The 2023 Florida Statutes
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As a result, Florida prosecutors charged Tucker, Miles, and Young with arson under Florida Statutes § 806.01. In lieu of an arson conviction, however, Miles pleaded nolo contendere to unlawful possession of a listed chemical (pseudoephedrine) in violation of Florida Statutes § 893.149(1), was adjudicated guilty, and received a sentence of 36 months' probation. Miles later received a sentence of 11 months and 29 days' imprisonment for violating his probation by failing a drug test for marijuana.One example is the theft statute, which expressly identifies three degrees of grand theft and two degrees of petit theft. See § 812.014, Fla. Stat. (2005). Another is the homicide statute, which expressly identifies three degrees of murder, as well as multiple forms of manslaughter. See id . §§ 782.04, 782.07. Yet another is arson, which has two degrees. See id . § 806.01. It is in such cases, and only such cases, that the exception was intended to apply.Movant argues that upon a plain reading of the Florida statute, it is apparent that Florida arson does not fit into the general definition of arson. (Objections, at 5). Judge Reid found, and Movant does not contest, that most courts define generic arson as “the intentional or malicious burning of any property.” (R&R, at 14). In 1992, when Movant was convicted, Florida law provided that an individual committed arson if he “willfully and unlawfully, or while in the commission of any felony, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged . . . (b) Any structure, or contents thereof, where persons are normally present, such as: Jails, prisons, or detention centers. . .” Fla. Stat. § 806.01( 1)(b) (1991). Movant avers that the definition of arson under Florida law is broader than generic arson because it includes the phrase “or while in the commission of any felony[.]” (Objections, at 6). As such, Movant contends, Florida arson does not comport with generic arson. In support, Movant cites to Edwards v. United States, No. 16-22585-CIV, 2017 WL 1534448, at *3 (S.D. Fla. April 28, 2018) (“Edwards I”), for the proposition that this additional language “clearly brings… Moreover, state law enforcement officers have numerous criminal statutes at their disposal that prohibit and punish unlawful conduct, and which protect public safety and private property. This non-exhaustive list includes, but is not limited to , Disorderly Conduct, § 877.03, Fla. Stat.; Affray, § 877.01(1), Fla. Stat.; Criminal Mischief, § 806.13, Fla. Stat.; Arson, § 806.01, Fla. Stat.; Fire bombs, § 806.111, Fla. Stat.; Assault, § 784.011, Fla. Stat.; Aggravated Assault, § 784.021, Fla. Stat.; Battery and Felony Battery, § 784.03, Fla. Stat.; Aggravated Battery, § 784.045, Fla. Stat.; Assault or Battery on Law Enforcement, § 784.07, Fla. Stat.; Assault or Battery on Person 65 or Older, § 784.08, Fla. Stat.; Trespassing §§ 810.08 – 09, Fla. Stat.; Burglary, § 810.02, Fla. Stat.; Mob Intimidation, § 784.0495, Fla. Stat.; Resisting Officer With Violence, § 843.01, Fla. Stat.; Resisting Officer Without Violence, § 843.02, Fla. Stat.; Obstruction by Disguised Person, § 843.03, Fla. Stat.; Unlawful Assemblies, § 870.02, Fla. Stat.; and Destroying/Demolishing Memorial or Historic Property, § 806.135, Fla. Stat.The procedural history of this case is established in the state court records appended to Respondent's response. ECF No. 14-1 to 25. Petitioner was charged in an Information in Escambia County, Florida with one count of burglary of a dwelling or structure (in violation of Fla. Stat. §§ 810.02(1) and (2)(c)(2)) and one count of arson (in violation of Fla. Stat. § 806.01(1)(a)). Id. at 23.Defendant argues counsel was ineffective for failing to properly move for judgment of acquittal as to the Second Degree Arson charge. To establish a prima facie case for Second Degree Arson, the State must introduce evidence that (1) Defendant, or a person he was a principal with, caused to be damaged or damaged a vehicle owned by Waters by fire, (2) the damage was done willfully and unlawfully, (3) and the vehicle was a structure. See Fla. Stat. § 806.01 (2009), Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 12.2 (2009).In Valdes v. State , 3 So. 3d 1067, 1068, 1071–75 (Fla. 2009), the Florida Supreme Court abandoned the "primary evil" and "core offense" tests previously used to determine whether two offenses are degree variants of the same underlying offense under section 775.021(4)(b) 2. such that convictions for both violate double jeopardy and instead adopted the approach set forth by Justice Cantero in a special concurrence in State v. Paul , 934 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 2006). Specifically, the Court held that offenses fall under section 