Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 810.09
S810.09 2a - TRESPASSING - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 9790 - M: F
S810.09 2b - TRESPASSING - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 10537 - M: F
S810.09 2c - TRESPASSING - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 10538 - F: T
S810.09 2d - TRESPASSING - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 10539 - F: T
S810.09 2e - TRESPASSING - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 10540 - F: T
S810.09 2f - TRESPASSING - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 10541 - F: T
S810.09 2g - TRESPASSING - RENUMBERED. SEE REC# 6065 - F: T
S810.09 2g - TRESPASSING - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 10542 - F: T
S810.09 2h - TRESPASSING - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 10543 - F: T
S810.09 2i - TRESPASSING - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 10544 - F: T
S810.09 2j1 - TRESPASSING - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 10545 - F: T
CopyCited 228 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 29862, 2006 WL 3498349
...At that point, they
were approached by a purported agent of the Sun Dome, Kelly Hickman, who also
requested they move to the protest zone. When Plaintiffs refused to relocate,
Hillsborough County Sheriff’s deputies arrested them for “trespass after warning,”
Fla. Stat. § 810.09 (2006). Plaintiffs were released and the charges dropped after
it was determined that no agent of the Sun Dome had the requisite authority to
provide a warning, as required by state trespass law.2
2
To be convicted under § 810.09(b) of the Florida penal code, an offender must defy an
“order to leave, personally communicated to the offender by the owner of the premises or by an
authorized person....
CopyCited 70 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 22233, 1990 WL 194407
..., means that “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640 ,
107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039 ,
97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Section
810.09, Florida Statutes, defines misdemeanor trespass as the unauthorized and uninvited entry on property which is posted; the offender’s refusal to leave after being ordered to do so constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree....
...8 When the trespass offense is accompanied by possession of a tool or implement used to commit the crime or when the offender is armed with a firearm or other dangerous weapon during the commission of a trespass, the offense may become a felony under sections
810.06 and
810.09(2)(c), Florida Statutes....
...541, 546 ,
69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26 ,
93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463, 467-68 ,
98 S.Ct. 2454, 2457-58 ,
57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978); Hudgins,
890 F.2d at 402 ; Rich v. Dollar,
841 F.2d 1558, 1560 (11th Cir.1988). 7 . In pertinent part, section
810.09, Florida Statutes states as follows: Trespass on property other than structure or conveyance.— (1) Whoever, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or co...
...y opens any door, fence, or gate or does any act which exposes animals, crops, or other property to waste, destruction, or freedom, or trespasses on property other than a structure or conveyance, he is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree.... § 810.09(1), (2)(b), Fla.Stat....
...Trespass on property other than structure or conveyance.— (c) If the offender is armed with a firearm or other dangerous weapon during the commission of the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance, he is guilty of a felony of the third degree.... § 810.09(2)(c), Fla.Stat....
...(3) He reasonably believes that a felony has been or is being committed and that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing it. §
901.15(1) — (3), Fla.Stat. (1985). 12 . The district court found that the facts of this case were "tailored” to the offense of misdemeanor trespass as defined by section
810.09, Florida Statutes, and recognized that probable cause is "measured at the time of the arrest.” R3-98-14, 15....
CopyCited 60 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 17051, 2009 WL 2181682
...for his involvement in Perron’s
murder. Under the Blockburger test, the crimes of armed trespass and third-degree
grand theft are different offenses from first-degree murder because they require
proof of different facts. Compare Fla. Stat. Ann. §
810.09(1)(a)1, (2)(c) (1997)
(requiring entry with a firearm or other dangerous weapon onto property as to
which notice against entering was posted or otherwise communicated) with §
812.014(2)(c)1 (requiring the unlawful taking of another’s...
CopyCited 56 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Diamond, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant. Warner S. Olds, Public Defender, and William W. Herring, Asst. Public Defender, for appellee. SUNDBERG, Justice. By order of The Honorable James R. Holmes, Judge of the County Court for Broward County, Florida, Section 810.09, Florida Statutes (1975), was declared unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, and Fla.App. Rule 2.1(5)(a), endow this Court with jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. Appellee was charged by information with trespass on school property in violation of Section 810.09, Florida Statutes (1975). [1] An arrest followed his refusal to leave the premises after being so ordered by a school custodian. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the information contending that Section 810.09, Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutional....
...In the instant case, the information is defective because it does not allege that "the offender defied an order to leave, communicated to him by an authorized person." Not only does it fail to state that a person with requisite authority demanded he leave, it does not even state that anyone ordered him to leave. See Section 810.09(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...in question can best be specified when actual cases requiring such interpretation are presented. Because the charging document in the instant case was defective, we affirm the result reached below but reverse the order of the county court declaring Section 810.09, Florida Statutes (1975), unconstitutional....
...The statute does not clearly indicate what conduct might constitute a violation nor does it clearly establish who would be authorized to require an alleged trespasser to vacate the premises. I agree with the trial court that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. ENGLAND and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] 810.09 Trespass on property other than structure or conveyance....
...other than a structure or conveyance, to-wit: school campus, located at 3600 Northwest 5th Court, Fort Lauderdale, property of The School Board of Broward County, without being authorized, licensed or invited to be upon said property, contrary to F.S. 810.09... ." [3] We note that there is no Cross-Assignment of Error making mention of the deficiency of the information in this regard. However, appellee raised this objection in his Motion to Dismiss. Because the trial judge found § 810.09, Fla....
CopyCited 51 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19746, 2011 WL 4467598
...ance . . . [a]s to which notice against
entering or remaining is given, either by actual communication to the offender or by posting,
fencing, or cultivation. . . commits the offense of trespass on property . . . .
FLA . STAT . ANN . § 810.09.
6
procedures have been set out by which the recipient of a trespass warning may
challenge the basis of the warning or the terms of the warning....
...e to the
later trespass charge.7 Besides, even if a Florida court acquitted the warning-
7
The Florida trespass statute contains no requirement that “notice against entering or remaining”
be rightful, authorized, or valid. FLA . STAT . ANN . § 810.09; see also id....
CopyCited 42 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 2232319
...s.”). The existence and extent of a license that would permit a “knock and talk” depends on the circumstances; homeowners who post “No Trespassing” or “No Soliciting” signs effectively negate a license to enter the posted property. See § 810.09, Fla....
CopyCited 35 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 980801
...See Turner v. State,
552 So.2d 1181, 1182 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). A mere "hunch" that criminal activity may be occurring is not sufficient. See McCloud,
491 So.2d at 1167. In this case, the criminal activity that the police were investigating was trespassing. Section
810.09(1), Florida Statutes, states that the crime of trespass occurs "when an individual, without being authorized, willfully enters upon or remains on property as to which notice against entering or remaining is given, either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, etc." See also Burgess v....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 8 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20
...e." Fla. Admin. Code R. 22F-8.03A. [13] We have not overlooked the Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Dye,
346 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1977), in which a divided Supreme Court upheld, against a charge of overbreadth offending the due process clause, §
810.09, Fla....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 564201
...n in Chief Judge Griffin's comments in her dissenting opinion in L.K.B. v. State,
697 So.2d 191, 22 Fla. Law Weekly D1735 (Fla. 5th DCA, July 18, 1997), pertaining to the permissibility of a detention for purposes of issuing a trespass warning under section
810.09(1), Fla.Stat. Both sections
810.08(1) and
810.09(1) deal with trespass after warning, although
810.08 deals with trespass of a structure or conveyance, and
810.09 with trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance.
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 1879817
...presence. See §
901.15(1), Fla. Stat. (1997); Carter v. State,
516 So.2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). In A.L. v. State,
675 So.2d 703, 704 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), the court listed four elements that must be satisfied to establish the crime of trespass under section
810.09, Florida Statutes: 1) wilfully entering upon or remaining in any property; 2) other than a structure or a conveyance; 3) without being authorized, licensed or invited; 4) where notice against entering or remaining is given either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing or cultivation....
...That section would appear to require "actual communication" of the revoked invitation. See Corn,
332 So.2d at 8 (interpreting predecessor statute and noting that it could cover the situation where someone is causing a disturbance in a mall lobby and is asked to leave). Unlike section
810.08, section
810.09 does not specifically address the revocation of an invitation....
...est must be suppressed as the fruits of the illegality. See Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471,
83 S.Ct. 407,
9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). We reverse and remand with directions to discharge Smith. PATTERSON, C.J., and THREADGILL, J., Concur. NOTES [1] §
810.09, Fla....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 542714
...NOTES [1] Although not argued by Appellant here or below, we note parenthetically that, at first blush, the fact that State agents apparently committed criminal trespass by entering fenced lands without consent presents a compelling argument for exclusion of the fruits of this unlawful intrusion. See § 810.09(1)(a)1., Fla....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1987 WL 2703
...Asserting that the arrest was unlawful, the defendant moved to suppress the cocaine discovered during the search. The motion was granted, and this appeal followed. The determinative issue on appeal is whether the police officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for a violation of section 810.09(1), Florida Statutes (1985)....
...*75 The defendant had more than adequate warning that trespassing was not permitted. Not only were signs posted on every building, but the police officer had warned him against trespassing just one week earlier. The defendant defied the warning and entered the property again. See State v. Dye,
346 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1977); §
810.09(2)(b), Fla....
...ment located within the complex to celebrate his birthday. The state concedes, and we agree, that if this testimony were accepted by the trier of fact, it clearly showed that the defendant was not in fact guilty of trespass after warning pursuant to section 810.09(1), Florida Statutes (1985)....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1990 WL 107760
...Park in Fort Lauderdale was "closed" at the time he allegedly trespassed in the park, or that the police officer who subsequently arrested him outside the park had a factual basis for believing appellant was on notice that the park was "closed." See § 810.09(1), Fla....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1242
...Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Norma J. Mungenast, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. SMITH, Judge. Appellant appeals an order adjudging him delinquent on the grounds that he trespassed on property other than a structure or conveyance in violation of section 810.09, Florida Statutes (1985)....
...He was given another trespass warning on May 26, 1986. The next day, mall security personnel spotted him in the mall, the police were called, and he was arrested for trespass. [1] He was charged and found guilty of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance in violation of section 810.09, Florida Statutes (1985)....
...See Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal), "Trespass On Property Other Than a Structure or Conveyance." The state is not required to prove that appellant defied an order to leave communicated by the owner or authorized person in order to establish a violation of section 810.09....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 238801
...Detective Potts urges that the law of trespass, and not search and seizure, is the controlling law, and that under the law of trespass he was not unlawfully upon Johnson's property because the property was not posted, fenced, or under cultivation pursuant to § 810.09, Florida Statutes....
...This holding though, does not end our inquiry. Detective Potts, although not lawfully on the premises in the exercise of his duties, still occupies some status while upon the property. Detective Potts urges that he is entitled to invitee status because pursuant to § 810.09 [7] he was not a trespasser. § 810.09 is this state's criminal trespass statute and its purpose is to impose criminal liability upon those who trespass upon the land of others....
...of his backyard to one he did not invite, welcome or permit there. I agree with the court's conclusion that there is no such liability. NOTES [1] Johnson's yard is approximately two acres in size. [2] That ATV was not the stolen property sought. [3] § 810.09....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1990 WL 175046
...Public Defender, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Laura Rush, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. SHIVERS, Chief Judge. Defendant L.D.L., a child, appeals final judgment and sentence finding him guilty of trespass after warning in violation of section 810.09(1), Florida Statutes (1987), and placing him on community control....
...Appellant stated that he knew he had been given a trespass warning, and that was one reason he ran when he saw the police. Appellant, a juvenile, was charged by petition filed in the circuit court with one count of trespass on property after warning in violation of section 810.09(1), Florida Statutes. He was tried and found guilty as charged. Adjudication of delinquency was withheld and appellant was placed on community control. Section 810.09(1), Florida Statutes, reads: 810.09 Trespass on property other than structure or conveyance....
...See R.C.W. v. State,
507 So.2d 700, 701-702 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) "Trespass On Property Other Than a Structure or Conveyance." The State did not prove each element of the offense of trespass violation of section
810.09(1), Florida Statutes beyond a reasonable doubt....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2790, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 6738, 1989 WL 146175
...The vehicle's occupants were detained for approximately thirty to forty five minutes from the time that the officer first stopped the vehicle to the time of the arrest of appellant. In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court reasoned that under section 810.09(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1987) a criminal trespass occurs when a person remains on property after defying an order to leave the property conveyed by "an authorized person." Determining that Officer Burns was an "authorized person", the...
...he other passengers in the vehicle were dangerous. In fact each officer present testified that he did *716 not suspect that the vehicle's occupants had possession of any weapons. Therefore, the stop to warn which arguably the police could make under section 810.09, Florida Statutes (1987) does not permit the investigatory search conducted in this case....
