The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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The Plaintiff argues in his motion that “Section 810.09 is inapplicable because the bar that Plaintiff entered is a ‘structure' as defined in Section 810.011(1).” (Pl.'s Resp. to Def. Officers' Mot. Summ. J. at 11, n.5; Def. Officers' Reply at 3-4.) The Court's conclusion would be the same under either statute because Buress neither refused nor defied orders under his version of events, nor would a reasonable police officer have believed himself to have authorization to order Buress's departure under the undisputed facts with all inferences drawn in favor of the Plaintiff.The burglary statute defines a “structure” as “a building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof.” § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. Although the term “curtilage” is not defined by statute, the Florida Supreme Court has determined that “some form of an enclosure [is necessary] in order for the area surrounding a residence to be considered part of the ‘curtilage' as referred to in the burglary statute.” State v. Hamilton, 660 So.2d 1038, 1044 (Fla. 1995).In a recent Eleventh Circuit case, the court stated that “[a] person commits the Florida misdemeanor offense of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance when, ‘without being authorized, licensed, or invited,' he ‘willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance: (1) As as [sic] to which which [sic] notice against entering or remaining is given, either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. 810.011.” Watkins v. Broward Sheriff Off., 824 Fed.Appx. 865, 868 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 810.09(1)(a), (2)(a) (2014)). In that case, the court found that the officer had probable cause to believe Watkins “was actively committing the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance” because the property manager “complained to the police that Watkins refused to leave the property after being asked to do so, and she knew that he remained on the property when she arrived.” Watkins, 824 Fed.Appx. in 868. In this case, there is no evidence of a complaint or call to police; rather, Defendant simply observed the vehicle.Section 810.011(1) defines structure as "a building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof." Section 810.011(2) defines dwelling as "a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether such building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof." The statutory definition of dwelling encompasses the statutory definition of structure. If it is a dwelling, it is also a structure.Section 810.011(1) defines structure as "a building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof." Section 810.011(2) defines dwelling as "a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether such building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof." The statutory definition of dwelling encompasses the statutory definition of structure. If it is a dwelling, it is also a structure.There do not appear to be any Florida cases that directly address whether the fence is itself part of the curtilage. But the fence is inextricably tied to the curtilage and therefore the structure itself. See Hamilton , 660 So. 2d at 1044 (requiring there be some form of an enclosure for an area to be part of the curtilage). The curtilage is not just an area next to the structure. By statute, the curtilage is the structure. See § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. (including the curtilage in the definition of "structure"); Baker v. State , 636 So. 2d 1342, 1344 (Fla. 1994) ("[T]he curtilage is not a separate location wherein a burglary can occur. Rather, it is an integral part of the structure or dwelling that it surrounds."). When a building stands on its own, the boundaries of the structure are defined by the walls of the building. When a building has a curtilage, the boundaries of the structure are defined by the fence. Just as the building's walls are part of the structure, the curtilage's fence is also part of the structure.The Court addresses this claim in accordance with the deferential standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. The state charged Petitioner with burglary with an assault while armed. Burglary “means entering or remaining in a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein.” § 810.02(1)(a), Fla. Stat. The theory of burglary here involved two elements - (1) Petitioner had permission or consent to enter the dwelling owned by or in the possession of Stacay Hawkins; and (2) Petitioner, after entering the dwelling, remained after permission to remain had been withdrawn and with intent to commit an assault inside the structure. Resp. Ex. S at 258-59; Resp. Ex. L at 17. “‘Dwelling' means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether such building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof.” § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat.Also, the information charged Mitchell with “unlawfully enter[ing] or remain[ing] in