Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...later trespass charge.7 Besides, even if a Florida court acquitted the warning- 7 The Florida trespass statute contains no requirement that “notice against entering or remaining” be rightful, authorized, or valid. FLA . STAT . ANN . § 810.09; see also id. at § 810.011 (no definition of “notice”)....

...the structure or conveyance at the time the crime is committed. At first blush, "structure or conveyance" seems to be an easily understandable and straightforward expression that is synonymous with "building" or "vehicle." But that is not the case. Section 810.011(1) defines a "structure" to mean "a building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof." Id. § 810.011(1) (emphasis added). Further, "dwelling" as used in section 810.011(2) is defined as "a building or conveyance of any kind, either temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof." Id. § 810.011(2) (emphasis added). By the use of the phrase "together with the curtilage thereof," it is apparent that the legislature intended that the terms "structure" and "dwelling" also encompass the "curtilage," a description not limited to buildings or conveyances. However, section 810.011 does not define "curtilage," even though a definition is crucial to comprehending the full scope of the crime of burglary....

..., or within the "curtilage." Around the same time, the legislature also enacted a statute which *1041 punished the breaking and entering of "any other buildings or any ship or vessel." See § 810.02, Fla. Stat. (1941). In 1974, with the enactment of section 810.011 (effective July 1, 1975), section 810.01 was repealed and the definition of burglary was expanded to apply to buildings of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which had roofs....

...Section 7 creates the new offense of repeat sexual batterer, section 794.0115, Florida Statutes (1999), and section 8 amends section 794.011, Florida Statutes (1997), to conform to the new crime created in section 7. Section 13 amends the definition of a conveyance in the burglary statute, section 810.011, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...Chapter 2001-239, section 1, at 2192-93, Laws of Florida, amended section 775.082(9), changing language concerning burglary of a dwelling and adding language applying the statute to felons released from custody in jurisdictions other than Florida. Chapter 2001-279, section 49, at 3201, Laws of Florida, reenacted section 810.011(5)(b), Florida Statutes, to incorporate other amendments made in the chapter....

...circumstances of the burglary and of the possession of the stolen property, when considered in the light of all evidence in the case, convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the burglary. Definitions. Give as applicable. § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. "Structure" means any building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, that has a roof over it, and the enclosed space of ground and outbuildings immediately surrounding that structure. § 810.011(3), Fla....

...caused damage to the [dwelling] [structure] [property] within the [dwelling] [structure], in excess of $1,000. In an area that is subject to a state of emergency, the definition of structure, dwelling, and conveyance may be different during a state of emergency. See § 810.011, Fla....

...ergency under Chapter *325 252, the "State Emergency Management Act." With no aggravating circumstances If you find that the defendant committed the burglary without any aggravating circumstances, you should find [him] [her] guilty only of burglary. § 810.011(4), Fla....

...75 Fla. at 798, 78 So. at 695. The proper remedy for a harsh law will not be found through construction or interpretation; it rests only in amendment or repeal. The legislature has defined "dwelling" such that the definition includes the curtilage. § 810.011(2), Fla....

..."Breaking" and "night time" have been completely eliminated. The legislature added remaining on the property without invitation or license to the "entering" element. If the property involved is a conveyance, the burglar need neither enter nor remain if he takes apart any portion of the conveyance. § 810.011(3), Fla....

...sentence. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [*] The definition of "conveyance" includes the following provision: "`[T]o enter a conveyance' includes taking apart any portion of the conveyance." § 810.011(3), Fla....

...For the reasons expressed below, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve the decision under review. FACTS Houston D. Perkins was charged with and convicted of the offense of burglary of a dwelling, a second-degree felony, under section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...perty. The owner last visited the house three to four weeks before the burglary when he mowed the grass and picked up trash. Perkins appealed his conviction and sentence, contending that the house he burglarized did not constitute a "dwelling" under section 810.011(2) because it was unoccupied and, therefore, he should have been adjudicated and sentenced only for the offense of burglary of a structure, a third-degree felony under section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1995). In a split decision, the First District affirmed, holding the house Perkins burglarized was a "dwelling" within the meaning of section 810.011(2), but certified the above question for our review....

...Thus, we held that the common law definition of "dwelling" contemplated that a structure be occupied and not merely capable of or suitable for occupation. See also Tukes v. State, 346 So.2d 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (holding a former residence unoccupied for one month and for sale was no longer a "dwelling"). However, section 810.011(2) was amended in 1982 and now provides in pertinent part: "Dwelling" means a building or conveyance of any kind, either temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof. This amendment constitutes a significant change in the meaning of the word "dwelling" as used in the burglary statute. The First District concluded that the house Perkins burglarized constituted a "dwelling" under the plain meaning of section 810.011(2) as amended in 1982....

...lusion." The court's task is clear: "the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." Id. at 219 (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 1144, 137 So. 157 (1931)). We find that the legislative definition of "dwelling" under section 810.011(2) is both clear and unambiguous, and a literal interpretation thereof does not lead to an "unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion." [3] We have long recognized the legislature's prerogative in defining or, in this case, redefining crimes....

...Although no one occupied the house at the time of the burglary, it was "designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night," and the owner intended it be used for that purpose. Because the house falls within the plain meaning of the definition of "dwelling" under section 810.011(2), we conclude that Perkins was properly convicted and sentenced for the second-degree felony of burglary of a dwelling. See § 810.011(2), Fla....

...Although the Third District affirmed the appellants' delinquency adjudications for burglary of a dwelling because "under the common law definition, the house burglarized in this case would still meet the definition of a dwelling," id. at 784, the court "agree[d] with appellants' argument that, in amending section 810.011(2), the legislature did not intend to overrule the common-law definition of a dwelling for purposes of the burglary statute." Id....

...All sexual batteries are included but not lewd and lascivious assault; carjacking is an eligible offense but not grand theft. Thus, it is clear that crimes of the same degree are not *279 necessarily punished in the same manner or to the same extent under the PRR. The State also argues the burglary statute, section 810.011, Florida Statutes (1997), defines "dwelling," and the definition does not make any distinction between occupied and unoccupied, so no distinction can be made....

...They do so based upon the premise that, in using the phrase, "burglary of an occupied structure or dwelling," the Legislature has failed to show a clear and specific intent to provide enhanced punishment for burglary of a "dwelling" (which, following the 1982 amendment to section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes, this Court has defined as a structure or conveyance suitable for lodging, irrespective of actual occupancy)....

...Litton, 736 So.2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); and Wallace v. State, 738 So.2d 972 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). [3] Included among the list of offenses eligible for sentencing under the PRR is armed burglary, i.e., burglary with a dangerous weapon or explosive. [4] Section 810.011, Florida Statutes (1997), provides in pertinent part as follows: 810.011 Definitions.—As used in this chapter: ....

...ial to compromise the victim's personal safety. It is apparent, reading the "Whereas" clauses accompanying the Act, that this is the type of "predatory" behavior which the legislators were endeavoring to curtail. (Emphasis supplied.) [7] Pursuant to section 810.011(1), Florida Statutes, "structure" means "a building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof."

