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Florida Statute 895.05 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
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The 2023 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 895
OFFENSES CONCERNING RACKETEERING AND ILLEGAL DEBTS
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 895.05
895.05 Civil remedies.
(1) Any circuit court may, after making due provision for the rights of innocent persons, enjoin violations of the provisions of s. 895.03 by issuing appropriate orders and judgments, including, but not limited to:
(a) Ordering any defendant to divest himself or herself of any interest in any enterprise, including real property.
(b) Imposing reasonable restrictions upon the future activities or investments of any defendant, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any defendant from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise in which the defendant was engaged in violation of the provisions of s. 895.03.
(c) Ordering the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise.
(d) Ordering the suspension or revocation of a license, permit, or prior approval granted to any enterprise by any agency of the state.
(e) Ordering the forfeiture of the charter of a corporation organized under the laws of the state, or the revocation of a certificate authorizing a foreign corporation to conduct business within the state, upon finding that the board of directors or a managerial agent acting on behalf of the corporation, in conducting the affairs of the corporation, has authorized or engaged in conduct in violation of s. 895.03 and that, for the prevention of future criminal activity, the public interest requires the charter of the corporation forfeited and the corporation dissolved or the certificate revoked.
(2)(a) All property, real or personal, including money, used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized through conduct in violation of ss. 895.01-895.05 is subject to civil forfeiture to the state.
(b) An investigative agency may, on behalf of the state, institute a civil proceeding for forfeiture in the circuit court for the judicial circuit in which real or personal tangible property, as described in paragraph (a) is located. An investigative agency may, on behalf of the state, institute a civil proceeding for forfeiture in a circuit court in the state regarding intangible property as described in paragraph (a).
(c) Upon the entry of a final judgment of forfeiture in favor of the state, the title of the state to the forfeited property shall relate back:
1. In the case of real property or a beneficial interest, to the date of filing of the RICO lien notice in the official records of the county where the real property or beneficial trust is located; if no RICO lien notice is filed, then to the date of the filing of any notice of lis pendens under s. 895.07(5)(a) in the official records of the county where the real property or beneficial interest is located; and if no RICO lien notice or notice of lis pendens is filed, then to the date of recording of the final judgment of forfeiture in the official records of the county where the real property or beneficial interest is located.
2. In the case of personal property, to the date the personal property was seized by the investigating agency.
(d) If property subject to forfeiture is conveyed, alienated, disposed of, diminished in value, or otherwise rendered unavailable for forfeiture, the investigative agency may, on behalf of the state, institute an action in any circuit court against the person named in the RICO lien notice or the defendant in the civil proceeding or criminal proceeding, and the court shall enter final judgment against the person named in the RICO lien notice or the defendant in the civil proceeding or criminal proceeding in an amount equal to the fair market value of the property, together with investigative costs and attorney fees incurred by the investigative agency in the action. In the alternative, the court may order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to the value of the property subject to forfeiture. If a civil proceeding is pending, such action shall be filed only in the court where the civil proceeding is pending.
(e) The state shall dispose of all forfeited property as soon as commercially feasible. If property is not exercisable or transferable for value by the state, it shall expire. All forfeitures or dispositions under this section shall be made with due provision for the rights of innocent persons. The proceeds realized from such forfeiture and disposition shall be promptly distributed in accordance with the provisions of s. 895.09.
(3) Property subject to forfeiture under this section may be seized by a law enforcement officer upon court process. Seizure without process may be made if:
(a) The seizure is incident to a lawful arrest or search or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant.
(b) The property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a forfeiture proceeding based upon this section.
(4) In the event of a seizure under subsection (3), a forfeiture proceeding shall be instituted promptly. Property taken or detained under this section shall not be subject to replevin, but is deemed to be in the custody of the law enforcement officer making the seizure, subject only to the order of the court. When property is seized under this section, pending forfeiture and final disposition, the law enforcement officer may:
(a) Place the property under seal.
(b) Remove the property to a place designated by court.
(c) Require another agency authorized by law to take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate location.
(5) The Department of Legal Affairs, any state attorney, or any state agency having jurisdiction over conduct in violation of a provision of this act may institute civil proceedings under this section. In any action brought under this section, the circuit court shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination. Pending final determination, the circuit court may at any time enter such injunctions, prohibitions, or restraining orders, or take such actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as the court may deem proper.
(6) Any aggrieved person may institute a proceeding under subsection (1). In such proceeding, relief shall be granted in conformity with the principles that govern the granting of injunctive relief from threatened loss or damage in other civil cases, except that no showing of special or irreparable damage to the person shall have to be made. Upon the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing of immediate danger of significant loss or damage, a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction may be issued in any such action before a final determination on the merits.