775.021(4)(b) 2. only when they "constitute different degrees of the same offense, as explicitly set forth in the relevant statutory sections." Id. at 1068, 1076–77. "Degree," in this context, means "a level based on the seriousness of an offense." Id. at 1076 (providing examples of degree variants by citing Justice Cantero's special concurrence that "[o]ne example is the theft statute, which expressly identifies three degrees of grand theft and two degrees of petit theft. See § 812.014, Fla. Stat. (2005). Another is the homicide statute, which expressly identifies three degrees of murder, as well as multiple forms of manslaughter. See id. §§ 782.04, 782.07. Yet… When Movant was convicted in 1992, Florida law at the time provided that an individual commits arson in the first-degree if he “willfully and unlawfully, or while in the commission of any felony, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged . . . (b) Any structure, or contents thereof, where persons are normally present, such as: Jails, prisons, or detention centers. . .” Fla. Stat. § 806.01(1)(b) (1991). “Structure” means “any building of any kind, any enclosed area with a roof over it, any real property and appurtenances thereto, any tent or other portable building, and any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft.” Fla. Stat. § 801.01(3) (1991).Prior to sentencing, Holland objected that the PSI improperly calculated his base offense level because it found that his 2000 second-degree Florida arson conviction, pursuant to Florida Statute § 806.01(2), was a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) and 4B1.2(a). This classification increased his base offense level from 14 to 20. Holland first argued that his second-degree arson conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) because the Florida statute did not involve as an element of the offense the use of physical force against another person as required to be considered a crime of violence. Second, Holland claimed that his state conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)'s enumeration clause because the Florida statute was much broader than the generic offense. Holland reiterated his objections at sentencing, and the government opposed the objections.The relevant facts are these. In August 2013, Dunn was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder with a firearm (Count 1), in violation of Fla. Stat. §§ 775.087 and 782.04(1), and thirty years' imprisonment for arson of a dwelling (Count 2), in violation of Fla. Stat. § 806.01(1)(a). The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal ("Fifth DCA") affirmed her sentences and convictions on August 19, 2014, and issued its mandate on September 12, 2014.. . . APPENDIX 12.1 ARSON - FIRST DEGREE § 806.01(1), Fla. Stat. . . . Give 2a if § 806.01(1)(a), Fla. Stat. is charged. 2. a. . . . Give 2b if § 806.01(1)(b), Fla. Stat. is charged. b. . . . Give 2c if § 806.01(1)(c), Fla. Stat. is charged. c. . . . Lesser Included Offenses ARSON - 806.01(1) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. . . .
. . . . § 806.01 ; Menomonie Farmers Credit Union v. . . .
. . . . § 806.01; see also Valdes , 3 So.3d at 1076 (quoting State v. . . .
. . . . § 806.01(1), Fla. Stat. . . . .” § 806.01(3), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 806.01, Fla. Stat.; Neilson v. . . . Again, section 806.01(2) only applies to structures not referred to in section 806.01(1); therefore, . . . See § 806.01(l)(c), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . . § 806.01; Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-7-60 to -62; Hawai'i Rev. . . .
. . . His reason was that a dwelling under section 806.01(l)(a) is also a structure under sections 806.01(2 . . . Stevens requested it based solely on the definition of “structure” in section 806.01(3). . . . With respect to section 806.01(2), Moore fails to do so. . . . (1) is entitled to an instruction under section 806.01(2). . . . and arson of an occupied structure under section 806.01(l)(c). . . .
. . . Under the rule of lenity, the 1990 amendment to section 806.01, Florida Statutes, mei’ely relieves the . . . proving that a person who causes a fire “while in the commission of any felony” did so intentionally. § 806.01 . . .
. . . Section 806.01(2), Florida Statutes (2014) provides: ' Any person who willfully and unlawfully, or while . . . In 1979, section 806.01 was amended to remove malice -from the ■ statute. . . . District provided a detailed analysis of whether voluntary intoxication was a defense to arson in section 806.01 . . .
. . . (3), 775.087(2)(a)(l) and 775.087(2)(a)(2); COUNT II ARSON-DWELLING (FI) — POSSESSION AND DISCHARGE 806.01 . . . discharged a “destructive device” as that term is defined in s. 790.001 in violation of Florida Statute 806.01 . . .