...his rights under the double jeopardy clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Burglary is a first degree felony if "in the course of committing" the burglary offense, the offender commits a battery upon any person. § 810.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. Section 810.011(4) provides that an act (such as a battery) is committed "in the course of committing" if the act occurs during flight after the commission of the basic (burglary) offense....

...conveyance, or, having been authorized, licensed, or invited, is warned by the owner or lessee of the premises, or by a person authorized by the owner or lessee, to depart and refuses to do so, commits the offense of trespass in a ... conveyance." Section 810.011, Florida Statutes (1991), defines the term "conveyance" in the above statute to include "any motor vehicle." Based on the above statutes, it is clear that there are three statutory elements of trespass in a conveyance: (1) the willful...

...*1068 Section 11: amends section 943.0535 to require clerks of court to transmit to the appropriate United States immigration officer records pertaining to aliens who are convicted or who enter a plea to any crime. Section 12: requires the Governor to publicize the penalties contained in the Act. Section 13: amends section 810.011 to expand the definition of "conveyance," as used to define burglary, to include a "railroad vehicle," the statute previously referencing only a "railroad car." Thus, only two of the Act's twelve substantive sections relate specifical...

...adversely affected by the amendments to the sentencing laws contained therein. See Heggs, 759 So.2d at 627. [28] Burglary of a conveyance with an assault or battery is a first-degree felony punishable by life. See § 810.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003). Section 810.011 previously referenced railroad cars within the definition of conveyance....

...The State argues that although no one actually communicated notice to Smith to leave the store, the officers still could arrest him because the property was "posted" against trespassing, and thus Smith had notice against remaining on the premises. Section 810.011, Florida Statutes (1997), contains the following relevant definition: (5)(a) "Posted land" is that land upon which signs are placed not more than 500 feet apart along, and at each corner of, the boundaries of the land, upon which sign...

...of “burglary of a dwelling,” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), the Florida offense of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, Fla. Stat. §§ 810.02(1)(b), (3)(b), does not fall under that definition. The Florida offense includes burglary of “the curtilage” of the dwelling. Fla. Stat. § 810.011(2)....

...It is generally used to indicate gross indecency with respect to sexual relations. 4. A "structure" is any building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it and includes any closely adjoining land enclosed by a fence or wall. § 810.011(3), Fla....

...ution or lewdness or any act in furtherance of such appointment or engagement. 5. A "structure" is any building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it and includes any closely adjoining land enclosed by a fence or wall. § 810.011(3), Fla....

...ution or lewdness or any act in furtherance of such appointment or engagement. 5. A "structure" is any building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it and includes any closely adjoining land enclosed by a fence or wall. § 810.011(3), Fla....

...a way that is patently offensive (Federal Jury Instructions, Sec. 62.03). 8. A "structure" is any building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it and includes any closely adjoining land enclosed by a fence or wall. *489 § 810.011(3), Fla....

...The charge arose as a result of Appellee having been seen removing hubcaps from an automobile. Thus, the question posed is whether or not the simple removal of hubcaps constitutes burglary of a conveyance. The State contends that it does, by virtue of a portion of the definition found in Florida Statute 810.011(2) which reads: "Conveyance" means any ......

...State, 120 So.2d 195, 197 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1960) [cert. denied, State v. Holzapfel, 125 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1960)]; Vazquez v. State, 350 So.2d 1094 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977) [cert. denied, State v. Vazquez, 360 So.2d 1250 (Fla. 1978)]. The definition of "entering a conveyance" in Section 810.011(2) does not obviate the necessity for alleging facts in support of an intent to commit an offense therein....

...When the trial court denied Dakes' motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the jury verdict but corrected the judgment to reflect that the structure was unoccupied, it erroneously classified Dakes' crime as burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, a second degree felony. A retail store is not a dwelling. § 810.011(2), Fla....

...e structure to meet the definition of a dwelling. 2 Id. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The Fifth and Second Districts disagree as to whether a structure undergoing substantial renovations constitutes a “dwelling” under section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (2009)....

...3d DCA 2003), as to whether a defendant can be convicted of carjacking where the force used in the robbery on the inside of the building is separate from the taking of the vehicle on the outside of the building. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the building in question constitutes a dwelling under section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (2009) and approve the Fifth District’s denial of relief....

...Because Young did not specifically argue at trial that the building was not a “dwelling,” this claim was not properly preserved and has been waived. Further, as explained below, addressing the merits of this claim, Young has not established that the trial court erred. Burglary of a Dwelling Florida’s burglary statute, section 810.011, defines dwelling as: a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether such building or conveyance is tempo *166 rary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof. However, during the time of a state of emergency ... the term includes such portions or remnants thereof as exist at the original site, regardless of absence of a wall or roof. § 810.011(2), Fla....

...legislative purpose to expand the coverage of the statute, not to restrict it as done by the majority in Munoz. Id. As further explained below, we conclude that the dissent in Munoz provides the proper explanation of the legislative intent regarding section 810.011(2). As this Court has already stated, it is the character and purpose of the house that determines its status as a dwelling. Perkins, 682 So.2d at 1084 . In Perkins, this Court also recognized that section 810.011(2) must be given its plain and obvious meaning unless a literal interpretation would produce an unreasonable or ridiculous result....

...d, without producing an unreasonable conclusion. The plain meaning of the statute indicates an intent for the state of emergency exception to apply to the portion of the statute requiring a roof, not the portion requiring a certain “design.” See § 810.011(2), Fla....

...cy, despite the fact that the roof no longer exists. This reading of the statute does not remove the requirement that the intended purpose or character of the building be that “designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night.” Id. See § 810.011(2), Fla....

...Upon arrival, police found appellant hiding under a van in the parking area. There was no evidence of actual entry into the building itself. The primary point for our consideration is whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal in light of Sections 810.02 and 810.011(1), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...dice, where the information charged and the evidence showed only that appellant had unlawfully entered the parking area of a commercial establishment with the intent to commit an offense therein. In light of the clear language of Sections 810.02 and 810.011, Florida Statutes (1975), we must reject appellant's contention....

...Section 810.02 provides: "(1) `Burglary' means entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain." [Emphasis added.] Pursuant to Section 810.011, "structure" is defined as: " any building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof....

...duction. It is not our purpose to discuss the technical prerequisites for the introduction of such a diagram into evidence; however, it is highly desirable that this evidence be available in the event of an appeal. Secondly, we will discuss Sections 810.011(1) and 810.02, Florida Statutes, as they relate to the facts of this case....

...the term "curtilage" has ever been associated with a structure other than a dwelling house. [1] The premises in this case involved a structure which was a place of business. We must, therefore, determine whether the language of the Florida Statutes (Section 810.011(1) and Section 810.01) are sufficiently informative to those of common understanding....

...Burglary' means entering and remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain." (Emphasis added.) Section 810.011, Florida Statutes (1975) provides: "810.011 Definitions....

...Each of the above three cases involved the search of an area incidental to a dwelling. Thus, since there has been no need to do so, no Florida court has yet to interpret "curtilage" to expand beyond its common law definition by applying it to commercial structures. [2] A plain reading of 810.011(1), extends curtilage to that of a structure, including a building of any kind, for purposes of defining a burglary....

