurance (F.S. § 627.737(1), F.S.A.); furthermore, the accident victim is assured of some recovery even where he himself is at fault....

...five hundred and forty dollars as the result of the fault of another would be without recourse against anyone under § 627.738, despite a clear loss to him and even where evidence of fault of the other party was overwhelming. The provisions of F.S. § 627.737, F.S.A., present a totally different picture....

...rom tort liability for tangible damages resulting from injury except where the benefits provided in F.S. § 627.736(1), F.S.A., are payable to the injured party by his insurer or would be so payable but for an authorized deduction or exclusion. F.S. § 627.737(1), F.S.A....

...are less than one thousand dollars. [9] In computing the one thousand dollar figure, a person entitled to receive free medical *15 and surgical benefits is credited with the equivalent value of the services so provided him, as a part of the $1,000. § 627.737(2)....

...from the total deprivation of any right of recovery for property loss under $550.00 disapproved in Kluger . The property provisions considered in Kluger did not allow any reasonable alternative to the traditional tort action; the provisions of F.S. § 627.737, F.S.A., do provide a reasonable alternative to the traditional action in tort, and therefore do not violate the right of access to the courts guaranteed by Art....

...ssed in the legal literature on the subject. In order to determine whether the act in question is reasonably related to these permissible legislative objectives, we are compelled next to examine what changes the act makes in the prior tort law. F.S. § 627.737, F.S.A., grants an exemption from liability in tort for vehicular accidents, to persons meeting the insurance requirements of F.S....

...ars a substantial relationship to the legislative purpose, the classification does not deny equal protection. Daniels v. O'Connor, 243 So.2d 144 (Fla. 1971). Appellants' basic equal protection argument deals with the "threshold" requirements of F.S. § 627.737(2), F.S.A., relating to circumstances in which an exemption is granted from tort liability for damages for pain and suffering, etc....

...It is not therefore the amount of the actual bill rendered to the patient which determines if the $1,000 "threshold" has been met, but rather the reasonable amount referred to in the statute and such medical expense as shall be "necessary." The second noted class of cases provided for in the threshold requirements of F.S. § 627.737(2), F.S.A., is that in which the *19 $1,000 medical expense "threshold" has not been reached, but in which death or permanent injury results....

...t's towers." As surely as "All men are created equal," so are all "equal" in death. PERMANENCY Similarly, equal protection of the laws is not offended by differentiating between non-permanent injuries and permanent injuries, i.e., those specified in § 627.737(2): permanent disfigurement, loss of a body member, permanent injury within reasonable medical probability and permanent loss of a bodily function, which have a reasonable likelihood of creating substantial pain and suffering. The grammatical construction of § 627.737(2) makes it abundantly clear that the $1,000 medical expense threshold is to be considered separately from the other thresholds, since it provides: "only in the event that the benefits which are payable for such injury ......

...se to substantial suffering, the Legislature has not been arbitrary or unreasonable. This is amplified by the fact that an alternate threshold is provided by the $1,000 medical provision for persons who have sustained serious but transient injuries. § 627.737(2)....

...A substantial relationship to permissible legislative objectives having been shown, and the other tests having been met, we find no denial of equal protection of the laws to be present. In sum, we here uphold both the $1,000 medical expenses threshold and the threshold listed in F.S. § 627.737(2), F.S.A., if: "......

...xcess of $1,000, and in which no death or permanent injury results, but in which: "... the injury or disease consists in whole or in part of ... a fracture to a weight-bearing bone, [or] a compound, comminuted, displaced or compressed fracture... ." § 627.737(2) Although this alternative "threshold" test was undoubtedly well intended, it unfortunately constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws by discriminating among members of the class of persons injured in automobile accidents who...

...The same is not true as to the weight-bearing little toe. One who suffers a soft tissue injury may not seek recompense for pain and suffering unless it can be proved that the injury is permanent; yet these have been shown to be among the most serious of bodily injuries. Under the provisions of § 627.737(2) dealing with this category of cases, a person sustaining a fracture as described in the statute (as the broken little toe described above) would be allowed to *21 proceed with suit, but a person who receives a severe wrenching of the ne...

...may suffer great pain and discomfort is allowed no redress in the courts under this provision. Such results cannot reasonably be said to rest on a rational basis, but are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, and for that reason this provision of F.S. § 627.737(2), F.S.A....

...the statute will be sustained. State ex rel. Lamar v. Dillon, supra ; State ex rel. Moodie v. Bryan, supra ; City of Miami v. State, 158 Fla. 56, 27 So.2d 829 (1946). Applying these tests to the instant provision we hold that the invalid portion of § 627.737 (2), as separate, independent "thresholds" alone, namely, the fracture of a weight-bearing bone or the compound, comminuted, displaced or compressed fracture, may properly be severed from the remainder of that section, and therefore that t...

...ants (despite their lack of standing to raise these points) and find them to be devoid of merit. The no-fault insurance act has not been shown to violate the equal protection of the laws, except as to the alternative "threshold" requirements of F.S. § 627.737(2), F.S.A., of particularized injuries involving weight bearing bones, etc., as outlined above. RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY Appellants' next contention is that the provisions of F.S. § 627.737, F.S.A., deprive them of their right to trial by jury under Fla....

...While the abolition of a cause of action triable by jury might in some instance be unconstitutional on another ground, [18] the present statutory provisions do not violate the right to trial by jury. *23 RESTRAINT ON NON-RESIDENTS' RIGHT TO TRAVEL Appellants argue that the provisions of F.S. § 627.737, F.S.A., infringe unconstitutionally on the rights of non-residents to travel to or in the State of Florida....

...However, the unique circumstances involved in this case persuade us that a simple affirmance of the order appealed would be contrary to the interests of justice. As noted earlier, the appellants in this action have now in fact exceeded the one thousand dollar "threshold" requirement of F.S. § 627.737(2), F.S.A., and thus would be entitled, under the act, to pursue their claims for intangible damages for pain and suffering, etc., absent the trial court's order of dismissal prior to such a showing....

...lants under F.S. § 627.736(1)(a), F.S.A., having now exceeded in amount the sum of one thousand dollars, in order to allow an opportunity to pursue a recovery in tort of damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience pursuant to F.S. § 627.737(2), F.S.A., as the facts may appear, and for such other and further proceedings as may be necessary, not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. ADKINS, C.J., and ROBERTS, McCAIN and CARLTON (Retired), JJ., concur. ERVIN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion. BOYD, J., dissents. ERVIN, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part): F.S. Sections 627.737 and 627.738, F.S.A....

...However, when the differences in treatment between those included and those excluded from the class bear a real and substantial relationship to the purposes sought to be obtained by the act, the classification is valid, as against an attack under the equal protection clause. Under Fla. Stat. § 627.737, F.S.A., entitled "Tort Exemption," there is an exemption from tort liability for damages because of bodily injuries, sickness or disease arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in this State....

...How can the Legislature possibly contend that a statute which would breed such results can be said to rest on a rational basis? This legislation unabashedly favors the rich — who can afford to pay and are charged and do pay higher medical fees and thus reach the threshold much faster — over the less affluent. In Fla. Stat. § 627.737, F.S.A., the tort exemption section, certain injuries were set forth which would support an action for damages for pain and suffering....

...on for pain and suffering, unless same is considered to be a permanent injury. Also, one who suffers a soft tissue injury may not recover for pain and suffering unless it can be proved that the injury is permanent. Under the provisions of Fla. Stat. § 627.737, F.S.A., a person sustaining a fracture as described in the statute would be allowed to proceed with suit, but a person who receives a severe wrenching of the neck and spine and the associated soft tissue (such as the typical "whiplash" in...

...[8] Or its approved equivalent. As used hereafter in this opinion, the term "insurance" refers to the security required to be maintained by F.S. § 627.733(3), F.S.A., whether the means by which such security is provided is insurance or some other approved method. [9] F.S. § 627.737(2), F.S.A., referring to benefits payable under F.S....

...1962). [20] The use of the terms "accrued" and "cause of action" in this context is different from the historical definitions, due to the possible subsequent accrual of the further cause of action at such later time as the $1,000 threshold of F.S. § 627.737, F.S.A., is reached.

...The defendants, Rollins and Cates, argued that the plain language of section 627.736(3), Florida Statutes (1991), [1] required the court to instruct the jury not to compensate the Pizzarellis for PIP benefits that had been paid or were to be paid in the future. The Pizzarellis argued that section 627.7372, Florida Statutes (1991), [2] applied and entitled Rollins and Cates to a setoff only for those PIP benefits that had been paid up until the time of trial....

....78 in PIP benefits fit the definition of "payable" and therefore set off the $524.78 from the $5000 future medical expense award. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that section 627.736(3) applied rather than section 627.7372....

...As an alteration of the common law, the statutory provisions that allow the introduction into evidence and setoff of collateral insurance benefits must be narrowly construed. Lastly, we disagree with the dissents in this case that our prior case law construing section 627.737(3) mandates a contrary result. In Purdy v. Gulf Breeze Enterprises, Inc., 403 So.2d 1325 (Fla.1981), we upheld the constitutionality of section 627.737(3) because it simply reduced the amount of damages injured plaintiffs can recover by the amount of PIP benefits "they have received." Purdy, 403 So.2d at 1327. In discussing the provisions of section 627.737(3) in effect at that time, we stated that "[t]o prevent the injured persons from receiving double recovery, the legislature has provided that any PIP benefits they have received from their insurers will be set off from the amount they...

...In all cases in which a jury is required to fix damages, the court shall instruct the jury that the plaintiff shall not recover such special damages for personal injury protection benefits paid or payable. § 627.736(3), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis supplied). [2] Specifically, section 627.7372(1), Florida Statutes (1991), provides: (1) In any action for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of the ownership, operation, use, or maintenance of a motor vehicle, the court shall admit into evidence the total amount of a...

...ready burdened judicial system," id., outweighed in the particular case the plaintiff's need to sue for property damage and later, having reached the no-fault threshold of $1,000 in personal injury damages or suffered permanent injury as required by Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1975), to sue for these latter damages....

