The 2023 Florida Statutes
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[T]hose other options were, option one, drop the 800.4 charge, and I believe that's the lewd lascivious charge, I'm not guilty of it, I will plead to - - plead guilty to 400 Counts of 815.04(4a) offense against intellectual property, a computer crime downloading illegal files, an F3 Level 1, he had written. Seventy two months, meaning six years of prison, and 120 months, 10 years, of non sex offender probation.The police subsequently obtained a warrant to search Willoughby's home and seized the laptop. Upon inspection, the police discovered that Willoughby had emailed her employer's client trust fund master list to her laptop. Willoughby was arrested and charged with unlawfully accessing a computer database in violation of sections 815.06(1) and (2)(a), Florida Statutes (2006) (count one), and obtaining trade secret or confidential data in violation of sections 815.04(3)(b) and (4)(a), Florida Statutes (2006) (count two).The State appeals an Order Granting y, Motion for Judgment of Acquittal After a Jury Verdict. The State argues that Appellee's alleged act of deleting computer al files from her former employer's computer tit system constituted the destruction of data pursuant to section 815.04(2), Florida Statutes, which provides that "[w]hoever willfully, knowingly, and without authorization destroys data . . . residing or existing internal or external to a computer . . . commits an offense against intellectual property." The trial court rejected this argument, concluding instead that because the employer was able to retrieve the files from its hard drives, there was no evidence that Appellee destroyed data as required for a conviction of section 815.04(2). We agree with this conclusion. We also `s agree with the trial court that although m there was testimony that the employer was able to retrieve everything except "the last four days," the employer's witness also testified that he did not know whether anything had been lost from those four days.The court next considers plaintiff's contention that defendants have violated the FCCA. Only § 815.04 of the FCCA, which pertains to offenses against intellectual property, and § 815.06, which pertains to offenses against computer users, appear to have any arguable relevance in this case. There are few cases that interpret the FCCA but it appears that neither section has any applicability here. Both are criminal statutes; while § 815.06 additionally provides that a civil action may be brought, the defendant must first have been convicted of violating the statute. Section 815.04 does not appear to be create any civil remedy and thus implies no private right of action. See, generally, Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975) (refusing to infer a private right of action from a "bare criminal statute"). Thus plaintiff has not shown there is a substantial likelihood it would prevail on its claim defendants violated the FCCA.(Emphasis added). The offense is a felony. See id. § 815.04(4)(b).Id. Defining trade secrets by reference to section 812.081(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), section 815.04(3)(a) plainly covers electronic mail.Mitchell Scott Newberger was convicted of the crimes of modifying intellectual property and making a false statement to obtain a credit card. On appeal, he argues that section 815.04, Florida Statutes (1991), which criminalizes modification of intellectual property, is unconstitutional. He also asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for both offenses. We hold that section 815.04 is constitutional, and affirm on that point. We also find that the evidence supported Newberger's conviction for making a false statement to obtain a credit card and affirm without discussion of the law and facts relevant to that charge. We reverse his convictions for modifying intellectual property.. . . . § 815.04, in an attempt to satisfy his judgment, Wilson caused an execution to be issued to the Sheriff . . .
. . . Statutes (2006) (count one), and obtaining trade secret or confidential data in violation of sections 815.04 . . . Count two charges a violation of section 815.04(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes which states, “Whoever . . . However, section 815.04(3)(b) does not include a requirement that the defendant have a malicious purpose . . .
. . . from her former employer’s computer system constituted the destruction of data pursuant to section 815.04 . . . drives, there was no evidence that Appellee destroyed data as required for a conviction of section 815.04 . . .
. . . 839.25, Florida Statutes (2000), and unlawful modification of computer data in violation of subsection 815.04 . . . Subsection 815.04(1), Florida Statutes (2000), provides: Whoever willfully, knowingly, and without authorization . . . See id. § 815.04(4)(b). This statute addresses what is colloquially referred to as “hacking.” . . . information already existing in the computer system, she would have been in violation of subsection 815.04 . . . The evidence here did not support a conviction for modifying intellectual property under subsection 815.04 . . .
. . . confidential and exempt from the public disclosure mandate of § 119.07(1) pursuant to the exemptions in §§ 815.04 . . . public necessity that trade secret information as defined in s. 812.081, and as provided for in s. 815.04 . . . were intended to apply only to computer data, programs or supporting documentation exempted by section 815.04 . . . Section 815.04(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), on which the order under review also relies, provides: . . . Defining trade secrets by reference to section 812.081 (l)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), section 815.04 . . .
. . . That in addition to the six payments of $135.84 ($815.04 total) and the $756.09 payment comes to a total . . .
. . . On appeal, he argues that section 815.04, Florida Statutes (1991), which criminalizes modification of . . . We hold that section 815.04 is constitutional, and affirm on that point. . . . The state charged Newberger with two counts of violating section 815.04 based on his use of the nine . . . We therefore hold that section 815.04, Florida Statutes (1991), is not unconstitutionally vague. . . . The state reads section 815.04 too broadly. . . .
. . . the gross estate in the total amount of $6,537.57, increasing the gross estate to the amount of $883,-815.04 . . .
. . . States paid Anderson the contract price ($141,000) as follows: $103,829.96 prior to June 30, 1938, $28,-815.04 . . . On that date, before any claim was paid by appellee, the United States paid Anderson $28,-815.04 from . . .