(7) The state, including any of its agencies, instrumentalities, subdivisions, or municipalities, if it proves by clear and convincing evidence that it has been injured by reason of any violation of the provisions of s. 895.03, shall have a cause of action for threefold the actual damages sustained and shall also recover attorneys’ fees in the trial and appellate courts and costs of investigation and litigation, reasonably incurred. In no event shall punitive damages be awarded. The defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs upon a finding that the claimant raised a claim which was without substantial factual or legal support.
(a) Either party may demand a trial by jury in any civil action brought pursuant to this subsection.
(b) Any prevailing plaintiff under this subsection or s. 772.104 shall have a right or claim to forfeited property or to the proceeds derived therefrom superior to any right or claim the state has in the same property or proceeds.
(8) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the state in any criminal proceeding under this act or any other criminal proceeding under state law shall estop the defendant in any subsequent civil action or proceeding under this act or under s. 772.104 as to all matters as to which such judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties.
(9) The Department of Legal Affairs may bring an action for a violation of s. 895.03 to obtain injunctive relief, civil penalties as provided in this subsection, attorney fees, and costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of any action under this chapter.
(a) A natural person who violates s. 895.03 is subject to a civil penalty of up to $100,000. Any other person who violates s. 895.03 is subject to a civil penalty of up to $1 million. Moneys recovered for civil penalties under this paragraph shall be deposited into the General Revenue Fund.
(b) Moneys recovered by the Department of Legal Affairs for attorney fees and costs under this subsection shall be deposited into the Legal Affairs Revolving Trust Fund, which may be used to investigate and enforce this chapter.
(c) In a civil action brought under this subsection by the Department of Legal Affairs, any party to such action may petition the court for entry of a consent decree or for approval of a settlement agreement. The proposed decree or settlement shall specify the alleged violations, the future obligations of the parties, the relief agreed upon, and the reasons for entering into the consent decree or settlement agreement.
(10) The Department of Legal Affairs may, upon timely application, intervene in any civil action or proceeding brought under subsection (6) or subsection (7) if it certifies that, in its opinion, the action or proceeding is of general public importance. In such action or proceeding, the state shall be entitled to the same relief as if the Department of Legal Affairs had instituted the action or proceeding.
(11) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a criminal or civil action or proceeding under this chapter may be commenced at any time within 5 years after the conduct in violation of this chapter terminates or the cause of action accrues. If a criminal prosecution or civil action or other proceeding is brought, or intervened in, to punish, prevent, or restrain any violation of this chapter, the running of the period of limitations prescribed by this section with respect to any cause of action arising under subsection (6), subsection (7), or subsection (9) which is based in whole or in part upon any matter complained of in any such prosecution, action, or proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency of such prosecution, action, or proceeding and for 2 years following its termination.
(12) The application of one civil remedy under any provision of this chapter does not preclude the application of any other remedy, civil or criminal, under this chapter or any other provision of law. Civil remedies under this chapter are supplemental, and not mutually exclusive.
(13)(a) In addition to the authority to file a RICO lien notice set forth in s. 895.07(1), the Department of Legal Affairs, the Office of Statewide Prosecution, or the office of a state attorney may apply ex parte to a criminal division of a circuit court and, upon petition supported by sworn affidavit, obtain an order authorizing the filing of a RICO lien notice against real property upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the property was used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized through conduct in violation of ss. 895.01-895.05. If the lien notice authorization is granted, the department shall, after filing the lien notice, forthwith provide notice to the owner of the property by one of the following methods:
1. By serving the notice in the manner provided by law for the service of process.
2. By mailing the notice, postage prepaid, by certified mail to the person to be served at his or her last known address and evidence of the delivery.
3. If neither of the foregoing can be accomplished, by posting the notice on the premises.
(b) The owner of the property may move the court to discharge the lien, and such motion shall be set for hearing at the earliest possible time.
(c) The court shall discharge the lien if it finds that there is no probable cause to believe that the property was used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized through conduct in violation of ss. 895.01-895.05 or if it finds that the owner of the property neither knew nor reasonably should have known that the property was used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized through conduct in violation of ss. 895.01-895.05.
(d) No testimony presented by the owner of the property at the hearing is admissible against him or her in any criminal proceeding except in a criminal prosecution for perjury or false statement, nor shall such testimony constitute a waiver of the owner’s constitutional right against self-incrimination.
(e) A lien notice secured under this subsection is valid for a period of 90 days from the date the court granted authorization, which period may be extended for an additional 90 days by the court for good cause shown, unless a civil proceeding is instituted under this section and a lien notice is filed under s. 895.07, in which event the term of the lien notice is governed by s. 895.08.
(f) The filing of a lien notice, whether or not subsequently discharged or otherwise lifted, shall constitute notice to the owner and knowledge by the owner that the property was used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized through conduct in violation of ss. 895.01-895.05, such that lack of such notice and knowledge shall not be a defense in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding under this chapter.
History.s. 5, ch. 77-334; s. 301, ch. 79-400; s. 2, ch. 81-141; s. 1, ch. 84-38; s. 5, ch. 84-249; s. 6, ch. 86-277; s. 3, ch. 87-139; s. 5, ch. 90-269; s. 76, ch. 95-211; s. 1447, ch. 97-102; s. 2, ch. 2016-84.
Note.Former s. 943.464.