...revises the civil and criminal law concerning fraudulent insurance claims and soliciting of motor vehicle tort claims by attorneys and others (Section 36); generally requires mandatory joinder of all personal injury claims and actions brought under Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1975) (Section 38); generally precludes joinder of liability insurers in suits against insureds (Section 39); changes the definition of "minor children" in the Wrongful Death Act (Section 40); provides for mandatory...

...Two physicians testified that Morey sustained permanent injury from the auto accident. However, it was also demonstrated that the medical history on which the doctors based their opinion of permanency was in part inaccurate. The jury found that Morey did not sustain a permanent injury under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1985), [1] and the court entered judgment in favor of Harper....

...ssenting). Accordingly, the decision below is quashed and the cause is remanded with directions that the trial court's judgment be affirmed. It is so ordered. BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1985), a plaintiff is precluded from recovering damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease arising out of ownership, maintenance, operati...

...listed threshold requirements. Morey and the instant case both involve the subsection (b) requirement that the injury or disease must be a "[p]ermanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement." § 627.737(2)(b), Fla....

...n insurer of medical costs, lost wages, etc., while foregoing the right to recover in tort for these same benefits and (in a limited category of cases) the right to recover for intangible damages to the extent covered by the required insurance (F.S. § 627.737(1), F.S.A.); furthermore, the accident victim is assured of some recovery even where he himself is at fault....

...Legislative History In an apparent response to concerns that unscrupulous doctors and lawyers were inflating or outright falsifying personal injury claims in an effort to meet and exceed the statutory monetary threshold amount, [4] the Legislature enacted section *818 627.7375, Florida Statutes (Supp.1976). See ch. 76-266, § 7, Laws of Fla. [5] Section 627.7375, when enacted, contained essentially that which is now found in subsections (1) through (4) of section 817.234, all of which then included, and still include, fraud as an element of the crime....

...e tort claims or claims for personal injury protection benefits. See ch. 78-258, § 3, Laws of Fla. The Legislature, again having the opportunity to include intent to defraud as an element, did not do so. The following year, the entire section (then-section 627.7375) was renumbered as section 817.234....

...Worthy of notice, however, is that during the same year, the Legislature passed a reviser's bill to remove inconsistencies and redundancies and otherwise clarify statutes and facilitate their correct interpretation. See ch. 79-400, Laws of Fla. While revising then-section 627.7375, the Legislature permitted subsections (8) and (9) to remain untouched....

...71-252, § 8, Laws of Fla. In 1976, the Legislature eliminated this monetary requirement, and in its place adopted a scheme which made recovery in tort dependent on the character of the injury suffered by the accident victim. See ch. 76-266, § 5, Laws of Fla.; see also § 627.737(2), Fla.Stat....

...Rehearing Denied July 26, 1984. *588 Paul Antinori, Jr. of Antinori & Thury, P.A., and Rudy G. LaRussa, Tampa, for appellant. Michael S. Rywant of Prugh & Rywant, Tampa, for appellees. RYDER, Judge. Patricia Fay, plaintiff below in a negligence action brought pursuant to section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1981), [1] appeals the final judgment entered in favor of appellees, Mincey and his insurance company, which confirmed the jury's findings that *589 Mincey had been negligent but Fay had not sustained permanent injuries....

...We reverse because the trial court abused its discretion with respect to these rulings and the exclusions were not harmless error. Fay filed a complaint against appellees Mincey and Sentry Insurance Company (Sentry) to recover damages recoverable under section 627.737(2) for personal injuries she allegedly suffered in an automobile collision which occurred on May 14, 1981....

...It was further stated that Mincey was insured under a liability insurance policy issued by Sentry. Appellees filed an answer denying Mincey's negligence and asserted Fay's comparative negligence as one defense and the "no-fault" tort liability exemption provision of section 627.737 as a second defense....

...Finally, we note the trend is to liberally construe section 90.702. Mannino v. International Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846 (6th Cir.1981) (construing similar federal provisions). Accordingly, assuming LCT is an appropriate subject for a jury's consideration in personal injury cases brought under section 627.737, we hold a licensed chiropractor is not precluded from being qualified to testify as to LCT and giving an opinion with respect to a particular thermographic study done by him if the trial court determines the proffered expert possesse...

...Dr. Kriz's also recently obtained evidence that Fay was not suffering compensable, permanent injuries under the no-fault law. In short, the exclusions were not harmless because medical testimony is necessary in establishing a permanent injury under section 627.737(2)....

...Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc. v. Stuart, 301 So.2d 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). We therefore REVERSE the jury's verdict, order a new trial, and REMAND the cause for proceedings consistent with this opinion. BOARDMAN, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 627.737(2) provides: (2) In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...Because the injured insured is statutorily prohibited from recovering these costs from the tortfeasor whose wrongful conduct caused the injury or death, he or she is relegated to payment of these necessary costs from his or her insurance carrier unless the statutorily-imposed threshold of permanency is established. § 627.737, Fla....

...insurer of medical costs, lost wages, etc., while foregoing the right to recover in tort for these same benefits and (in a limited category of cases) the right to recover for intangible damages to the extent covered by the required insurance (F.S. s 627.737(1), F.S.A.); furthermore, the accident victim is assured of some recovery even where he Himself is at fault....

...This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the circuit court in Manatee County awarding the appellants $7,937.20 for damages incurred as a result of an automobile accident. Because the trial judge upheld the constitutionality of sections 627.736(3) [1] and 627.7372, [2] Florida Statutes *1327 (1977), we have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution (1972)....

...During the course of the trial a dispute arose as to the admissibility of evidence relating to Mr. Purdy's receiving PIP benefits from his insurer. Both sides agreed to postpone arguments concerning the constitutionality of the collateral source statute, section 627.7372, Florida Statutes (1977), and the effect it would have on the amount of damages awarded until after the trial was over....

...At the end of the trial the jury awarded Mr. Purdy $11,318.00 as compensation for his injuries and Mrs. Purdy $500.00 as compensation for the loss of her car. At a post trial hearing the trial judge upheld the constitutionality of sections 627.736(3) and 627.7372, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...ive method of meeting such public necessity can be shown. Kluger v. White, 281 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973). This holding does not apply to these statutes since they do not abolish any previous right of access to courts. Basically, sections 627.736(3) and 627.7372 reduce the amount of damages injured plaintiffs can recover from tortfeasors by the amount of benefits they have received from collateral sources....

..."admit into evidence the total amount of all collateral sources which have been paid to the claimant prior to the commencement of the trial. The court shall also admit into evidence any amount paid by the claimant to secure such collateral sources." § 627.7372(1), Fla....

...yearly. We believe the statute refers to the costs incurred by claimants to secure the actual policies from which they received benefits for whatever period of time the policy is in effect. From this analysis we conclude that sections 627.736(3) and 627.7372, Florida Statutes (1977), do not deprive persons injured in automobile accidents of their right of access to the courts....

...These sections merely prevent injured plaintiffs from recovering monies which, equitably speaking, belong to their insurers. Furthermore, there is nothing in the law which prevents injured persons from waiving their rights to receive insurance benefits and suing the tortfeasor for the full amount of their damages. Section 627.7372 sets off only those benefits which actually have been paid....

...— No insurer shall have a lien on any recovery in tort by judgment, settlement, or otherwise for personal injury protection benefits, whether suit has been filed or settlement has been reached without suit. An injured party who is entitled to bring suit under the provision of s. 627.737, or his legal representative, shall have no right to recover any damages for which personal injury protection benefits are paid or payable....

...heir interests may appear, or without obtaining the insurer's consent to a different method of payment. (d) In the event an injured party or his legal representative is entitled to bring suit against a third party tort-feasor under the provisions of § 627.737 and fails to bring such suit against such third pay tort-feasor within one year after the last payment of any benefits under subsection (1), the insurer of such injured party, upon giving thirty days' written notice to such injured party,...

...Prosser, The Law of Torts 236 (4th ed. 1971). Since Greene relied upon his loss of smell and taste to meet the nofault thresholds, it was incumbent upon him to prove that Mrs. Flewelling's negligence was the legal or proximate cause of his loss of these senses. See § 627.737(2), Fla....

...correct, it is not necessary that we address this point. For the same reason, it is unnecessary that we address Greene's further argument that the court erred in refusing to give a jury instruction on a "serious, nonpermanent injury" as described in § 627.737(2)(e)....

...Accordingly, the order of the trial court setting aside the jury's verdict and entering *782 a judgment in favor of Greene for only his property damage is affirmed. GRIMES, C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur. NOTES [1] In order for Greene to maintain his tort suit for personal injuries, § 627.737, Fla....

...tested. In response to special interrogatories, the jury found that plaintiff was not comparatively negligent and that she had sustained a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability as a result of the automobile accident. See § 627.737(2)(b), Fla....

...In any given case, because of the absence of a statutory definition or jury instruction, a permanent injury is essentially what the medical experts and lawyers tell the jury it is. ("We know it when we see it."). Comment 3 to Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) 6.1 states: "Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1991), does not define `permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability'.......

...jury, “the trial court took from the jury’s consideration the issue of the permanency of [Wald’s] *1207 neck and back injuries, the only conditions for which [he] sought damages.” Grainger, 982 So.2d at 43 . The First District concluded that section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (2007), precluded the jury from awarding Wald damages based on the permanency of the thigh injury because it did not cause “pain, suffering, mental anguish, or inconvenience” where defense counsel had stated that the thigh injury caused no “ongoing daily chronic pain.” Id. at 43 & n. 1. We find the First District’s reading of the statute does not comport with its plain language. Section 627.737(2)(b) provides that a plaintiff may recover damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience (noneconomic damages) because of a bodily injury arising out of the use of a motor vehicle only in the event that the injury “consists in whole or in part of ......

...Dillon suffered severe but nonpermanent injuries and had medical expenses exceeding $1,000. The defendants moved for dismissal or a judgment in their favor, asserting that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because the facts alleged did not meet the "tort threshold" under section 627.737. Plaintiffs responded with the contention that section 627.737 is unconstitutional as a denial of access to courts, due process, and equal protection. The trial court issued an order holding for the defendants and finding the statute constitutional. On appeal, the district court found sections 627.736(1), [1] 627.737, [2] and 627.739 [3] of *15 the no-fault statute unconstitutional....

