The 2023 Florida Statutes
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The prosecutor charged Wyche with racketeering, conspiracy to engage in racketeering, human trafficking, and cocaine trafficking, first-degree felonies punishable by thirty years in prison. (Doc. 9-2 at 2-13.) §§ 775.082(3)(b), 787.06(3)(b), and 893.135(1)(b)(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014); §§ 775.082(3)(b) and 895.04(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). As a result, Wyche faced a 120-year prison sentence. In exchange for Wyche's guilty plea to the racketeering and human trafficking charges, the prosecutor agreed to a ten-year prison sentence and agreed to dismiss the drug trafficking and racketeering conspiracy charges. (Doc. 9-2 at 15-24.)
In this case, one of Zeno's sentences exceeded both the lowest permissible sentence and the statutory maximum-his thirty-year sentence for conspiracy to commit RICO (Count 2). As the postconviction court concluded in its order, Count 2 is a second-degree felony, which carries a fifteen-year maximum. See § 895.04(1), Fla. Stat. (2001) (defining RICO as "a felony of the first degree"); § 777.04(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (2001) ("[I]f the offense attempted, solicited, or conspired to is . . . a felony of the first degree, the offense of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy is a felony of the second degree ...." (emphasis added)); § 775.082(3)(c) (instructing that a defendant convicted of a second-degree felony may be punished "by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 15 years"). But the correct lowest permissible sentence exceeds that statutory maximum. As such, the sentencing court could not have imposed Zeno's thirty-year sentence on Count 2 under a correct scoresheet; it was obligated to impose the correct lowest permissible sentence. See Gabriel, 314 So.3d at 1252; Brooks, 969 So.2d at 243. And Zeno is entitled to relief on that count.
In this case, one of Zeno's sentences exceeded both the lowest permissible sentence and the statutory maximum—his thirty-year sentence for conspiracy to commit RICO (Count 2). As the postconviction court concluded in its order, Count 2 is a second-degree felony, which carries a fifteen-year maximum. See § 895.04(1), Fla. Stat. (2001) (defining RICO as "a felony of the first degree"); § 777.04(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (2001) ("[I]f the offense attempted, solicited, or conspired to is ... a felony of the first degree, the offense of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy is a felony of the second degree ...." (emphasis added)); § 775.082(3)(c) (instructing that a defendant convicted of a second-degree felony may be punished "by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 15 years"). But the correct lowest permissible sentence exceeds that statutory maximum. As such, the sentencing court could not have imposed Zeno's thirty-year sentence on Count 2 under a correct scoresheet; it was obligated to impose the correct lowest permissible sentence. See Gabriel , 314 So. 3d at 1252 ; Brooks , 969 So. 2d at 243. And Zeno is entitled to relief on that count.
On August 14, 2015, Nunnally was indited for First Degree Premeditated Murder-a capital felony-in Okaloosa County Circuit Court No. 2015-CF-1608. (Doc. 8, Ex. A1 at 7, lines 17-18; see also Fla. Stat. §§ 782.04(1)(a)1. and 775.082)). On August 21, 2015, Nunnally was charged by information with one count of Racketeering and one count of Conspiracy to Commit Racketeering-both first degree felonies-in Okaloosa County Circuit Court No. 2015-CF-1609. (Ex. A-2 at 5, lines 17-20; see also Fla. Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04(1)).
Relying on Calhoun , the parties here agree that state law can supplement general maritime law and, depending on the remedies offered by state law, provide additional remedies. They disagree over which state's law should apply. RCL argues for Wisconsin law, which caps non-pecuniary damages at $350,000 for wrongful deaths caused in Wisconsin. Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4). Wisconsin does not apply its own law to deaths that happen outside of the state. Id. § 895.03 ; see also Waranka v. Wadena Ins. Co ., 353 Wis.2d 619, 847 N.W.2d 324, 329 (2014) ("If no Wisconsin wrongful death cause of action arises under Wis. Stat. § 895.03, ... Wis. Stat. § 895.04 terms and limitations do not apply."). Ms. Goodloe urges us to apply Florida law, which, by contrast, allows for non-pecuniary damages with no cap and applies regardless of where the death is caused. See Fla. Stat. §§ 768.19 (cause of action), 768.21 (damages). If Florida law supplements, the damages award stands. If Wisconsin law supplements, the fact that the death occurred outside Wisconsin forecloses the availability of non-pecuniary damages.
Noel's privately-retained counsel requested a prison sentence of 3.8 years, while the prosecutor sought a minimum of fifteen years in prison. According to Noel's sentencing scoresheet, the lowest possible prison sentence was 3.81 years, while the maximum prison sentence for each offense was thirty years. §§ 812.014(2), 895.03(4), 895.04(1), 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009).