...per sphere of operation. Atlas Travel Service, Inc. v. Morelly, 98 So.2d 816 (Fla. 1st DCA 1957). This court may adopt the term "curtilage" without reference to the common law restriction to dwellings to preserve the plan meaning of Florida Statutes Section 810.011(1)....

...sed, or invited to enter. Although no one on the property communicated to them that they could not enter, and the property was not posted with signs, the property was “fenced land” and is considered enclosed and posted. See §§ 810.09(l)(a)(l), 810.011(7), (8). It is not necessary in Florida to post enclosed land in order to obtain the benefit of section 810.09 if the property includes a dwelling house and does not exceed five acres in size. § 810.011(5)(b)....

...r remaining in a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain. § 810.02(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). Section 810.011(3), Florida Statutes (1997), defines conveyance as "any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad car, trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car." In addition, "`to enter a conveyance' includes taking apart any portion of the conveyance." § 810.011(3), Fla....

...rwise, is a nonconsensual entry with the intent to commit an offense within; the purpose of the statute is to punish an invasion of the possessory property rights of another in structures and conveyances. The definition of "entering a conveyance" in Section 810.011(2) does not obviate the necessity for alleging facts in support of an intent to commit an offense therein....

...Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. HARDING, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur. SHAW, J., concurs in result only. QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which WELLS, C.J., concurs. QUINCE, J., dissenting. The definition of conveyance as outlined in section 810.011(3), Florida Statutes *53 (1997), provides a meaning also for the term "to enter a conveyance" which includes the taking apart any portion of the conveyance....

...Henry "did unlawfully enter or remain in a structure, to-wit: a shed or trailer ... with the intent to commit ... [t]heft," in violation of section 810.02(3), Florida Statutes (1995). "Structure" means a building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof. § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). Section 810.011(1), Florida Statutes (1995), defines structure for purposes of the burglary statute in a way that excludes any unroofed area (whether or not fenced) unless the open area comprises the "curtilage" of a building....

...aining (without consent) in the curtilage with the intent to commit a crime in the curtilage, or the building which it surrounds, is a burglary of the structure, statutorily defined to consist of a "building ... together with the curtilage thereof." § 810.011(1), Fla....

...'s boat and trailer. In response to a question from the jury, the court instructed the jury that the structure did not have to be totally enclosed, and appellant argues that this was error. We affirm. In our burglary statute "dwelling" is defined by section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1995) as: "a building or conveyance of any kind, either temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the cu...

...We therefore affirm the conviction, but remand for resentencing based on a corrected guidelines scoresheet. FARMER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The burglary statute, section 810.02, Florida Statutes, refers to both dwellings and structures, and both terms are defined in a similar manner in section 810.011.

...The charge alleges that defendant opened the hood of a 1971 Datsun automobile intending to remove the battery. No charge is made that he entered the passenger compartment. Appellant argues that it is not burglary, under the plain meaning of Sections 810.02(1) and 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1977), to "enter" the engine compartment, without "entering" the passenger compartment. We disagree. Section 810.02(1) defines burglary as "entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein." Section 810.011(2) defines conveyance as "any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad car, trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car," and further states, "`to enter a conveyance' includes taking apart any portion of the conveyance." There is no limitation in...

...ntering must be into the passenger compartment. There is no distinction between entering the engine compartment, the passenger compartment, or the trunk as far as its being an "entering" as prohibited by the obvious wording of Sections 810.02(1) and 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Burglary of a structure is defined as entering or remaining in a "structure" with the intent to commit an offense therein. See § 810.02(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). A "structure" is a building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof. Id. § 810.011....

...We address each theory in turn. First, we reject the State's argument that the carport qualifies as an independent structure. A "structure" is defined as "a building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof." See § 810.011, Fla....

...people understand the term to mean and would violate the principle of strictly construing criminal statutes in favor of the defendant. Significantly, the legislature recently amended the definition of a "dwelling" to include an "attached porch," see § 810.011(2), Fla....

...tatutes (1995), or at the very least, it constitutes part of the curtilage of a structure. NOTES [1] Although the carport was attached to a residence, appellant was charged with burglary of a "structure" rather than burglary of a "dwelling." Compare § 810.011(1), with § 810.011(2), Fla....

...While he concedes on appeal that the State proved that he removed aluminum siding from the exterior of the structure, he asserts the evidence was not legally adequate to support the charge of burglary of a dwelling because the State failed to prove the elements of "dwelling" as defined in section 810.011(2) Florida Statutes....

...PADOVANO and THOMAS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] "Dwelling" means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch ... which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof. Fla. Stat. § 810.011(2) (2009).

...Hamilton, 660 So.2d 1038 (Fla.1995), Martinez sought a judgment of acquittal on the burglary of a dwelling charge, arguing that the garage was not part of the home's curtilage. The prosecutor successfully argued that Hamilton 's enclosure requirement applied only to grounds, not outbuildings. Section 810.011, Florida Statutes (1993) defines "dwelling" as: a building or conveyance of any kind, either temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof. § 810.011(2), Fla....

...ere as in this case, the garage was only 10 feet from the dwelling. NOTES [1] Martinez points out that since Hamilton was decided, the legislature has amended the definition of dwelling only to include "any porch" within the meaning of the term. See § 810.011(2), Fla....

...[impaired] [impeded] [telephone] [power] transmission to a dwelling. 2. (Defendant) did so for the purpose of facilitating or furthering the [commission] [attempted commission] of a burglary of that dwelling. To define a burglary, see the elements of burglary in instruction 13.1. Definitions. § 810.011(2), Fla....

...building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the enclosed space of ground and outbuildings immediately surrounding it. § 810.011(3), Fla....

...kind, including any attached porch, whether such building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the cartilage thereof." § 810.011(s), Fla....

...646, 538 N.E.2d 1202, appeal denied, 127 Ill.2d 633, 136 Ill.Dec. 600, 545 N.E.2d 124 (1989) (vacant residential property *805 into which new tenant planned to move in near future). Florida, too, has amended its applicable statute. § 1, Ch. 82-87, Laws of Fla. Section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1989) now defines "dwelling" as "a building or conveyance of any kind, either temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof" ( emphasis supplied )....

...SCHEB, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL and PATTERSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We find only two post-amendment cases debating what sort of structure may constitute a "dwelling." Herbert v. State, 439 So.2d 971 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), held that a motel room is a "dwelling" by virtue of section 810.011(2) as amended....

...State, 646 So.2d 827 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). This appears to be true. The argument Weber advanced to the trial court was that the cement slab, from which the fan was stolen, did not constitute an "attached porch" as contemplated by the definition of a dwelling set forth in section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...s sitting to where this ends (indicating). [Prosecutor:] About six or seven feet? [Goodwin:] Yeah, about that. We agree with the trial judge that, based upon the foregoing testimony, the fan was taken from an "attached porch" as that term is used in section 810.011(2)....

...State, 767 So.2d 573 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). There we set forth the state's dual arguments: (1) the evidence relating to the nature of the porch enclosure in that case, and (2) the statutory definition of a dwelling expressly including "any attached porch" in section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...Last, we decline to amend the burglary instruction to include language explaining that the enclosure around a structure or dwelling need not be “continuous” in order for there to be curtilage. Rather, we adhere to the statutory language as enacted by the Legislature and as previously interpreted by this Court. See § 810.011, Fla....