...police officer and were prevented from leaving. [2] Although Dilyerd characterized this as a "stop", the use of that term has constitutional significance in Fourth Amendment analysis. A stop to inform trespassers of an order to leave required under section 810.09(2)(b), Florida Statutes, is more akin to a "mere encounter" than a "stop" for constitutional analysis....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 11580, 2009 WL 2514168
...1868,
20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). [3] See §
901.36(1) (stating that "[i]t is unlawful for a person who has been arrested or lawfully detained ... to give a false name, or otherwise falsely identify himself or herself in any way"). [4] In a similar manner, section
810.09(1)(a)(1) prohibits trespassing on property other than a structure or conveyance after notice has been given....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...and Robert L. Bogen, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant. Meredith J. Cohen, Orlando, for appellee. ALDERMAN, Justice. This cause is before us on direct appeal from a final order of the Circuit Court in and for Osceola County, holding section
810.09(1), Florida Statutes (1977), and section
810.011(6), Florida Statutes (1977), unconstitutional as applied to the appellee, William Cormier. The sole issue is whether section
810.09(1) and section
810.011(6) give a constitutionally sufficient warning that a criminal trespass can be committed by entering upon a privately-owned island completely surrounded by water where the island is not under cultivation or surrou...
...uphold the statutes and reverse the trial court. Brahma Island is a privately-owned island completely surrounded by water and located in Lake Kissimmee in Osceola County. The State charged Cormier with armed trespass upon Brahma Island, contrary to section
810.09(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1977). Cormier's motion to dismiss the charge on the ground that section
810.09 and section
810.011 are unconstitutional as applied to him was granted. Section
810.09 provides in pertinent part: (1) Whoever, without being authorized, licensed, or invited willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance as to which notice against entering or remaining is given, ei...
...as to be clearly noticeable from outside of the boundary line. (b) It shall not be necessary to give notice by posting on any enclosed land or place not exceeding 5 acres in area on which there is a dwelling house in order to obtain the benefits of ss.
810.09 and
810.12 pertaining to trespass on enclosed lands....
...ed and posted. (Emphasis supplied.) Cormier alleges that Brahma Island was not posted, fenced, or under cultivation and that he received no actual communication against entering or remaining on the island. The thrust of his argument is that sections
810.09 and
810.011 do not clearly delineate whether a criminal trespass can be committed by entering upon a privately-owned island completely surrounded by water where there is no posting, cultivation, or fencing....
...formed by water even though there is no actual fence; that the common-sense interpretation of the language of section
810.011(6) is that where all boundaries are formed by water the land is considered "fenced" for purposes of charging trespass under section
810.09; and that this interpretation does not render section
810.09(1) and section
810.011(6) unconstitutionally vague or uncertain....
...Further, it is a basic axiom of statutory construction that words of common usage, when appearing in a statute, should be construed in their plain and ordinary sense. Tatzel v. State,
356 So.2d 787 (Fla. 1978). For the purposes of charging criminal trespass under section
810.09(1), the legislature expressly provided that "any boundary or part of a boundary of any land which is formed by water" is to be considered "fenced." Giving effect to the plain language of the statute, we hold that an island, because all of its boundaries are formed by water, is "fenced" under section
810.011(6) for the purposes of charging trespass under section
810.09. The legislature is not required to expressly state that "fenced land" includes an island or land completely surrounded by water; such is the logical and reasonable conclusion of the language it used. We hold that section
810.09(1) and section
810.011(6) give a sufficiently definite warning of the proscribed conduct and are not unconstitutionally vague or uncertain....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 6509, 2005 WL 1027087
...he time period relevant here. By custom and usage, there is an implied invitation for visitors to approach the front door of a residence, in the absence of some external indication to the contrary. See 55 Fla. Jur.2d Trespass § 9, at 311-12 (2000); § 810.09, Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 33 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 554, 2008 Fla. LEXIS 1237, 2008 WL 2679168
...upervision, training, guidance, and management responsibilities of full-time law enforcement officers, part-time law enforcement officers, or auxiliary law enforcement officers but does not include support personnel employed by the employing agency. § 810.09(2)(d), Fla. Stat. If the construction site is greater than one acre in area, see § 810.09(2)(d)1, Fla....
...See chapter 395, Fla. Stat. §
812.014(2)(b)3, Fla. Stat. "Emergency medical aircraft or vehicle" means any aircraft, ambulance or other vehicle used as an emergency medical service vehicle that has been issued a permit in accordance with Florida law. §
810.09(1)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1992 WL 206397
...me Court would agree with this statement. [7] We hesitate to describe the detective's presence on the adjoining property, without permission, as a trespass without pointing to the difference in the civil and criminal laws as they relate to trespass. Section 810.09, Florida Statutes (1991) requires active or constructive notice that one is trespassing by an authorized person to create a criminal trespass on real property. 810.09 Trespass on property other than structure or conveyance....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...Babb, Jr., Public Defender, and Patricia C. Jenkins, Asst. Public Defender, Ocala, for respondent. FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge. Respondent Wondle Wimberly was charged with trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance in violation of section 810.09, Florida Statutes (1981)....
...rty of T and W MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, d/b/a SHEFFIELD'S TRUCK STOP, in the are, [sic care] custody and control of CHARLES WHITED located in the vicinity of 4032 N.W. CR-326, Ocala, having notice against trespass, in the violation of Florida Statute
810.09; First Degree Misdemeanor... . Relying on State v. Dye,
346 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1977), the circuit court held that the information filed against Wimberly was fatally defective. In Dye, the defendant was charged with trespass on school property in violation of section
810.09, Florida Statutes (1975). The 1975 statute read in part as follows:
810.09 Trespass on property other than structure or conveyance....
...The information in Dye charged that the defendant: [D]id then and there willfully enter upon or remain upon property other than a structure or conveyance, to wit: school campus ... without being authorized, licensed or invited to be upon said property, contrary to F.S. 810.09......
...t allege that `the offender defied an order to leave, communicated to him by an authorized person.' Not only does it fail to state that a person with requisite authority demanded he leave, it does not even state that anyone ordered him to leave. See Section 810.09(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1975)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 30539
...3d DCA 1998); K.S. v. State,
697 So.2d 1275 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); L.A.T. v. State,
650 So.2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); S.D. v. State,
627 So.2d 1261 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), or, as shown by the fact that a trespass charge was abandoned, in his presence at the scene. See §
810.09(1)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...The state argues that when Kelly refused to obey the guard's request, he was committing a trespass and therefore the guard had the right to temporarily detain him for investigatory purposes. [1] Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1,
88 S.Ct. 1868,
20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); §
901.151, Fla. Stat. (1979). Section
810.09, Florida Statutes (1979), provides in part as follows: (1) Whoever, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance as to which notice against enteri...
...Contrary to Kelly's assertion, his conduct indicates that he did not intend to comply with the request of the deputies. Appellant was asked to go inside the skating rink or leave by the deputies who, as security guards, were "authorized persons" within the purview of section 810.09....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 1224777
...For his part, Seago conceded that the officers had given him a trespass warning sometime prior to the incident. But when his girlfriend needed items from the store, she would call Mr. Qader to tell him that she was sending Seago down to pick them up. Seago then went to the store and purchased the items. Section 810.09(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), provides: A person who without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance: 1....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 6058, 2011 WL 1599572
...constitutes a *528 statutory trespass. We have found no Florida case expressly addressing this issue. Undoubtedly, the most troublesome fact in this case is the fact that the deputies’ entry onto the property arguably may have been a violation of section 810.09, Florida Statutes (2008)....
...The officers willfully entered the property without being expressly authorized, licensed, or invited to enter. Although no one on the property communicated to them that they could not enter, and the property was not posted with signs, the property was “fenced land” and is considered enclosed and posted. See §§
810.09(l)(a)(l),
810.011(7), (8). It is not necessary in Florida to post enclosed land in order to obtain the benefit of section
810.09 if the property includes a dwelling house and does not exceed five acres in size. §
810.011(5)(b). A violation of the statute is more than civil trespass; technically, it is a misdemeanor — albeit one that is rarely prosecuted. See §
810.09(2)(a)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1988 WL 34663
...on or about 10-29-83 through 10-30-83, at the home of CHARLES and THELMA SARGENT, which is addressed 3320 55th STREET NORTH, ST. PETERSBURG, FLORIDA, committed the offense of TRESPASS AFTER WARNING, or lesser included offense, in violation of Florida Statute 810.09....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 74844
...We affirm but remand for correction of a clerical error in the judgment and commitment. At approximately 10:30 p.m. on February 29, 1988, appellant was arrested on a charge of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance in violation of Section 810.09(1), Florida Statutes (1987)....
...This section is erroneously referred to in the judgment as "893.13(1)(e)"; and in the commitment order as "893.12(1)(e)." The trial court shall, upon remand, correct such errors. AFFIRM but REMANDED for correction of judgment and commitment order. WENTWORTH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 810.09(1) provides: (1) Whoever, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance as to which notice against entering or remaining is given, either by actual...
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 10801
...The crime of trespass occurs when an individual, without being authorized, willfully enters upon or remains on property as to which notice against entering or remaining is given, either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, etc. § 810.09(1), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2013 WL 535407
...upervision, training, guidance, and management responsibilities of full-time law enforcement officers, part-time law enforcement officers, or auxiliary law enforcement officers but does not include support personnel employed by the employing agency. § 810.09(2)(d), Fla. Stat. If the construction site is greater than one acre in area, see § 810.09(2) (d)l, Fla....
...HIS PROPERTY COMMITS A FELONY.” §
395.002(17), Fla. Stat. “Licensed facility” means a hospital, ambulatory surgical center, or mobile surgical facility licensed by the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration. See chapter 395, Fla. Stat. §
810.09(l)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1993 WL 33337
...Huffstetler, Jr., Spring Hill, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Myra J. Fried, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. W. SHARP, Judge. Pointec appeals from his conviction for simple criminal trespass pursuant to section 810.09(1), Florida Statutes (1991). He argues the information which charged him solely with trespassing on a construction site pursuant to section 810.09(2)(d), does not encompass all of the elements of simple trespass....
...The no trespassing signs did not state the name of the owner, lessee or occupant. In addition, the letters used for the words "No Trespassing" in the signs, were less than two inches in height. The amended information in this case charged Pointec with violating section 810.09(2)(d), a third degree felony....
...ates, agent or agents of the owner, and said site was legally posted and identified in substantial compliance with the statute, and the said David Pointec was not authorized, licensed, or invited to be on the property by the owner or his agents... . Section 810.09(2)(d) enhances a trespass to a felony if the property trespassed upon is a construction site "that is legally posted and identified in substantially the following manner: `This area is a designated construction site, and anyone trespas...
...on
810.011(5)(a). The trial court agreed that the signage at the boat ramp failed in many regards (size of print, name of owner, and location) to conform to section
810.011(5)(a). *573 He ruled that the definition of "posted" was intended to control section
810.09(2)(d). We agree with his analysis. Accordingly, the trial judge directed a verdict on the construction site charge, but he ruled there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on "simple trespass," the misdemeanor charge set forth in section
810.09(1)....
...State,
507 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). See State v. McCormack,
517 So.2d 73 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). We disagree with Pointec that the state also had to prove Pointec "defied an order to leave" personally communicated to him by the owner of the premises. §
810.09(2)(b), Fla....
...The additional fact that Pointec denied his identity and ran when caught by Motley at the construction site strongly supports the jury's finding that he knew his presence at the boat ramp construction site the evening of December 16th was wrongful and unauthorized. AFFIRMED. COBB and PETERSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 810.09(1), Fla. Stat. [2] § 810.09(2)(d), Fla. Stat. [3] § 810.09(1), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2017 WL 3316914, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 11260
...4th
DCA 2012)).
In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court ruled that "[t]he initial
detention of Brown was supported by reasonable suspicion that he had committed the
crime of trespass, which does not require a prior warning by anyone." However, section
810.09, Florida Statutes (2015), clearly requires "notice against entering or remaining"
to have previously been given. § 810.09(1)(a)(1), (2)(b); see also Moore, 200 So. 3d at
1292 ("[S]ection 810.09(1)(a) 'requires that notice be given before a person can be
guilty of trespassing on property other than a structure or conveyance.' " (quoting S.N.J.
v....