F.S. 895.05 on Google Scholar

F.S. 895.05 on Casetext

Amendments to 895.05


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 895.05
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 895.05.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

10 Cases from Casetext:Date Descending

U.S. Supreme Court11th Cir. - Ct. App.11th Cir. - MD FL11th Cir. - ND FL11th Cir. - SD FLFed. Reg.Secondary Sources - All
  1. The Amended Complaint asserts Count XI under Florida's criminal RICO statute, Fla. Stat. § 895.05(6), and Count XII under the Federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964(c).
    PAGE 26
  2. Wyche contended that the first, thirteenth, fourteenth, and sixteenth predicate acts occurred many years before the charges and therefore were barred by the statute of limitation; the state postconviction court determined that the claim was conclusory. (Doc. 9-2 at 105.) “[A] criminal or civil action or proceeding under [Florida's racketeering statutes] may be commenced at any time within five years after the conduct in violation of a provision of this act terminates or the cause of action accrues.” § 895.05( 10), Fla. Stat. (2008). “The limitations period commences upon the date the ‘crime' is completed which, for substantive [racketeering] purposes, is the date of the last charged predicate act committed by the individual defendant.” S tate v. Reyan, 145 So.3d 133, 139 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). The amended information alleged that Wyche committed predicate acts in 1986 through 1994, 2008, and 2009, (Doc. 9-2 at 3-4, 6, 7-8, 10), and the prosecutor filed the amended information on December 9, 2014. However, because the amended information also alleged that Wyche committed predicate acts in 2013 and 2014, (Doc. 9-2 at 2-7), a motion to dismiss would not succeed, and the state…
  3. On September 22, 2020, Plaintiffs commenced a Chapter 15 proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, Case No. 20-20230-RAM (“Chapter 15 Case”). On September 19, 2022, Plaintiffs filed an Adversary Complaint in which they assert the following claims against Defendants: violations of Federal RICO Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Count I), conspiracy to violate Federal RICO Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count II), violation of Florida Civil Rico, Fla. Stat. § 772.103 (Count III), breaches of fiduciary duty under Cayman Islands law (Count IV), unlawful means conspiracy under Cayman Islands law (Count V), knowing receipt and/or equitable proprietary claims under Cayman Islands law (Count VI), usurpation of corporate opportunity under Florida law (Count VIII), civil theft under §772.11, Fla. Stat. (Count IX), conversion under Florida law (Count X), constructive fraud under Florida law (Count XI), unjust enrichment under Florida law (Count XII), imposition of constructive trust under Florida law (Count XIII), request for accounting (Count XIV), and request for preliminary and permanent injunction under §895.05, Fla. Stat. (Count XV).
    PAGE 2
  4. The plaintiff cites to Fla. Stat. §895.05 in support of an award of attorney's fees related to the Florida RICO claim (Doc. 165, p. 9). That statute applies to the “Florida criminal RICO” Act. Johnson Enterprises of Jacksonville, Inc, v. FPL Grp., Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1334 n.18 (11th Cir. 1998). The appropriate attorney's fee provision here is Fla. Stat §772.104, a provision of the “Florida civil RICO” Act. See Id. Therefore, the court herein will refer to Fla. Stat. §772.104 in connection with that claim. .
    PAGE 4
  5. Jean-Marie v. State