...rily explained, may justify a conviction of burglary if the circumstances of the burglary and of the possession of the stolen property convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the burglary. Definitions; give as applicable. § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. “Structure” means any building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, that has a roof over it, and the enclosed space of ground and outbuildings immediately surrounding that structure. § 810.011(3), Fla....

...nt; or the chief of police of an incorporated city, or any sheriff of a county. State of emergency. The definitions of structure, dwelling, and conveyance are different for counties where a state of emergency has been declared under chapter 252. See § 810.011(1), (2), and (3), Fla....

...Definition. The term “conditions arising from the emergency” means civil unrest, power outages, curfews, voluntary or mandatory evacuations, or a reduction in the presence of or response time for first responders or homeland security personnel. § 810.011(h), Fla....

...§ 812.014(2), Fla. Stat. “Conditions arising from the emergency” means civil unrest, power outages, curfews, voluntary or mandatory evacuations, or a reduction in the presence of or response time for first responders or homeland security personnel. § 810.011(2), Fla....

...nt officers, or auxiliary law enforcement officers but does not include support personnel employed by the employing agency. § 810.09(2)(d), Fla. Stat. If the construction site is greater than one acre in area, see § 810.09(2) (d)l, Fla. Stat., and § 810.011(5)(a), Fla....

...But the subject boat ramp property does not qualify for any exception to the posting provisions. After the state completed its case, Pointec moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the state failed to prove the site was posted as specified by section 810.011(5)(a). The trial court agreed that the signage at the boat ramp failed in many regards (size of print, name of owner, and location) to conform to section 810.011(5)(a)....

...For simple trespass, the statute provides: (1) Whoever, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property ... as to which notice against entering or remaining is given, either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. 810.011 commits the offense of trespass on property......

...State, 293 So.2d 44, 45 (Fla. 1974), we accordingly affirm the order under review. [5] Affirmed. NOTES [1] § 810.02(1) provides, in pertinent part: "Burglary" means entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein... . [2] § 810.011(1), Fla....

...SHIVERS, Senior Judge, concurs. ERVIN, J., Dissents With Written Opinion. ERVIN, Judge, dissenting. I cannot agree with the majority's decision or the Second District's opinion in State v. Bennett, 565 So.2d 803 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), which regards the 1982 amendment to Section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes, as superseding the common-law rule precluding a defendant's conviction for burglary of a dwelling once the owner has vacated the house with no intention to return, because, under such circumstances, the place entered had lost its character as a dwelling house....

...aced upon the amended statute in L.C. v. State, 579 So.2d 783 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), is more consistent with the legislative intent than that of the Second District in Bennett. In L.C., the court agreed with appellant that the legislature's creation of section 810.011(2) did not reflect any attempt to overrule the common-law definition of a dwelling insofar as it pertained to a prosecution for burglary....

...e first degree because a mobile home, notwithstanding its design for occupation by people lodging therein at night, was not a structure. Id. To remedy the above omissions, the legislature in chapter 82-87 not only added the definition of dwelling to section 810.011, but also amended section 810.02, the statute proscribing burglary as an offense, by including in subsection (2)(b) the words "or conveyance," thereby obviating Professor Latimer's criticism that one who arms himself inside a conveyance could not be convicted of a first-degree felony....

...is more consistent with the statutory maxim requiring that penal statutes be given a strict interpretation. I would therefore reverse appellant's conviction for second-degree burglary and remand the case with directions that a sentence be imposed upon defendant for the commission of a felony in the third degree. NOTES [1] Section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1991), defines dwelling as follows: "a building or conveyance of any kind, either temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof." [2] See Ex parte Bailey, 39 Fla. 734, 23 So. 552 (1897); Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1977). [3] § 810.011(2), Fla....

...circumstances of the burglary and of the possession of the stolen property, when considered in the light of all evidence in the case, convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the burglary. Definitions; give as applicable. § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. "Structure" means any building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, that has a roof over it, and the enclosed space of ground and outbuildings immediately surrounding that structure. § 810.011(3), Fla....

...y the respective department, chief of police of an incorporated city, or sheriff of a county. In an area that is subject to a state of emergency, the definition of structure, dwelling, and conveyance may be different during a state of emergency. See § 810.011, Fla....

...o a state of emergency under Chapter 252, the "State Emergency Management Act." State of emergency. The definitions of structure, dwelling, and conveyance are different for counties where a state of emergency has been declared under chapter 252. See § 810.011(1), (2), and (3), Fla....

...ncy. Definition. The term "conditions arising from the emergency" means civil unrest, power outages, curfews, voluntary or mandatory evacuations, or a reduction in the presence of or response time for first responders or homeland security personnel. § 810.011(4), Fla....

...§ 812.014(2), Fla. Stat. "Conditions arising from the emergency" means civil unrest, power outages, curfews, voluntary or mandatory evacuations, or a reduction in the presence of or response time for first responders or homeland security personnel. § 810.011(2), Fla....

...ent officers, or auxiliary law enforcement officers but does not include support personnel employed by the employing agency. § 810.09(2)(d), Fla. Stat. If the construction site is greater than one acre in area, see § 810.09(2)(d)1, Fla. Stat., and § 810.011(5)(a), Fla....

...The statutory definition of “in the course of committing” is identical to the corresponding provisions of the robbery and carjacking statutes: An act is committed “in the course of committing” if it occurs in an attempt to commit the offense or in flight after the attempt or commission. § 810.011(4), Fla....

...The trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection and instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s remark. . The burglary statute provides that a "dwelling” includes "a building or conveyance of *800 any kind, including an attached porch ... [and] the curtilage thereof.” § 810.011(2), Fla....

...The burglary statute defines "dwelling" as "a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether such building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof." § 810.011(2), Fla....

...Ross again argues that he is entitled to be re-sentenced without the PRR designation because the dwellings were not occupied. Under Florida's burglary statute, a "dwelling" is defined as a building with a roof over it "designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night." § 810.011(2), Fla....

...the public. “Knowingly” means with full knowledge and intentionally. “Recklessly” means with a conscious and intentional indifference to consequences. “Negligently” means failing to use reasonable care under the circumstances. Fla. Stat. § 810.011 (2) *769 “Dwelling” means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it, including a tent, and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night....

...Spearman, 366 So.2d 775 (Fla.2nd DCA 1978). Despite this apparent misconception, the trial court correctly instructed the jury that a "structure" could include the enclosed grounds immediately surrounding the building. Fla.Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 136; see § 810.011(1) and (2), Fla....

...is used to commit the intended crime, the majority nonetheless concludes that there was ample evidence of entry because the statutory definition of dwelling provides that it "means a building ... of any kind ... together with the curtilage thereof." Section 810.011(2), Fla....

...minor's adjudication of delinquency for the offense of burglary, caused by the child's lobbing eggs through an open door or window of a structure after the child had entered the curtilage. I cannot believe that the legislature, in enacting sections 810.011 and 810.02, intended to proscribe such conduct as burglary....