...tional. As did the district court, we shall address each of the constitutional issues separately. DENIAL OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS Dillon was not allowed to maintain his suit for pain and suffering because he did not meet the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1979), insofar as his injuries were not permanent....

...The district court recognized that in Lasky we held that the denial of the right to recover such damages did not violate this constitutional provision because the legislature had established a reasonable alternative. The court concluded, however, that subsequent changes in sections 637.736, 627.737, and 627.739 rendered the alternative no longer reasonable....

...t this requirement. This provides a reasonable alternative to the traditional action in tort. In exchange for his previous right to damages for pain and suffering (in the limited class of cases where recovery of these elements of damage is barred by § 627.737), with recovery limited to those situations where he he can prove that the other party was at fault, the injured party is assured of recovery of his major and salient economic losses from his own insurer....

...f PIP coverage have been increased from $5,000 to $10,000. Regardless of the actual amount of recovery, an injured person will receive prompt payment for his major and salient economic losses even where he himself is at fault. Thus the provisions of section 627.737 still provide a reasonable alternative to the traditional action in tort and therefore do not violate the right of access to courts guaranteed by article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution. *18 DUE PROCESS OF LAW The district court found that sections 627.736(1), 627.737(1), and 627.739(1), Florida Statutes (1979), unconstitutionally denied due process in that they did not bear a reasonable relationship to permissible legislative objectives. The district court explained: The changes to sections 627.736, 627.737 and 627.739 noted above cause the 1979 no-fault act to no longer be reasonably related to several of the permissible legislative objectives noted in Lasky: (1) injured parties are able to initiate suits for expenses not payable by an insurer...

...presume that they do so with knowledge of the consequences. This provision is reasonably related to the legislative objective of minimizing the cost of insurance in this state. EQUAL PROTECTION Finally, Dillon argues that the threshold provisions of section 627.737(2), which require some sort of permanent injury before a suit for pain and suffering can be brought, unconstitutionally deny him equal protection of the laws....

...ain to recover damages to recompense them, while not granting such right of recovery to those substantially less likely to incur any prolonged pain. Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co., 296 So.2d at 19. In conclusion, we find that sections 627.736(1), 627.737, and 627.739 of the Florida Statutes (1979), do not violate the rights of access to courts, due process, or equal protection....

...ed personal injury protection for medical expenses and loss of earnings. SUNDBERG, Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Although I concur substantially with the majority opinion, I feel compelled to dissent from the holding that section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1979), is constitutional insofar as it eliminates all causes of action for intangible damages for nonpermanent injuries....

...Florida Constitution. But complete elimination of the common law right to redress for such injury and damages requires that analysis now. When I apply the principles of Kluger v. White, 281 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), I am compelled to the conclusion that section 627.737(2) violates article I, section 21 of our constitution by absolutely denying access to the courts to vindicate a prior existing common law right to recover intangible damages for nonpermanent injuries....

...This right is withdrawn without supplying any viable alternative just as was condemned in Kluger. If the right to intangible damages for nonpermanent injuries can be constitutionally eliminated then so too could the right to damages for permanent injuries. For this reason I dissent from the holding that section 627.737(2) is constitutional insofar as it prohibits recovery of intangible damages for nonpermanent injuries....

...air or deceptive act or practice involving the business of insurance, and any such insurer committing such violation shall be subject to the penalties afforded in such part, as well as those which may be afforded elsewhere in the insurance code. [2] 627.737 Tort exemption; limitation on right to damages; punitive damages....

...(b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. (c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement. (d) Death. (3) When a defendant, in a proceeding brought pursuant to ss. 627.730-627.741, questions whether the plaintiff has met the requirements of s. 627.737(2), then the defendant may file an appropriate motion with the court, and the court shall, on a one-time basis only, 30 days before the date set for the trial or the pre-trial hearing, whichever is first, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it, ascertain whether the plaintiff will be able to submit some evidence that the plaintiff will meet the requirements of s. 627.737(2)....

...3d DCA 1991); Pulte Home Corp. v. Ply Gem Indus., 804 F. Supp. 1471 (M.D.Fla. 1992). Technically, this is incorrect. Because the law of negligence does not recognize a protected interest in purely economic loss, no cause of action exists under such circumstances. Cf. § 627.737, Fla....

...tually obligated to pay the defendant's costs and attorney's fees and the statute does not provide for reimbursement or indemnification of the insurer. (4) The jury's finding of "no permanent injury", a threshold finding necessary for recovery under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes, was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence in view of the uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff's dentist as to damages to the plaintiff's teeth....

...tained as a result of [his] [her] injury and death, including any damages that the estate and the survivors are reasonably certain to incur or experience in the future. NOTE ON USE FOR 501.1 If there is an issue of limitation on damages because of F.S. 627.737(2), use instruction 501.4....

...dequately compensate (spouse) for any loss by reason of [his wife's] [her husband's] injury, of [his] [her] services, comfort, society and attentions in the past [and in the future] caused by the incident in question. NOTES ON USE FOR 501.4 1. See F.S. 627.737(2) (1991). Use of the threshold instruction will in most cases require the use of an interrogatory verdict form. 2. If there is proof that a claimant will incur future damages that are not excluded from recovery by F.S. 627.737 (1991), such as where claimant at trial is not at maximum medical improvement and will have a limited period of future lost income or medical expenses, it will be necessary to add the following language after the word "question": "includin...

...The committee has placed this instruction in the damages section because the statute sets a threshold to the recovery of non-economic damages only. If claimant does not establish permanency, claimant may still be entitled to recover economic damages that exceed personal injury protection benefits. See F.S. 627.737(2) (1991); Auto-Owners Insurance Co....

...jury, then the court may wish to modify the instruction. For example, the court may instruct the jury: "If the greater weight of the evidence does not support the claim on the issue of permanency, then your verdict should be for the defendant." 4. F.S. 627.737(2) (1991) does not define "permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability" that is established by expert testimony....

...Instruction 501.8b, not instruction 501.8a, should be given in all actions for personal injury or wrongful death accruing before October 1, 1993, arising out of the ownership, operation, use, or maintenance of a motor vehicle. Instruction 501.8b is derived from F.S. 627.7372 (1987), which was repealed for causes of action accruing on or after October 1, 1993....

...e to meet the threshold requirements deprived them of their right to recover all damages, including property damages and damages for loss of consortium. Such an interpretation of Florida's no-fault law is contra to the plain language of the statute. Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1975) [3] *216 provides tort exemption for damages due to "bodily injury, sickness, or disease arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use" of a motor vehicle only to the extent that the benefits de...

...n to be answered by you, and it will be your duty to answer each of these questions. If you answer each of these three questions "no," you will not consider the issue of damages, but will find a verdict for the defendants. [Emphasis added.] [3] Sec. 627.737, Florida Statutes, provides: (1) Every owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...This conclusion makes it necessary to reach the merits of the defendants' appeal. On that point, it seems clear that the failure to credit the defendants with 80% of the $10,000.00 in PIP benefits was completely in conflict with the parties' agreement and, more important, with the mandatory terms of section 627.737(1), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...She contends that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow testimony by one of her expert witnesses, Dr. Hartwig, regarding the results of a thermographic examination, introduction of which was sought in support of her claim of permanent injury meeting the threshold requirements of Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...3d DCA 1991), in which the Third District Court of Appeal held that an injured party's recovery for unpaid medical bills for a non-permanent injury should not be reduced by the amount of benefits recoverable under the injured party's personal injury protection policy, rejecting the contention that the exemption contained in section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1983), required the reduction....

...We find conflict with Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Worthy, 447 So.2d 998 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), and Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co., 296 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1974). [1] We quash the district court's decision, finding that its holding would effectively repeal the exemption contained in section 627.737, which is a fundamental *988 part of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law. The following are the pertinent portions of the No-Fault Law applicable to the issues in this case: 627.737 Tort exemption; limitation on right to damages; punitive damages....

...of: (a) Significant and permanent loss of an important bodily function. (b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. (c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement. (d) Death. § 627.737(1)-(2), Fla....

...t pain and deeply depressed. While the Mansfields admitted liability, they denied that Rosa Rivero suffered permanent physical injuries and the trial proceeded on the issue of whether Rosa Rivero crossed the permanent injury threshold requirement of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...The record establishes that the Riveros' insurance carrier has refused to provide them any benefits; no rule requires them to recover from the carrier. Rivero, 584 So.2d at 1014. We disagree because we find that the district court failed to apply the clear exemption contained in section 627.737(1). The record reflects that both the Mansfields and the Riveros had PIP coverage as required by the statute. Because the jury found that no permanent injury existed, the Mansfields were exempted from tort liability by the express provisions of section 627.737(1) to the extent of the personal injury protection benefits....

...e no-fault law. As noted, the no-fault statutory scheme sets up a means by which an injured party recovers most of his or her out-of-pocket expenses from his or her own insurer, where the injury fails to reach the permanent injury threshold found in section 627.737(2)....

...efits and suing the tortfeasor for the full amount of the damages was dicta and written in the context of discussing the constitutionality of the collateral source rule. It was not written with any consideration of the mutual exemption provisions of section 627.737....

...*990 498 So.2d at 423 (emphasis added). The district courts have applied this exemption, as illustrated by the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision in Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Worthy, 447 So.2d 998, 1001 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), in which that court said that section 627.737(1) exempts "a tortfeasor from tort liability for damages because of bodily injury caused by a motor vehicle only `to the extent that benefits described in section 627.736(1) are payable for such injury, or would be payable but for any...

...Accordingly, because the record reflects that both the Mansfields and the Riveros had PIP coverage as required by the statute, and because the jury found that no permanent injury existed, the Mansfields were exempted from tort liability by the express provisions of section 627.737(1) to the extent that PIP benefits would be payable under the Riveros' PIP policy....

...See Connecticut General Life Insurance v. Dyess, 569 So.2d 1293 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), review denied, 581 So.2d 1307 (Fla. 1991). The majority's further attempt to distinguish Purdy by stating that it related only to a discussion of the collateral source rule, contained in section 627.7372, is equally unpersuasive....