Asserting that Noel was a sophisticated cog in the conspiracy, the prosecutor argued for a minimum sentence of 15 years. The maximum prison sentence for both first degree grand theft and conspiracy to racketeer is 30 years imprisonment. §§ 812.014(2), 895.03(4), 895.04(1), 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009). The defense attorney requested a sentence at the “low end of the guidelines,” 3.8 years. The trial court noted nine other incidents where Noel was involved with bad checks, stolen property, or deceptive practices.
Asserting that Noel was a sophisticated cog in the conspiracy, the prosecutor argued for a minimum sentence of 15 years. The maximum prison sentence for both first degree grand theft and conspiracy to racketeer is 30 years imprisonment. §§ 812.014(2), 895.03(4), 895.04(1), 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009). The defense attorney requested a sentence at the "low end of the guidelines," 3.8 years. The trial court noted nine other incidents where Noel was involved with bad checks, stolen property, or deceptive practices.
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Hoffman-La Roche Inc.'s and Roche Laboratories Inc.'s (collectively, "Defendants") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Punitive Damages (Dkt. 73) and Plaintiff's Response thereto (79). Plaintiff filed this action wrongful death claim pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.04. Defendants move for summary judgment on Count IV of Plaintiff's Complaint requesting punitive and exemplary damages. Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants' Motion and acknowledges that punitive damages are not available in a wrongful death action under prevailing Wisconsin case law, citing Wangden v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 464-465 (Wis. 1980), Bartholowmew v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 717 N.W.2d 216, 229 (Wis. 2006), and VanDen Eng v. The Coleman Company, Inc., 2006 WL 1663714, *10 (E.D. Wis. 2006). Upon review of the applicable case law, the Court agrees with the parties.
Moreover, there is no statutory provision that would allow the Markses to recover, from the DLA, attorney's fees incurred in defending a criminal case instituted by the State Attorney's office, regardless of the validity of either case. The Markses fail to point to any case law to support their contention, and section 895.04, Florida Statutes, which controls criminal RICO actions, makes no provision for recovery of attorney's fees. We find the Legislature clearly intended that reasonable attorney's fees be recovered in meritless civil forfeiture actions, but not in criminal actions. "When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." Blanton v. City of Pinellas Park, 887 So.2d 1224, 1230 (Fla. 2004). "[C]ourts read statutes in pari materia, harmonizing them and giving effect to each." State v. Burkhart, 869 So.2d 1242, 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). If the Legislature intended a party to recover attorney's fees recovered in a criminal forfeiture action, such intention would be…
. . . . §§ 812.014(2), 895.03(4), . 895.04(1), 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .
. . . . §§ 812.014(2), 895.03(4), 895.04(1), 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .
. . . . §§ 895.04(1), (2), 852.01(l)(d); Day v. Allstate Indem. . . .
. . . . § 895.04(1). . . . We note that under § 895.04(2), Aliyana (but not Henning’s parents) can participate in the suit alongside . . .
. . . . §§ 895.03, 895.04(1). . . . Ann. § 895.04(2). “Lineal heirs” include the decedent’s parents. Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 852.01(l)(c). . . . Ann. §§ 895.04. b. . . .
. . . The Markses fail to point to any case law to support their contention, and section 895.04, Florida Statutes . . .
. . . . § 895.04, which provides that “an action for wrongful death may be brought by the personal representative . . . To that end, § 895.04(4) allows wrongful death plaintiffs to recover for pecuniary injury, as well as . . .
. . . . § 895.04(6) that they contend permits them to waive the estate’s action as part of a settlement of . . . Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04 for their loss of Alyssa’s society and companionship. . . . Stat. § 895.04 authorizes either the personal representative of the estate or the person who will benefit . . . Section 895.04(4) allows an award of damages for loss of society and companionship up to $350,000 when . . . Stat. § 895.04(6) allows the relatives of a decedent to waive the estate’s cause of action. . . .
. . . . § 895.04(4)). . . .
. . . . § 895.04, the Court concluded that Noreen Boomsma (Chelsea and Owen’s grandmother), lacked standing . . . Stat. § 895.04(4) (1995-1996); see also Neiman v. American Nat’l Prop. & Cas. . . .
. . . Stat § 895.04 (emphasis added). 1. . . . Stat. § 895.04(2). . . . Stat. § 895.04(4). . . . Stat. § 895.04(4). . . . Stat. § 895.04(2). . . .
. . . . § 895.04. . . .