    339 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022)
    Jean-Marie nonetheless argues that section 775.15(1) cannot apply here because the statutory amendment adding the relevant language was passed after the enactment of section 895.05 and did not evince a legislative intent to abrogate the five-year limitation in the RICO statute. See Ch. 77-334, § 5, Laws of Fla. (enacting RICO statute with same five-year limitation period); Ch. 96-145, § 2, Laws of Fla. (adding "felony that resulted in death" language to section 775.15 and providing that amendment will take effect October 1, 1996). However, Jean-Marie's interpretation gets it exactly backwards. We presume legislative knowledge of the existing statutory landscape. See Woodgate Dev. Corp. v. Hamilton Inv. Tr., 351 So. 2d 14, 16 (Fla. 1977) ("The courts presume that statutes are passed with knowledge of prior existing statutes and that the legislature does not intend to keep contradictory enactments on the books or to effect so important a measure as a repeal of a law without expressing an intention to do so."). Accordingly, we assume the legislature knew of the existing five-year statute of limitations in section 895.05( 10) and, through the clear language of…
  6. “The Florida criminal RICO statute allows a private plaintiff to bring a civil suit for equitable relief only.” Johnson Enterprises of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1302 n.18 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Fla. Stat. ch. 895.05(6) (1997)). Defendants argue that as a former employee, Plaintiff does not have standing to pursue injunctive relief. [Doc. 18 at p. 8]. In response, Plaintiff contends that the injunctive relief requested is the correction of the false internal affairs reports that continue to damage his reputation and ability to find a job in law enforcement. [Doc. 22 at pp. 3-4]. While Plaintiff alleges that he was written up for two corrective investigative reports, the Amended Complaint does not include a request for injunctive relief. In fact, both counts seek monetary relief only. As such, the Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal as to the Florida RICO statute.
    PAGE 12
  7. Respondents sued Brinkmann and Majab asserting claims of fraud, fraudulent transfer, unjust enrichment, and violations of Florida's civil RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization) Act. See § 895.05, Fla. Stat. (2015) (setting forth the civil remedies associated with RICO violations). As a part of that lawsuit, Respondents served Brinkmann and Majab with discovery requests. Respondents also served certain nonparties with subpoenas duces tecum. Specifically, Respondents served subpoenas on Valentine, the real estate agent who assisted Brinkmann and Majab in purchasing and selling real estate in Collier County; Gruber, who serves as Brinkmann's and Majab's accountant and records custodian; and F&E, a Florida company incorporated and managed by Brinkmann, which provided furnishings to the properties purchased by Majab.
    PAGE 920
  8. Keppel also alleges that Defendants violated Florida's RICO statute. But in pleading his state law claim, Keppel cites only to section 895.O2(8)(b) of the Florida Statutes-the Florida criminal RICO statute. Not only is this state law claim insufficiently pleaded, section 895.05( 6) limits the relief available for a private person to injunctive relief. See Johnson Enters, of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1302 n.l8 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining that section 895.05( 6) of the Florida criminal RICO statute "allows a private plaintiff to bring a civil suit for equitable relief only"). Florida courts have interpreted 895.05( 6) to permit both preliminary and permanent injunctions under certain conditions. See Banco Indus, de Venezuela, C.A. v. Mederos Suarez, 541 So.2d 1324, 1326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Although Keppel argues in his response to Defendants' motion to dismiss that "[t]he injunctive relief requested under [Florida law] is the correction of the false Internal Affairs reports that continue to damage [Keppel] by damaging his reputation and ability to find a job in law enforcement" and that he does not seek an injunction based on…
  9. Marchione also alleges that Defendants violated Florida's RICO statute. But in pleading his state law claim, Marchione only cites to section 895.02(8)(b), Florida Statutes-the Florida criminal RICO statute. Not only is this state law claim insufficiently pleaded, section 895.05( 6) limits the relief available for a private person to injunctive relief. See Johnson Enters, of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1302 n.18 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining that section 895.05( 6) of the Florida criminal RICO statute "allows a private plaintiff to bring a civil suit for equitable relief only"). Because Marchione is no longer an employee of the Pasco County Sheriffs Office and has alleged no threat of future injury, he lacks standing to seek injunctive relief under Florida law. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 364 (2011) (noting that plaintiffs who were former employees no longer employed by the defendant "lack[ed] standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief against its employment practices"); Drayton v. W. Auto Supply Co., No. 01-10415, 2002 WL 32508918, at *4 (11th Cir. Mar. 11, 2002) ("[T]his Court has held that former…
  10. Lape also alleges that Defendants violated Florida's RICO statute. But in pleading his state law claim, Lape only cites to section 895.O2(8)(b), Florida Statutes-the Florida criminal RICO statute. Not only is this state law claim insufficiently pleaded, section 895.05( 6) limits the relief available for a private person to injunctive relief. See Johnson Enters, of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1302 n.l8 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining that section 895.05( 6) of the Florida criminal RICO statute "allows a private plaintiff to bring a civil suit for equitable relief only"). Because Lape is no longer an employee of the Pasco County Sheriffs Office and has alleged no threat of future injury, he lacks standing to seek injunctive relief under Florida law. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 364 (2011) (noting that plaintiffs who were former employees no longer employed by the defendant "lack[ed] standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief against its employment practices"); Drayton v. W. Auto Supply Co., No. 01-10415, 2002 WL 32508918, at *4 (11th Cir. Mar. 11, 2002) ("[T]his Court has held that former employees who…

Cases from cite.case.law:

BROWN, Jr. F. J. LLC, I, III, IV, v. WILLIAMS,, 270 So. 3d 447 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Forfeiture Act ("the Act"), the Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), section 895.05 . . .

MAROLF v. MIAMI- DADE COUNTY,, 172 So. 3d 450 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . used in the course of, derived from, or realized through” racketeering activity, see sections 895.01-895.05 . . . last of such incidents occurred within 5 years after a prior incident of racketeering conduct Section 895.05 . . . the course of, derived from, or realized through conduct in violation of a provision of ss. 895.01-895.05 . . . course of, or which was derived from or realized through, a pattern of racketeering activity, See § 895.05 . . .

STATE v. REYAN,, 145 So. 3d 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . . § 895.05(10), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . . offenses is five years from the date of commission of the crime as to the racketeering charge, section 895.05 . . . Section 895.05(10), Florida Statutes (2003), provides in pertinent part: "Notwithstanding any other provision . . .