...mains in any structure or conveyance or, having been authorized, licensed, or invited is warned to depart and refuses to do so, commits the offense of trespass in a structure or conveyance." [2] The definition of the word "structure" is contained in Section 810.011(1), Florida Statutes (1979), which provides: "`Structure' means any building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof." The petitioners filed motions to dismiss the info...

...ed, or invited, willfully enters ... any structure ... commits the offense of trespass in a structure." Fla.Stat. § 810.08(1) (Supp.1976) (emphasis added). "Structure" is defined as "any building of any kind ... which has a roof over it." Fla.Stat. § 810.011(1) (1979) (emphasis added)....

...intent to commit a crime commits burglary. Fla. Stat. § 810.02. The law defines “structure,” in relevant part, as “a building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof.” Id. § 810.011(a)(1). It defines “dwelling” similarly. See id. § 810.011(a)(2). “Conveyance” does not contemplate a building at all: it includes motor vehicles, ships, vessels, railroad cars, and aircrafts. Id. § 810.011(a)(3). 4  Case: 16-12519 Date Filed: 06/15/2016 Page: 5 of 9 It is unclear from the record which clause of the ACCA the district court employed when it concluded that Mr....

...6  Case: 16-12519 Date Filed: 06/15/2016 Page: 7 of 9 element encompasses a “building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof.” Fla. Stat. § 810.011(a)(1). This line of cases was the only binding legal basis for applying the ACCA to Mr....

...Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant. Meredith J. Cohen, Orlando, for appellee. ALDERMAN, Justice. This cause is before us on direct appeal from a final order of the Circuit Court in and for Osceola County, holding section 810.09(1), Florida Statutes (1977), and section 810.011(6), Florida Statutes (1977), unconstitutional as applied to the appellee, William Cormier. The sole issue is whether section 810.09(1) and section 810.011(6) give a constitutionally sufficient warning that a criminal trespass can be committed by entering upon a privately-owned island completely surrounded by water where the island is not under cultivation or surrounded by actual fencing or "posted." We uphold the statutes and reverse the trial court....

...Brahma Island is a privately-owned island completely surrounded by water and located in Lake Kissimmee in Osceola County. The State charged Cormier with armed trespass upon Brahma Island, contrary to section 810.09(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1977). Cormier's motion to dismiss the charge on the ground that section 810.09 and section 810.011 are unconstitutional as applied to him was granted....

...ed willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance as to which notice against entering or remaining is given, either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. 810.011, commits the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance. ..... The relevant portions of section 810.011 provide: ........

...ed. (Emphasis supplied.) Cormier alleges that Brahma Island was not posted, fenced, or under cultivation and that he received no actual communication against entering or remaining on the island. The thrust of his argument is that sections 810.09 and 810.011 do not clearly delineate whether a criminal trespass can be committed by entering upon a privately-owned island completely surrounded by water where there is no posting, cultivation, or fencing. Although recognizing that section 810.011(6) provides that it is not necessary to fence "any boundary or part of a boundary of any land which is formed by water," *854 Cormier argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and uncertain because it does not state that "fenced land" includes by definition an island or land completely surrounded by water. The State argues that the definition of "fenced land" found in section 810.011(6) expressly states that land shall be considered "fenced" along any boundary which is formed by water even though there is no actual fence; that the common-sense interpretation of the language of section 810.011(6) is that where all boundaries are formed by water the land is considered "fenced" for purposes of charging trespass under section 810.09; and that this interpretation does not render section 810.09(1) and section 810.011(6) unconstitutionally vague or uncertain....

..."any boundary or part of a boundary of any land which is formed by water" is to be considered "fenced." Giving effect to the plain language of the statute, we hold that an island, because all of its boundaries are formed by water, is "fenced" under section 810.011(6) for the purposes of charging trespass under section 810.09. The legislature is not required to expressly state that "fenced land" includes an island or land completely surrounded by water; such is the logical and reasonable conclusion of the language it used. We hold that section 810.09(1) and section 810.011(6) give a sufficiently definite warning of the proscribed conduct and are not unconstitutionally vague or uncertain....

...in statutes dealing with the same or similar subject matter. There is another rule of law that a legislative definition prevails over a common-law meaning where it is clear and explicitly applicable. Certainly the statutory definitions contained in section 810.011, Florida Statutes, control the meaning of these words when they are used in chapter 810, which relates to burglary and trespass, but it is quite another question as to whether the word "assault" as used in section 810.02(2)(a), Florid...

...A “dwelling” is defined as “a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether such building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof.” § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2013). A “structure” is defined as “a building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof.” § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2013). 1 *416 We need not address whether the carport constituted part of the curti-lage of the house, an issue without a clear resolution. What is clear, however, is that the carport at issue was an “attached porch.” Section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes, does not require an attached porch to be completely enclosed to be considered part of the dwelling that could be burglarized....

...Section 810.02(1), Florida Statutes (1993), defines burglary as "entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain." "Conveyance" means any motor vehicle. § 810.011(3), Fla.Stat....

...The house also had plumbing and electricity, but the power system was temporary and "for construction purposes" only and the indoor plumbing was not in use; the workers used the Port-O-Let prominently standing in the front yard. *688 It is undisputed that this house previously qualified as a dwelling under section 810.011. Section 810.011(2) defines a "dwelling" as "a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether such building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied...

...Bennett, this court concluded that as long as a structure is "`designed' for eventual human habitation," it qualifies as a dwelling. 565 So.2d 803, 805 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (finding that a mobile home unconnected to utilities and sitting on a sales lot qualified as a dwelling under section 810.011)....

...be designed to be occupied by people for lodging therein at night, but also that it must not be substantially changed to the extent that it becomes unsuitable for lodging by *689 people. The only exception would be that created by the legislature in section 810.011—if a structure became unsuitable for lodging because of substantial changes occurring during a state of emergency....

...The legislature specifically protected houses made unsuitable for lodging during states of emergency; it did not provide the same protection for houses unsuitable for lodging for other reasons, for instance because of reconstruction or renovation. According to section 810.011 and Perkins, if the character of the house is substantially changed to the extent that it becomes unsuitable for lodging for some reason other than during a state of emergency, there is no statutory exception and the house no longer qualifies as a dwelling....

...urrent habitability — that is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and cannot be reconciled with the rationale of our decision in Bennett. The majority is unjustified in relying on the second sentence of the definition of dwelling in section 810.011(2) to transform the meaning of the first sentence of that definitional provision....

...the definition of dwelling requires both that the structure is designed for lodging by people and suitable for lodging by people." (Emphasis supplied.) While the definition of dwelling was added to the statute in 1982, see ch. 82-87, § 1, Laws of Fla., the second sentence of section 810.011(2) was added effective June 1, 1993, to the definitional provision, see ch....

...r burglary of a dwelling. Under this provision, a house that has lost its roof or has collapsed during a state of emergency would continue to be considered a dwelling. The provision was necessary because under the definition in the first sentence of section 810.011(2), a structure is a not a dwelling unless it has a roof over it....

...the state of emergency provision. That provision deals with circumstances where a dwelling suffers such extensive structural damage during a state of emergency that it would no longer be covered by the definition of dwelling in the first sentence of section 810.011(2)....