...And the facts established at the suppression
hearing were that Brown and Marchman had been directed by the residents to leave the
property and that they were complying with the directive; officers engaged them as they
were walking away from the house and toward the street. Cf. § 810.09(2)(b) ("If the
offender defies an order to leave, personally communicated to the offender by the
owner of the premises or by an authorized person ....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 561716
...If the property is the unenclosed curtilage of a dwelling and the offender enters or remains with the intent to commit an offense thereon, other than the offense of trespass, commits the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance. § 810.09, Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2009 WL 2972476
...The officer claimed to have been unable to issue the warnings without names. Thus, S.N.J.'s and S.F.'s refusal to identify themselves constituted an obstruction of the officer's duty. We review the denial of motions for judgment of dismissal de novo. See G.T.J. v. State,
994 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Section
810.09(1)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (2007), requires that notice be given before a person can be guilty of trespassing on property other than a structure or conveyance....
...could be legally detained for trespassing only if they were first warned to leave the property. See In the Interest of B.M.,
553 So.2d 714, 716 n. 2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (explaining that the crime of trespass on unposted land does not occur until after trespasser is warned to depart and fails to do so). Section
810.09(2)(b) provides that any person authorized by the property owner may give the requisite warning....
...without knowing their names. See Slydell,
792 So.2d at 673 (holding that until the officer had a reasonable suspicion of trespassing, defendant could refuse to give his name). He did not; thus, neither S.N.J. nor S.F. was guilty of trespassing under section
810.09(1)(a)(1), and no sufficient cause existed to detain them....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 1502845
...See also Burgess v. State,
630 So.2d 666, 667 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Where "no trespassing" signs are not posted, a trespass occurs when a person remains on the property after defying an order to leave the property, conveyed by an owner or an authorized person. See §
810.09(2)(b), Fla....
...The "authorized person" has the authority to approach a person to warn the suspected trespasser and order him to leave. See In the Interest of B.M.,
553 So.2d 714, 715 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). A stop to inform trespassers of an order to leave required under section
810.09(2)(b), Florida Statutes, is more akin to a "mere encounter" than a "stop" for constitutional analysis....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 3400551
...The crime of trespass occurs when an individual, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters or remains on property as to which notice against entering or remaining has been given, either by actual communication to the offender or by posting or fencing. See § 810.09(1)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 1387023
...notice against entering or remaining in is given, (1) ... by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s.
810.011 ... commits the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance. §
810.09(1)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1996 WL 347004
...We reverse, as there is absolutely no evidence in the record that A.L. was on the convenience store property before he was escorted to the parked police cars. Four elements must be satisfied in order to establish the crime of trespass as defined by section 810.09, Florida Statutes (1995): 1) wilfully entering upon or remaining in any property; 2) other than a structure or conveyance; 3) without being authorized, licensed, or invited; 4) where notice against entering or remaining is given, eithe...
...ed,
436 So.2d 73 (Fla.1983); see also Patterson v. State,
512 So.2d 1109, 1110 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (under Florida Standard Jury Instructions (Criminal), "willfully means intentionally and purposely"); Fla.Std.Jury Instr. (Crim.) [p. 141] (Under section
810.09, Florida Statutes, "[w]illfully means intentionally and purposely")....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | District Court, N.D. Florida | 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11682
...In the following language, the court addressed the petitioners' assertion that the statute is overly broad and vague: Appellants' allegation of vagueness is based in part upon the fact that the words `authorized, licensed, or invited' are not expressly defined by Section 810.09(1)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61191, 2008 WL 3319795
...The Court will analyze each in turn. i. Trespassing Wilkin, Goodwein, and Barcelo argue that they had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs for trespassing on private property: the railroad track on which they were arrested. [3] The arresting deputies invoke Florida Statutes Section 810.09, which states in pertinent part: A person who, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance: 1....
...As to which notice against entering or remaining is given, either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s.
810.011 commits the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance. Fla. Stat. §
810.09(1)(a). The four elements that must be satisfied to establish the crime of trespass under section
810.09 are: "1) willfully entering upon or remaining in any property; 2) other than a structure or a conveyance; 3) without being authorized, licensed or invited; 4) where notice against entering or remaining is given either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing or cultivation." Smith v....
...department has received written authorization from the owner, his or her agent, or a community association authorized as an agent for the owner, to communicate an order to leave the property in the case of a threat to public safety or welfare." Id. § 810.09(3)....
...the railroad along the tracks. See Brooks Depo. at 116-17; Brooks Aff. at 3; Photographs, D.E. # 170. There is no record evidence suggesting that the owner of the tracks or an agent for such owner authorized Plaintiffs' presence, in accordance with section 810.09(3)....
...As the district court explained, the complaint alleges the absence of at least one element of the offense of trespass as defined by Florida law-that a person "willfully enter[] upon or remain[] in any property other than a structure or conveyance." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 810.09(1)(a)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 1958667
...by *566 posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. 810.111; or 2. If the property is the unenclosed curtilage of a dwelling and the offender enters or remains with the intent to commit an offense thereon, other than the offense of trespass, § 810.09(1)(a)1., Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 1500310
...Pye,
551 So.2d 1237, 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). The crime of trespass in a park after hours occurs, however, only if the suspect had actual or constructive notice that the park was closed. K.S. v. State,
840 So.2d 1116, 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing §
810.09(1)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 11352
...enforcement officer and possessed a firearm “during the commission of the
offense”); §
794.0115, Fla. Stat. (2015) (providing mandatory minimum sentence if
the offender “used or threatened to use a deadly weapon during the commission of”
certain designated offenses); §
810.09, Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2012 WL 6155342
...e, and took him to jail. There, the officers completed a sworn arrest affidavit charging Lawson with Disorderly Conduct in an Establishment in violation of Florida Statutes §
509.143, as well as Trespass on Property in violation of Florida Statutes §
810.09....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 13787
...The officer claimed to have been unable to issue the warnings without names. Thus, S.N.J.’s and S.F.’s refusal to identify themselves constituted an obstruction of the officer’s duty. We review the denial of motions for judgment of dismissal de novo. See G.T.J. v. State,
994 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Section
810.09(l)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (2007), requires that notice be given before a person can be guilty of trespassing on property other than a structure or conveyance....
...could be legally detained for trespassing only if they were first warned to leave the property. See In the Interest of B.M.,
553 So.2d 714 , 716 n. 2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (explaining that the crime of trespass on unposted land does not occur until after trespasser is warned to depart and fails to do so). Section
810.09(2)(b) provides that any person authorized by the property owner may give the requisite warning....
...without knowing their names. See Slydell,
792 So.2d at 673 (holding that until the officer had a reasonable suspicion of trespassing, defendant could refuse to give his name). He did not; thus, neither S.N.J. nor S.F. was guilty of trespassing under section
810.09(l)(a)(l), and no sufficient cause existed to detain them....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 2253895
...State,
577 So.2d 1372, 1374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Such a suspicion cannot be based upon a mere hunch or guess. Tamer v. State,
484 So.2d 583 (Fla.1986). State v. Hopkins,
661 So.2d 937, 938 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); accord Brown v. State,
687 So.2d 13 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). *371 Section
810.09, Florida Statutes, provides that a person trespasses in violation of that statute by willfully entering or remaining in any property other than a structure or conveyance as to which notice against entering or remaining has been given. §
810.09(1), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 2467066
...or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance ... [a]s to which notice against entering or remaining is given, either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. *376
810.011." §
810.09(1)(a)(1), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2009 WL 3271372
...We conclude that there was probable cause. The officer had previously ordered W.J. to leave the housing project and warned that he would be arrested for trespass if he returned. W.J. returned. There was probable cause to arrest him for trespass. See § 810.09, Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1993 WL 142703
...this erroneous jury instruction. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this cause for a new trial. [7] REVERSED and REMANDED. DAUKSCH and W. SHARP, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The private, posted construction site in this case was closed to the public, and section 810.09(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1989), provides that it is a felony for unauthorized persons to willfully enter such property....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1991 WL 87268
...ould not arrest him for trespass after warning. We disagree. The trespass statute creates a misdemeanor penalty "[i]f the offender defies an order to leave, personally communicated to him by the owner of the premises or by an authorized person. ..." § 810.09(2)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 659503
...He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of trespass on a construction site, because the evidence did not establish the posting element of the offense. We agree and reverse. Lewis was charged with trespass on a construction site pursuant to section 810.09(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2002). Section 810.09(2)(d) provides that it is a third-degree felony to trespass on "a construction site that is legally posted and identified in substantially the following manner: `THIS AREA IS A DESIGNATED CONSTRUCTION SITE, AND ANYONE WHO TRESPASSES ON...
...Said signs shall be placed along the boundary line of posted land in a manner and in such position as to be clearly noticeable from outside the boundary line. §
810.011(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). At Lewis's trial, there was testimony that there was a sign on the victim's property quoting the language required by section
810.09(2)(d)....
...However, all of the witnesses testified that there was only one such sign on the property, not a sign on each corner of the property as required by section
810.011(5)(a). Further, there was no testimony that the letters on the sign were two inches in height, as required by this statute. The State argues that section
810.09(2)(d) requires only substantial compliance, that the definition of posted land in section
810.011 should not be applied to section
810.09(2)(d), and that any technical deficiency was a matter for the jury to consider. We disagree. First, we note that the term "substantially" is used in section
810.09(2)(d) to describe the particular language required to be placed on the sign, but it is not used in conjunction with the term "legally posted." Second, we conclude that the definition of "posted land" in section
810.011 was intended to apply to the term "legally posted" in section
810.09. The only Florida case addressing this issue is Pointec v. State,
614 So.2d 570 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). In Pointec,
614 So.2d at 573, the Fifth District held that the definition of "posted" was intended to control section
810.09(2)(d). We agree with the Fifth District and believe that this reasoning is supported by the legislature's use of the language "legally posted" in section
810.09(2)(d), instead of merely providing that a construction site must be "posted in substantially the following manner....
...." The trial court in the instant case similarly found no merit in the argument raised by the State. It found that the *359 language regarding posting requirements in both statutes must be read in pari materia and that the court in Pointec correctly applied the definition of posted to section 810.09(2)(d)....
...Here, although the foundation of the house was complete and partial walls had been constructed, there was no roof on the residence. Therefore, it did not meet the definition of dwelling and the property was required to be legally posted. Accordingly, because the signage in the instant case did not meet the requirements of section
810.09(2)(d) and section
810.011(5)(a), we reverse Lewis's conviction for trespass on a construction site. Lewis's conviction and sentence for petit theft is affirmed. We note that the size of the property at issue was only 50 by 100 feet. However, neither section
810.011(5)(a) nor section
810.09(2)(d) provide for an exception to the posting requirements for properties of this size....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 2119157
...Judge Griffin, however, dissented, explaining: The plain truth is that this defendant was arrested because he ran off when the officer approached him to give him a trespass warning. The problem is that a police officer cannot detain a person and force him to identify himself for the purpose of giving a trespass warning. Section 810.09, Florida Statutes provides that a person trespasses in violation of that statute by willfully entering or remaining in any property other than a structure or conveyance as to which notice against entering or remaining has been given. 810.09(1), Fla....
...r authority in this case where no warning against trespassing was posted was limited to conveying an order to depart the premises." Id. at 715. This court further stated in footnote 2: A stop to inform trespassers of an order to leave required under section 810.09(2)(b), Florida Statutes, is more akin to a `mere encounter' than a `stop' for constitutional analysis....
...r reasonably suspected the detainee was committing at the time of the stop. It is also of no import that Deputy Maldonado did not ascertain if the appellant had been notified that he could not remain on that property prior to the investigatory stop. § 810.09, Fla....
...stop. See Popple v. State,
626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993). Appellant's actions did not meet the statutory requirements for a trespass, nor was he committing or about to commit a trespass. There are four elements that constitute a trespass pursuant to section
810.09, Florida Statutes (2005)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 400112
...The plain truth is that this defendant was arrested because he ran off when the officer approached him to give him a trespass warning. The problem is that a police officer cannot detain a person and force him to identify himself for the purpose of giving a trespass warning. Section 810.09, Florida Statutes provides that a person trespasses in violation of that statute by willfully entering or remaining in any property other than a structure or conveyance as to which notice against entering or remaining has been given. § 810.09(1), Fla....
...Robillard was concerned only about the profitability of his business and he asked the police to give L.K.B. "a trespass warning" because he did not want his customers (whose subjective fear or concern does not translate to an articulable suspicion) upset or scared away from the store. See Section 810.09, Florida Statute (1995). [2] Section 810.09 does not require the detention of *198 L.K.B....
..."assaulting the sensibilities" of another is now a crime. GRIFFIN, C.J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur. NOTES [1] §
856.021, Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] §
843.02, Fla. Stat. (1995). [1] See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1,
88 S.Ct. 1868,
20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). [2] §
810.09 Trespass on property other than structure or conveyance. (1) Whoever, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance as to which notice against enterin...