...For the reasons stated above I find Purdy and Matthews controlling and would affirm the analysis and decision below. BARKETT, C.J., and SHAW, J., concur. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. [2] In accordance with sections 627.737(1) and 627.736(1), the Riveros should recover 80% of all their reasonable medical expenses from their own PIP carrier....

...also unused benefits believed to be available. Rollins did not address how the PIP setoff should be calculated or involve any consideration of comparative negligence and therefore does not expressly and directly conflict with the decision below. [3] Section 627.737(1) limits an injured party's entitlement to bring suit in tort by stating in pertinent part: Every owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by [the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law] ......

...the extent that the benefits described in s. 627.736(1) are payable for such injury ... unless a person is entitled to maintain an action for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience for such injury under the provisions of subsection (2). § 627.737(1), Fla....

...Fensom, Barron, Redding, Boggs, Hughes & Fite, Panama City, for appellees. PER CURIAM. Peggy J. Burkett appeals a summary final judgment entered by the trial court dismissing her complaint for personal injuries for failure to meet the threshold requirements of Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes, allowing a tort action for damages suffered in a motor vehicle accident for "permanent injury," other than "scarring or disfigurement." We reverse....

...d against cannot prevail. Mejiah v. Rodriguez, 342 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977). Under the foregoing principles, we conclude that a genuine issue existed of whether plaintiff's injury comes within the "permanent injury" requirement of the statute, Section 627.737(2), precluding summary judgment. See Johnson v. Phillips, 345 So.2d 1116 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1977). Although Section 627.737 has been held unconstitutional in Dillon v....

...No permissible inference of permanent injury otherwise arises from this record. Compare Sullivan v. Price, 368 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). I therefore think the trial court's summary judgment was entirely correct, and that this claim is barred by section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...[6] The Wooten and Marquez decisions are disapproved to the extent they are inconsistent with our conclusions, and the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in this case is affirmed. OVERTON, C.J., and BOYD, SUNDBERG and KARL, JJ., concur. HATCHETT, J., concurs in result only. ADKINS, J., dissents. NOTES [1] § 627.737, Fla....

...The amended law is not before us, but the issues considered in this proceeding are applicable to rights and procedures under the amended statute. [2] Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. [3] In fact, a 1976 amendment to the statute indicates the contrary. Ch. 76-266, § 5, Laws of Florida, enacted § 627.737(3), Fla....

...r v. Walker, 335 So.2d 636, 638 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 341 So.2d 1086 (Fla. 1977), and in the footnotes in the district court's opinion on rehearing in this proceeding. 341 So.2d at 778 n. 1, 2. [5] See § 34.01(1), Fla. Stat. (1975). [6] § 627.737(3), Fla....

...The Riveros alleged that as a result of her injuries Rosa was in constant pain that left her unable to work and caused her to become deeply depressed. At trial, the Mansfields admitted liability. The trial proceeded on the issues of damages and whether the Riveros crossed the permanent injury threshold requirement of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...al bills, but finding that Rosa had not sustained a permanent injury. Consequently, the trial court entered a final judgment in accordance with *1014 the jury verdict. The Mansfields then requested the court to reduce the judgment by 80% pursuant to section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...reduced amount. The Riveros filed this appeal. The Riveros argue that the trial court erred in failing to give the requested instruction. We disagree, and in so doing, recede from our decision in Jones v. Smith, 547 So.2d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). [1] Section 627.737 permits a plaintiff to recover damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience "only in the event that the injury consists in whole or in part of: ... (2) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability." § 627.737(2), Fla....

...The remaining points on appeal lack merit. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded. NOTES [1] In Jones v. Smith, 547 So.2d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), we held that the trial court had committed reversible error in refusing plaintiff's request to instruct the jury that in section 627.737(2) "the words permanent injury include subjective complaints obtained resulting from an initial organic injury." Jones, 547 So.2d at 201....

...Morey contends on appeal that he presented uncontroverted medical evidence at trial that he sustained a permanent injury as a result of Carl Harper's negligent operation of a motor vehicle and that such evidence entitled him to a directed verdict on the issue of whether he sustained a permanent injury under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Flinchbaugh's finding of permanent impairment was based on an inadequate history and related only to appellant's back and neck, while Dr. Sharf's opinion as to permanency was based on an inadequate history and related only to the right wrist. *1288 Under section 627.737(2), a plaintiff is precluded from recovering damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience because of bodily injury, sickness or disease arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, or use of a motor...

...Use the appropriate bracketed numbered provision applicable to the evidence adduced in the case. 2. Use of the threshold instruction will in most cases require the use of an interrogatory verdict form. 3. If there is proof that a claimant will incur future damages that are not excluded from recovery by section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1991), such as where claimant at trial is not at maximum medical improvement and will have a limited period of future lost income or medical expenses, it will be necessary to add the following language after the word "question": "including any such damage as (claimant) is reasonably certain to [incur] [experience] in the future." Comments 1. See section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...The committee has placed the threshold instruction after instructions on negligence because the statute sets a threshold to the recovery of noneconomic damages only. If claimant does not establish permanency, claimant may still be entitled to recover economic damages that exceed personal injury protection benefits. See § 627.737(2), Fla....

...e jury, then the court may wish to modify the instruction. For example, the court may instruct the jury: "If the greater weight of the evidence does not support the claim on the issue of permanency, then your verdict should be for the defendant." 3. Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1991), does not define "permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability" that is established by expert testimony....

...Ipser was unqualified to render an opinion about whether she had a permanent injury because he has no medical training. It is well established that expert medical testimony is required to prove that a plaintiff has suffered a permanent injury under our no-fault insurance law. See § 627.737(2), Fla.Stat....

...each of those statutes and altering the dynamics of trial, without any indication that such a result was one that the legislature intended. The situation presented in this case is analogous to that arising under another portion of the No-Fault Law, section 627.737(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), which uses the phrase "[p]ermanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability" without defining it. The standard jury instructions do not attempt to define the terms. In its note explaining the absence of a jury *275 instruction on permanency, the Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases observed: Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1991), does not define "permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability" that is established by expert testimony....

...lon v. Reid, 602 So.2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), review granted, 614 So.2d 503 (Fla.), case dismissed, 620 So.2d 762 (Fla.1993). Fla.Std.Jury Instr. (Civ.) 6.1, Comment 3. The Supreme Court authorized the use of the Committee's proposed instruction on section 627.737(2)....

...We agree with defendants that the evidence in the record does not support a claim for punitive damages and that, therefore, the issue should not have gone to the jury. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. NOTES [1] See § 627.737(2), Fla....

...setoffs, $741,636.31, plus attorney’s fees and costs” in the bad-faith case. Id. Because Cadle may recover only economic damages (medical expenses and wages) if her injuries do not meet the threshold requirement of permanent injury under Florida Statutes § 627.737(2), the judge reasoned “the vitality of her $75,000 demand and GEICO’s good faith obligation to pay it depends entirely on whether GEICO had reason to believe, prior to June 2009, that ....

...shall include any amount in excess of the policy limits.” 9 185 So. 3d at 1221. In contrast to this expansive coverage, the Florida Supreme Court has explained the requirement of a permanent injury for recovery of noneconomic damages: Section 627.737(2)(b) provides that a plaintiff may recover damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience (noneconomic damages) because of a bodily injury arising out of the...

...mages. Wald v. Grainger, 64 So. 3d 1201, 1207 (Fla. 2011) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).10 Consequently, insureds seeking noneconomic benefits from their uninsured-motorist carrier, first must meet the permanent-injury requirement of § 627.737(2)(a)-(d). 11 “In view of section 627.727(7), it is clear that the statute 10 The interrelated Florida Statutes § 627.727(7) and § 627.737(2) state and define the permanency requirements for noneconomic damages: The legal liability of an uninsured motorist coverage insurer does not include damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience unless the injury or disease is described in one or more of paragraphs (a)-(d) of s. 627.737(2). Fla....

...(b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. (c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement. (d) Death. Fla. Stat. § 627.737(2)(a)-(d). 11 The district judge instructed the jury on the permanent-injury requirement of § 627.727(7) for recovery of noneconomic damages: 22  Case: 15-11283 Date Filed: 09/30/2016 Page: 23 of 27 does not require an insurance carrier to provide uninsured motorist coverage for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience unless the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2) have been met.” Dauksis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 623 So. 2d 455, 456 (Fla. 1993).12 The Florida Supreme Court has explained the interrelationship of § 627.727(7) and § 627.737(2) regarding the medical proof required for a permanent injury resulting from an automobile accident: [T]he statute[s] require[] that the plaintiff establish the existence of a physical injury and prove that this injury is permanent....

...in a reasonable degree of medical probability; “(c) significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement; and, “(d) death.” Trial Tr. vol. III at 24-25 (Dec. 3, 2014) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 627.737(2)(a)-(d)); see Fla. Standard Jury Instruction 501.3. 12 “It is axiomatic that all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole....

...permanent injury—the plaintiff must also present expert medical testimony to establish the existence and permanency of the alleged injury. City of Tampa v. Long, 638 So. 2d 35, 37-38 (Fla. 1994) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 627.737(2)(b)) (emphasis added)....

...of her injury. Noneconomic damages are available under an insurance policy only if the plaintiff incurs a “permanent injury,” which must be established “within a reasonable degree of medical probability” within the cure period. Fla. Stat. § 627.737(2)(b). While witness credibility determinations traditionally are a jury function, the court should review the record as a whole[;] it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe....

...n Alamo Rent-A-Car bumper sticker. When the Stellases rested their case in chief, it was immediately assailed by a motion for partial directed verdict on the issue of noneconomic damages, for failure of plaintiffs to have established, in accord with section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1993), that Mrs....

...Ultimately, the trial court opted for the test emanating from Novak, and, applying that test, concluded that a sufficient nexus existed between the motor vehicle and the Stellases' injuries so as to make the statute applicable. We disagree with the lower court's decision to apply section 627.737 in this case....

...nership, maintenance, operation, or use of such motor vehicle only in the event that the injury or disease consists in whole or in part of: (b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. § 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...(1981), against the defendants, Eley and her insurer, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company. In his complaint alleging negligence on the part of Eley, the plaintiff sought recovery of medical expenses and general damages based on permanent injury. See § 627.737(2)(b), Fla....