. . . . § 806.01(2). . . .
. . . . § 806.01(2). . . .
. . . Statutes (2011), and the statutory citation for the second-degree arson conviction should be section 806.01 . . .
. . . Give 2a ov-2bif§ 806.01(1) (a), Fla. Stat. is charged. 2. a. . . . Give 2b if § 806.01(1)(b), Fla. Stat. is charged. b. . . . Give 2c if § 806.01(l)(c), Fla. Stat. is charged. c. . . . Give 3c if charged under § 806.01(1) (c), Fla-.-J5tat. e, — [a-strueture]. . . . “Unlawfully” means without a legitimate, lawful purpose. § 806.01(3) Fla. . . .
. . . The (structure alleged) was Give 3a if charged, under § 806.01(1) (a), Fla. Stat. a. [a dwelling]. . . . Give 3b if charged under § 806.01(1) (b), Fla. Stat. b. . . . Give Sc if charged under § 806.01(1) (c), Fla. Stat. c.[a structure]. . . . Give only if charged under § 806.01(l)(c), Fla. . . . Give if applicable. § 806.01(3), Fla. Stat. “Structure” means: Any building of any kind. . . .
. . . Section 806.01(l)(c), Florida Statutes, provides: "(1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, or while . . .
. . . A jury convicted Jesus Perez of arson of a dwelling, § 806.01(l)(a), Fla. . . .
. . . as an example the arson statute, which identifies two degrees of arson. 3 So.3d at 1076; see also § 806.01 . . .
. . . Orders adjudicating each of them guilty of first-degree felony arson of a dwelling, contrary to section 806.01 . . .
. . . Section 806.01, Florida Statutes (2007), governs arson: (1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, . . . appurtenances thereto, any tent or other portable building, and any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft. § 806.01 . . .
. . . The state charged the defendant with second-degree arson under section 806.01(2), Florida Statutes (2006 . . . resulting in injury to another because the statutory elements of second-degree arson as provided in section 806.01 . . .
. . . . § 11-806.01 and Pima County Zoning Code Chapter 18.69.” (DSOF 6; PSOF 3.) . . .
. . . . § 806.01. It is in such cases, and only such cases, that the exception was intended to apply. . . .
. . . . § 11-806.01 (delegating power of zoning subdivisions to the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors). . . .
. . . . § 806.01(l)(a). . . . Stat. § 806.01(1 )(a), and commits criminal mischief when he willfully and maliciously damages property . . .
. . . . § 806.01 ("any structure ... under any circumstances” and defining "structure” as, among other things . . .
. . . . § 806.01(2))). . . . Stat. § 806.01(2)). . Based on In re Fualaau, 21 I. & N. . . .
. . . . § 806.01. It is in such cases, and only such cases, that the exception was intended to apply. . . .
. . . . §§ 777.04, 806.01 and 720 Ill. Comp. . . .
. . . . § 806.01 Arson. (2) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, ... by fire or explosion, damages or causes . . . degree.... (3) As used in this chapter, 'structure' means any building of any kind... any vehicle .... § 806.01 . . .
. . . offenses against the Apostles Lutheran Church located in Brandon: arson in the second degree, section 806.01 . . .
. . . . § 806.01. It is in such cases, and only such cases, that the exception was intended to apply. . . .
. . . The State charged the defendant with first degree arson in violation of section 806.01(l)(a), Florida . . . unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damage or cause to be damaged a dwelling, located at ..., contrary to F.S. 806.01 . . . a structure within the broad definition of the term “structure” found in the arson statute, section 806.01 . . .
. . . . § 806.01(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001). . §§ 810.02(1) and (3); 810.07, Fla. . . .
. . . After review, we conclude Yuksanovic’s second-degree arson conviction in violation of § 806.01(2), Florida . . . arson], is guilty of arson in the second degree, which constitutes a felony of the second degree.... § 806.01 . . . See id. § 806.01(3). . . .
. . . , a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent of one count of first-degree arson, a violation of section 806.01 . . . persons are normally present, to-wit: RI-BAULT MIDDLE SCHOOL, contrary to the provisions of Section 806.01 . . . See § 806.01(3) (defining “structure” to include “any building of any kind”). . . . See § 806.01(l)(a)-(c). . . . See § 806.01(2). . . .