. . . . § 895.04(4) _ Also, there was substantial testimony regarding the warm and close relationship between . . .
. . . See §§ 895.04, 895.05, Fla. Stat. (2000). . . .
. . . . § 895.04(4) (1998) provides that: “Judgment for damages for pecuniary-injury from wrongful death may . . . and Marquise each receive the maximum damages for loss of society and companionship permitted by § 895.04 . . . support for treating loss of a parent’s society as analogous to a spouse's loss of consortium in § 895.04 . . . Section 895.04(4) allows "[additional damages” to be awarded to the spouse, children or parents of the . . .
. . . conducting a business enterprise through a pattern of racketeering, in violation of sections 895.03 and 895.04 . . .
. . . See § 895.04, Fla. Stat. (1989). Instead, the statute classifies forfeiture as a civil remedy. . . .
. . . . § 895.04(1), Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .
. . . . § 895.04. . . .
. . . See § 895.04(1), Fla.Stat. (1991). . See § 895.02(l)(a)17 and 29, Fla.Stat. (1991). . . . .
. . . . § 895.04; Rineck v. . . .
. . . Finally, the sentence misstates crucial language of section 895.04 which requires proof of predicate . . .
. . . 28, Fla.Stat. (1989) (making sale or possession of obscene materials a racketeering offense) with § 895.04 . . .
. . . provided by law for another offense for which appellant was being sentenced (§§ 775.082(3)(b), 895.03 and 895.04 . . .
. . . . § 895.04(4); 746 F.2d at 1250. . . .
. . . pecuniary damages for loss of the society and companionship of Barbara Allen, pursuant to Wis.Stat. 895.04 . . . Wis.Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04. . . . Wis.Stat. § 895.04(4). . . .
. . . .-03 and 895.04. . . . Wangen, supra, 97 Wis.2d at 312, 294 N.W.2d 437; Wis.Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04. . . . . § 895.04(4) and (5), the named beneficiaries may recover for their pecuniary injury, for their loss . . . Wis.Stat. § 895.04(4). . . . As noted earlier, section 895.04(4), Wis.Stat., provides that a plaintiff in a wrongful death action . . .
. . . . § 895.04 (Supp.1984) (RICO violation punishable by up to 30 years’ imprisonment). . . .
. . . . § 895.04, the Wisconsin wrongful death statute, applies, limiting his estate’s maximum recovery to . . . $25,000 for loss of society and companionship. (5) Wis.Stat. § 895.04, which limits siblings’ recovery . . . Stat. § 895.04 allows the personal representative of Daniel Bell’s estate to recover for loss of life . . . Wis.Stat. § 895.04(4), discussed infra. . . . Section 895.04(2). . . .
. . . . § 895.04 and that punitive damages cannot be recovered here because they cannot be recovered incident . . .
. . . . § 895.04, Fla.Stat. (1981). . . .
. . . . § 895.04. I have reconsidered that holding and have concluded that it was wrong. . . . Under Wisconsin’s wrongful death statute, Wis.Stats. § 895.04, the personal representative of the deceased . . . Wis.Stats. § 895.04(4) reads as follows: “(4) Judgment for damages for pecuniary injury from wrongful . . . Therefore, the limitations of Wis.Stats. § 895.04(4) do not apply in this action. 9. . . .
. . . . § 895.04 Wis. Stats. . . . Daniel Bell (brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and the Wisconsin wrongful death statute, § 895.04 . . .
. . . . §§ 895.04-.05 was applicable. . . .
. . . . § 895.04(7) (1951). . . .
. . . . § 895.04 (1971) ($5,000 limit on recovery for loss of consortium). . . . .
. . . . § 895.04 (1965) authorized recovery for a wrongful death not to exceed $22,500 base limit for pecuniary . . .
. . . . § 895.04 Wis.Stats. imposes monetary limits as to the damages recoverable for wrongful death. . . . upon the motion of the defendants Uebelherr and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company it is declared that § 895.04 . . .
. . . . § 895.04 (1965). . . .
. . . . § 895.04(1). . . .
. . . . § 895.04 (1965). . . .
. . . .$895.04 ■(e) Additional gutters, down spouts baskets and splash plates ...................... 206.48 . . . ) Extra cost of substituting woven wire mesh in lieu of metal lath in excess of the amount allowed $895.04 . . . Defendant having allowed $30, the balance claimed by plaintiff is $895.04. . . .
. . . Mar. 15, 1919, $25,000 par value stock purchased for_^_ 60, 312.36 Earnings available — 73 days_ 6, 895.04 . . .
. . . This final account shows that said Louis Rueg received, as his net partnership interest, $895.04-J, and . . .