...of the ownership, maintenance, operation, or use of such motor vehicle only in the event that the injury or disease consists in whole or in part of: *1103 ... . Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability. ... [emphasis added] § 627.737(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1981). Absent a finding of permanent injury by the jury, it could not award general damages for pain, suffering or any of the other elements of damages set forth in section 627.737(2)....

...ages under the next question. We first deal with the trial court's conclusion that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. This whole issue turns on the jury's finding that the plaintiff had not sustained a permanent injury. See § 627.737(2)(b)....

...At trial, Dauksis moved in limine to preclude State Farm from presenting evidence directed toward the lack of permanency of his injuries. Dauksis argued that because the tortfeasor did not have the required security necessary to claim tort exemption under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1987), it was unnecessary for him to meet the permanency threshold of that subsection....

...... . (7) The legal liability of an uninsured motorist coverage insurer does not include damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience unless the injury or disease is described in one or more of paragraphs (a) through (d) of s. 627.737(2). Section 627.737(2) provides: (2) In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...anent loss of an important bodily function. (b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. (c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement. (d) Death. The security referred to in section 627.737 is an insurance policy or other equivalent security which provides PIP benefits....

...more serious cases. In view of section 627.727(7), it is clear that the statute does not require an insurance carrier to provide uninsured motorist coverage for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience unless the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2) have been met....

...Thus, the critical question in this case is whether the insurance carriers should be bound by the language of their contracts with the insureds, or whether they should be afforded the exemption from tort liability available under the provisions of sections 627.727(7) and 627.737(2), Florida Statutes. 560 So.2d at 1312. The court held that the claimants could recover under the language of their policy because they would be "legally entitled to recover" from the uninsured tortfeasor without the necessity of meeting the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2)....

...e Fla.Bar 2d ed. 1991), which states: Uninsured motorist policies typically contain language to the effect that the carrier will pay the damages the insured is legally entitled to recover from the operator or owner of an uninsured vehicle. Because F.S. 627.737(2) provides that the tort threshold requirements apply only to an owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle for which security has been provided, it follows that an insured is entitled to recover all damages regardless of whether the tort threshold requirements are met when seeking UM benefits....

...r her subrogated insurer, is entitled to recover damages for personal injuries to the nominal plaintiff Linda caused by the negligent operation of the Wallace motor vehicle by the defendant Lisa unless the plaintiff first establishes, as required by section 627.737(2)(b), Florida Statutes, that Linda suffered a "permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement." This is a condition precedent or threshold requirement to the plaintiff's right to recover damages for Linda's personal injuries in this case....

...Permanency of injury is considered in the Florida Standard Jury Instructions only in model instruction 6.9a relating to life expectancy and the use of mortality tables. Unfortunately the Standard Jury Instructions do not contain an instruction on the no-fault threshold issue of permanent injury contained in section 627.737(2)(b) and should be amended to do so....

...accident involving a vehicle owned by the City of Tampa. Long sought damages for her injuries which consisted mostly of pain in her neck and lower back. The City defended the lawsuit on the ground that Long had failed to satisfy the requirements of section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1989), a provision of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law. Under this statute a plaintiff's injuries are recoverable only if the injuries are "permanent ... within a reasonable degree of medical probability." § 627.737(2)(b)....

...In response Long argues that the Mansfield decision was wrong and that, even if it is correct, the instruction in the instant case differs from the instruction disapproved in that case. Our decision in this case requires a construction of the no-fault law contained in section 627.737, which provides, in relevant part, as follows: (2) In any action of tort brought against the owner......

...ury ... arising out of the ownership ... of such motor vehicle only in the event that the injury ... consists in whole or in part of: ..... (b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. § 627.737(2), Fla....

...The first issue we must address is whether a permanent injury can be established when the only evidence of that permanent injury is based on the subjective complaints of the claimant. The second issue concerns the proper jury instruction, given the provisions of section 627.737....

...ault Law, include permanent subjective complaints of pain resulting from an initial organic injury." Id. The district court, in affirming the trial court's action, explained why the trial court properly rejected the requested instruction. It stated: Section 627.737 permits a plaintiff to recover damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience "only in the event that the injury consists in whole or in part of: ... (2) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability." § 627.737(2), Fla....

...The School Board sought to dismiss the negligence claim against it for failure to comply with the notice requirements stated in section 768.28(6)(a) of the Florida Statutes. [1] Wolentarski then moved for summary judgment on this issue. Wolentarski also moved to strike the School Board's section 627.737(2) affirmative defense....

...[3] By this juncture, depositions (two to be exact) had already been taken and other discovery exchanged. Following amendment to add the PIP claim, litigation continued primarily on the School Board's affirmative defenses. Wolentarski moved to strike the School *1053 Board's section 627.737 defense....

...resents such claim in writing to the Department of Financial Services, within 3 years after such claim accrues and the Department of Financial Services or the appropriate agency denies the claim in writing.... § 768.28(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). [2] Section 627.737(2) limits damages in tort actions against owners, registrants, operators, and occupants of motor vehicles or against any person or organization legally responsible for such persons' acts or omissions, where "security has been provided as required by ss....

...He was ultimately scheduled for knee surgery on September 28, 1995, for injuries that his orthopaedic surgeon related to the accident. Bills for this surgery were received by State Farm on October 13, 1995. Rather than pay the bill within the thirty-day period provided for in section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1993), because of her concern that the surgery might not be related to the accident, State Farm's adjuster scheduled Jones for a physical examination on November 30, 1995, in Daytona Beach, Florida. Jones responded by filing a four-count complaint against the tortfeasor and State Farm on November 20, 1995. The complaint sought PIP benefits and alleged that State Farm had violated section 627.737 because of the failure to make payment on the claim within the thirty-day period provided for in the statute....

...In an action by Horowitz and his wife, the plaintiffs presented Anthony J. Dorto, a chiropractor for the purpose of establishing that he had suffered a "permanent injury within reasonable medical probability" to qualify him to maintain his tort action against the defendants under Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...But do the requirements of the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act, Chapter 627, Florida Statutes, dictate a contrary ruling? To maintain a tort action for injuries received from an automobile accident, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish a permanent injury within "reasonable medical probability" under Section 627.737, or to establish medical expense in excess of $1,000....

...the ambit of his permitted practice and his professional expertise. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. BOARDMAN, C.J., and OTT, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 627.737, concerning limitation on bringing tort actions, was amended by Ch. 76-266, effective October 1, 1976, repealing the $1,000 threshold. As amended, Section 627.737(2) now provides: (2) In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...Nevertheless, because of our disposition of this case, those matters are moot. The original 1972 "no-fault" statutes provided in section 627.736(1), Florida Statutes, for PIP benefits of 100 percent of medical expenses and 100 percent of lost earnings up to a limit of coverage of $5,000. Section 627.737, Florida Statutes, gave exemption from tort liability to the extent of the PIP benefits payable under section 627.736(1), Florida Statutes, and provided that if certain thresholds relating to permanency and seriousness were met the in...

...e court in Chapman v. Dillon, 415 So.2d 12, 18 (Fla. 1982), stated: Under the new provisions the injured party still recovers most of his out-of-pocket expenses from his own insurer and is allowed to bring suit for the remainder. (emphasis supplied) Section 627.737(1), Florida Statutes, undertakes to exempt a tortfeasor from tort liability for damages because of bodily injury caused by a motor vehicle only "to the extent that benefits described in s. 627.736(1) are payable for such injury, or would be payable but for any [authorized] exclusion... ." Therefore, under the statutes cited and Lasky and Chapman, without meeting the thresholds in section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes, the tortfeasor and his liability carrier, here State Farm, is liable to the injured party for the 20 percent of medical expenses not payable under the PIP coverages provided by section 627.736(1)(a) and the 40 pe...

...f lost gross income and earning capacity not payable under the PIP coverage provided by section 627.736(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and for 100 percent of those damages as exceeds the applicable policy limits. Of course, after meeting the thresholds of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes, the injured party may also recover in tort from the tortfeasor and his liability carrier for all pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience resulting from bodily injury caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle....

...For these reasons, whether the insured's question to the adjuster is construed to relate to payment of medical expenses, as the insured's counsel contends, or to the possibility of recovery for pain and suffering resulting from a significant and permanent injury under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes, as the PIP insurer suggests, the suggestion of the insurer's adjuster for *1002 the insured to "take it up with State Farm" was fair and appropriate because of State Farm's legal liability and was reasonable in r...

...been met. REVERSED AND REMANDED for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. HOBSON, Acting C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 627.730-741, Fla. Stat. (1979) (more correctly styled the "Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act"). [2] § 627.737(2), Fla. Stat. (1979). [3] § 627.737(2)(b), Fla....

...DeLaura of Smalbein, Eubank, Johnson, Rosier & Bussey, P.A., Rockledge, for appellees. Larry Klein, West Palm Beach, for amicus curiae The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers. DAUKSCH, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from an order which found sections 627.737 et seq., Florida Statutes (1979), (the 1979 no-fault act) to be constitutional, granted defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and, in the alternative, granted defendants' Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice. Defendants' motions were granted because plaintiffs' pleadings did not meet the tort threshold required by section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1979), in order to sue for plaintiffs' damages....

...n and physical suffering, intangible injuries for which damages have historically (before "no-fault") been recoverable through an action in tort. However, since this complaint clearly showed that the plaintiffs did not meet the threshold required by section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1979), the trial court found plaintiffs to be precluded from maintaining their action for redress of Dillon's injuries....

...heir right of access because the Legislature had established a reasonable alternative. The court first noted that the exemption for tort liability only applied to owners of motor vehicles who maintained security as required by the no-fault act. Sec. 627.737, Fla....

...Chapter 77-468, Laws of Florida, amended these recovery provisions and the present no-fault act allows an injured party to only recover 80% of his medical expenses and either 60% or 80% of his lost income. However, the injured party may recover the remaining percentage of his expenses through litigation because section 627.737(1), Florida Statutes (1979), only grants an exemption from tort liability for damages "to the extent that the benefits described in s....