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 651
...3d DCA 1998); K.S. v. State,
697 So.2d 1275 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); L.A.T. v. State,
650 So.2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); S.D. v. State,
627 So.2d 1261 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), or, as shown by the fact that a trespass charge was abandoned, in his presence at the scene. See §
810.09(l)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11093, 1993 WL 302604
...Plaintiffs contend that defendants tried to remove plaintiffs from their campsite solely because plaintiffs were homeless individuals. However, the record indicates that defendants attempted to remove plaintiffs because plaintiffs did not have permission to live on the property. See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 810.09 (West Supp.1993) (prohibiting an individual from entering the land of another without permission, license, or invitation)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2011 WL 3477077
..."If the evidence, taken in a light most favorable to the state does not support a conviction, the motion must be granted. If the state establishes the existence of each element of the crime charged, then the motion must be denied." T.L.T. v. State,
53 So.3d 1100, 1102 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Section
810.09, Florida Statutes (2009), provides: (1)(a) A person who, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance: *314 1....
...a property other than a structure or conveyance... as to which prior notice against entering or remaining was given by actual communication ... by the owner of the said premises or by an authorized person, to-wit: OFFICER C. PULLEASE, contrary to F.S. 810.09, FIRST DEGREE MISDEMEANOR, TRESPASS AFTER WARNING....
...Although Massey testified that he witnessed Pullease ask K.M.B. to leave, this testimony was contradicted [7] by Pullease, himself, who admitted that he never actually communicated to K.M.B. that he was to leave. Thus, Pullease never warned K.M.B. pursuant to section 810.09....
...why he was under arrest, he testified that it was his intention to arrest him for disorderly conduct. The charge in this case is trespass after warning. As Pullease testified at trial that no warning was *315 given, the State failed to establish a violation of section 810.09....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 13959, 2003 WL 22136816
...Thus, we decline to hold the statute facially unconstitutional, leaving any marginal confusion in the statute for resolution in challenges to the statute as applied to the specific facts of other cases. Affirmed. FULMER and WALLACE, JJ„ Concur. . § 810.09, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 14776, 2016 WL 5807047
...THE APPLICABLE LAW On review of the denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings that are supported *1292 by competent, substantial evidence and we review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. Villanueva v. State,
189 So.3d 982, 984-85 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). Section
810.09(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2014), provides in pertinent part that “[a] person who, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance ... [a]s to which notice against entering or remaining is given ... commits the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance.” Thus section
810.09(l)(a) “requires that notice be given before a person can be guilty of trespassing on property other than a structure or conveyance.” S.N.J....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 15564
...We conclude that there was probable cause. The officer had previously ordered W.J. to leave the housing project and warned that he would be arrested for trespass if he returned. W.J. returned. There was probable cause to arrest him for trespass. See § 810.09, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2011 WL 5914260, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136238
...If the property is the unenclosed curtilage of a dwelling and the offender enters or remains with the intent to commit an offense thereon, other than the offense of trespass, commits the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance. Fla. Stat. § 810.09 (1)(a)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 3330764
...Construction and took an all-terrain vehicle called a "Gator cart." He was charged with grand theft of a motor vehicle, §
812.014(2)(c)(6), Fla. Stat. (2004); burglary of a conveyance, §
810.02(4)(b); and trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance, §
810.09(1)(a), (2)(a)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 1859421
...Having already resolved the first of these arguments in favor of appellant, we turn to his claim that police lacked probable cause to arrest him for trespass. To be guilty of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance, appellant must have been given notice against entry. See § 810.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). This notice may be accomplished by either “actual communication” to appellant or by “posting” the property as that term is defined by statute. See § 810.09(1)(a)1, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 2130284, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 7810
...or less, and instructed the jury in accordance with that presumption. This was error. The offense of trespass on a construction site is an enhancement of the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance, which is set forth in section 810.09(1), Florida Statutes. Simple trespass is a misdemeanor of the first degree. § 810.09(2)(a), Fla. Stat. Section 810.09(2)(d), Florida Statutes, provides for increased penalties if the trespass involves a construction site and certain additional requirements are met....
...be placed at the location on the property where the permits for the construction are located. For construction sites of 1 acre or less as provided in this subparagraph, it shall not be necessary to give notice by posting as defined in s.810.011(5). § 810.09(2)(d), Fla....
...It is sufficient if the area is identified as a construction site by a sign that appears “prominently” and in letters of not less than two inches in height, which reads in substantially the following manner: “THIS AREA IS A DESIGNATED CONSTRUCTION SITE, AND ANYONE WHO TRESPASSES ON THIS PROPERTY COMMITS A FELONY.” § 810.09(2)(d)2., Fla. Stat. On smaller sites, the sign is to be placed “at the location on the property where the permits for the construction are located.” § 810.09(2)(d)2., Fla....
...In addition, the sign must include the name of the owner, lessee, or occupant of said land. Id. Here, the information did not specify which subsection of the statute Higgs was alleged to have violated. It simply asserted that Higgs without being authorized, licensed or invited, did willfully, in violation of Florida Statute 810.09(2)(d), enter or remain on a certain construction site, to-wit: ESPN Wide World of Sports, the property of Walt Disney World and RICHARD J....
...ed construction site, and anyone who trespasses on this property commits a felony.” While the information asserted that the site was “legally posted,” proof of legal posting would satisfy the requirements of either subsection (d)l. or (d)2. of section 810.09(2)....
...annot be established by proof of the other). The State concedes error as it relates to the jury instructions and asks for the case to be remanded with instructions to enter judgment for trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance under section 810.09(1)(a), Florida Statutes....
...tion). Accordingly, we reverse Higgs’ conviction for trespass on a construction site. Because of our ruling on this issue, we do not reach Higgs’ complaint that the jury instructions were flawed. REVERSED. TORPY, C.J., and EVANDER, J., concur. . § 810.09(2)(d), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13907, 2005 WL 1176098
...A purported Sun Dome agent, Kelly Hickman, also approached the plaintiffs and requested the plaintiffs to move to the area designated for demonstrators ( id. at p. 9, ¶ 29). After the plaintiffs refused to relocate, Hillsborough County Sheriff's deputies arrested them for "trespass after warning" in violation of § 810.09, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 2120259, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 7962
...citizen and prosecute [her] where there was insufficient basis to convict on some other charge.” Woody,
581 So.2d at 967 ; accord Simms,
51 So.3d at 1268 . The officers had no basis to detain S.K.W. for attempted burglary, or even trespassing. See §
810.09(2)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 1698347, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 7828
...Case 2D11-30 (circuit case 10-CJ-3346) In this case, the State charged D.L. with trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance based on his presence at an apartment complex. The State concedes that it failed to prove that D.L. had actual notice that he was not allowed on the property, see § 810.09(l)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 1255838, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 4607
...talks: The existence and extent of a license that would permit a “knock and talk” depends on the circumstances; homeowners who post “No Trespassing” or “No Soliciting” signs effectively negate a license to enter the posted property. See § 810.09, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 3980
...If at the close of the evidence for the petitioner, the court is of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of guilt against the child, it may, or on the motion of the state attorney or the child, shall enter an order dismissing the petition for insufficiency of the evidence. . § 810.09(l)(a)2„ Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 156396
...Indeed, the course of Florida jurisprudence regarding curtilage is a somewhat tortured one. See, e.g., Martinez v. State,
700 So.2d 142, 145 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (W. Sharp, J., dissenting); Greer v. State,
354 So.2d at 953-54 (Pearson, J., dissenting). [3] See §
810.02(1) and §
777.04(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). [4] See §
810.09(1), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 2494714, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 9266
...Defense counsel made proper hearsay objections to both these statements. Importantly to this case, the Robles Park manager himself did not testify, nor did the State provide any sort of documentation that the project manager had granted Tampa police officers authority to issue trespass warnings pursuant to section 810.09, Florida Statutes (2011)....
...delinquent, and committed him to a moderate risk residential program followed by a year of probation. II. Analysis In order to be convicted of trespass after warning, the defendant must have been previously ordered not to be on the premises and subsequently violated that order. Subsection (2)(b) of section 810.09 makes such violation a misdemeanor of the first degree and provides that the offender commits the offense “[i]f the offender defies an order to leave, personally communicated to the offender by the owner of the premises or by an authorized person .......
...t J.G. for trespass after warning, J.G.’s adjudication of delinquency for such offense cannot stand. Adjudication of delinquency reversed and disposition vacated with instructions to dismiss the charge against J.G. KELLY and LaROSE, JJ., Concur. . § 810.09(l)(a), (2)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186426, 2016 WL 3982877
...The officers arrested Tarpley for trespass after warning. (Mot. 6, ECF No. 63.) Trespass after warning occurs when a person “defies an order to leave, personally communicated to the offender by the owner of the premises or by an authorized person .... ” Fla. Stat. 810.09(2)(b)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 9922, 2015 WL 3986139
...2d DCA 1997); see also McKiver v. State,
55 So.3d 646, 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Here, the allegations of the delinquency petition were sufficient to encompass the elements of trespass, and the evidence showed that K.B. made a nonconsensual entry into the fenced backyard. See §
810.09(l)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19412, 1993 WL 595753
...ose on official business. Any non-resident group or individual wishing to solicit, picket, demonstrate, or engage in any other concerted activity on Housing Authority property must first obtain permission from the board of directors. Florida Statute 810.09 states, in pertinent part: (1) Whoever, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance as to which notice against entering or remaining is given, either by...
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5076, 1993 WL 118173
...on the premises, Judge Wilson recommended that the Court ADOPT Plaintiff's Motion For Preliminary Injunction. Judge Wilson thereby recommended that the City be enjoined from arresting the Plaintiff under the trespass-after-warning statute, Fla.Stat. § 810.09 (1989), while he is engaged in door-to-door political expression between the hours of 7:00 A.M....
...ic housing areas. In order to combat the crime problem in the areas and the effects of the uninvited outsiders, the Housing Authority delegated to the Tampa Police Department its right to invoke Florida's trespass-after-warning provision, Fla. Stat. § 810.09 (1989). Florida Statute § 810.09 provides in pertinent part: (1) Whoever, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance as to which notice against entering or remaining is given, either...
...Magistrate Wilson determined this issue on November 20, 1992. The Magistrate recommended that this Court approve a preliminary injunction, enjoining the Defendants, and their agents, from arresting the Plaintiff *1493 under the trespass-after-warning statute, Fla.Stat. § 810.09 (1989), based upon a warning issued by the police or the Housing Authority, while he is engaged in door-to-door political expression between the hours of 7:00 A.M....
...This Court is confident that the Magistrate Judge properly came to these conclusions of fact. However, Plaintiff's remaining objections require some examination. Plaintiff objects to the finding that, "the plaintiff acknowledges that public housing authorities may delegate to municipal police officers the authority under § 810.09 [Fla.Stat.] to issue the initial warning to leave the premises, as was done here (Doc....
...r warning. Similarly, the Attorney General of Florida, in opinion 90-68 (Aug. 17, 1990), concluded that a municipal housing authority may predesignate on-duty municipal police officers to order persons to leave the housing authority's property under § 810.09....
...OPTED and incorporated herein, with exceptions previously noted; Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction be GRANTED; and Defendants, and their agents, be enjoined from arresting the Plaintiff under the trespass-after-warning statute, Fla.Stat. § 810.09 (1989), based upon a warning issued by the police or the Housing Authority, while he is engaged in door-to-door political expression between the hours of 7:00 A.M....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 12514, 2001 WL 1007937
...(b) As used in this section, the term “unenclosed curtilage” means the unenclosed land or grounds, and any outbuildings, that are directly and intimately adjacent to and connected with the dwelling and necessary, convenient, and habitually used in connection with that dwelling. §
810.09(l)(a),(b), Fla. Stat. (2000). This was not a case where there was “actual communication to the offender” about not entering or remaining on the property within the meaning of section
810.09(l)(a)l. The property was not “posted land” as defined by section
810.011(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2000). 1 Assuming that appellant was on “unenclosed curtilage” as provided in section
810.09(l)(a)2., his act of putting something down his pants did not give rise to probable cause to believe that he had an intent to commit an offense on the property....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 21230
...er some circumstances where the actual commission of the crime is a misdemeanor. For example, even were we to follow appellant’s reasoning that only the trespasses in chapter 810 are covered by the burglary tool section, trespass over posted land (section 810.09), with certain exceptions, is a misdemeanor of the first degree....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 16031
...r remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance ... [a]s to which notice against entering or remaining is given, either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. *376
810.011.” §
810.09(l)(a)(l), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...guidance, and management responsibilities of full-time law enforcement
officers, part-time law enforcement officers, or auxiliary law enforcement
- 11 -
officers but does not include support personnel employed by the employing
agency.