. . . . § 806.01 (West 2005); Ga.Code Ann. § 16-7-61 (West 2005); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-804 (2005); 720 Ill. . . .
. . . . § 806.01(1) (1987). . . . Section 806.01(2) provided that [a]ny person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages . . . Ann. § 806.01(2) (1987). . . .
. . . in his prison cell were not “contents” of the cell within the meaning of the arson statute, section 806.01 . . .
. . . . § 33-806.01, which restricts the fee a beneficiary may charge upon sale of residential trust property . . . alienation, is void as against public policy, is in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes section 33-806.01 . . .
. . . . §§ 806.01(1); 817.233, Fla. Stat. (1995). . Janson v. . . .
. . . armed burglary of a dwelling and one count of first-degree arson in violation of sections 810.02 and 806.01 . . .
. . . A person is guilty of arson as defined in section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1999), when they willfully . . .
. . . Turning first to the attempted arson of a dwelling charge, section 806.01(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1997 . . . reasonable grounds to believe is occupied by a human being also are classified as first degree arsons. § 806.01 . . . Arson of any other structure is second degree arson, a second degree felony. § 806.01(2), Fla. . . . thereto, any tent or other portable building, and any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft.” § 806.01 . . . attempting to commit an arson of “a certain dwelling house, or its contents ... contrary to Chapter 806.01 . . .
. . . by information with committing various crimes, including arson of a dwelling in violation of section 806.01 . . .
. . . See §§ 777.04, 806.01, Fla. Stat. (1997). . . . See § 806.01, Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .
. . . . § 806.01 (defining arson); Fla. Stat. § 794.011 (defining sexual battery); Fla. . . .
. . . A vacant, damaged, boarded-up house is not a “dwelling” within the meaning of section 806.01, Florida . . .
. . . by a human being so as to support a conviction for arson in the first degree in violation of section 806.01 . . . Neilson was charged pursuant to section 806.01(l)(c). . . . that he knew or had reasonable grounds to believe was occupied by a human being; contrary to Chapter 806.01 . . . (l)(c), Florida Statutes ” Section 806.01(3) defines “structure” as follows: (3) As used in this chapter . . . Thus, under the precise wording of the information and the definition of “structure” in section 806.01 . . . However, in order to support a conviction of first-degree arson under section 806.01(1), Florida Statutes . . . Because the State failed to prove an essential element of first-degree arson under section 806.01(l)( . . . The evidence, however, supports a conviction of second-degree arson under section 806.01(2), and judgment . . .
. . . . § 806.01(1), Fla. Slat. (1995). . § 810.02, Fla. Stat. (1995). .Miranda v. . . .
. . . charged by petition with a single count of arson of an unoccupied structure in violation of section 806.01 . . . Section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1995), provides in pertinent part: (1) Any person who willfully and . . . As a general intent statute, section 806.01 “prohibits either a specific voluntary act or something that . . .
. . . . §§ 806.01(2); 810.02(1) & (3); 806.13; 914.23, Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .
. . . See § 806.01(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .
. . . recycling container does not meet the statutory definition of a “structure,” as contemplated in section 806.01 . . . appurtenances thereto, any tent or other portable building, and any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft. § 806.01 . . . “Fla.Stat. § 806.01: Florida Arson Law — The Evolution of the 1979 Amendments,” 8 Fla. St. . . . meaningful difference between the recycling container’s “cover” and a “roof,” as contemplated in section 806.01 . . .
. . . . § 806.01. . . .
. . . . § 806.01(2), Fla.Stat. (1991). . § 914.23, Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .
. . . . § 806.01(2), Fla.Stat. (1991). . § 817.233, Fla.Stat. (1991). .§ 817.234, Fla.Stat. (1991). . . . .
. . . Appellant was convicted upon a no contest plea of two counts of first-degree arson in violation of section 806.01 . . .
. . . Give 3b if charged under F.S. 806.01(l)(b) b. . . . Give 3c if charged under F.S. 806.01(l)(c) c. [a structure.] . . . The new language is added based on 1990 amendments to F.S. 806.01(1). . . . Definition 806.01(3) “Structure” means: 1. Any building of any kind. 2. . . . The new language is added based on 1990 amendments to F.S. 806.01(2). . . .
. . . .-011(4), s. 806.01, s. 893.13, or s. 893.135, or adjudged guilty of a violation of s. 794.011(2) or . . .