ALASCIA, LLC. LLC. v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS,, 135 So. 3d 402 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . authority to order forfeiture of property for violations of [the gambling laws] is found within F.S. 895.05 . . .

TEMPAY, INC. v. BILTRES STAFFING OF TAMPA BAY, LLC, a I., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (M.D. Fla. 2013)

. . . . § 895.05; see Network Services, 617 F.3d at 1144-45 (requiring disgorgement of fees based on constructive . . . Stat. § 895.05; Hudson National Bank v. . . .

L. BARLASS, v. CITY OF JANESVILLE, WISCONSIN,, 483 F. App'x 261 (7th Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 895.05(2) requires a plaintiff in a defamation suit against a media source to provide notice of the . . . testified that she sent one, her description of the letter’s content could not establish compliance with § 895.05 . . . Barlass, but even by her account the letter she sent did not comply with the notice requirement of § 895.05 . . .

S. W. a v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE,, 987 So. 2d 173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . .” § 895.05(18). It does not necessarily mean “secure” detention. . . .

MARKS v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS,, 937 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . appeal a final order denying their motion for criminal attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 895.05 . . . dismissal of the civil RICO action,'and the Marks made a motion for attorney’s fees, pursuant to section 895.05 . . . This case is governed by subsections 895.05(5) and (7), Floridá Statutes. . . . Section 895.05(7), governing civil RICO actions, states, in relevant part: The Department of Legal Affairs . . . finding that the claimant raised a claim which was without substantial factual or legal support. § 895.05 . . .

CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, v. MULLIGAN,, 934 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 2006)

. . . See § 895.05, Fla. Stat. (2005); Ruth v. . . .

SMITH, C. R. St. Jr. St. P. A. St. P. A. v. VIRAGEN, INC. a, 902 So. 2d 187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . against Walter Smith, his attorneys and their law firms in circuit court pursuant to sections 57.105 and 895.05 . . . Viragen also sought fees pursuant to section 895.05(7), for bringing a frivolous civil RICO claim. . . . without such support in both fact and law, and thus also properly awarded fees pursuant to section 895.05 . . .

In H. DeROSE, H. DeROSE, v. EFG, 316 B.R. 606 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2004)

. . . She could choose a 30 year plan and pay between $895.05 per month and $928.95 per month, and her total . . .

EFRON, v. MILTON,, 892 So. 2d 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . civil RICO are barred by the five-year statute of limitations, according to sections 812.035(10)and 895.05 . . .

BEE LINE ENTERTAINMENT PARTNERS, v. STATE, 791 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See §§ 895.04, 895.05, Fla. Stat. (2000). . . . “The civil remedies of section 895.05 are available for violations of chapter 895, which primarily targets . . . See § 895.05(3), Fla. Stat. . . . To meet those two duties we interpret section 895.05(3), allowing seizure “upon court process,” to mean . . .

CHECK N GO OF FLORIDA, INC. v. STATE, 790 So. 2d 454 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . Florida Statutes (2000), which reads in part: If, pursuant to the civil enforcement provisions of s. 895.05 . . .

EIGHT HUNDRED, INC. v. STATE, 781 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . , through the Department of Legal Affairs, initiated a civil suit which sought relief under section 895.05 . . . pursuant to section 895.06(2), which provides: If, pursuant to the civil enforcement provisions of s. 895.05 . . .

UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a v. SANAR CLINICAL REHAB CENTER, INC., 766 So. 2d 356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . Section 895.05(6), Florida Statutes, (1999) states, in pertinent part: [R]elief shall be granted in conformity . . .

JOHNSON ENTERPRISES OF JACKSONVILLE, INC. a v. FPL GROUP, INC. a FPL a a, 162 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 1998)

. . . Stat. ch. 895.05(6) (1997). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, v. BRADENTON GROUP, INC. v., 727 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1998)

. . . money, and personal property derived from proceeds of alleged criminal activities pursuant to section 895.05 . . . the course of, derived from, or realized through conduct in violation of a provision of ss. 895.01-895.05 . . . is subject to civil forfeiture to the state. § 895.05(2)(a), Fla. . . . Subsection 895.05(5) states: The Department of Legal Affairs, any state attorney, or any state agency . . . actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as the court may deem proper. ’ § 895.05 . . .

THOMPSON III, v. NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORTER PUBLISHING COMPANY, C., 4 F. Supp. 2d 833 (E.D. Wis. 1998)

. . . . § 895.05(2). . . .

BRADENTON GROUP, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, STATE OF FLORIDA,, 701 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . concerning the relationship between sections 895.01-.06, Florida Statutes (“RICO”), in particular section 895.05 . . . The complaint sought forfeiture pursuant to subsection 895.05(2) of two parcels of real property, one . . . See § 895.05(5) Fla. Stat. (1995). . . . Subsection (5) of section 895.05, Florida Statutes, states in part: Pending final determination, the . . . Section 895.05(5), Florida Statutes (1993), states: (5) The Department of Legal Affairs, any state attorney . . .