§ 810.09(2)(d), Fla. Stat.
If the construction site is greater than one acre in area, see § 810.09(2)(d)1,
Fla....
...rty, and
propelled by power other than muscular power, but the term does not include
traction engines, road rollers, personal delivery devices, special mobile
equipment, vehicles that run only upon a track, bicycles, swamp buggies, or
mopeds.
§ 810.09(1)(b), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...In this Anders appeal,* we affirm Appellant’s judgment and
sentence. The written judgment, however, incorrectly reflects that
Appellant entered a plea to trespass on property other than a
* Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967).
structure or conveyance in violation of section
810.09, Florida
Statutes, but he entered a plea to trespass of a conveyance in
violation of section
810.08, Florida Statutes....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 16561, 2009 WL 3674572
...evated to a detention because, as acknowledged by Officer Sirolli, Ward was no longer free to leave. This detention was lawful because the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that Ward had just committed the crime of trespass. Specifically, section 810.09(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that an individual commits the offense of trespass when, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, such person willfully enters upon property, other than a structure or conveyance, as to w...
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 8621
SHIVERS, Chief Judge. Defendant L.D.L., a child, appeals final judgment and sentence finding him guilty of trespass after warning in violation of section 810.09(1), Florida Statutes (1987), and placing him on community control....
...Appellant stated that he knew he had been given a trespass warning, and that was one reason he ran when he saw the police. Appellant, a juvenile, was charged by petition filed in the circuit court with one count of trespass on property after warning in violation of section 810.09(1), Florida Statutes. He was tried and found guilty as charged. Adjudication of delinquency was withheld and appellant was placed on community control. Section 810.09(1), Florida Statutes, reads: 810.09 Trespass on property other than structure or conveyance.— (1)Whoever, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance as to which notice against entering o...
...v. State,
507 So.2d 700, 701-702 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) “Trespass — On Property Other Than a Structure or Conveyance.” The State did not prove each element of the offense of trespass — violation of section
810.09(1), Florida Statutes — beyond a reasonable doubt....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1985 [
477 So. 2d 985],
and 2012 [
87 So. 3d 679], and 2018.
20
13.4 TRESPASS—ON PROPERTY OTHER THAN A
STRUCTURE OR CONVEYANCE
§
810.09(1)(a)1 and 2, Fla....
...(Defendant) willfully entered upon or remained in property other
than a structure or conveyance.
2. The property was [owned by] [in the lawful possession of] (person
alleged).
3. Give one of the following paragraphs, as applicable.
Give if § 810.09(1)(a)1, Fla....
...is charged.
Notice not to enter upon or remain in that property had been
given by [[actual communication to the defendant] [[posting]
[fencing] [cultivation] of the property in the manner defined in
this instruction]].
Give if § 810.09(1)(a)2, Fla....
...§
810.011(3), Fla. Stat.
“Conveyance” means any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad vehicle or
car, trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car; and “to enter a conveyance” includes
taking apart any portion of the conveyance.
§
810.09(3), Fla....
...enforcement officer whose department has received written authorization
from the owner, his or her agent, or a community association authorized as an
agent for the owner, to communicate an order to leave the property in the case
of a threat to public safety or welfare.
§ 810.09(1)(b), Fla....
...4th DCA 2016).
“Great bodily harm” means great as distinguished from slight, trivial,
minor, or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises.
Lesser Included Offenses
TRESPASS ON PROPERTY OTHER THAN STRUCTURE OR
CONVEYANCE — 810.09(1)(a)
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...Finding no merit to
either assertion, we affirm.
X.B. was charged by petition for delinquency with trespassing on the
grounds of Horace Mann Middle School “when said [respondent] was a
student currently under suspension or expulsion, in violation of s.
810.097(1).” The matter proceeded to an adjudicatory hearing where the
trial court heard from the former dean of students at the school, Darren Jones
(“Jones”), and Alicia Griffin (“X.B.’s mother”), among others....
...to sustain a conviction.” Pagan v. State,
830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002).
“To overcome a motion for judgment of acquittal, the state must have
put forth evidence of each element in each crime.” K.S. v. State,
840 So. 2d
1116, 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Section
810.097(1), Florida Statutes
(2020), provides as follows:
(1) Any person who:
4
(a) Does not have legitimate business on the campus or any
other authorization, license, or invita...
...Thus, the elements of the
crime “are that the person charged is [(1)] ‘a student currently under
suspension or expulsion,’ [(2)] who enters or remains upon the campus or
any other facility of a school.” L.M.,
256 So. 3d at 228 (quoting §
810.097(1)(b), Fla....
...because the State did not introduce into evidence the exclusionary letter the
school gave him to bring home. This argument is meritless. There is no
requirement that the State must introduce the written notice of suspension
or exclusionary letter to prove the suspension element of section
810.097(1)(b). Moreover, any argument that in order for a suspension to be
effective under section 810.097(1)(b) it must be reported in writing, is
5
foreclosed by this Court’s holding in L.M....
...supervision to deter” his participation in a juvenile act, as described in section
985.02, Florida Statutes (2020), his return to school was not willful on his
6
part. This argument fails for two reasons. First, section
810.097(1) does not
cross-reference section
985.02, which sets forth the legislative intent for
chapter 985 concerning Florida’s juvenile justice system....
...has given us no
reason to import the legislative intent for that chapter into a criminal trespass
statute.
Second, and more fundamentally, under the plain language of the
statute, there is no requirement that the State prove that the student’s
trespass was intentional. Section 810.097(1) does not state that a person
must willfully enter or remain to be guilty of trespass....
...See Rozier
v. State,
402 So. 2d 539, 542-43 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (explaining that
“willfully” as used in section
810.08(1), Florida Statutes (1979) “refers to a
general intent . . . intentionally, knowingly, and purposely done”); compare §
810.097(1) (“Any person ....
....
commits a trespass upon the grounds of a school facility . . . .”), with §
810.08(1), Fla. Stat. (2020) (“Whoever, without being authorized, licensed,
or invited, willfully enters or remains in any structure or conveyance . . .
commits the offense of trespass . . . .”), and §
810.09(1)(a), Fla....
...ters
7
upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance . . .
commits the offense of trespass . . . .”). X.B. has not asserted any argument
to construe an element of willfulness into section
810.097(1) contrary to the
plain language of the statute. Cf. J.H. v. State,
220 So. 3d 508, 510 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2017) (affirming conviction under section
810.097(1) for trespassing
without legitimate business for being on campus and rejecting contention
that school principal should have inquired with juvenile why he was on
campus because “[s]ection
810.097(1) does not require that school
personnel ask the trespasser his reasons for being on campus to determine
whether he had legitimate business, and we decline the invitation to add
such a requirement to the statute”).
Finally, X.B.’s reliance on M.C....
...his court as ‘any purpose for
8
being there which is connected with the operation of the school,’” and
therefore did not violate section 228.091(1)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (1995),
the predecessor to section 810.097(1)(a)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 19293
...Construction and took an all-terrain vehicle called a “Gator cart.” He was charged with grand theft of a motor vehicle, §
812.014(2)(c)(6), Fla. Stat. (2004); burglary of a conveyance, §
810.02(4)(b); and trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance, §
810.09(l)(a), (2)(a)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 18713
...The crime of trespass occurs when an individual, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters or remains on property as to which notice •against entering or remaining has been given, either by actual communication to the offender or by posting or fencing. See § 810.09(l)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...authority to do so as a teacher, he did have that authority in his
capacity as a sheriff’s reserve deputy. 1
After the State rested its case, defense counsel moved for JOA
on the charge of trespass upon the grounds of a school facility after
warning, brought under section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes
(2021)....
...Whether Deputy Rimes had received
consent to trespass someone from the school grounds was not
hearsay. Instead, the giving of consent is a verbal act. See A.J.M.
v. State,
182 So. 3d 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); Palmer v. State,
448
So. 2d 55 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)).
2 Section
810.097(2) provides:
(2) Any person who enters or remains upon the
campus or other facility of a school after the principal of
such school, or his or her designee, has directed such
person to leave such campus or facility....
...incipal to restrict
access to the property. In J.R., the evidence failed to demonstrate
that the school resource officer was designated by the principal to
direct a person to leave, subject to a trespass charge. Id. at 430.
J.R.’s conviction under section 810.097(2) was therefore reversed.
Id.
Here, the State responded that Deputy Rimes’ testimony that
he was authorized “to trespass people” in his capacity as a reserve
deputy was enough to survive the motion for JOA....
...State,
67 So. 3d 1029, 1032 (Fla. 2011).
Our supreme court has held that “the identity and authority
of the person who has warned a defendant to leave is an essential
element of the offense” of trespass upon the grounds of a school
facility under section
810.097(2). D.J.,
67 So. 3d at 1033. The
statute requires the warning person to be “the principal of such
school, or his or her designee.” §
810.097(2), Fla. Stat. As stated
in D.J., “section
810.097 grants to the principal of a school the
same authority that is granted to the owner of private property by
section
810.09, namely, the authority to order persons to either
leave the premises or face criminal sanction.” D.J., at 1033....
...The
absence of evidence that the warning person “has received express
or implied authorization from the school’s principal to exercise
4
control over the property of the school” requires reversal of a
conviction for trespass on school grounds after warning under
section
810.097(2). J.R.,
99 So. 3d at 429.
While a law enforcement officer’s position alone does not
constitute express or implied authorization from the school’s
principal for purposes of the trespass offense under section
810.097(2), here, viewing the inferences most favorably to the
State, there was sufficient evidence that Deputy Rimes had
consent to trespass people from school grounds to raise a jury
question....
...ool
principal to trespass people from school grounds. Whether he
actually had such authority was therefore properly a question for
the jury, so the trial court was correct to deny the motion for JOA.
Appellant’s conviction for a violation of section 810.097(2), and
his other convictions, are therefore AFFIRMED.
LEWIS, BILBREY, and LONG, JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...committed the offense of trespass in a conveyance, a second-degree misdemeanor. See §
810.08, Fla. Stat. (2016). However, the disposition order indicates that he was adjudicated delinquent of the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or a conveyance, a first-degree misdemeanor. See §
810.09(2)(a)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...committed the offense of trespass in a conveyance, a second-degree misdemeanor. See §
810.08, Fla. Stat. (2016). However, the disposition order indicates that he was adjudicated delinquent of the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or a conveyance, a first-degree misdemeanor. See §
810.09(2)(a)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...econd-degree misdemeanor.
See §
810.08, Fla. Stat. (2016). However, the disposition order indicates that he was
adjudicated delinquent of the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or a
conveyance, a first-degree misdemeanor. See §
810.09(2)(a)....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...(2020) (justifying the use or threatened use of non-deadly force,
“when and to the extent” necessary, “to prevent or terminate” another’s
“trespass on, or other tortious or criminal interference with,” the non-
dwelling portions of one’s “real” or “personal property”); 5 see also
§ 810.09(1)(a)2., Fla....
...Petition for writ of prohibition granted; case remanded with instructions.
CIKLIN and CONNER, JJ., concur.
* * *
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
6 As used in section 810.09(1), “the term ‘unenclosed curtilage’ means the
unenclosed land or grounds, and any outbuildings, that are directly and
intimately adjacent to and connected with the dwelling and necessary,
convenient, and habitually used in connection with that dwelling.” § 810.09(1)(b),
Fla....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 2002).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
enforcement officers as they occur. Pursuant to section
810.09(1)(a), Florida Statutes, "[a] person who, without
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 7723, 2015 WL 2431739
...the Nieminski decision relied significantly on the "reasonable expectation" test derived
from Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967). See Nieminski,
60 So. 3d at 524-29.
We recognized that the officers in that case may have committed a trespass under
section
810.09, Florida Statutes (2008)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 7556
...Pye,
551 So.2d 1237, 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). The crime of trespass in a park after hours occurs, however, only if the suspect had actual or constructive notice that the park was closed. K.S. v. State,
840 So.2d 1116, 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing §
810.09(1)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1242, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 8265
SMITH, Judge. Appellant appeals an order adjudging him delinquent on the grounds that he trespassed on property other than a structure or conveyance in violation of section 810.09, Florida Statutes (1985)....
...He was given another trespass warning on May 26, 1986. The next day, mall security personnel spotted him in the mall, the police were called, and he was arrested for trespass. 1 He was charged and found guilty of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance in violation of section 810.09, Florida Statutes (1985)....