...The 1979 no-fault act requires PIP coverage of $10,000.00 but the maximum allowable deductible is $8,000.00. Sec. 627.739(1), Fla. Stat. (1979). This change means that the 1979 act allows for decreased PIP coverage. These changes to sections 627.736, 627.737 and 627.739 mean that these provisions no longer provide a reasonable alternative for redress of injuries suffered in automobile accidents....

...We find that the Legislature has not shown any public necessity different from that which was present when the Lasky court considered the 1972 no-fault act. The provisions upheld in Lasky thereby constitute an alternative method for meeting such necessity. DUE PROCESS We also find that sections 627.736(1), 627.737(1), and 627.739(1), Florida Statutes (1979), cause plaintiffs' due process rights to be violated and are thus unconstitutional....

...58 system which was supposedly unduly costly; and (6) correcting the situation in which the pressing necessity of paying medical bills often forced an injured party to accept an unduly small settlement for his claim. The changes to sections 627.736, 627.737 and 627.739 noted above cause the 1979 no-fault act to no longer be reasonably related to several of the permissible legislative objectives noted in Lasky : (1) injured parties are able to initiate suits for expenses not payable by an insurer...

...a) Significant and permanent loss of an important bodily function. (b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. (c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement. (d) Death. Sec. 627.737(2), Fla....

...We must follow this declaration of our supreme court in Lasky supporting the conclusion that the threshold provisions of the 1979 no-fault act do not deny plaintiffs their right to equal protection. Accordingly, the order of the trial court which found sections 627.737 and 627.739, Florida Statutes (1979), constitutional, granting defendants' summary judgment *359 and in the alternative granting defendants' motion to dismiss is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings....

...State, 384 So.2d 141 (Fla. 1980). The Motion for Stay is denied. DAUKSCH, C.J., FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and COWART, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §§ 627.730 et seq., Fla. Stat. (1971), effective January 1, 1972. [2] Injured parties who do not meet the threshold requirement of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1977). [3] See sec. 627.737(1), Fla....

...[1] Accordingly, we reverse the orders for directed verdict and new trial appealed in this case and remand for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion. COBB and DANIEL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Armour & Co. v. Doig, 45 Fla. 162, 34 So. 249 (1903). [2] See Robertson v. Robertson, 106 So.2d 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958). [1] § 627.737(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. (1985); Calhoun v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 354 So.2d 882 (Fla. 1978) (plaintiff may not relitigate if jury verdict of negligence results but jury does not find permanency under § 627.737).

...In analyzing this dispute, we should start with the proposition that a tortfeasor is responsible for all damages caused by his or her negligence unless relieved by statute. We are urged by the parties that there are two statutes that may apply to this case— section 627.7372, Florida Statutes (1991), and section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1991). The parties' primary dispute is which statute is controlling in this case. DeMarco urges that section 627.7372, the collateral source setoff statute which was in effect at the time of the accident, should control. Kokotis, on the other hand, contends that the case is controlled by section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1991), the tort exemption statute....

...who live in Florida. To understand why the legislature placed any state residency requirement in subsection (4)(d) of section 627.736 in 1971, one must look at the overall operation of the no-fault law. The law was very controversial in 1971 because section 627.737 created a "no-fault threshold" and took away a person's common law right to sue for any minor injury occurring in a Florida automobile accident....

...See Kluger v. White, 281 So.2d 1 (Fla.1973). The quid pro quo that allowed the nofault statute to survive this constitutional challenge was found both in the payment of personal injury benefits under section 627.736 and in the immunity provided under section 627.737....

...Ordinarily in automobile accident cases such as this, before a jury may render an award for pain and suffering, there has to be a threshold finding of permanent injury. See McClellan v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 475 So.2d 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); § 627.737(2), Fla....

...International Bankers Insurance Company (Interbankers), on appellants' claim for uninsured motorist coverage under their policies with the respective insurers. The issue presented is whether a Florida insured must meet the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1984), when the claim is based upon the alleged negligence of an uninsured, nonresident motorist, and where the subject policy does not require the insureds to meet such threshold requirements, and specifically s...

...of an accident with a non-resident, uninsured motorist. Specifically, appellants sought a decree that they are entitled to recover damages for their injuries arising out of the accident without the necessity of meeting the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2)(a)-(d), Florida Statutes (1984), under the uninsured motorist coverage of the policies issued to them by Auto-Owners and Interbankers....

...Newton sought personal injury protection benefits. Thereafter, the insurers filed motions to dismiss, raising as grounds that the complaint failed to state a cause of action in that appellants admitted they had not sustained a permanent injury pursuant to section 627.737, Florida Statutes. On October 5, 1987, the trial court entered an order, determining that appellants must meet the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2), to sustain a claim under the uninsured motorist coverage of the policies....

........ (7) The legal liability of an uninsured motorist coverage insurer does not include damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience unless the injury or disease is described in one or more of paragraphs (a) through (d) of s. 627.737(2). (Emphasis supplied.) The section 627.737(2) limitation on tort damages specifies that — a plaintiff may recover damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease arising out of the ownership, maintenance, o...

...Thus, the critical question in this case is whether the insurance carriers should be bound by the language of their contracts with the insureds, or whether they should be afforded the exemption from tort liability available under the provisions of sections 627.727(7) and 627.737(2), Florida Statutes....

...3d DCA 1991), quashed, 620 So.2d 987 (Fla. 1993). Second, section 627.739(1) was not the basis for our decision in Mansfield, but was cited in the footnote in order to distinguish it from the calculations made in accordance with sections 627.736(1) and section 627.737(1)....

...r, or occupant of a vehicle or any person or organization legally responsible for any such person's acts or omissions who is made exempt from tort liability by ss. 627.730-627.7405. [2] In Mansfield v. Rivero, 620 So.2d 987 (Fla. 1993), we held that section 627.737 of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law requires that an injured party's recovery for unpaid medical bills for a non-permanent injury be reduced by the amount of benefits recoverable under the injured party's PIP policy. In a footnote, we calculated the percent that would be recovered from the injured party's own PIP carrier and the percent that the tortfeasor was obligated to pay, in accordance with sections 627.737(1) and 627.736(1), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...operator of an uninsured car because of bodily injury: 1. sustained by an insured person; 2. caused by accident ; and 3. arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured car. The bodily injury must be a serious injury as described in Section 627.737(2) of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law before we will pay for damages consisting of pain, suffering, mental anguish, or inconvenience....

...Ludwig, the driver of the other car. Mrs. Ladner sought damages for loss of consortium. On appeal, it is undisputed that Mr. Ludwig's negligence was the sole cause of the accident. The parties vigorously tried the issue of the no-fault threshold. See § 627.737, Fla....

...verage. The verdict awarded zero for any future medical expenses or lost earning ability, and, more significant to our decision, zero for past bodily injury, pain and suffering. Automobile personal injury cases arising prior to the effective date of section 627.737, Florida Statutes, and non-automobile personal injury cases decided both before and after that date, have held that a jury verdict awarding to an injured person only the exact amount of the medical expenses incurred and nothing for pa...

...Corp., 463 So.2d 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Skelly v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 445 So.2d 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Rodriguez v. Allgreen Corp., 242 So.2d 741 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971); Pickel v. Rosen, 214 So.2d 730 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). The effect of the No-Fault Law, section 627.737, Florida Statutes, was to foreclose damages for pain and suffering because of injury arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation or use of a motor vehicle, unless the injured plaintiff first met one of the threshold requirements, e.g., permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability....

...This argument is based upon the fact that the damages found by the jury in the aggregate amount of $2,350.00 were necessarily predicated on an implied finding by the jury, consistent with the trial court's instructions, that the plaintiff had sustained a permanent injury per the threshold requirement of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...*825 Lawrence J. Robinson, Sarasota, for appellant. Roger T. Minor of Fuller & Minor, P.A., Fort Myers, for appellee. RYDER, Acting Chief Judge. Donna Holmes challenges the trial court's final judgment in this personal injury action brought pursuant to section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...quirement was declared unconstitutional. See Kluger v. White, 281 So.2d 1 (Fla.1973). [4] They are not responsible for many minor accidents that do not result in permanent injuries, but they have uncapped liability for all significant accidents. See § 627.737, Fla....

...This is an appeal by the plaintiff Robert Daniel Scarfone from a final judgment entered in an automobile negligence action in favor of the defendants Thomas R. Magaldi, Richard Magaldi and Government Employees Insurance Company based on an adverse jury finding that the plaintiff had not met the no-fault threshold under Section 627.737(2), Fla....

...ges such as pain and suffering, disability, physical impairment, disfigurement, mental anguish, inconvenience, aggravation of a disease or physical defect, or loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. These non-economic damages are precluded under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1993), [2] absent a finding of a permanent injury; however, there is nothing in section 627.737(2) that precludes an *1021 award of future economic damages without a permanent injury....

...Because negligence and causation were combined in question 1 on the verdict form, and the verdict was admittedly inconsistent and excessive, I would reverse for a new trial on all issues. NOTES [1] Vogel and Paul, who were also defendants below, settled with Morrisey and are not parties to this appeal. [2] Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1993), provides: (2) In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...Additionally, the statute's requirement of an immediate payment effectively deprives State Farm of the right to question its legal liability for noneconomic damages under its contract in the event the tortfeasors had personal injury protection insurance coverage under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1989), at the time of Mrs....

...In that regard, section 627.727(7), Florida Statutes (1989), provided that: The legal liability of an uninsured motorist coverage insurer does not include damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience unless the injury or disease is described in one or more of paragraphs (a) through (d) of s. 627.737(2). [8] Section 627.737(2), which describes the "injury" or "disease" requirements that must first be met, provided as follows: In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...(d) Death. [9] Thus, "[i]n view of section 627.727(7), it is clear that the statute does not require an insurance carrier to provide uninsured motorist coverage for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience unless the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2) have been met." Dauksis v....

...icle." 623 So.2d at 457. The specific issue facing the court was whether the insured, based on this policy language, could recover noneconomic damages against the *136 uninsured motorist carrier without first satisfying the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2) in a factual setting involving an uninsured motorist who did not have personal injury protection coverage. The court began its analysis by noting that the underlying legislative theory of section 627.737 "is that if every automobile has PIP coverage, injured motorists will be reimbursed by their own carriers for most of their economic damages regardless of fault, and negligence actions against third parties will be limited to the more serious cases." 623 So.2d at 456. The court also observed that section 627.737 furthers this objective by rewarding individuals who have secured personal injury protection coverage as required by Florida's no-fault law "by exempting them from liability for noneconomic damages except in cases involving permanency or death." Id....