STATE v. MEISNER, 692 So. 2d 933 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . or income derived from or used during the course of racketeering are subject to forfeiture under § 895.05 . . .

L. RUTH, v. DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS,, 684 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1996)

. . . The State's request for forfeiture was based on section 895.05(2), Florida Statutes (1989), which provides . . . the course of, derived from, or realized through conduct in violation of a provision of ss. 895.01-895.05 . . . PROPERTY AS BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE DEFENDANT IN A CIVIL FORFEITURE ACTION BROUGHT PURSUANT TO SECTION 895.05 . . . The State sought various forms of relief provided by section 895.05, Florida Statutes (1989), including . . . See Id. § 895.05; see also Delisi v. . . . See § 895.05(2)(a), Fla. Stat.; see also Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So.2d at 966. . . .

W. MILSAP, v. JOURNAL SENTINEL, INC., 100 F.3d 1265 (7th Cir. 1996)

. . . Stat. 895.05(2); Hucko v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 100 Wis.2d 372, 302 N.W.2d 68 (App.1981). . . .

PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES, INC. v. CHUCKLEBERRY PUBLISHING, INC. S. p. A., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)

. . . an electronic bulletin board located on “SportsNet” was a periodical within the meaning of section 895.05 . . . In holding that the posting was not a periodical, the court stated: [S]ubsec. (2) of § 895.05, STATS. . . . Therefore, we conclude that extending the definition of ‘periodical’ under § 895.05(2), STATS., to include . . .

L. RUTH, a k a a k a M. a k a a k a E. a k a M. v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS,, 661 So. 2d 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . said properties without prior approval of the Court, during the pendency of this action, under Section 895.05 . . . Section 895.05, Florida Statutes (1989), delineates the following civil remedies under the Florida RICO . . . Furthermore, section 895.05(2) provides for civil forfeiture of property and states: “All property, real . . . the course of, derived from, or realized through conduct in violation of a provision of ss. 895.01-895.05 . . . The state argues that section 895.05(1), Florida Statutes (1989), grants any circuit court in the State . . .

HIBISCUS ASSOCIATES LTD. a M. A. B. v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF POLICEMEN AND FIREMEN RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF CITY OF DETROIT, HIBISCUS ASSOCIATES LTD. a M. A. B. v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF POLICEMEN AND FIREMEN RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF CITY OF DETROIT,, 50 F.3d 908 (11th Cir. 1995)

. . . . § 895.05(7). . . . granting attorney’s fees to plaintiffs as prevailing Florida RICO defendants pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 895.05 . . .

REMOVA POOL FENCE CO. v. ROTH A-, 647 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . 1993, appellees filed a second motion seeking attorney’s fees pursuant to sections 57.105, 772.104 and 895.05 . . . correctly contend, the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was also based on sections 772.104 and 895.05 . . . Section 895.05(7), Florida Statutes (1998), contains a virtually identical provision, with the sole variation . . . for determining entitlement to attorney’s fees is slightly less stringent under sections 772.104 and 895.05 . . . would be obligated to pay the opposing party’s attorney’s fees, section 772.104 (and presumably section 895.05 . . .

UNITED STATES v. ONE SINGLE FAMILY RESIDENCE LOCATED AT NORTH BAY ROAD, MIAMI, M., 13 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir. 1994)

. . . The RICO Act considered in Caggiano concerned a state forfeiture statute, § 895.05(2)(a), Florida Statutes . . .

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, PINELLAS COUNTY, v. TOM F. SAWYER,, 620 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1993)

. . . Fla.Stat. (1989) (State’s expenses in processing insurance claims include investigative expenses); § 895.05 . . .

CITY OF NORTH BAY VILLAGE v. COOK,, 617 So. 2d 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . .-104, enacted in 1986 to correct problems resulting from including its RICO predecessor, section 895.05 . . .

CHEFFER v. JUDGE, DIVISION S JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,, 614 So. 2d 632 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . Petitioners seek to prohibit their further prosecution for violation of section 895.05(3), Florida Statutes . . . essence a new prosecution and thus filed beyond the five year racketeering statute of limitations. § 895.05 . . . The legislature expressly provided a five year limitation for such prosecution. § 895.05(10), Fla. . . .

MORAL MAJORITY, INC. v. BROWARD COUNTY CHAPTER OF THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC., 606 So. 2d 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . .-104 and 895.05(7), Florida Statutes (1991), and pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1991) . . .

A. BUTTERWORTH, v. A. CAGGIANO,, 605 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1992)

. . . grounds that the property was “used” in the course of racketeering activity in violation of section 895.05 . . . the course of, derived from, or realized through conduct in violation of a provision of ss. 895.01-895.05 . . . is subject to civil forfeiture to the state. § 895.05(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1989). . . .