...See Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal), “Trespass — On Property Other Than a Structure or Conveyance.” The state is not required to prove that appellant defied an order to leave communicated by the owner or authorized person in order to establish a violation of section 810.09....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 1982 Fla. LEXIS 2425
(1981) (trespass in a structure or conveyance); §
810.09, Fla.Stat. (1981) (trespass on property other
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 1882189, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 7040
...1 As such, the officers in this case needed “a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” Popple v. State,
626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993). The elements of trespass on property are set out in section
810.09(1), Florida Statutes....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2011 WL 1079074
...If at the close of the evidence for the petitioner, the court is of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of guilt against the child, it may, or on the motion of the state attorney or the child, shall enter an order dismissing the petition for insufficiency of the evidence. [2] § 810.09(1)(a)2., Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 3772
...notice against entering or remaining in is given, (1) ... by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s.
810.011 ... commits the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance. §
810.09(l)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 3461, 2008 WL 649589
...offense of trespass in a structure or conveyance. The trial court found, consistent with the testimony presented by the State’s witnesses, that K.F. never entered the building. Accordingly, K.F. could not be found guilty of violating that statute. Section 810.09 of the Florida Statutes (2006), the trespass statute dealing with trespass on property other than a structure, provides: 810.09 Trespass on property other than structure or conveyance.— (l)(a) A person who, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance: 1....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 6694
...We reverse, as there is absolutely no evidence in the record that A.L. was on the convenience store property before he was escorted to the parked police cars. Four elements must be satisfied in order to establish the crime of trespass as defined by section 810.09, Florida Statutes (1995): 1) wil-fully entering upon or remaining in any property; 2) other than a structure or conveyance; 3) without being authorized, licensed, or invited; 4) where notice against entering or remaining is given, eith...
...
36 So.2d 73 (Fla.1983); see also Patterson v. State,
512 So.2d 1109 , 1110 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (under Florida Standard Jury Instructions (Criminal), “willfully means intentionally and purposely”); Fla.Std.Jury Instr. (Crim.) [p. 141] (Under section
810.09, Florida Statutes, “[w]illfully means intentionally and purposely”)....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1996).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
be protected under the laws of this state. Section
810.09(1), Florida Statutes, provides: Whoever, without
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 8976, 2017 WL 2665071
...James Saint-Fort (“the defendant”) challenges his conviction for trespass while armed with a dangerous weapon. He argues that the rock he raised up and aimed—but did not throw—at a security guard could not constitute a dangerous weapon under section 810.09(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2016), and thus his motion for a judgment of acquittal should have been granted and a judgment of guilt entered on the lesser included offense of trespass....
...e security guard. The defendant lifted his arm and drew it back as if to throw the rock at the guard. When the guard unhol-stered his gun, the defendant fled. Upon his arrest, the rock was recovered. It was ultimately entered into evidence at trial. Section 810.09(2)(c) provides that the offense of trespass is a felony of the third degree “[i]f the offender is armed with a firearm or other dangerous weapon during the commission of the offense.” The term “dangerous weapon” is not defined in chapter 810, which governs burglary and trespass....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2016 WL 3065852, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 8282
...and the resulting sentences based on the trial court’s finding that he violated
Condition Five of his probation by committing two new law violations—unlawful
assembly in violation of section
870.02, Florida Statutes (2014), and trespass after
warning in violation of section
810.09(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2014)....
...ed in
2011 by Gregg Fortner, who was the Executive Director of the Miami-Dade Public
Housing Agency at that time. The trespass enforcement agreement authorized
officers of the City of Miami Police Department to enforce trespass laws set forth
in section 810.09, and to issue trespass warnings, direct trespassers to leave the
premises, and arrest trespassers....
...complex for the purpose of trespassing. Therefore, based on the evidence
presented, we conclude that the State failed to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant violated his probation by committing the new law
violation of unlawful assembly.
IV. Section 810.09(2)(b) Trespass After Warning
Section 810.09(2)(b) provides that an individual commits a first degree
misdemeanor if he “defies an order to leave, personally communicated to the
12
offender by the owner of the premises or by an authorized person ....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 36 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 363, 2011 Fla. LEXIS 1572
...We have for review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in D.J. v. State,
43 So.3d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). In its opinion, the Third District affirmed a juvenile’s conviction for trespassing upon the grounds of a school facility in violation of section
810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2009)....
...nd that the petitioner’s conviction must be vacated. BACKGROUND The petitioner in this case is D.J., a juvenile. On January 14, 2009, a petition for delinquency was filed in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit charging the petitioner with a violation of section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2009)....
...uch person to leave such campus or facility or not to enter upon the campus or facility, commits a trespass upon the grounds of a school facility and is guilty of a misdemeanor in the first degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082 or s.
775.083. §
810.097(2), Fla....
...She notified the school’s police officer, who arrested the petitioner for trespassing. Following the presentation of the State’s evidence, the defense moved for a judgment of dismissal. See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.110(k). Specifically, the defense argued that section 810.097(2) requires the State to prove, as an essential element of the trespass offense, that the defendant was warned to leave the school either by the school’s principal or by a person to whom the principal had granted authority to restrict access to the property....
...v. Dye,
346 So.2d 538 (Fla.1977). We granted review, dispensing with oral argument pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.320. See D.J. v. State,
47 So.3d 1287 (Fla.2010). Based on our consideration of Dye as well as the clear language of section
810.097(2), we find that the Third District’s conclusion was error....
...712 ,
148 L.Ed.2d 629 (2001)). The question presented in this case is whether the identity and authority of a person who has warned a defendant to leave a school are essential elements of the offense of trespass upon the grounds of a school facility as set out by section
810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2009)....
...The statute provides that a person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree by entering or remaining on the grounds of a school “after the principal of such school, or his or her designee, has directed such person to leave such campus or facility or not to enter upon the campus or facility.” § 810.097(2)....
...Dye,
346 So.2d 538 (Fla.1977). The defendant in that case was arrested after being ordered to leave the grounds of a school by the school’s custodian, and after refusing to leave. He was subsequently charged with trespassing on school property in violation of section
810.09, Florida Statutes (1975) (“Trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance.”). 2 At the time of the conviction, section
810.09(2) stated that a person would commit a misdemeanor of the first degree where that person “defie[d] an order to leave, personally communicated to him by the owner of the premises or other authorized person.” See §
810.09(2)(a), Fla....
...f a crime to be valid.” Id. at 541 . In Dye’s case, we determined that the information was defective because it did not allege that “the offender defied an order to leave, personally communicated to him by an authorized person.” Id. (quoting § 810.09(2))....
...We stated, “Not only does [the information] fail to state that a person with requisite authority demanded he leave, it does not even state that anyone ordered him to leave.” Id. This Court’s opinion next addressed the specific proof that would be required to support a conviction for violating section 810.09(2) under the circumstances presented in Dye ....
...On public premises, authorized personnel includes those persons who have been given either express or implied authority from the chief executive. Dye,
346 So.2d at 541-42 . In the case of a public school, we found that the chief executive was the school board. Thus, in order to prove that a defendant violated section
810.09(2) for the purposes of a trespass on a school, the State was required to demonstrate that the defendant was ordered to leave the school by an employee of the school board who was given authority to exercise control over school property....
...d proved by the prosecution at trial.” Id. at 542 (emphasis added). Although the two cases concerned prosecutions under different trespass statutes, the parallels between Dye and the instant case cannot be avoided. When viewed in pari materia with section 810.09, it becomes clear that section 810.097 grants to the principal of a school the same authority that is granted to the owner of private property by section 810.09, namely, the authority to order persons to either leave the premises or face criminal sanction. Moreover, just as we concluded that the phrase “other authorized person” in section 810.09(2) referred to one who had received either express or implied authorization from the property’s owner to exercise control over the property, we find that the phrase “his or her designee” in section 810.097(2) necessarily refers to one who has received express or implied authorization from the school’s principal to exercise control over the property of the school. Accordingly, to prove that a defendant has committed the first-degree misdemeanor set out in section 810.097(2), the State must present evidence that the defendant was (1) warned to leave the premises by a specific person, and (2) that that person was either the principal of the school or one who had received authorization from the principal to restrict access to the property....
...That the identity and authority of the person who has warned a defendant to leave is an essential element of the offense is supported by the plain language of the statute, which clearly states that the offender must have been warned to leave the property “by the principal of such school, or his or her designee.” § 810.097(2)....
...or refrain from entering the premises by either the principal or a designee of the principal. Furthermore, the primary decision relied on by the district court, Downer v. State,
375 So.2d 840 (Fla.1979), is not applicable to the current language of section
810.097(2)....
...s or remains in any structure or conveyance or, having been authorized, licensed, or invited is warned to depart and refuses to do so, commits the offense of trespass in a structure or conveyance. §
810.08(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1976). In contrast to section
810.09(2), Florida Statutes (1975), which we addressed in Dye , section
810.08 did not state that the offender must have been warned to leave by the owner of the property or a person authorized by the owner. 4 The conclusion reached by this Court in Downer therefore does not apply in the instant case. Instead, the trial court and the district court should have relied on this Court’s decision in Dye when determining the requirements of section
810.097....
...system and one that guides the review of any criminal conviction in this state.” Barnum,
921 So.2d at 519 . Here, the statute provides that the offender must have been warned to leave “by the principal of such school, or his or her designee.” §
810.097(2), Fla....
...We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. . At the time Dye was decided, trespassing on the grounds of a school was criminalized by section 228.091, Florida Statutes (1975). That statute was later amended and renumbered, and is now codified under section 810.097, the statute at issue in the instant case. See ch. 99-147, § 1, Laws of Fla. Nonetheless, Dye was charged with committing the more general trespassing offense in violation of section 810.09, rather than with the more specific offense of trespassing on a school in violation of section 228.091. . The current version of section 810.09 uses essentially the same language as that used in the 1975 version. See § 810.09(2)(b), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 2011 WL 2637451
...We have for review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in D.J. v. State,
43 So.3d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). In its opinion, the Third District affirmed a juvenile's conviction for trespassing upon the grounds of a school facility in violation of section
810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2009)....
...find that the petitioner's conviction must be vacated. BACKGROUND The petitioner in this case is D.J., a juvenile. On January 14, 2009, a petition for delinquency was filed in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit charging the petitioner with a violation of section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2009)....
...uch person to leave such campus or facility or not to enter upon the campus or facility, commits a trespass upon the grounds of a school facility and is guilty of a misdemeanor in the first degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082 or s.
775.083. §
810.097(2), Fla....
...She notified the school's police officer, who arrested the petitioner for trespassing. Following the presentation of the State's evidence, the defense moved for a judgment of dismissal. See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.110(k). Specifically, the defense argued that section 810.097(2) requires the State to prove, as an essential element of the trespass offense, that the defendant was warned to leave the school either by the school's principal or by a person to whom the principal had granted authority to restrict access to the property....
...Dye,
346 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1977). We granted review, dispensing with oral argument pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.320. See D.J. v. State,
47 So.3d 1287 (Fla.2010). Based on our consideration of Dye as well as the clear language of section
810.097(2), we find that the Third District's conclusion was error....
...712,
148 L.Ed.2d 629 (2001)). The question presented in this case is whether the identity and authority of a person who has warned a defendant to leave a school are essential elements of the offense of trespass upon the grounds of a school facility as set out by section
810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2009)....
...The statute provides that a person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree by entering or remaining on the grounds of a school "after the principal of such school, or his or her designee, has directed such person to leave such campus or facility or not to enter upon the campus or facility." § 810.097(2)....
...Dye,
346 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1977). The defendant in that case was arrested after being ordered to leave the grounds of a school by the school's custodian, and after refusing to leave. He was subsequently charged with trespassing on school property in violation of section
810.09, Florida Statutes (1975) ("Trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance."). [2] At the time of the conviction, section
810.09(2) stated that a person would commit a misdemeanor of the first degree where that person "defie[d] an order to leave, personally communicated to him by the owner of the premises or other authorized person." See §
810.09(2)(a), Fla....
...We explained that "[a]n information must allege each of the essential elements of a crime to be valid." Id. at 541. In Dye's case, we determined that the information was defective because it did not allege that "the offender defied an order to leave, personally communicated to him by an authorized person." Id. (quoting § 810.09(2))....
...We stated, "Not only does [the information] fail to state that a person with requisite authority demanded he leave, it does not even state that anyone ordered him to leave." Id. This Court's opinion next addressed the specific proof that would be required to support a conviction for violating section 810.09(2) under the circumstances presented in Dye....
...On public premises, authorized personnel includes those persons who have been given either express or implied authority from the chief executive. Dye,
346 So.2d at 541-42. In the case of a public school, we found that the chief executive was the school board. Thus, in order to prove that a defendant violated section
810.09(2) for the purposes of a trespass on a school, the State was required to demonstrate that the defendant was ordered to leave the school by an employee of the school board who was given authority to exercise control over school property....