...law. If the tortfeasor had personal injury protection coverage then the uninsured motorist carrier, standing in the shoes of the tortfeasor, was entitled to raise as a defense to such damages its insured's failure to meet the threshold conditions of section 627.737(2)....

...Hassen may be claiming as a result of an alleged permanent injury. Hence, by an anomalous twist of legislative fiat, the mandatory payment requirement imposed on State Farm by the 1992 statute effectively relieves Mrs. Hassen of having to satisfy the mandatory threshold requirements of section 627.737(2) before she is entitled to collect noneconomic damages from State Farm....

...We do not determine, however, the legislature's authority to effectuate such a retroactive change in the law. [8] The legislature left this subsection intact when it amended the statute in 1992. Ch. 92-318, § 79, at 3150, Laws of Fla. [9] This subsection continues to retain this language to the present day. § 627.737(2), Fla....

...ant motor vehicle operator. At the subsequent trial, the jury found that the defendant was 100% negligent and that the plaintiff sustained damages of $4,500.00, yet it also determined that the plaintiff had not satisfied the threshold requirement of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...e plaintiff's mode of transportation, the threshold requirement applies as long as the defendant has personal injury protection benefits as required by statute. The applicable statutory provisions refute this contention. The threshold requirement of Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1981), applies only in a tort action where security has been provided....

...[2] Reading section 627.736(1), Florida Statutes (1981), one discovers that security is not provided to a motorcyclist, who is "an occupant of a self-propelled vehicle." [3] Thus, a motorcyclist need not satisfy the threshold to maintain a suit for the damages enumerated in subsection (2) of section 627.737. Similarly, a motor vehicle operator cannot assert the tort exemption of section 627.737 (1), Florida Statutes (1981), against a plaintiff motorcyclist because the exemption protects against liability only to the extent personal injury protection benefits are payable or would be payable but for express statutorily authorized exclusions....

...e the thresholds of the statute are not met, the injured party is assured a speedy payment of his medical bills and compensation for lost income from his own insurer, even where the injured party was himself clearly at fault... . The provisions of F.S. 627.737, F.S.A., do provide a reasonable alternative to the traditional action in tort, and therefore do not violate the right of access to the courts......

...equal protection of the laws. Of course, in those states where acceptance of the coverage of a no fault plan confers at least a partial immunity to tort liability, all common law actions may remain against an uninsured motorcyclist or motorist. [2] § 627.737(2): In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...s. This appeal ensued. Plaintiffs contend the trial court should have dismissed their suit without prejudice once the jury found that plaintiff failed to establish either injuries or medical expenses in excess of $1,000, as required under Fla. Stat. § 627.737....

...e issues. Plaintiffs argue, however, that Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., Fla. 1974, 296 So.2d 9, mandates a different result. In Lasky the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the permanent injury and medical expense thresholds of Fla. Stat. § 627.737....

...olved against him by the jury. [2] The judgment entered herein does not bar the plaintiffs from bringing a later action within the limitations period, should Tucker sustain medical expenses in excess of the $1,000 threshold requirement of Fla. Stat. § 627.737(2) subsequent to the trial of this cause....

...Procedurally, this case is more closely analogous to Calhoun v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 354 So.2d 882 (Fla. 1978), than to Levine. In Calhoun, the plaintiff filed a suit seeking damages for personal injuries sustained in a car accident. At that time, section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1975), provided that a condition precedent to maintaining an action for damages was proof of permanent injury or aggregate compensable damages over $1,000....

...ion of the earlier condition. To the court's query about whether a doctor had testified on this the defense answered no. The defense did not request an instruction regarding the permanency threshold for recovery under the no fault insurance statute, section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes, and no such instruction was given....

...Stat.) prohibits the recovery of future economic damages in the absence of an affirmative finding of a permanent injury. The Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law limits the right of a person involved in a motor vehicle accident to bring an action for damages sought for bodily injury, sickness or disease. Section 627.737(1), Florida Statutes, provides that no action may be brought to recover damages for bodily injury, sickness or disease to the extent the damages are covered by the insurance (Personal Injury Protection) required by section 627.736(1), Florida Statutes. Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes, provides that no action may be brought to recover damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease resulting from a motor vehicle accident, unless a threshold requirement is met....

...The appellant claimed that she had sustained a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability and was, therefore, in addition to other damages, entitled to recover for the pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience she suffered as a result of the accident. See § 627.737(2), Fla....

...jury should have been allowed to award future medical expenses even though it found that the appellant did not sustain a permanent injury. Throughout these proceedings, the appellant has taken the position that she met the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2) because she established that she had sustained a permanent injury as a result of the automobile accident....

...CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur. NOTES [1] The committee comments to the Standard Jury Instructions-Civil Cases, 613 So.2d 1316 (Fla. 1993), are noteworthy. The comments by the Standard Jury Instructions Committee state that "[s]ection 627.737(2) does not define `permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability' that is established by expert testimony." (Cites omitted.) The comments then state that "[t]herefore the instructions do not attempt to define the terms a...

...(Fla. 1993), are again noteworthy. The comments by the committee indicate that "[i]f claimant does not establish permanency, claimant still may be entitled to recover economic damages that exceed personal injury protection benefits." A "see" cite of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1991), and Smey follows.

...efendant's position. Having granted the directed verdict on the issue of permanency, the trial court allowed the jury to consider plaintiff's claim for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience. See Easkold v. Rhodes, 614 So.2d at 497 n. 1; § 627.737(2)(b), Fla....

...accident caused the difficulty, and to allow the commencement of proper medical treatment. We reverse the judgment below and remand for a new trial on the issue of damages in light of Banyas. [3] REVERSED. CROSS and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 627.737(2), Fla....

...med to have received as a result of the collision. Meyer had raised the affirmative defense that the Hutchinsons had not sustained the threshold injuries which would entitle them to recover for pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...In no event shall anyone collect more than once. The trial court's construction of an insurance policy to determine coverage as a matter of law is subject to de novo review. E.g., Hartford Ins. Co. v. Bellsouth Communications, Inc., 824 So.2d 234 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Section 627.737, Florida Statutes, is the authority for a "threshold defense" under which Meyer contends her Michigan insurance policy provides. The pertinent parts of section 627.737 include: (1) Every owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...on. (b) permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability other than scarring or disfigurement. (c) significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement. (d) death. Before a claimant can recover the non-economic damages, described in section 627.737(2), the claimant must establish a threshold injury as described in section 627.737(2)(a)-(d)....

...1987), the Florida Supreme Court adopted this court's decision in Spence v. Hughes, 485 So.2d 903 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), in which non-residents of Florida who voluntarily obtain PIP coverage conforming to Florida's no-fault law were held to be exempt from tort liability under section 627.737 to the same extent as Florida residents who had obtained the required statutory coverage....

...future medical expenses, no loss of consortium was suffered by Alpheus Simpson. Accordingly, the verdict as to Alpheus is affirmed. As to the jury's denial of non-economic damages for Lois Simpson, we conclude that, while the threshold finding of a section 627.737 permanent injury coupled with a denial of any damages for pain and suffering indeed appears to be inconsistent, [1] the lack of clarity in the existing case law on this point, as noted by Judge Altenbernd, makes it inappropriate to fi...

...Discovery proceedings were instituted, and on October 9, 1973 petitioner and his father were deposed. At petitioner's deposition, counsel for the insurer learned for the first time of the fact that petitioner had incurred medical expenses in excess of the threshold $1,000 provided in Fla. Stat. § 627.737(2), F.S.A., and therefore he possessed a right of action....

...Cobb, appealed a judgment entered for Joseph A. Stuart as natural guardian and next friend for Mark K. Stuart, against them. The claim arose as a result of an automobile accident that occurred on April 20, 1972. In view of the provisions of Fla. Stat. § 627.737, the Plaintiff sought to prove a permanent injury....

...scretion in the denial thereof by the trial judge. We adhere to our original opinion and the Petition for Rehearing is DENIED. SHARP, J., and BAKER, JOSEPH P., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] On date of the accident, the threshold requirements of § 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1975), included among other things medical bills in excess of $1,000.00 or a permanent injury as a condition to maintaining a tort action.

...Appellants' contention that they were prejudiced by the foregoing instruction cannot be sustained. The instruction referred to counsel's argument concerning the amount of damages. However, the jury never reached this issue because it determined that the appellants failed to meet the permanent injury threshold of section 627.737(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...5th DCA 1986) (en banc), in which the district court certified the following as a question of great public importance: Are non-residents who voluntarily obtain PIP coverage conforming to Florida's no-fault law (§ 627.730-627.7405, Fla. Stat.) exempt from tort liability under section 627.737, Florida Statutes, to the same extent as residents who obtain the same coverage because required by statute to do so? Id....

...McDONALD, C.J., and BOYD, OVERTON and SHAW, JJ., concur. EHRLICH, J., dissents with opinion with which ADKINS, J., concurs. EHRLICH, Justice, dissenting. I agree with the reasoning expressed in the dissenting opinion of Judge DAUKSCH. ADKINS, J., concurs. NOTES [*] Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1983), provides in pertinent part: (1) Every owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...McCall of Ayers, Cluster, Curry, McCall & Briggs, P.A., Ocala, for appellees. SHAW, Judge. This is an appeal from a directed verdict rendered against the plaintiff/appellant in a personal injury action predicated upon the court's finding that the appellant failed to meet the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1977). We disagree with the trial court's application of the statute and reverse. Under section 627.737(2)(e) a plaintiff may recover damages in tort if he shows: A serious, nonpermanent injury which has a material degree of bearing on the injured person's ability to resume his normal activity and lifestyle during all or substantially a...