a certain dwelling . . . with the intent to commit an offense therein.” (Doc. 10-2 at 103) § 810.02(1)(b)(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). A dwelling means “a building or conveyance of any kind . . . which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof.” § 810.011( 2), Fla. Stat. (2010) (bolding added). The evidence showed that the broken window was in rear of the house (Doc. 10-2 at 327), and a six-foot high chain linked fence enclosed the backyard of the house. (Doc. 10-2 at 331-33) A screen for the window was lying on the ground. (Doc. 10-2 at 336) Even though a section of the backyard fence for entering and exiting always remained open (Doc. 10-2 at 332, 350), the enclosed backyard was part of the curtilage of the house. Therefore, the evidence proved that Mitchell entered the “dwelling.” Baker v. State, 636 So.2d 1342, 1344 (Fla. 1994) (“Entry onto the curtilage is, for the purposes of the burglary statute, entry into the structure or dwelling. Baker entered Wilson's yard which was protected by a fence and shrubbery… First, the BIA said that it could not imagine a burglary prosecution in Florida for a dwelling that was "never occupied." See A.R. at 7 (emphasis removed). But a Florida Supreme Court case decided after Bennett affirms that "[o]ccupancy is no longer a critical element under [the statutory] definition" of burglary, and explains that "a structure's design or suitability for habitation, rather than actual occupancy or intent to occupy, controls in determining whether a structure constitutes a dwelling [under § 810.011(2) ]." Young , 141 So. 3d at 166 (citation omitted). See also Jacobs v. State , 41 So. 3d 1004, 1006–07 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (holding that a jury could reasonably find that a vacant home under renovation, with roof and walls and equipped with utilities that were not turned on, was a dwelling under § 810.011(2) though it had been unoccupied for several years due to a fire).The parties agree that the version of the Florida burglary statute under which Mr. Banks was convicted in 1981 was non-generic, and indeed it sanctioned not only entry into structures, but also the structure's curtilage and conveyances. See Fla. Stat. §§ 810.02 &810.011 (1981). The sentencing record is silent as to which of the ACCA's clauses the district court relied on to enhance Mr. Banks' sentence. Consequently, Mr. Banks is correct that this case turns on the legal landscape at the time of sentencing-specifically, Taylor and Adams.. . . . §§ 810.011(2), 810.02 (1976) ; Ga. . . .
. . . "Unlawfully" means without a legitimate, lawful purpose. § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. Dubose v. . . . Definitions; give as applicable. § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. Dubose v. . . . See § 810.011(1), (2), and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Definitions. §810.011(1) , Fla. Stat. ; and State v. . . . Definitions. § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. Dubose v. State, 210 So.3d 641 (Fla. 2017). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. ; Dubose v. State, 210 So.3d 641 (Fla. 2017). . . . Stat., and § 810.011(5)(a), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . . § 810.011(2) (West 2008). U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. (B)(iii); see United States v. . . . Ann. § 810.011(2) (West 2008) (emphasis added). Descamps v. . . .
. . . ." § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. Dubose v. State, 210 So.3d 641 (Fla. 2017). . . . The enclosure need not be continuous as it may have an ungated opening for entering and exiting.] § 810.011 . . .
. . . See § 810.011 (5) -(8), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . .
. . . . § 810.011 (1983) ; Ga. Code Ann . § 16-7-1 (1984); Haw. Rev. . . . Stat . § 810.011(2) ; Ga. Code Ann . § 16-7-1 ; Haw. Rev. Stat . § 708-800 ; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. . . .
. . . Subsequently, this Court held that a Florida burglary conviction under Florida Statute §§ 810.02(l)(b)(l) and 810.011 . . . Esprit, this Court held that a Florida burglary conviction under Florida Statute §§ 810.02(l)(b)(l) and 810.011 . . .
. . . . § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat; Dubose v. State, 210 So. 3d 641 (Fla. 2017). . . . The enclosure need not be continuous as it may have an ungat-ed opening for entering and exiting.] § 810.011 . . . engagement for prostitution or lewdness or any act in furtherance of such appointment or engagement. § 810.011 . . . The enclosure need not be continuous as it may have an ungat-ed opening for entering and exiting.] § 810.011 . . . The enclosure need not be continuous as it may have an ungat-ed opening for entering and exiting.] § 810.011 . . .
. . . See § 810.011, Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. . . . . § 810.011(3), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 810.011(1), (2), and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . reduction in the presence of or response time for first responders or homeland security personnel. § 810.011 . . .
