The 2023 Florida Statutes
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Whether Defendant Beatty had probable cause or arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff depends on the elements of the alleged crime, Crosby v. Monroe Cty., 394 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2004), and on the operative facts, Skop, 485 F.3d at 1137-38. Defendant Beatty argues there are four crimes for which he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff: resisting an officer without violence in violation of Florida Statute § 843.02; stopping, standing, or parking in a prohibited place in violation of Florida Statute § 316.1945; walking on a limited access facility in violation of Florida Statute § 316.130(18); and hindering or attempting to hinder a firefighter in performance of his duty in violation of Florida Statute § 806.10. Although Plaintiff was only charged with resisting an officer without violence, Defendant Beatty is shielded by qualified immunity if he had probable cause or arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for any offense. Bailey, 956 F.2d at 1119 n.4.Deputy Scales further argues that even if he did not have arguable probable cause to charge Mr. Olin with violating § 843.02, he would have had arguable probable cause to charge him with violating a Florida statute that makes it illegal to "willfully or unreasonably interfere[] with, hinder[], or assault[] . . . any firefighter in the performance of his or her duty." § 806.10( 2), Fla. Stat.; see Bailey v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 956 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.4 (11th Cir. 1992) ("The validity of an arrest does not turn on the offense announced by the officer at the time of the arrest."). A conviction has been upheld under § 806.10( 2) when an individual failed to move his car to allow firefighters access to a person who was having a seizure. Robinson v. State, 673 So. 2d 114, 115-16 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Reasonable officers could have believed that Mr. Olin's actions—moving his vehicle while firefighters were working very close to his car and then requesting that the locksmith leave so he could continue to do so—would unreasonably interfere with the firefighters' performance of their duties, which include protecting people. Thus, Deputy Scales also had arguable probable… Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint asserts a single claim of negligence. See Doc. 44, p. 7. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “fail[ed] to promptly and accurately report to the FDA incidents and problems with the EnPulse E1DR21 that occurred after the device received [PMA],” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 360i, 21 C.F.R. § 803.50(a), 21 C.F.R. § 806.10(a), 21 C.F.R. § 814.84(a), and 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.198(a) & (c). Id. at ¶ 30. Although Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant “had a duty to notify the FDA,” her Response contends that “the essence of Plaintiff's claim is not that the defendant breached a duty to the FDA, but that it breached a duty to [the Decedent], who was in the foreseeable zone of risk created by [Defendant]—namely, the duty to provide an adequate warning of the dangers of its product, which in this case paralleled its duty to comply with the conditions of its PMA.” Id. at ¶ 29; Doc. 46, p. 11.Second, in its claim for negligence, Plaintiff has failed to set forth any problem or failure to comply with a federal regulation that could be linked to the injury alleged. Wolicki,634 F.3d at 1301-02 (citing Ilarraza v. Medtronic, Inc., 677 F.Supp. 2d 582, 589 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)). In its negligence claim, Plaintiff simply claims that Defendant had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design, manufacture, testing, sale and distribution of its Pump, and based upon what Defendant should have known, it was negligent for failing to warn the public that the Pump's safety had not been established for use in the joint space. Id. at ¶¶ 29-31. However, Plaintiff has not directed the Court to any FDA regulation that requires a device manufacturer to contact doctors or patients, let alone "the U.S. medical community" regarding a potential device defect without FDA involvement. Doc. 1, ¶¶ 31, 37-39. Indeed, the FDA regulations regarding manufacturer reporting requirements refer to reporting to the FDA, not doctors or patients. See 21 U.S.C. § 360i; 21 C.F.R. § 803.50(a); 21 C.F.R. § 806.10( a); 21 C.F.R. § 814.84(a); and 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.198(a), (c); see also Leanord v… The plaintiff argues that there was no probable cause for her arrest under § 806.10 because that section only applies to firefighters who are