...ange of circumstances covered by the state of emergency provision. Furthermore, given the statutory history — which evidences a legislative purpose to expand the coverage of the statute — the majority is unjustified in using the second sentence of section 810.011(2) as a basis for jettisoning the plain meaning of the first sentence of that subsection and thereby contracting the coverage of the statute....

...The Third District reversed because the compressors were not located within the houses or within the curtilage of the houses. [3] Bennett, decided before Perkins, did not address whether a mobile home on a sales lot was suitable for lodging. [4] The exception in section 810.011(2) states, "However, during the time of a state of emergency declared by executive order or proclamation of the Governor under chapter 252 and within the area covered by such executive order or proclamation and for purposes of ss....

...ntered" the house. See Barton v. State, 797 So.2d 1276, 1278 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (entry into conveyance occurred when defendant crossed invisible plane over bed of pickup truck). The house is a "structure" because it is a building and it has a roof. § 810.011(1), Fla....

...illfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance: 1. As to which notice against entering or remaining is given, either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. 810.011; or 2....

...because there was no evidence that the defendant received an actual communication to not enter or remain on the property. Savickus admitted he had never given the defendant a trespass warning before. The residence was also not posted, fenced, or cultivated land as defined by section 810.011....

...State, 293 So.2d 44, 45 (Fla.1974), we accordingly affirm the order under review. 5 Affirmed. . § 810.02(1) provides, in pertinent part: “Burglary” means entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein.... . § 810.011(1), Fla.Stat....

...The court below passed upon the constitutionality of a state law, thus vesting jurisdiction of the appeal in this Court. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. The appellant was informed against for the crime of burglary of a conveyance with the intent to commit larceny therein in violation of sections 810.02(1) and 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Section 810.02(1) provides: "Burglary" means entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to *685 the public or the defendant is licensed to enter or remain. Section 810.011(2) provides: "Conveyance" means any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad car, trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car; and "to enter a conveyance" includes taking apart any portion of the conveyance....

...The appellant also contends that the burglary statute is overbroad in that it proscribes and punishes as burglary unlawful conduct that is less culpable than the conduct generally sought to be prevented by the criminal laws against burglary. He argues that the language of section 810.011(2) defining entry of a conveyance to include "taking apart any portion of the conveyance" punishes as burglary conduct which would otherwise be considered larceny....

...These unique facts illustrate that Barton entered the vehicle with the intent to remove the bike inside. Thus, we affirm. As to the other issues raised in this appeal, we affirm as unpersuasive. GUNTHER and WARNER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] "Conveyance" includes any motor vehicle. § 810.011(3), Fla....

...This enclosed area constitutes curtilage that falls under the *884 same constitutional protections as the residence it surrounds. [1] Section 810.08(1), Florida Statutes (2008), specifies that an unauthorized entry into a "structure" is a trespass and a second-degree misdemeanor. Section 810.011(1), Florida Statutes (2008), defines "structure" to mean "a building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof." Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "cur...

...At the time of the crime the addition, which was separated from the home in which the victim was living by a temporary wall containing no access, had walls and a roof, but no door or windows. A dwelling, for purposes of our burglary statute, section 810.02, Florida Statutes (2002) is defined in section 810.011(2) as follows: "Dwelling" means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether such building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof....

...was adjudicated delinquent. We reverse. On appeal, M.J.S. argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the statutory definition of "conveyance" does not include heavy construction equipment such as a backhoe. "Conveyance" is defined in section 810.011(3), Florida Statutes (1983), as "any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad car, trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car......

...rniture on her part of the porch and treated it as part of the home, and testified repeatedly that she considered the porch "private." The state also points out that the statutory definition of "dwelling" expressly includes "any attached porch." See § 810.011(2), Fla....

...Section 810.02(1) provides in pertinent part that "`[b]urglary' means entering or remaining in a structure ... with the intent to commit an offense therein." Section 810.02(3) enhances the penalty for burglary if the structure entered is a dwelling. Section 810.011(1) defines structure to mean "a building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof." (Emphasis added.) [3] Section 810.011(2) defines a dwelling as "a building or conveyance of any kind, either temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage...

...he judgment to reflect a conviction for a third-degree felony. Additionally, depending on the outcome of the proceedings on retrial, the sentence for this offense may be affected. [2] Hamilton confessed that he and Thomas had cut the phone line. [3] Section 810.011, however, does not define curtilage....

...e to all structures, and not just to dwellings. See DeGeorge v. State, 358 So.2d 217, 220 ("This court may adopt the term `curtilage' without reference to the common law restriction to dwellings to preserve the plan [sic] meaning of Florida Statutes Section 810.011(1).")....

...*860 Section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1981), defines burglary as "entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain." Section 810.011(3), Florida Statutes (1981), defines conveyance as "any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad car, trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car." Additionally, the statute states that "to enter a conveyance includes taking apart any portion of...

night, together with the curti-lage thereof.” Id. § 810.011(2) (emphasis added). After his Florida conviction

...o enter or remain." § 810.02, Fla. Stat. (1995). A "conveyance" is defined as "any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad car, trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car; and ` to enter a conveyance' includes taking apart any portion of the conveyance ...." § 810.011(3), Fla....

...A “dwelling” is defined as “a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether such building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof.” § 810.011(2), Fla....

...eceiving power and all of the utilities required rewiring. Dicks was charged by amended information with burglary of a dwelling by unlawfully entering a dwelling with the intent to commit theft, proscribed by section 810.02, Florida Statutes (2009). Section 810.011(2) defines the term “dwelling” to mean “a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch ..., which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtil...

...lary of a dwelling, but he intended “to talk” about those instructions and recited the basic elements of the offense. However, at the point of defining a “dwelling,” the prosecutor “par *859 aphrased” the statutory definition provided in section 810.011(2) by describing a dwelling as “a building with a roof designed to be occupied by persons[,] together with the yard and thé outbuildings immediately surrounding it.” Moreover, when addressing whether Dicks had “entered” the d...

...At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. There is no dispute that the prosecutor’s definition of a dwelling designed to include a trespass on unenclosed property surrounding the dwelling expressed an erroneous interpretation of the law. Although section 810.011(1) & (2) defines both a structure and a dwelling to include “the curtilage thereof,” it omits a definition of the term “curtilage.” However, the Florida Supreme Court has ruled that the term “curtilage,” as contemplate...

...llfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance: as to which notice against entering or remaining in is given, (1) ... by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. 810.011 ......

...ter hours as a passenger in a car, he did so willfully. Further, we find on this record insufficient evidence to demonstrate either that Appellant had actual notice or that the park was properly posted so as to give adequate constructive notice. See § 810.011(5)(a), Fla....

...Gen., for appellee. MILLS, Judge. The sole issue raised by this appeal from an order adjudicating J.E.S. guilty of burglary of a dwelling is whether a bicycle stolen by him from the driveway of the victim's home was within the curtilage of the home. It was. Section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1983), defines a "dwelling" as "a building or conveyance of any kind ... together with the curtilage thereof. " (Emphasis added) Likewise, a "structure" is defined in Section 810.011(1) as "a building of any kind ......

...the conveyance, or (b) after having been so authorized, licensed or invited to enter or remain in the conveyance, refusing to comply with a warning by the owner, lessee or a person authorized by the owner or lessee to depart the conveyance. Id.; see § 810.011(3), Fla....