. . . . § 810.011(1) (West 1995); see also Henry v. State, 707 So.2d 370, 372 (Fla. 1st DGA 1998). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(1) (1989). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(2) (emphasis added). . . . Stat. § 810.011(2) (emphasis added). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(2); see also id. § 810.011(1) (defining “structure” as “a building of any kind, either temporary . . . Id. § 810.011(2). . . . Id. § 810.011(1). . . .
. . . .” § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . .” § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . Section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes, does not require an attached porch to be completely enclosed to . . .
. . . . § 810.011(a)(1)). . . .
. . . See § 810.011(4), Fla. Stat. (1989); Carbajal v. State, 75 So.3d 258 (Fla.2011); DuBoise v. . . .
. . . Section 810.011 defines the term “structure” used in § 810.02 as “a building of any kind, either temporary . . . Section 810.011 defines- the term “dwelling” used in § 810.02 as a building or conveyance of any kind . . . Ann. § 810.011(2) (West 2007). . . . Lastly, § 810.011 defines the term “conveyance” as “any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad vehicle . . . Ann. .§ 810.011(3) (West 2007). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(a)(1). It defines “dwelling” similarly. See id. § 810.011(a)(2). . . . Id. § 810.011(a)(3). . . . Stat. § 810.011(a)(1). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. . . . reduction in the presence of or response time for first responders or homeland security personnel. §■ 810.011 . . . Stat., and § 810.011(5)(a), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . . § 810.011[2]). . . .
. . . .” § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .
. . . Section 810.011 details the requirements that must be met for the property to be considered posted or . . . not be necessary to fence any boundary or part of a boundary of any land which is formed by water. § 810.011 . . . Therefore, the property does not meet the legal definition of fenced land provided in section 810.011 . . . The case law is rife with examples of courts requiring strict compliance with section 810.011(5)(a)1. . . . The State argues that the posting of the property also complies with a different section of 810.011, . . .
. . . . § 810.011(2), which takes the offense outside of the federal definition of “generic burglary.” . . .
. . . . §§ 810.09, 810.011(1), 810.011(5) (2014). . . .
. . . .” § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. (1986) (emphasis added). . . . structure” is defined for purposes of the burglary statute as including the curtilage of a building. § 810.011 . . .
. . . . § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. . . . . § 810.011(8), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 810.011(1), (2), and (8), Fla. Stat. . . . reduction in the presence of or response time for first responders or homeland security personnel. § 810.011 . . .
. . . . § 810.011(2). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(4), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(1). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(2). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . . § 810.011(2) (West 2009) (emphasis added). . . . . Ann. § 810.011(2) (West 2009). . United States v. . . .
. . . provided in this subparagraph, it shall not be necessary to give notice by posting as defined in s.810.011 . . . Smaller construction sites of one acre or less do not have to be “posted” in accordance with section 810.011 . . . For construction sites of more than one acre, warning signs must be posted in accordance with section 810.011 . . . apart along the boundaries of the land, and the lettering must be at least two inches in height. § 810.011 . . .
. . . . § 810.011(2) “Dwelling” means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether . . .
. . . either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. 810.011 . . .
. . . as to whether a structure undergoing substantial renovations constitutes a “dwelling” under section 810.011 . . . reasons that follow, we conclude that the building in question constitutes a dwelling under section 810.011 . . . Burglary of a Dwelling Florida’s burglary statute, section 810.011, defines dwelling as: a building or . . . See § 810.011(2), Fla. . . . See § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(3). . . . Id. § 810.011(2). . . . Stat. § 810.011(2), under Florida law is comparable to that presented when a generic burglary of a dwelling . . .
. . . See § 810.011, Fla. Stat. (2012); State v. . . . Definitions; give as applicable. § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. . . . . § 810.011(3), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 810.011(1), (2), and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Stat., and § 810.011(5)(a), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . . § 810.011(2)). . . .
. . . ." § 810.011(s), Fla. Stat. (2007). In State v. . . .
. . . See § 810.011(5), Fla. Stat. . . . probable cause to arrest for trespass, there must be evidence that the signs complied with section 810.011 . . . Section 810.011(5), Florida Statutes, provides as follows: (5)(a) "Posted land” is that land upon which . . .
. . . . § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. and State v. Hamilton, 660 So.2d 1038 (Fla.1995). Gim if-applicable. . . . . § 810.011(3), FlaStat. . . . Definitions. § 810.011(1) Fla. Stat. and State v. Hamilton, 660 So.2d 1038 (Fla.1995). . . . . § 810.011(3) Fla. Stat. . . . “Willfully” means intentionally, knowingly, and purposely. § 810.011(5)(a)l. and (b), FlaStat. . . .
. . . an “attached porch” and does not fall within the definition of a “dwelling” as provided in section 810.011 . . . Section 810.011(2) defines “dwelling” to mean: a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached . . . While section 810.011 does not define the term, a review of how the subject has been treated by the courts . . . short, the area where the bicycle was parked was not an “attached porch” as contemplated in section 810.011 . . . The structure of section 810.011(2) is significant in this regard, because it ensures that any area deemed . . .
. . . Section 810.011(2) defines the term “dwelling” to mean “a building or conveyance of any kind, including . . . of defining a “dwelling,” the prosecutor “paraphrased” the statutory definition provided in section 810.011 . . . Although section 810.011(1) & (2) defines both a structure and a dwelling to include “the curtilage thereof . . .
. . . .” § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .
. . . .” §§ 810.011(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .
. . . either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. 810.011 . . .
. . . . § 810.09; see also id. at § 810.011 (no definition of “notice”). . . .
. . . either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. 810.011 . . .
. . . . § 810.011(1) (1998). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(3). . . .
. . . Section 810.011(1), Florida Statutes (2008), defines “structure” to mean “a building of any kind, either . . .
. . . See §§ 810.09(l)(a)(l), 810.011(7), (8). . . . . § 810.011(5)(b). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). . . .
. . . See § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2008); Dukes v. . . .
. . . stolen is valued at $100 or more, but less than $300, and is taken from a dwelling as defined in s. 810.011 . . .
. . . burglary of a dwelling because the State failed to prove the elements of “dwelling” as defined in section 810.011 . . . Stat. § 810.011(2) (2009). . . .
. . . present sufficient evidence that the lot was “posted” within the meaning of subsections 810.09(l)(a) and 810.011 . . .
. . . Nearby section 810.011(1), Florida Statutes (2006), defines a structure as “a building of any kind, either . . . holding that because both burglary and trespass rely on the definition of “structure” found in section 810.011 . . .
. . . against entering has been given either by actual communication or by posting as described in section 810.011 . . . establish that the posted “no trespassing” signs strictly complied with the requirements of section 810.011 . . . Section 810.011 (5)(a) 1., Florida Statutes (2007), provides: (5)(a) 'Posted land’ is that land upon . . .
. . . Section 810.011 defines structure and dwelling: (1) “Structure” means a building of any kind, either . . . designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof.... § 810.011 . . . Because a fenced backyard qualifies as a dwelling or structure as defined in section 810.011, Florida . . .
. . . Section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (2008), defines “dwelling” as: “a building or conveyance of any . . . held that the slab from which the fan was stolen qualified as an attached porch pursuant to section 810.011 . . . The front porch is part of the dwelling as defined under section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes. . . . It held that the carport was not itself an independent structure, as defined in section 810.011, because . . .
. . . . § 810.011(1). . . .
. . . . § 810.011 includes “curtilage.” . . . Stat. § 810.011(1) (emphasis added). . . . Stat. § 810.011(2) (1993)). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(3), Fla. . . . permanent, which has a roof over it and includes any closely adjoining land enclosed by a fence or wall. § 810.011 . . . permanent, which has a roof over it and includes any closely adjoining land enclosed by a fence or wall. § 810.011 . . . permanent, which-has a roof over it and includes any closely adjoining land enclosed by a fence-or wall, § 810.011 . . .
. . . either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. 810.011 . . .
. . . . § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. . . . . § 810.011(3), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 810.011(1), (2), and (8), Fla. Stat. . . . reduction in the presence of or response time for first responders or homeland security personnel. § 810.011 . . . reduction in the presence of or response time for first responders or homeland security personnel. § 810.011 . . .