F. SAWYER, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, PINELLAS COUNTY,, 596 So. 2d 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . See, e.g„ §§ 27.56(1)(a); 45.061(3)(a); 253.03(13); 373.129(6); 489.132(3) 631.54(5); 895.05(7); 895.07 . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, v. L. RUTH, a k a a k a M. a k a a k a E. a k a M., 595 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . April 13, 1990, the state filed RICO lien notices against appellees’ properties pursuant to section 895.05 . . . argues that section 895.07(9) is effective when only a RICO lien notice has been filed and that section 895.05 . . . Section 895.05(5) provides in pertinent part that “[i]n any action brought under this section, the circuit . . . Under section 895.05(5), the court has the authority to, at any time, enter injunctions, prohibitions . . . had no authority to grant the state’s motion when, in fact, it did have such authority under section 895.05 . . .

F. STORY, v. STATE, 589 So. 2d 939 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . Sections 895.05(3) and 895.05(4), Florida Statutes (1985). . . . .

O MALLEY, v. U. MOUNTS, Jr., 590 So. 2d 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . offenses is five years from the date of commission of the crime as to the racketeering charge, section 895.05 . . .

ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL COMPANY, a v. SCARFONE,, 939 F.2d 1472 (11th Cir. 1991)

. . . . § 895.05(7), applicable to this law suit, tracked the federal treble damage provision. . . . .

A. CAGGIANO, v. A. BUTTERWORTH,, 583 So. 2d 347 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . Consequently, the state sought forfeiture of the appellant’s homestead pursuant to section 895.05(2)( . . .

HENHILL CORPORATION, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS,, 578 So. 2d 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . This lien notice was authorized under section 895.05(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), of the RICO Act . . . A lien notice under section 895.05(12)(a) is obtained as follows: [T]he Department of Legal Affairs, . . . The State’s section 895.05(12)(a) RICO lien notice was recorded on May 16, 1989. . . . (12)(a) notice, in accordance with the requirements of section 895.05(12)(e). . . . See §§ 48.23, 895.05(2)(b), Fla.Stat. (1989). . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, v. JACKSON,, 576 So. 2d 864 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . not undertake a criminal investigation, arrest him, or seek a cease and desist order under section 895.05 . . .

RODRIGUEZ No. B, v. BANCO INDUSTRIAL VENEZUELA, C. A., 576 So. 2d 870 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . , et seq., has been interpreted as permitting a court to issue a temporary injunction under section 895.05 . . . Section 895.05(6) provides relief against unlawful violations of the RICO Act. § 895.05(1), Fla.Stat. . . . court to issue such injunctions “after making due provisions for the rights of innocent persons.” § 895.05 . . . she is not alleged to have violated the RICO Act, she is an “innocent person” under the statute. § 895.05 . . . under the RICO Act, the trial court must make “due provisions for the rights of innocent persons.” § 895.05 . . .

KNIGHT, v. E. F. HUTTON AND CO. INC., 750 F. Supp. 1109 (M.D. Fla. 1990)

. . . Florida Statutes, § 895.05(10). . . . Defendant is also correct in pointing out that Florida Statutes § 895.05(7) does not authorize the recovery . . . In her response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Knight quotes Florida Statutes, § 895.05(7) (1987) . . . Florida Statutes, § 895.05(7) (1987) and (1989) reads: The state, including any of its agencies, instrumentalities . . . Section 895.05(7) will not support an award of attorneys’ fees for Plaintiff. . . .

STALL, STATE LONG, v. STATE, 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990)

. . . Stat. (1989) (making racketeering a first-degree felony) and § 895.05(2), Fla.Stat. (1989) (authorizing . . .

MITCHELL, v. CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, a, 747 F. Supp. 1446 (M.D. Fla. 1990)

. . . . §§ 772.104, 812.035, 895.05, these exclusions involve civil redress for actions in which punitive damages . . .

ZICCARDI, v. STROTHER,, 570 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . appellant argues that this statute was procedural in nature, designed to correct problems in section 895.05 . . . 86-277, which created chapter 772, the legislature described the bill as, inter alia, “amending s. 895.05 . . . Section 895.05(7), Florida Statutes (1985), had provided private victims a civil remedy for the identical . . . designed to correct problems resulting from the inclusion of its RICO predecessor provision, section 895.05 . . . See § 772.17, Fla.Stat. (1987); § 895.05(10), Pla.Stat. (1981). . . .

In FORFEITURE OF U. S. CURRENCY. BROWN, v. STATE, 559 So. 2d 717 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . filed an additional civil complaint against appellant, seeking remedies under Sections 812.035 and 895.05 . . . appellee filed an “Amended Complaint” in the consolidated cases seeking forfeiture, pursuant to Sections 895.05 . . .

GUNIO v. V. I. D. INC., 40 Fla. Supp. 2d 150 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1989)

. . . With such amendment, the court finds the plaintiffs have standing under § 895.05 Florida Statutes (1987 . . .

ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL COMPANY, v. SCARFONE, 713 F. Supp. 1420 (M.D. Fla. 1989)

. . . . § 895.05(7) (1984), 812.035(7) (Supp.1984), track the federal provision thereby making this rationale . . .