...See § 810.09(1)(a)1, Fla. Stat.; see also Ward v. State, 21 So.3d 896 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). The statutory requirements for posting are very specific, requiring signs placed at specific locations, at specific heights, and in type of a certain size. See § 810.011(5), Fla....

...k cashing store and along the eastern sidewall of the building. In order for the posted signs to provide the required notice against entry and to give rise to probable cause to arrest for trespass, there must be evidence that the signs complied with section 810.011(5) and that the property was “posted” within the meaning of the statute....

...the events of May 7, 2010 (4D10-2760) are reversed. The conviction for resisting an officer that arose out of the events of October 15, 2009 (4D10-2761) is, however, affirmed. Affirmed in part and Reversed in part. WARNER and CONNER, JJ., concur. . Section 810.011(5), Florida Statutes, provides as follows: (5)(a) "Posted land” is that land upon which: 1....

...Stat. “Cannabis” means all parts of any plant of the genus Cannabis, whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant or its seeds or resin. Definitions. Give as applicable. § 810.011(1), Fla....

...2017). A “structure” is any building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it together with the curtilage. The “curtilage” is the enclosed land adjoining the structure. [The enclosure need not be continuous as it may have an ungated opening for entering and exiting.] § 810.011(3), Fla....

...er involved an entry into the house, an attached porch, or the curtilage. To prove a burglary of a dwelling, the State needs to prove that a defendant entered a dwelling with the intent to commit an offense therein. See § 810.02, Fla. Stat. (2008). Section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (2008), defines "dwelling" as: "a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether such building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and i...

...5th DCA 2001), the defendant was convicted of burglary of a dwelling for stealing a ceiling fan lying on a cement slab. The slab adjoined the rear of the apartment, had a roof over it and was supported by posts. This Court held that the slab from which the fan was stolen qualified as an attached porch pursuant to section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes. Id. at 1003. Here, similar to Weber, Ferrara had to enter a covered porch at the front of the residence to steal the door. The front porch is part of the dwelling as defined under section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes....

...The carport shared one wall with the residence and was otherwise supported only with poles. The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the open carport was not a "structure" for purposes of the burglary statute. It held that the carport was not itself an independent structure, as defined in section 810.011, because it had only one wall....

...d to enter or remain." Section 810.02(1), Fla. Stat. (1989). "Conveyance" means any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad car, *1076 trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car; and "to enter a conveyance" includes taking apart any portion of the conveyance. Section 810.011(3), Fla....

...spassing" and in addition thereto the name of the owner, lessee, or occupant of said land. Said signs shall be placed along the boundary line of posted land in a manner and in such position as to be clearly noticeable from outside the boundary line. § 810.011(5)(a), Fla....

...At Lewis's trial, there was testimony that there was a sign on the victim's property quoting the language required by section 810.09(2)(d). However, all of the witnesses testified that there was only one such sign on the property, not a sign on each corner of the property as required by section 810.011(5)(a). Further, there was no testimony that the letters on the sign were two inches in height, as required by this statute. The State argues that section 810.09(2)(d) requires only substantial compliance, that the definition of posted land in section 810.011 should not be applied to section 810.09(2)(d), and that any technical deficiency was a matter for the jury to consider....

...First, we note that the term "substantially" is used in section 810.09(2)(d) to describe the particular language required to be placed on the sign, but it is not used in conjunction with the term "legally posted." Second, we conclude that the definition of "posted land" in section 810.011 was intended to apply to the term "legally posted" in section 810.09....

...It found that the *359 language regarding posting requirements in both statutes must be read in pari materia and that the court in Pointec correctly applied the definition of posted to section 810.09(2)(d). However, the trial court found that posting was not required pursuant to section 810.011(5)(b), because there was a dwelling on the property. We conclude that the trial court erred in applying this exception to the posting requirement. Dwelling is defined by section 810.011(2) as a building or conveyance that has a roof over it....

...re was no roof on the residence. Therefore, it did not meet the definition of dwelling and the property was required to be legally posted. Accordingly, because the signage in the instant case did not meet the requirements of section 810.09(2)(d) and section 810.011(5)(a), we reverse Lewis's conviction for trespass on a construction site. Lewis's conviction and sentence for petit theft is affirmed. We note that the size of the property at issue was only 50 by 100 feet. However, neither section 810.011(5)(a) nor section 810.09(2)(d) provide for an exception to the posting requirements for properties of this size....

...ony of the second degree; and (3) in all other burglaries, the offender committed a felony of the third degree. Fla. Stat. § 810.02(2), (3). Under Florida law at the time, a structure included the curtilage surrounding that structure. Fla. Stat. § 810.011(1) (1989)....

...misdemeanor. The appellants contend that the court erred in adjudicating them delinquent as to burglary of a dwelling because the house had been unoccupied for several months and, therefore, could not be considered a "dwelling" within the meaning of section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...911 (1920) (in order for a house to be considered a dwelling, the house must be occupied and the owner, occupant, family member, or servant must sleep there with the intention of continuously returning to the premises). We agree with appellants' argument that, in amending section 810.011(2), the legislature did not intend to overrule the common-law definition of a dwelling for purposes of the burglary statute....

...g must be affirmed because, under the common-law definition, the house burglarized in this case would still meet the definition of a dwelling. See e.g. Herbert v. State, 439 So.2d 971 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (motel room is a "dwelling" within meaning of section 810.011(2), without regard for whether it has been rented out at the time of the offense)....

...grand theft and criminal mischief as a first-degree misdemeanor are vacated with directions that appellants be adjudicated delinquent for petit theft and criminal mischief as a second-degree misdemeanor. Affirmed in part; reversed in part. NOTES [1] Section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1989), provides: "Dwelling" means a building or conveyance of any kind, either temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof....

...Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Michael J. Kotler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. We agree with the decisions of the First, Third, and Fourth District Courts of Appeal that Section 810.011(1), *431 Florida Statutes, extends the application of curtilage to the area surrounding any building, not just a dwelling, for purposes of defining a burglary....

...Section 810.02(1), Florida Statutes (1977), provides: "`Burglary' means entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance *776 with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain." A structure is defined in Section 810.011(1) as "any building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof." It is well established that the unqualified use of the word "enter" in a burglary statute does not confine...

structure which by definition includes its curtilage. § 810.011(1) and § 810.02(1), Fla. Stat. (1989). The evidence

SALCINES, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] As defined in section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1997), the dwelling would

definition of a "dwelling" as provided in section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (2010). We agree and reverse

it was a "dwelling" within the meaning of section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (2000). When the defense

at night .... ” Id. at 805 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 810.011(2)). Although the court concluded that such a

810.02(1) and 810.02(3), Florida Statutes. Section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982), defines

occupied by people lodging therein at night ...." § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). In our view, the houses

cultivation," as described in Florida Statute 810.011 (2006).[2] Section 810.011(5)(a) specifically describes

not have to be “posted” in accordance with section 810.011(5), Florida Statutes. It is sufficient if the

at night, together with the curtilage thereof. § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). There

taking apart any portion of the conveyance." § 810.011(3), Fla. Stat. (1997). We conclude that this was

posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in § 810.011, commits the offense of trespass on property other