. . . . § 806.01(2). . . . Florida law defines a structure for purposes of Section 806.01 to include "any vessel [or] watereraft . . . Stat. § 806.01(3). . . .
. . . Florida Statute 806.01 states that “any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages . . .
. . . the defendant with committing arson on November 5, 1988, a first-degree felony proscribed by section 806.01 . . .
. . . The applicable statute, section 806.01(1), Florida Statutes (1989), provides: (1) Any person who willfully . . .
. . . John Henry Knighten appeals his conviction and sentence for arson, a violation of section 806.01, Florida . . .
. . . be damaged a dwelling or its contents” which were the property of Charlie Berry, contrary to Section 806.01 . . . one’s own home as charged and proved in this case simply is not arson within the meaning of section 806.01 . . . Section 806.01, defines the crime of arson and provides in pertinent part: Any person who willfully and . . . Thus, we hold that a violation of section 806.01 can be proved by evidence that a defendant willfully . . . The evidence in this case was sufficient to support a conviction under section 806.01. . . .
. . . is there a definition of "dwelling” except the phrase "whether occupied or not” contained in section 806.01 . . .
. . . So.2d 177, 179 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), because the court certified the following question: IS SECTION 806.01 . . . (2), FLA.STAT., SECOND DEGREE ARSON, A NECESSARILY INCLUDED OFFENSE OF § 806.01(1), FLA.STAT., FIRST . . . damaged a structure or contents thereof where persons are normally present,” contrary to subsection 806.01 . . . Section 806.01(1) first degree arson, does not include all of the elements of § 806.01(2) second degree . . . (Emphasis added.) . § 806.01(2) arson is listed as a necessarily lesser included offense of § 806.01( . . .
. . . fails to support this reason, his record includes prior crimes against property and arson under section 806.01 . . .
. . . manslaughter [§ 782.07, Fla.Stat. (1989)], aggravated battery [§ 784.045, Fla.Stat. (1989) ], and arson [§ 806.01 . . .
. . . . §§ 806.01-806.04, F.S.A.).” Brown, 206 So.2d at 381. . . .
. . . Arson is proscribed by section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1987). 806.01 Arson.— (1)Any person who willfully . . .
. . . appealed the trial court’s denial of his request to have the jury instructed on second degree arson, § 806.01 . . . Stat., as a necessarily lesser included offense of the offense charged, first degree arson, § 806.01( . . . Section 806.01(1) first degree arson, does not include all of the elements of § 806.01(2) second degree . . . offenses and this opinion, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question: IS SECTION 806.01 . . . (2), FLA.STAT., SECOND DEGREE ARSON, A NECESSARILY LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF § 806.01(1), FLA.STAT., . . .
. . . WIS.STAT. 806.01. . . .
. . . 800.04 None Attempt Assault — 784.011 Battery — 784.03 Unnatural and lascivious act — 800.02 Arson — 806.01 . . . (1) Arson — 806.01(2) Criminal mischief — 806.-13(l)(b)l Attempt Criminal mischief — 806.-13(l)(b)2. . . .
. . . offenses 782.04(1) — (2) Specified sexual battery 794.011(4) offenses and 794.041 Specified arson offenses 806.01 . . .
. . . Ricky Coleman Erwin was convicted of, inter alia, arson of an occupied structure pursuant to section 806.01 . . . Section 806.-01(l)(c) provides as follows: 806.01 Arson.— (1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully . . . However, the evidence does support a conviction under section 806.01(2), Florida Statutes (1985) on the . . . majority opinion that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction for first degree arson (§ 806.01 . . .
. . . defendant is guilty of Arson in the First Degree and Burning to Defraud an Insurer under Florida Statutes 806.01 . . .
. . . Under counts IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X, Shinholser was convicted of arson pursuant to section 806.01 . . .
. . . All in violation of and contrary to Section 806.01, Florida Statutes. . . . Like the defendant in the instant case, Mayle was charged with second degree arson under Section 806.01 . . . The inclusion of such facts has only served to confuse. .Section 806.01 provides in pertinent part: ( . . .
. . . 800.04 None Attempt Assault — 784.011 Battery — 784.03 Unnatural and lascivious act— 800.02 Arson — 806.01 . . . (1) Arson — 806.01(2) Criminal mischief— 806.13(l)(b)l Attempt Criminal mischief— 806.13(l)(b)2 Criminal . . .