extinguishing a fire or attempting to save someone's life. In Robinson v. State of Florida, 673 So.2d 114, 115 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), the court found that the defendant violated § 806.10 by refusing to move his vehicle when told by a firefighter that it was blocking the path of an emergency medical vehicle. See id. The court in Robinson read § 633.30 in pari materia with § 806.10 to find that § 806.10 is violated by interfering with a firefighter performing a duty delineated in § 633.30. See id. Enforcing fire prevention codes is one of the primary responsibilities of a firefighter under § 633.30 and it was reasonable for Eggert and Watson to believe that Stachel was interfering with the performance of that duty when she tore up the fire inspection form. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they had arguable probable cause to arrest Stachel for violating § 806.10(2).806.10. Preventing or obstructing extinguishment of fireReading section 633.30 in para materia with section 806.10, it is clear that an individual violates section 806.10 by interfering with a firefighter who, in the course of his or her employment, is attempting to save a human life. At bar, the firemen were responding to a seizure victim, a situation involving the preservation of human life. Mr. Sexsmith was clearly hindered and interfered with by Robinson's actions as he was forced to leave the scene of the emergency to obtain the assistance of Officer Branford. Moreover the firemen in the EMS truck were also hindered and interfered with by Robinson, as their path to the victim was obstructed by Robinson's vehicle. Contrary to Mr. Robinson's assertions, subsection (2) of the statute makes no distinction between a firefighter who is extinguishing a fire and one who is providing medical services.. . . . §§ 806.10 and 806.15. In sum, Wis. . . .
. . . . §§ 803.50, 806.10. See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(b), (j), 360i(a)(1), (g)(1). . . .
. . . . § 806.10(b), a manufacturer is required to report to the FDA any corrective action taken to reduce . . .
. . . . § 806.10. Id. ¶¶ 53,159. . . . violated FDA regulations by issuing recalls without reporting them to the FDA, in violation of 21 C.F.R. § 806.10 . . .
. . . . §§ 803.50(a)(1), 806.10(a)(1). . . .
. . . . § 806.10(a), 21 C.F.R. § 814.84(a), and 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.198(a) & (c). Id. at ¶ 30. . . .
. . . . §§ 803.50(a)(1), 806.10(a)(1). . . .
. . . the FDA noted that Medtronic’s Educational Brief of July 2003 was “a reportable correction under CFR 806.10 . . . reduce a risk to health posed by a device was not reported in writing to FDA, as required by 21 CFR 806.10 . . . The FDA also believes that the July 2003 Educational Brief is a reportable correction under 21 CFR 806.10 . . .
. . . . § 806.10. . . .
. . . .; 806.10(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .
. . . Section 806.10(2) of the Florida Statutes provides that “Any person who willfully or unreasonably interferes . . . The plaintiff argues that there was no probable cause for her arrest under § 806.10 because that section . . . State of Flonda, 673 So.2d 114, 115 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), the court found that the defendant violated § 806.10 . . . The court in Robinson read § 633.30 in pari materia with § 806.10 to find that § 806.10 is violated by . . . Thus, because there was arguable probable cause for the charge of violating § 806.10(2), the arrest was . . .
. . . WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 806.10(1) Appellant also argues that his conviction under . . . subsection 806.10(1), Florida Statutes (1995), cannot be sustained because the state did not prove that . . . We find that the terms “willfully and maliciously” as used in subsection 806.10(1), Florida Statutes . . . Section 806.10, Florida Statutes (1995) provides: 806.10. . . .
. . . Robinson was convicted under section 806.10, Florida Statutes (1993), which reads in pertinent part: . . . Reading section 633.30 in para materia with section 806.10, it is clear that an individual violates section . . . 806.10 by interfering with a firefighter who, in the course of his or her employment, is attempting . . .
. . . . § 806.10, at the time a judgment is entered, and “upon payment of the [required] fee,” the judgment . . .
. . . . § 806.10(1). The card notes the damages and costs but not the raze order. . . . Wis.Stat. § 806.10(1). . . .
. . . . — The following provisions apply only to items 806.10, 806.20, and 806.30: (a) The value of repairs . . .
. . . . — Tbe following provisions apply only to items 806.10, 806.20, and 806.30: (a) Tbe value of repairs . . .
. . . .— The following provisions apply only to items 806.10, 806.20 and 806.30 : (a) The value of repairs, . . .