...and proved by the prosecution at trial." Id. at 542 (emphasis added). Although the two cases concerned prosecutions under different trespass statutes, the parallels between Dye and the instant case cannot be avoided. When viewed in pari materia with section 810.09, it becomes clear that section 810.097 grants to the principal of a school the same authority that is granted to the owner of private property by section 810.09, namely, the authority to order persons to either leave the premises or face criminal sanction. Moreover, just as we concluded that the phrase "other authorized person" in section 810.09(2) referred to one who had received either express or implied authorization from the property's owner to exercise control over the property, we find that the phrase "his or her designee" in section 810.097(2) necessarily refers to one who has received express or implied authorization from the school's principal to exercise control over the property of the school. Accordingly, to prove that a defendant has committed the first-degree misdemeanor set out in section 810.097(2), the State must present evidence that the defendant was (1) warned to leave the premises by a specific person, and (2) that that person was either the principal of the school or one who had received authorization from the principal to restrict access to the property....
...That the identity and authority of the person who has warned a defendant to leave is an essential element of the offense is supported by the plain language of the statute, which clearly states that the offender must have been warned to leave the property "by the principal of such school, or his or her designee." § 810.097(2)....
...or refrain from entering the premises by either the principal or a designee of the principal. Furthermore, the primary decision relied on by the district court, Downer v. State,
375 So.2d 840 (Fla.1979), is not applicable to the current language of section
810.097(2)....
...s or remains in any structure or conveyance or, having been authorized, licensed, or invited is warned to depart and refuses to do so, commits the offense of trespass in a structure or conveyance. §
810.08(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1976). In contrast to section
810.09(2), Florida Statutes (1975), which we addressed in Dye, section
810.08 did not state that the offender must have been warned to leave by the owner of the property or a person authorized by the owner. [4] The conclusion reached by this Court in Downer therefore does not apply in the instant case. Instead, the trial court and the district court should have relied on this Court's decision in Dye when determining the requirements of section
810.097....
...justice system and one that guides the review of any criminal conviction in this state." Barnum,
921 So.2d at 519. Here, the statute provides that the offender must have been warned to leave "by the principal of such school, or his or her designee." §
810.097(2), Fla....
...NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. [2] At the time Dye was decided, trespassing on the grounds of a school was criminalized by section 228.091, Florida Statutes (1975). That statute was later amended and renumbered, and is now codified under section 810.097, the statute at issue in the instant case. See ch. 99-147, § 1, Laws of Fla. Nonetheless, Dye was charged with committing the more general trespassing offense in violation of section 810.09, rather than with the more specific offense of trespassing on a school in violation of section 228.091. [3] The current version of section 810.09 uses essentially the same language as that used in the 1975 version. See § 810.09(2)(b), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 3046351, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 12214
...(2009) (“Whoever shall resist, obstruct, or oppose any officer ... in the lawful execution of any legal duty, without offering or doing violence to the person of the officer, shall be guilty of a misdemean- or... .”). Pursuant to the trespass statute, section 810.09(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2009), a trespass is committed “[i]f the offender defies an order to leave, personally communicated to the offender by the owner of the premises or by an authorized person.” (Emphasis added.) As such, as an...
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 11399
for the purpose of giving a trespass warning. Section
810.09, Florida Statutes provides that a person trespasses
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 10837, 2004 WL 1620856
...Appellant argues the state failed to prove that he entered or remained in a structure or conveyance. He did not properly preserve this claim for appellate review because, at the revocation hearing, defense counsel represented to the court that appellant was charged with trespassing under section 810.09, Florida Statutes (2002), which prohibits trespassing on any property other than a structure or conveyance....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Argued: Apr 16, 2024
...We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
7 Because we find probable cause for arrest under Florida Statute §
856.021, we
decline the government’s invitation to address alternative grounds under Flor-
ida Statute §
810.09....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 11167
HAWKES, J. This is an appeal from a conviction for trespass on school grounds pursuant to section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2010)....
...Although the motion is not included in the record, one of the arguments defendant raises on appeal reveals fundamental error, namely that there was no evidence showing the principal or his designee ordered him to leave school grounds. Because this was a necessary element of section 810.097(2), we reverse....
...State,
852 So.2d 226, *669 230-31 (Fla.2003); see also A.P.R.,
894 So.2d at 286 . After examining each of defendant’s arguments on appeal, we conclude that he has raised a claim which constitutes fundamental error. In particular, defendant argues the State offered insufficient evidence to establish section
810.097(2) as it did not show LaForte was a designee of the principal. As will be explained below, this was a necessary element of the offense, and the total absence of evidence supporting it warrants reversal. The need to prove the involvement of the principal or his/her designee under Section
810.097(2) Section
810.097(2) defines the offense of trespass on school grounds in the following way: Any person who enters or remains upon the campus or other facility of a school after the principal of such school, or his or her designee, has directed such pe...
...Because no evidence was introduced linking LaForte to the principal’s office in any way, and because the evidence which was introduced demonstrated LaForte had no such connection, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish this needed element of section 810.097(2)....
...eversal of defendant’s conviction. The Third District’s opinion in D.J. v. State By reversing defendant’s conviction, we are recognizing that the State must prove the involvement of the principal or his/her designee to establish a violation of section 810.097(2)....
...In D.J., the evidence showed a school security guard had directed the defendant not to enter school property. Id. at 177 . On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court should have dismissed the case because the State failed to introduce any evidence that the security guard was a designee of the principal, as required by section 810.097(2). Id. The Third District rejected this argument. It found that proving the order to leave came from the principal or his/her designee does not become a necessary element of section 810.097(2) unless, at trial, the defendant challenges the authority of the individual giving the order. Id. Because the defendant in D.J. did not contest the security guard’s authority at trial, the Third District affirmed the conviction. Id. This was incorrect for two reasons. *670 First, the language of section 810.097(2) clearly indicates that it is necessary to demonstrate the order to leave came from the principal or his/her desig-nee. It is also required by the jury instructions for section 810.097(2), which indicate the State must show: (1) Defendant entered or remained on the campus of (school name) [and] (2) The principal or [his] [her] designee [told or directed the defendant to leave the campus or facility] Fla....
...(Criminal) 13.5(b) (2010). Indeed, the jury instructions identify the charge as “Trespass on School Grounds or Facilities after Warning by Principal or Designee.” (emphasis added). The fact that the order came from the principal or his/her designee sets section 810.097(2) apart from other trespass charges....
...The State must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was instructed to leave by the principal or his/her designee to establish the offense. Second, the authority cited by the Third District in D.J. does not support its interpretation of section
810.097(2). The Third District cited Downer v. State,
375 So.2d 840 (Fla.1979), and R.C.W. v. State,
507 So.2d 700, 701-02 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), as support. However, neither case deals with section
810.097(2)....
...tion
810.08(1). As the Supreme Court stated, section
810.08(1) is satisfied so long as the defendant receives notice that he or she is trespassing; it does not require that such notice come from an authorized individual. This is in stark contrast to section
810.097(2), which hinges entirely upon the principal or his/her designee ordering the defendant to leave. Unlike section
810.08(1), the language of section
810.097(2) requires that a particular authorized individual be involved for a violation to be found. Similarly, R.C.W. v. State concerned a trespass statute which did not require establishing the identity of the individual ordering the defendant to leave. The defendant in R.C.W. was charged with violating section
810.09, Florida Statutes, which governs trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance. Id. at 701-02. This Court in R.C.W. broke section
810.09 into its elements, and found the provision did not require the State “to prove that appellant defied an order to leave communicated by the owner or [another] author *671 ized person[.]” Id. at 702. Again, the situation changes when comparing section
810.09 with section
810.097(2), which hinges entirely upon the identity of the individual ordering the defendant to leave....
...Conclusion We conclude that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to establish that defendant was ordered to leave school grounds by the school principal or his/her designee. Because this was an essential element of the charge under section 810.097(2), defendant’s conviction constitutes fundamental error....
...To the extent that this decision does not comport with the Third District’s opinion in D.J., we certify conflict. REVERSED; CONFLICT CERTIFIED. VAN NORTWICK and PADOVANO, JJ., concur. . We address only the officer's authority to exclude individuals from school grounds under section 810.097(2). He may very well have authority elsewhere but the charge here was a violation of section 810.097(2).
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2011 WL 2752869
...Gordon, Assistant Public Defenders, Tallahassee, for Appellant. *668 Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Dixie Daimwood, Donna A. Gerace, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. HAWKES, J. This is an appeal from a conviction for trespass on school grounds pursuant to section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2010)....
...Although the motion is not included in the record, one of the arguments defendant raises on appeal reveals fundamental error, namely that there was no evidence showing the principal or his designee ordered him to leave school grounds. Because this was a necessary element of section 810.097(2), we reverse....
...State,
852 So.2d 226, *669 230-31 (Fla.2003); see also A.P.R.,
894 So.2d at 286. After examining each of defendant's arguments on appeal, we conclude that he has raised a claim which constitutes fundamental error. In particular, defendant argues the State offered insufficient evidence to establish section
810.097(2) as it did not show LaForte was a designee of the principal. As will be explained below, this was a necessary element of the offense, and the total absence of evidence supporting it warrants reversal. The need to prove the involvement of the principal or his/her designee under Section
810.097(2) Section
810.097(2) defines the offense of trespass on school grounds in the following way: Any person who enters or remains upon the campus or other facility of a school after the principal of such school, or his or her designee, has directed such pe...
...Because no evidence was introduced linking LaForte to the principal's office in any way, and because the evidence which was introduced demonstrated LaForte had no such connection, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish this needed element of section 810.097(2)....
...ts a reversal of defendant's conviction. The Third District's opinion in D.J. v. State By reversing defendant's conviction, we are recognizing that the State must prove the involvement of the principal or his/her designee to establish a violation of section 810.097(2)....
...In D.J., the evidence showed a school security guard had directed the defendant not to enter school property. Id. at 177. On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court should have dismissed the case because the State failed to introduce any evidence that the security guard was a designee of the principal, as required by section 810.097(2). Id. The Third District rejected this argument. It found that proving the order to leave came from the principal or his/her designee does not become a necessary element of section 810.097(2) unless, at trial, the defendant challenges the authority of the individual giving the order. Id. Because the defendant in D.J. did not contest the security guard's authority at trial, the Third District affirmed the conviction. Id. This was incorrect for two reasons. *670 First, the language of section 810.097(2) clearly indicates that it is necessary to demonstrate the order to leave came from the principal or his/her designee. It is also required by the jury instructions for section 810.097(2), which indicate the State must show: (1) Defendant entered or remained on the campus of (school name) [and] (2) The principal or [his][her] designee [told or directed the defendant to leave the campus or facility] Fla....
...(Criminal) 13.5(b) (2010). Indeed, the jury instructions identify the charge as "Trespass on School Grounds or Facilities after Warning by Principal or Designee. " (emphasis added). The fact that the order came from the principal or his/her designee sets section 810.097(2) apart from other trespass charges....
...The State must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was instructed to leave by the principal or his/her designee to establish the offense. Second, the authority cited by the Third District in D.J. does not support its interpretation of section
810.097(2). The Third District cited Downer v. State,
375 So.2d 840 (Fla.1979), and R.C.W. v. State,
507 So.2d 700, 701-02 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), as support. However, neither case deals with section
810.097(2)....
...tion
810.08(1). As the Supreme Court stated, section
810.08(1) is satisfied so long as the defendant receives notice that he or she is trespassing; it does not require that such notice come from an authorized individual. This is in stark contrast to section
810.097(2), which hinges entirely upon the principal or his/her designee ordering the defendant to leave. Unlike section
810.08(1), the language of section
810.097(2) requires that a particular authorized individual be involved for a violation to be found. Similarly, R.C.W. v. State concerned a trespass statute which did not require establishing the identity of the individual ordering the defendant to leave. The defendant in R.C.W. was charged with violating section
810.09, Florida Statutes, which governs trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance. Id. at 701-02. This Court in R.C.W. broke section
810.09 into its elements, and found the provision did not require the State "to prove that appellant defied an order to leave communicated by the owner or [another] authorized *671 person[.]" Id. at 702. Again, the situation changes when comparing section
810.09 with section
810.097(2), which hinges entirely upon the identity of the individual ordering the defendant to leave....
...Conclusion We conclude that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to establish that defendant was ordered to leave school grounds by the school principal or his/her designee. Because this was an essential element of the charge under section 810.097(2), defendant's conviction constitutes fundamental error....
...To the extent that this decision does not comport with the Third District's opinion in D.J., we certify conflict. REVERSED; CONFLICT CERTIFIED. VAN NORTWICK and PADOVANO, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We address only the officer's authority to exclude individuals from school grounds under section 810.097(2). He may very well have authority elsewhere but the charge here was a violation of section 810.097(2).