Definitions; give as applicable. § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. “Structure” means any building

without a legitimate, lawful purpose. § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. “Dwelling” means a building

include the curtilage of the structure. Fla. Stat. § 810.011(1). Florida case law construes curtilage narrowly

as to give adequate constructive notice. See § 810.011(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001); In Interest of B.P.

burglary. Definitions; give as applicable § 810.011(1), FlaStat. “Structure” means any building of

is licensed or invited to enter or remain. Section 810.011(1), Florida Statutes (1991) defines structure

and not a "conveyance" within the meaning of section 810.011, Florida Statutes (2000). There was "not such

by definition, "the curtilage thereof." See § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). Here, the first element

... would be meritless. The jury had evidence that Appellant entered the “dwelling” as defined by section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes. Entering the area underneath a home can qualify as the necessary entry to meet that element of a burglary. See Tindall v. State, 997 So. 2d 1260, 1261 (Fla. 5th ...

posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in § 810.011, commits the offense of trespass on property other

considered a “dwelling” within the meaning of section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1989).1 Appellants argue

with the curtilage thereof. Fla. Stat. § 810.011(2). 1 1 The Supreme Court has held that Florida’s

means intentionally, knowingly, and purposely. § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. and State v. Hamilton, 660 So.2d

curtilage without the owner’s permission. See § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2008); Dukes v. State, 796 So

such as a backhoe. “Conveyance” is defined in section 810.-011(3), Florida Statutes (1983), as “any motor

property was not “posted land” as defined by section 810.011(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2000).1 Assuming that

be guilty of a felony of the third degree. . § 810.011. As used in this chapter: (1) “Structure” means

over it, together with the curtilage thereof.” § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. (1986) (emphasis added). The inclusion

communication or by posting as described in section 810.011. By his own admission, Ward had no lawful reason

that the area have some form of enclosure. See § 810.011(1), Fla.Stat. (1991). The court narrowly interpreted

purposes of section 810.02(3), Florida Statutes. See § 810.011(2), Fla.Stat. We reject this argument and affirm

taking apart any portion of the conveyance.” § 810.011(3), Fla.Stat. (1983). The elements of breaking

Definitions; give as applicable. § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. “Structure” means any building

owner, lessee, or occupant of said land.” Section 810.-011(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1991) The trial court

under the circumstances. . Fla, Stat. § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. “Dwelling” means a building

curtilage thereof. Id. § 810.011(2); see also id. § 810.011(1) (defining “structure” as

“the curtilage” of the dwelling. Fla. Stat. § 810.011(2). “[T]he inclusion of curtilage takes Florida’s

“the curtilage” of the dwelling. Fla. Stat. § 810.011(2). “[T]he inclusion of curtilage takes Florida’s

“the curtilage” of the dwelling. Fla. Stat. § 810.011(2). “[T]he inclusion of curtilage takes Florida’s

776.08. § 810.02(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007). Section 810.011 defines structure and dwelling: (1) "Structure"

Greer v. State, 354 So.2d 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); § 810.011(1), (2), Fla.Stat. (1987). Reversed and remanded

furtherance of such appointment or engagement. § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat; Dubose v. State, 210 So. 3d 641

homeland security personnel. *1324 § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. ; Dubose v. State,

“structure” and “dwelling” include the cur-tilage. See § 810.011(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (2000). The “curtilage” includes

also amended to better track the language of section 810.011(3), Florida Statutes. Next, instructions

and not a “conveyance” within the meaning of section 810.011, Florida Statutes (2000). There was “not such

more than 500 feet apart on agricultural land. § 810.011(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). Turning to the statute

after . . . commission” of the burglary. See § 810.011(4), Fla. Stat. But the person Appellant allegedly

night, together with the curtilage thereof. § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). There

over it, together with the curtilage thereof.” § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). A plain reading of the

Fla. Stat.aNN, § 810.02(l)(a) (West 2011). Section 810.011 defines the term “structure” used in § 810

Pier Corporation, 112 So. 841 (Fla. 1927). 8 Section 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. (1995), defines "[s]tructure"

810, which governs burglary and trespass. See § 810.011, Fla. Stat. (2015). However, the standard jury

night, together with the curtilage thereof.” § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 810.011(4), Fla. Stat. (1989); Carbajal v. State, 75 So.3d 258 (Fla.2011);

cultivation,” as described in Florida Statute 810.011 (2006).2 Section 810.011(5)(a) specifically describes

house is afforded the same protection, under section 810.011(2), as an occupied house). Moore does not specify

unarmed burglar who arms himself once inside. Section 810.011(3), Florida Statutes (1981), states: (3) An

over it, together with the curtilage thereof.... § 810.11(1) Dakes was the first case to address the issue

curtilage thereof.’ ” Id. (quoting Fla. Stat. § 810.011(a)(1)). Accordingly, neither the record nor current

responders or homeland security personnel. § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat.; Dubose v. State, 210 So. 3d 641

Definitions. Give as applicable. § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. Dubose v. State, 210 So. 3d 641

notice by posting or fencing, as defined by section 810.011. To. achieve notice through actual communication

feet apart on agricultural land. § 810.011(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014).

offender, by posting notices, or by fencing. See § 810.011 (5) -(8), Fla. Stat. (2016). Given that this offense

offender, by posting notices, or by fencing. See § 810.011 (5)-(8), Fla. Stat. (2016). Given that this offense

together with the curtilage thereof.” See Fla. Stat. § 810.011(1) (West 1995); see also Henry v. State, 707 So

together with the curtilage thereof.” Fla. Stat. § 810.011(1) (1989). Because Florida burglary could be committed

” § 810.02(1)(b)1., Fla. Stat. (2022). Section 810.011(2) defines a “dwelling” as a building

v. State, 397 So.2d 1120, 1123 (Fla.1981). Section 810.011, Florida Statutes (2002), defines a structure

*56Section 810.02(3), Florida Statutes (1991). § 810.011, Fla.Stat. (1991) (“ ‘Dwelling’ means a building

places within the city. Appellee points to section 810.011, Florida Statutes (1997), which defines a motor

trespass in a structure or conveyance." Nearby section 810.011(1), Florida Statutes (2006), defines a structure

notice was given by posting as described in section 810.-011(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1987). The state

“in the course of committing” is defined in Section 810.011(4) as follows: (4) An act “is in the course

not include a bicycle within the definition. § 810.011(3), Fla. Stat. This omission of bicycles is consistent

(citations omitted). We observe, then, that section 810.011(5)(a) does define “posted land.” That section

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. § 810.011(3) Fla.Stat. (1993) (“‘[T]o enter a conveyance’ includes taking apart

did not qualify as a dwelling as defined by section 810.011, Florida Statutes (2006), and as a result,

the statutory definition of “dwelling” in section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the design of

- Definitions; give as applicable. § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. “Structure” means any building

defined as a building with "a roof over it." § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). The facts in evidence indicate

defined as a building with “a roof over it.” § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). The facts in evidence

charge of Burglary of an Occupied Structure.1 Section 810.011(1) of the Florida Statutes defines “structure”

within the curtilage of the home. It was. Section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1983), defines a “dwelling”