. . . insurance and intent to injure or defraud the insurer, elements not found in the arson statute, section 806.01 . . .
. . . impression: Is an unenclosed motorcycle a “structure” as contemplated by the statutory provisions of section 806.01 . . . The applicable statute provides: 806.01 Arson.— (1)Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or . . . Jones was charged with violation of section 806.01(2) by willfully damaging, by fire or explosion, the . . . The dissent contends that the purpose of section 806.01(2) is to “more severely punish those who burn . . . This rationale overlooks section 806.01(1), which in actuality serves that purpose by providing that . . .
. . . impression: Is an unenclosed motorcycle a “structure” contemplated by the statutory provisions of section 806.01 . . . The applicable statute provides: 806.01 Arson.— (1)Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or . . . Jones was charged with violation of section 806.01(2) by willfully damaging, by fire or explosion, the . . .
. . . The subject information follows the language of the arson statute [§ 806.01(1), Fla.Stat. (1985)] which . . .
. . . . § 806.01(3), “structure” is defined as “any building of any kind, any enclosed area with a roof over . . .
. . . with reasonable grounds to believe that a human being was therein, in violation of Florida Statute 806.01 . . .
. . . Petitioner was indicted for arson under section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1981), and first-degree felony . . . trial court’s denial of the voluntary intoxication instruction and held that (1) arson under section 806.01 . . . In the instant case, petitioner was charged with arson under section 806.01 and felony murder, with arson . . . Section 806.01 reads, in part: “Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages . . . Accordingly, we hold that arson under section 806.01 is a general intent crime and, therefore, voluntary . . .
. . . Appellant says that arson of an unoccupied structure under section 806.01(2), Florida Statutes (1977) . . .
. . . Respondent was charged in a two-count information with first-degree arson in violation of section 806.01 . . . Section 806.01(1), Florida Statutes (1981), provides: (1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by . . .
. . . The second degree arson charged in this case, in violation of section 806.01(2), involved appellant’s . . .
. . . of a felony of the first degree for a violation of s. 782.04(2) or (3), s. 787.01, s. 794.011(4), s. 806.01 . . .
. . . of first degree arson because the burned structure was not a dwelling within the meaning of section 806.01 . . . trial court erred in concluding that the subject house was a dwelling inside the meaning of section 806.01 . . . remand with instructions that the trial court enter judgment on the lesser included offense [section 806.01 . . . Section 806.01(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1981), provides: (1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire . . . Section 806.01(2), Fla.Stat. (1981), provides: (2) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or . . .
. . . remand with instructions that the trial court enter judgment on the lesser included offense [section 806.01 . . .
. . . Defendant was convicted under section 806.01(1), Florida Statutes (1981), of arson in the first degree . . .
. . . motion to dismiss an amended information accusing him of second degree arson in violation of section 806.01 . . . The second degree arson statute, section 806.01(2), reads in relevant part: Any person who willfully . . . Subsection (3) of section 806.01 provides that, as used in chapter 806, the definition of “structure” . . . Although the word “unlawfully” in section 806.01 has yet to be clearly defined, we believe that where . . . See Fla.Stat. § 806.01: Florida Arson Law — The Evolution of the 1979 Amendments, Lawrence W. . . .
. . . ”), 790.05 (carrying “any pistol” without a license), 790.23(1) (a felon possessing “any firearm”), 806.01 . . .
. . . Defendant was indicted for arson under section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1981), and for first degree . . . However, we find that arson under section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1981), is a general intent crime . . . Accordingly, section 806.01(1) of the Florida arson statute, which says that a person who “willfully . . . be drawn readily and easily from the bare wording of section 806.01. . . . Ann., section 2C:17-1, in contrast to section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1981), provides that the crime . . .
. . . State, 416 So.2d 522, 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (new arson statute § 806.01(l)(a) does not require showing . . .
. . . These consolidated cases involve the constitutionality of Section 806.01(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1979 . . . After consideration of Lofton’s contentions regarding the constitutionality of Section 806.01, we are . . . Section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1981), provides as follows: (1)Any person who willfully and unlawfully . . . Fla.Stat. § 806.01: Florida Arson Law — Evolution of the 1979 Amendments, 8 F.S.U.L.Rev. 81 (1980). . . .
. . . Federal Rule of Appellate Proeedure (Appellate Rule) 10(b). 13 Collier on Bankruptcy, (14th ed.), ¶ 806.01 . . .