The 2023 Florida Statutes
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[a] violation of s. 316.193, s. 316.027(1), s. 327.35(1), s. 782.071(1)(b), or s. 860.13(1)(a) which results in physical injury or death; however, an act involving the operation of a motor vehicle, boat, or aircraft which results in injury or death does not constitute a crime for the purpose of this chapter unless the injury or death was intentionally inflicted through the use of the vehicle, boat, or aircraft.
enacted"); Hughes v. State, 943 So.2d 176, 190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (holding that, because section 860.13 governing operation of aircraft while intoxicated was last reenacted without any amendments in 1983
In reaching this conclusion we note that the Third District Court's determination that the state criminal statute (section 860.13) concerns a different subject matter than the applicable federal regulations ( 14 C.F.R. parts 65, 121 and 135), finds support in the Eleventh Circuit's decision which, although it did not resolve this preemption question on the merits, did observe that the preemption language of Appendix I may not encompass Florida Statute section 860.13 because "it is not absolutely clear that the challenged Florida statutes cover the same subject matter" as the federal regulations. 377 F.3d at 1273.
In Carswell, we found that section 860.13( 2) does incorporate the federal standards for the safe operations of aircraft. Carswell, 557 So.2d at 184. As it was undisputed in Carswell that the federal standards relied upon in that case existed at the time of section 860.13's enactment, we concluded that there was no improper delegation of legislative power. Id. In the instant case, however, the parties dispute whether the federal standards relied upon in this case existed at the time that section 860.13 was reenacted in 1983. The federal standards referred to in the instant case are found in 14 C.F.R. § 91.17(a), which prohibit a crewmember from acting in that capacity within eight hours of consuming any alcoholic beverage or with a blood alcohol level of .04 percent or higher. In 1983, the federal regulations clearly prohibited acting as a crewmember within eight hours of consuming alcohol. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.11. However, the prohibition against acting as a crewmember with a blood alcohol level of .04 percent or higher, did not exist in 1983. Thus, for section 860.13( 2) to adopt and include the federal regulation prohibiting acting as a crew…
In Carswell, we found that section 860.13( 2) does incorporate the federal standards for the safe operations of aircraft. Carswell, 557 So.2d at 184. As it was undisputed in Carswell that the federal standards relied upon in that case existed at the time of section 860.13's enactment, we concluded that there was no improper delegation of legislative power. Id. In the instant case, however, the parties dispute whether the federal standards relied upon in this case existed at the time that section 860.13 was reenacted in 1983. The federal standards referred to in the instant case are found in 14 C.F.R. § 91.17(a), which prohibit a crewmember from acting in that capacity within eight hours of consuming any alcoholic beverage or with a blood alcohol level of .04 percent or higher. In 1983, the federal regulations clearly prohibited acting as a crewmember within eight hours of consuming alcohol. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.11. However, the prohibition against acting as a crewmember with a blood alcohol level of .04 percent or higher, did not exist in 1983. Thus, for section 860.13( 2) to adopt and include the federal regulation prohibiting acting as a crew…
Appellant, a private pilot, pled guilty to operating an aircraft while under the influence of alcohol in violation of section 860.13, Florida Statutes (2001), expressly reserving two dispositive legal questions for review: First, whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague for failure to define "under the influence," and second, whether the statute is void under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution because it was preempted by federal law. We answer both questions in the negative and affirm.
Fla. Stat. § 860.13.
Fla. Stat. § 860.13(1)(a) provides:
We first conclude that section 860.13, Florida Statutes, does not violate the single-subject rule of the Florida Constitution. This is because we find the matters in the statute are reasonably or logically connected. See Smith v. Department of Insurance, 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1987); State v. Canova, 94 So.2d 181 (Fla. 1957). Moreover, even if the title to section 860.13, Florida Statutes, may be defective, the statute's reenactment cures any infirmity or defect in the title. See Honchell v. State, 257 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1972); Alterman Transport Lines, Inc. v. State, 405 So.2d 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
. . . . § 860.13 (2010). . . .
. . . defines “[c]rime” as [a] violation of s. 316.193, s. 316.027(1), s. 327.35(1), s. 782.071(1)(b), or s. 860.13 . . .
. . . State, 943 So.2d 176, 190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (holding that, because section 860.13 governing operation . . .
. . . operating an aircraft while intoxicated or in a careless or reckless manner, in violation of section 860.13 . . . State, 888 So.2d 733 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)(deter-mining that section 860.13 is not preempted by federal . . . We find that section 860.13, Florida Statutes, criminalizing the operation of an aircraft while under . . . However, unlike the Parts of the Code of Federal Regulations specified above, section 860.13 does not . . . Section 860.13 was last reenacted without any amendments in 1983. . . .
. . . operating an aircraft while intoxicated or in a careless or reckless manner, in violation of section 860.13 . . . State, 888 So.2d 733 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (determining that section 860.13 is not preempted by federal . . . We find that section 860.13, Florida Statutes, criminalizing the operation of an aircraft while under . . . However, unlike the Parts of the Code of Federal Regulations specified above, section 860.13 does not . . . Section 860.13 was last reenacted without any amendments in 1983. . . .
. . . , pled guilty to operating an aircraft while under the influence of alcohol in violation of section 860.13 . . .
. . . . § 860.13. . Fla. . . .
. . . . §§ 316.193(l)(c) and 860.13(l)(a). Hughes and Cloyd pleaded “not guilty” to all state charges. . . . Stat. § 860.13(l)(a) provides: (1) It shall be unlawful for any person: (a) To operate an aircraft in . . . Stat. § 860.13(l)(a). . . . .
. . . Nations Credit (revolving charge)* $ 3,474.17 Bank of America Visa* $ 3,892.11 Credit First Firestone $ 860.13 . . .
. . . Robert Carswell, with operating an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner in violation of section 860.13 . . . The trial court dismissed the information based upon a holding that section 860.13, Florida Statutes, . . . See § 860.13(2), Fla. Stat. We conclude there is no unlawful delegation. . . . Section 860.13, Florida Statutes, however, does not violate this principle. . . . Accordingly, we rule that section 860.13, Florida Statutes, is not unconstitutional. . . .
. . . . § 860.13(l)(a) Hawaii — Hawaii Rev.Stat. § 263-11 Idaho — Idaho Code § 21-112 Illinois — Ill.Ann.Stat . . .
. . . Section 860.13(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to operate . . .
. . . Miscellaneous Claim for $860.13 It appears that Ross and Johnson, in accordance with custom among contractors . . . balance, it is alleged by Ross that end of relations between Ross and Johnson left Johnson owing Ross $860.13 . . .
. . . and personal property, all appraised as of the date of his death, in the aggregate amount of $211,-860.13 . . .
. . . debited with a check of $197.34, leaving a balance to liis credit at the suspension of business of 860.13 . . .