...The calculation used by the trial court properly encompassed these objectives. AFFIRMED. HARRIS and ANTOON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] These kinds of damages are encompassed in the required personal injury protection benefits of Florida's no-fault law. § 627.736(1), Fla. Stat. [2] § 627.736(3), Fla. Stat. (1995). [3] § 627.737(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). [4] Economic damages of $21,019.23, minus Assi's comparable negligence of $9,458.65, for a subtotal of $11,560.58, minus 55% tort liability of defendants applied to the $10,000 PIP payment ($5,500.00), equals $6,060.58. [5] § 627.737, Fla....

exclusion authorized by ss. 627.730-627.7405... . § 627.737(1), Fla. Stat. (1983). The benefits described

personal injury litigation has immunity by reason of § 627.737(1), F.S. 1973, is at or near the outset, not after

threshold requirement provided for in Florida Statute 627.737(2). Appellants contend that Mrs. Phillips

permanent scarring or disfigurement. (d) Death. § 627.737(2), Fla. Stat. (1985). Here, Napolitano sought

Automobile Reparations Reform Act, specifically F.S. 627.737. That statute provides that any person who suffers

No Fault threshold requirements are set out in § 627.737(2) Fla. Stat.

automobile accident with the defendant, under section 627.737(2), ■ Florida Statutes. Under the statute,

the personal injury threshold prescribed by Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1975) has not been reached

instructed the jury, however, pursuant to section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1987), that they were

the damages enumerated in subsection (2) of Section 627.737." Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded

Plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence under Fla. Stat. 627.737(2) to show that she suffered as alleged:

was entitled to the threshold defense under section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1997), requiring the Fac-cones

without regard to the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes. Iowa National Mutual

no fault insurance law in 1976 to include Section 627.737(2)(e), Florida Statutes, which reads as follows:

, concur. NOTES [1] Recently we interpreted § 627.737(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1977), precluding actions for

vehicles owned or operated by an insured. Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1985), provides: ...

liability (except in certain limited circumstances). § 627.737, Fla. Stat. (1981). In general, Florida requires

failed to meet the no-fault threshold under section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1979). We reject this argument

to meet the threshold injury requirement. Section 627.737(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991) requires that

damages that are not excluded from recovery by section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1991), such as where claimant

bodily injury was not met for purposes of section 627.737(2), Florida Statute (1991), the fact remains

plaintiff to recover for personal injuries, see § 627.737, Fla. Stat. (1981), then, given the results of

operator of a motor vehicle or his or her insurer. § 627.737(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2010). She thus contends it

Kokotis that the setoff provision contained in section 627.737 (the tort exemption statute) rather than setoff

"medically or scientifically demonstrable" in Section 627.737(2)(e), Florida Statutes, requires objective

the meaning of Florida's tort claim statute, section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1987). Our review of

The trial court, apparently referring to section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1983), found that the verdict

has exceeded the "threshold" requirements of § 627.737(2) F.S.A., a dismissal should be without prejudice

been paid or are “payable” for such injuries. § 627.737(1), Fla. Stat. (1997).2 To prevent double recovery

1982) (limitations in Florida's no fault statute, § 627.737, provide a reasonable alternative to tort actions

we certify a question to the supreme court. Section 627.737(1) provides in pertinent part that every owner

with pain without anatomic change." [6] Cf., § 627.737(2)(b), Florida Statutes, prescribing a standard

non-economic damages to injuries as described in section 627.737(2), then permanency is an issue which must

did not meet the threshold requirements of Section 627.737(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1977), regarding the

traditional tort action; the provisions of F.S. § 627.737, F.S.A., do provide a reasonable alternative to

assert the defense that the action was barred by § 627.737 Fla. Stat., F.S.A. on the ground that the damage

meet and prove the permanency requirements of section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1989). The trial court,

injury under the provisions of subsection (2). § 627.737(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). As this provision provides

satisfied the no-fault permanency threshold. See § 627.737, Fla. Stat. (1993). We agree that the language

Florida Statutes (1993). We agree and reverse. Section 627.737(1) provides that every owner, operator, or

he need not satisfy the verbal threshold of section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1989), in order to recover

we held that the "threshold" requirement of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1981) did not apply to

Loring argued to the trial court that under section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1993),[2] he was entitled

reasonable degree of medical probability. See § 627.737(2)(a)-(d), Fla. Stat. (1997). On the other hand

asserted a no-fault threshold defense pursuant to section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1991). At the conclusion

an issue of limitation on damages because of F.S. 627.737(2), use in*614struction 501.34. instead of instruction

“serious injury” within the meaning of FI. Stat. § 627.737(2). That provision provides that a plaintiff may

of the term “permanent injury” contained in section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1983), to reflect that

forth in the Policy and in Florida Statutes, § 627.737(2). (See Doc. 136, p. 3.) . Declining to extend

must prove it is both permanent and significant. § 627.737(2), Fla. Stat. (1991). We have not been cited

sustain a permanent injury within the meaning of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1995). In this case,

to the exemption from liability afforded by section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1999) was not disputed.

suffering unless the injury is described in section 627.737(2)(a) through (d). Those subsections specify

suffering, mental anguish or inconvenience." See § 627.737(2), Fla. Stat.

meet the “threshold” requirement of Fla.Stat., § 627.737(2) (1984) 1 because they had not produced

plaintiff to recover for personal injuries, see § 627.737, Fla.Stat. (1981), then, given the results of

not first meet the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2)(a-d), Florida Statutes. The Dixons collided

a reasonable degree of medical probability.” § 627.737(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995). .The jury awarded

must allege threshold injuries (as defined in § 627.737(2), Fla. *904Stat.) in a negligence action against

he need not satisfy the verbal threshold of section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1989), in order to recover

injury” threshold of Florida’s no-fault law. § 627.737(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). The question of permanency

action involving the no-fault threshold under section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1999), to tell a jury that

permanent injury, as defined and required by Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1975). Special verdicts

meaning of the insurance policy and Fla. Stat. § 627.737(2)(b) [D.E. 74 at 4-6, 9-10]. Although Allstate

the permanent injury *242threshold found in section 627.737(2). The district court’s holding that would

This was error due to the application of section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1989).

more important, with the mandatory terms of section 627.737(1), Florida Statutes (1997). Mansfield v. Rivero

injury requirement, as related to damages. See, Section 627.737 Florida Statutes (1975). The judgment appealed

DCA 1996), Clark has confessed to error. See § 627.737(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). The second issue on appeal

Acting C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur. . Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1987) provides: In any

compensation benefits received by appellant. § 627.737(2), Fla.Stat. (1983); Clark v. Tampa Electric

first satisfying the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2) in the case of an uninsured motorist who

damages if the jury finds no permanent injury. See § 627.737(2), Fla. Stat. See also Chapman v. Dillon, 415

damages that are not excluded from recovery by section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1991), such as where claimant

the one thousand dollar threshold required by § 627.737, F.S.1973. Allstate Insurance Company v. Ruiz

immunities that would otherwise be available under section 627.737. See § 627.733(4), Fla. Stat. (2019).

action was not subject to the tort exemptions of § 627.737, Fla.Stat. in that Lois Funny “sustained a permanent

by the second district’s interpretation of section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1999), in Smiley v. Nelson

shall be limited to economic damages only. See § 627.737(2), Fla. Stat. (2010). AFFIRMED. ORFINGER

inadvertently failed to charge the jury on Section 627.-737(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1977). On this appeal

for past and future pain and suffering. See § 627.737(2), Fla. Stat. (2011). In closing argument, Mr

injury within reasonable medical probability.” Fla.Stat. 627.737. It is acknowledged that the medical did not

the injuries met the threshold set forth in section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1985),1 and further asserted

shall be limited to economic damages only. See § 627.737(2), Fla. Stat. (2010). AFFIRMED. ORFINGER, TORPY

matter the appellee was required to prove under § 627.737(2)(b), Fla.Stat. that she had sustained a permanent

meet the applicable threshold requirements of section 627.-737(2), Florida Statutes (1985). We find no error

received a permanent injury in the accident. § 627.737(2), Fla. Stat. (2021). That section defines permanent

action brought pursuant to the provisions of § 627.737.” Mrs. Collier’s action was brought pursuant to

the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act. § 627.737, Fla.Stat. We have considered this fact in the

bodily function, the threshold requirements of Section 627.-737(2), Florida Statutes (1981) have not been

instant claims are inextricably intertwined. See § 627.737, Fla. Stat. (2012) ("In any action of tort brought

instant claims are inextricably intertwined. See § 627.737, Fla. Stat. (2012) ("In any action of tort brought

probability, other than scarring or disfigurement.” Id. § 627.737(2)(b) (West 1984). If the threshold requirement

order dismissing his complaint pursuant to section 627.737(3) of the Florida “no-fault” statute. We reverse

injury was not otherwise shown as required by § 627.737, Florida Statutes. Just before Bartholf brought

been paid or are “payable” for such injuries. § 627.737(1), Fla. Stat. (1997).2 To prevent double recovery

injury within reasonable medical probability. § 627.737, Fla.Stat. (1975). During the course of the trial

damages under the threshold requirements of section 627.-737, Florida Statutes (1979). However, the Pre-Trial

injuries that exceed the threshold presented in Section 627.737(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1977), and whether

requirements of the 1977 no-fault statute, Section 627.737(2)(a-f). During the defense presentation, a

scarring or disfigurement. (d) Death. § 627.737(2)(a)-(d), Fla. Stat. (2015). By using the words

that satisfies the permanency threshold under section 627.737(2). This court has consistently held that the

automobile no-fault threshold, found at Fla. Stat. § 627.737. Thereafter, the Angeluceis filed suit against

relief can be granted in that Florida Statute § 627.737(4) precludes the recovery of punitive damages

a verdict on the threshold question under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1987) and in failing

the injuries were permanent in nature. See Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1975). Appellees filed a

threshold of serious, non-permanent injury under Section 627.737(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1977). We cannot agree

upon so as to avoid the no-fault threshold. See § 627.737(2), Fla.Stat. (1985). It is further urged that

without satisfying the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2) depends on whether the tort-fea-sor motorist

question of “subject matter jurisdiction.” Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1975), creates specific

cases arising prior to the effective date of section 627.737 ... and non-automobile personal injury cases

met the statutory threshold requirements of section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1977), we find no record

required under Florida’s no fault insurance statute. § 627.737(2), Fla.Stat. (1987). The trial court then awarded