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...2d DCA 1997);
see also McKiver v. State,
55 So. 3d 646, 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Here, the
allegations of the delinquency petition were sufficient to encompass the elements of
trespass, and the evidence showed that K.B. made a nonconsensual entry into the
fenced backyard. See §
810.09(1)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...for two counts of aggravated assault with a firearm following a
nonjury trial. Roberts’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial
court erred in rejecting both his statutory 1 and common law
affirmative defenses 2 of citizen’s arrest regarding his use of a
1 See § 810.09(2)(c), Fla....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1990).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
property other than a structure or conveyance." Section
810.09(2)(b), F.S., provides: If the offender defies
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 275583, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 1080
...The key factor here, however, is whether H.D.’s intervening trespass while fleeing from Officer Morley was a sufficient attenuation to purge the taint of the unlawful BOLO. See id. at 1140 . H.D. committed the trespass in Officer Morley’s presence. See § 810.09(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court, N.D. Florida | 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11117
...The suit arises from a series of incidents in which Plaintiffs, while duck hunting, carried their boat over a strip of land and were confronted by Defendant Taylor and told that they were trespassing. Plaintiffs were charged with five counts of trespassing in violation of Section 810.09, Florida Statutes, and in April, 1979, were tried to a jury and found not guilty....
...f Phipps Broadcasting Stations. 7. On or about December 12, 1978, Harry Morrison, acting as State Attorney for the Second Judicial Circuit of Florida, filed an information charging the Plaintiffs with five counts of criminal trespass in violation of Section 810.09, Florida Statutes....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...on, training,
guidance, and management responsibilities of full-time law enforcement
officers, part-time law enforcement officers, or auxiliary law enforcement
officers but does not include support personnel employed by the employing
agency.
§ 810.09(2)(d), Fla. Stat.
If the construction site is greater than one acre in area, see § 810.09(2)(d)1,
Fla....
...ower, but the term does not include
- 13 -
traction engines, road rollers, personal delivery devices, special mobile
equipment, vehicles that run only upon a track, bicycles, swamp buggies, or
mopeds.
§ 810.09(1)(b), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 437, 2016 WL 145816
...nald’s, by the front door,
read: “Notice: All Coral Springs police officers are authorized to advise any
person to leave these premises. Failure to leave the premises after being
instructed will result in an arrest for trespass. Florida Statutes 810.09.”
The trial court properly admitted a photograph of the sign into evidence
over appellant’s hearsay objection, because the sign amounted to a verbal
act authorizing the arresting officer to order appellant to leave the
premises.
Appellant was charged with trespass on property other than a structure
or conveyance, in violation of section 810.09(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2014),
which provides, in pertinent part:
If the offender defies an order to leave, personally
communicated to the offender by the owner of the premises or
by an authorized person ....
...“any law enforcement officer whose department has received written
authorization from the owner, his or her agent, or a community association
authorized as an agent for the owner, to communicate an order to leave
the property in the case of a threat to public safety or welfare.” § 810.09(3).
A common definition of “received” is “to have something bestowed,
conferred, etc.” THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 1198 (1967).
A contested issue at trial was whether the arresting officer was a person
“authorized” within the meaning of section 810.09(2)(b) to order appellant
to leave the premises....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 2012 WL 399879
...TEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. None Attempt (except
777.04(1) 5.1 refuse to depart) *685 Comment This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1985 [
477 So.2d 985 ], and 2011. 13.4 TRESPASS — ON PROPERTY OTHER THAN A STRUCTURE OR CONVEYANCE §
810.09(l)(a)l and 2, Fla....
...The property was [owned by] [in the lawful possession of] (person alleged). 3. Notice not to [enter upon] [remain in] that-property — had been-given by: {actual communication to the defendant], {■[■posting] [fencing] — [cultivation]—of the property], Give one of the following paragraphs, as applicable. Give if§ 810.09(l)(a)l is charged. Notice not to enter upon or remain in that property had been given by [[actual communication to the defendant] [[posting] [fencing] [cultivation] of the property in the manner defined in this instruction]]. Give jf§ 810.09(l)(a)2 is charged....
...iately surrounding it. §
810.011(3) Fla. Stat. “Conveyance” means any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad vehicle or car, trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car; and “to enter a conveyance” includes taking apart any portion of the conveyance. §
810.09(3) Fla....
...department has received written authorization from the owner, his or her agent, or a community association authorized as an agent for the owner, to communicate an order to leave the property in the case of a threat to public safety or welfare. *686 § 810.09(l)(b) Fla....
...for the definition of “destructive device. ” A “dangerous weapon” is any weapon that, taking into account the manner in which it is used, is likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Lesser Included Offenses TRESPASS ON PROPERTY OTHER THAN STRUCTURE OR CONVEYANCE — 810.09(l)(a) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....
CopyPublished | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12031, 1994 WL 465899
...He continued to refuse to leave. Officer Kurt Grau then issued Plaintiff a written trespass warning which Plaintiff signed. Plaintiff continued to refuse to leave, and Officer Grau arrested him for trespassing after warning in violation of Florida Statutes, § 810.09(2)(b)....
...§ 1983 that his First Amendment rights were violated. Neither were Plaintiffs constitutional rights to be free of arrest or prosecution without probable cause violated. Plaintiff was arrested for trespassing after warning in violation of Florida Statutes, chapter 810.09 (1992)....
...nce is a misdemeanor of the first degree.... (b) If the offender defies an order to leave,personally communicated to him by the owner of the premises or by an authorized person ... he is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree____ Fla.Stat., ch. 810.09....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 892, 1992 WL 18557
...2221 ,
53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977); Dees,
397 So.2d at 1146 . Accordingly, we reverse Shivers’s conviction and vacate his sentence on the felony contraband charge. 5 Conviction REVERSED; sentence VACATED. COBB and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . U.S. Const, amend. V.; Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. . §
810.09, Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...However, if the State
fails to present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of the crime
charged, then dismissal is proper. E.A.B. v. State,
851 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2003).
Here, Appellant was charged with the crime of trespass on property other
than a structure or conveyance. §
810.09, Fla....
...The notice required by the statute
can be accomplished in various ways, including through actual communication or
through constructive notice by posting or fencing, as defined by section
810.011.
3
To achieve notice through actual communication, section
810.09 requires
that notice against entering or remaining be actually communicated to the offender.
Florida courts have interpreted this requirement to necessitate that the trespasser
receive an oral warning....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 514, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 600, 1988 WL 13060
...ssue to be dispositive of the case. Pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.160, the trial court certified the following question to be of great public importance: Whether international law authorizes an individual to commit a violation of § 810.09, Florida Statutes (1985), (trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance), if the person reasonably believes such a violation is necessary to prevent the commission of a war crime or a crime against humanity....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
property other than a structure or conveyance, see §
810.09, Fla. Stat. (2016), but it is not a necessarily
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...court’s determination. See J.Y. v. State,
332 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (holding: “In examining a record to
3 It is possible that the State could have charged I.L. with trespass on property
other than a structure or conveyance, see §
810.09, Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 1101, 1990 WL 15908
SCHEB, Acting Chief Judge. The defendant, Anthony Lewett White-hurst, appeals his judgments and sentences of trespass on property after warning, a violation of section
810.09(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), and petit theft, a second-degree misdemeanor, section
812.014(l)(d) Florida Statutes (1987)....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 1279, 1993 WL 20368
...ing authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains on another’s property “as to which notice, against entering or remaining is given, either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing or cultivation....” § 810.09(1), Fla.Stat....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 2004).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
than a structure or conveyance. For example, section
810.09(1)(a), Florida Statutes, states that "[a] person
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 17239
...remain in the property of the School Board of Dade County, located in the vicinity of 11700 S.W. 116th Street. . ” This is the site of Mays Junior High School, and the record reflects that the alleged offense, failure to leave the premises when ordered to do so, occurred within the school building. Section 810.09, as of the date at issue herein, provided, in pertinent part, that “[a] person commits an offense if, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, he willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure ....
...he was found to have committed was not an offense under the laws of Florida. The state contends that the true issue is whether or not there was a fatal variance between the allegation and the proof, asserting that an error in the charge (citation to Section
810.09, Trespass on Property Other Than Structure or Conveyance, instead of Section
810.08, Trespass in Structure or Conveyance) did not mislead or embarrass defendant in the preparation of his defense....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 9542, 1990 WL 205854
PER CURIAM. A.R., a juvenile, appeals an adjudication of delinquency for: count I — trespass on property other than structure or conveyance, § 810.09(1), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1988), and count II — trespass on grounds of a public school, § 228.091, Fla.Stat. (1987). We reverse. A.R. was charged with violation of section 810.09(1). A conviction under that statute is proper when the state proves the offender unlawfully entered or remained on property where notice is given as described in section 810.09(1)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 12810
-probation and restitution were ordered. We reverse. Section
810.09(1), Florida Statutes (1991), provides, Whoever
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 12827, 2003 WL 22012683
...He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the trespass charge because the State failed to prove that he was not authorized to be on the construction site. We agree. The crime of trespass on a construction site is set forth in section 810.09, Florida Statutes (2001)....
...property, and (2) the property was a construction site “legally posted and identified in substantially the following manner: ‘THIS AREA IS A DESIGNATED CONSTRUCTION SITE, AND ANYONE WHO TRESPASSES ON THIS PROP *750 ERTY COMMITS A FELONY.’ ” § 810.09(l)(a), (d)....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1990).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
actual costs of traffic control. Question Two Section
810.09(1), F.S., states "[w]hoever, without being
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
legally posted horticultural property under section
810.09(2)(e), Florida Statutes. 1 We have jurisdiction
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 12549
...“If the evidence, taken in a light most favorable to the state does not support a conviction, the motion must be granted. If the state establishes the existence of each element of the crime charged, then the motion must be denied.” T.L.T. v. State,
53 So.3d 1100, 1102 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Section
810.09, Florida Statutes (2009), provides: (l)(a) A person who, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance: *314 1....
...a property other than a structure or conveyance ... as to which prior notice against entering or remaining was given by actual communication ... by the owner of the said premises or by an authorized person, to-wit: OFFICER C. PULLEASE, contrary to F.S. 810.09, FIRST DEGREE MISDEMEANOR, TRESPASS AFTER WARNING....
...Although Massey testified that he witnessed Pullease ask K.M.B. to leave, this testimony was contradicted 7 by Pullease, himself, who admitted that he never actually communicated to K.M.B. that he was to leave. Thus, Pullease never warned K.M.B. pursuant to section 810.09....
...why he was under arrest, he testified that it was his intention to arrest him for disorderly conduct. The charge in this case is trespass after warning. As Pul-lease testified at trial that no warning was *315 given, the State failed to establish a violation of section 810.09....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...was not “engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty” because
no evidence established that Stamitoles was defying “an order to
leave, personally communicated to the offender by the owner of the
premises or by an authorized person” as to the dealership property.
§ 810.09(2)(b), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...ign a warrant of
arrest” for an out-of-state fugitive that may “be directed to any
peace officer or other person whom the Governor may think fit to
entrust with the execution thereof” (emphasis supplied)).
26
§ 810.09(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (authorizing a property owner or his
designee to detain a person he believes is engaged in felonious
armed trespass until a law enforcement officer arrives); § 810.097,
Fla....
...or to stop a trespass on his property, it also typically gives
immunity from criminal and civil liability for “false arrest, false
imprisonment, or unlawful detention,” provided the citizen
complies with the statutory requirements for detention. See, e.g.,
§§
493.631(9),
810.08,
810.09,
810.097(3),
812.015(3)(c), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 16100
his probation by trespassing in violation of Section
810.09, Florida Statutes (1977). The revocation order
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 3762, 1998 WL 171441
...Fabian was based on his bare *116 suspicion of illegal activity which we cannot approve. In a further effort to sustain the legality of the search, the State argued that the search was based upon probable cause for the crime of trespass. The location of the alleged trespass was neither in a structure nor a conveyance so section 810.09, Florida Statutes (1995), governs....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 2016 WL 1460587
...guidance, and management responsibilities of full-time law enforcement
officers, part-time law enforcement officers, or auxiliary law enforcement
officers but does not include support personnel employed by the employing
agency.
- 14 -
§ 810.09(2)(d), Fla. Stat.
If the construction site is greater than one acre in area, see § 810.09(2)(d)1,
Fla....
...TRESPASSES ON THIS PROPERTY COMMITS A FELONY.”
§
395.002(17), Fla. Stat.
“Licensed facility” means a hospital, ambulatory surgical center, or
mobile surgical facility licensed by the Florida Agency for Health Care
Administration. See chapter 395, Fla. Stat.
§
810.09(1)(b), Fla....