. . . main claim is that the structure he burglarized did not qualify as a dwelling as defined by section 810.011 . . .
. . . either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. 810.011 . . .
. . . . § 810.011(2) (2005). In United States v. . . . Stat. § 810.011(2) (2006); see also Gomez-Guerra, 485 F.3d at 303-04. . . .
. . . . § 810.011(1) (1984). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(b); Gomez-Guerra, 485 F.3d at 303. . . . .
. . . Because the definition of dwelling in § 810.011(2) includes “the curtilage thereof,” Pacheco-Salazar’ . . .
. . . . § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. . . . . § 810.011(3), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 810.011, Fla. Stat. . . . burglary without any aggravating circumstances, you should find [him] [her] guilty only of burglary, § 810.011 . . .
. . . RECEIVED NOTICE AGAINST ENTERING OR REMAINING GIVEN BY POSTING, FENCING, OR CULTIVATION AS DESCRIBED IN S. 810.011 . . . against entering or remaining given by posting, fencing, or cultivation,” as described in Florida Statute 810.011 . . . Section 810.011(5)(a) specifically describes the requirements for providing notice by posting with regards . . . iron, steel, barbed wire, other wire, or other material, which stands at least 3 feet in height.” § 810.011 . . .
. . . .; see § 810.011(3), Fla. Stat. (2005) (defining “conveyance” as including “any motor vehicle”). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(2) (1995) (emphasis added); see also Baker v. . . .
. . . . § 810.011(2), Fla. . . . . § 810.011(3), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable. . . .
. . . . §§ 810.02, 810.011(2). Stewart’s argument is without merit. . . . Stat. § 810.011(2). . . .
. . . valued at $100 or more, but less than $300, and that it was “taken from a dwelling as defined in s. 810.011 . . .
. . . .” § 810.011(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (1987), (1994). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(1). . . .
. . . . § 810.011(1) (1989). . . .
. . . It is undisputed that this house previously qualified as a dwelling under section 810.011. . . . Section 810.011(2) defines a “dwelling” as “a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached . . . The only exception would be that created by the legislature in section 810.011 — if a structure became . . . According to section 810.011 and Perkins, if the character of the house is substantially changed to the . . . The exception in section 810.011(2) states, "However, during the time of a state of emergency declared . . . majority is unjustified in relying on the second sentence of the definition of dwelling in section 810.011 . . . was added to the statute in 1982, see ch. 82-87, § 1, Laws of Fla., the second sentence of section 810.011 . . . The provision was necessary because under the definition in the first sentence of section 810.011(2), . . . emergency that it would no longer be covered by the definition of dwelling in the first sentence of section 810.011 . . . expand the coverage of the statute — the majority is unjustified in using the second sentence of section 810.011 . . .
. . . . § 810.011(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . Second, we conclude that the definition of “posted land” in section 810.011 was intended to apply to . . . However, the trial court found that posting was not required pursuant to section 810.011(5)(b), because . . . Dwelling is defined by section 810.011(2) as a building or conveyance that has a roof over it. . . . However, neither section 810.011(5)(a) nor section 810.09(2)(d) provide for an exception to the posting . . .
. . . either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. 810.011 . . .
. . . .” §'810.011(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .
. . . Section 13: amends section 810.011 to expand the definition of “conveyance,” as used to define burglary . . . Section 810.011 previously referenced railroad cars within the definition of conveyance. . . .
. . . .2d 1083 (Fla.1996)(holding that an unoccupied house is afforded the same protection, under section 810.011 . . . Moore does not specify how the homes did not meet the definition of “dwelling” under section 810.011( . . .
. . . Section 810.011, Florida Statutes (2002), defines a structure as “a building of any kind, either temporary . . .
. . . .” § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). . . .
. . . Definitions; give as applicable § 810.011(1), FlaStat. . . . . § 810.011(3), FlaStat. . . . burglary without any aggravating circumstances, you should find [him][her] guilty only of burglary. § 810.011 . . .
. . . . by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. 810.011 . . . See § 810.011(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001); In Interest of B.P., 610 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). . . .