BANCO INDUSTRIAL VENEZUELA, C. A. a v. MEDEROS SUAREZ, a k a a k a, 541 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . . § 895.05(6), Fla.Stat. (1985). . . . The author distinguishes subsection 1 from subsection 6 of section 895.05 by suggesting that subsection . . . Section 895.05(1) sets forth a nonexclusive list of orders the court may issue to enjoin violations of . . . 15 (Fla.1982) (applying section 812.035(1), Florida Statutes (1977), which is identical to section 895.05 . . . Subsection (l)(d) of section 895.05 refers specifically to temporary relief, namely the suspension of . . . Southeast Bank, N.A., 490 So.2d 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), which was the first judicial treatment of section 895.05 . . . Section 895.05(6) permits [an] aggrieved person [to] institute a proceeding under subsection (1). . . . Section 895.05(1) provides, in relevant part: Any circuit court may, after making due provision for the . . . In Finkelstein, the court construed section 895.05(6) as requiring the party seeking a preliminary injunction . . . As we read the plain language of the balance of section 895.05(6), the only requirements for a preliminary . . .

GALERIE FURSTENBERG, v. COFFARO, C. V. M. d b a C. V. M. A. D. L. d b a T. R. a k a a k a T. R., 697 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)

. . . contains an explicit provision for punitive damages: “Punitive damages, which are permitted in section 895.05 . . .

HUDSON NATIONAL BANK, v. SHAPIRO a k a a k a, 695 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Fla. 1988)

. . . theft statute, 812.085(6), Florida Statutes, as well as the Florida RICO statute, Florida Statutes, 895.05 . . .

M. SCHUSTER, M. D. M. M. D. a k a M. M. D. P. A. a k a a k a v. KIDDER, PEABODY COMPANY, INC. a a, 699 F. Supp. 271 (S.D. Fla. 1988)

. . . . § 1962(c) (the federal RICO Act); § 895.05 of the Florida Statutes (Florida RICO); Count VI, breach . . .

J. SCUTIERI, Jr. v. ESTATE OF REVITZ,, 683 F. Supp. 795 (S.D. Fla. 1988)

. . . . § 895.05) This count is the Florida counterpart to the federal RICO claim alleged in Count VIII. . . .

DeRUYTER, v. STATE, 521 So. 2d 135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . Section 895.05, Florida Statutes, provides for forfeiture of real property and sets out the procedures . . .

In MARILL ALARM SYSTEMS, INC. MARILL ALARM SYSTEMS, INC. v. EQUITY FUNDING CORPORATION,, 81 B.R. 119 (S.D. Fla. 1987)

. . . . § 895.05(7), which mandates an award of treble damages in the amount of $260,500.44. . . .

H. ARMBRISTER, v. ROLAND INTERNATIONAL CORP., 667 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Fla. 1987)

. . . The relevant limitation period is expressed in § 895.05(10), which states: Notwithstanding any other . . .

CAPARROZ A. v. TECNICA Y MOTORES, S. A. DE C. V. a, 511 So. 2d 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . Co., 281 So.2d 558 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), cert. denied, 289 So.2d 737 (Fla. 1974); §§ 895.05(6), 812.035 . . .

In MARILL ALARM SYSTEMS, INC. MARILL SECURITY SERVICES, INC. a a v. OPEN DOOR CAPITAL CORPORATION a a C., 68 B.R. 399 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986)

. . . . § 895.05(7) which mandates an award of treble damages and, where appropriate, punitive damages. . . .

SEMINOLE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. v. R. TANNER,, 635 F. Supp. 582 (M.D. Fla. 1986)

. . . . § 895.05(6), (7) (1985). In other words, RICO is not concerned with uniquely federal interests. . . .

FINKELSTEIN, v. SOUTHEAST BANK, N. A., 490 So. 2d 976 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . Florida Statutes (1983), and Florida’s RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) Act, Section 895.05 . . . Section 895.05(6), Florida Statutes (1985), provides: Any aggrieved person may institute a proceeding . . .

KTM CORPORATION, a E. v. L. SELIGMAN, J. A. W., 110 F.R.D. 297 (S.D. Fla. 1986)

. . . within a federal statute, the most analogous state statute of limitation is applied) and Fla.Stat. ss. 895.05 . . .

ELBE, v. WAUSAU HOSPITAL CENTER, Co- HENSCHEL, v. WAUSAU HOSPITAL CENTER, O, 606 F. Supp. 1491 (W.D. Wis. 1985)

. . . . § 895.05(2). . . . Section 895.05(2) requires that before commencing a civil defamation action based on allegedly libelous . . .

J. BANDERAS, L. R. N. A. P. A. P. a k a St. s v. BANCO CENTRAL ECUADOR,, 461 So. 2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . Punitive damages, which are permitted in section 895.05(7), are appropriate where fraudulent conduct . . .

CITY OF GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA, v. ISLAND CREEK COAL SALES COMPANY,, 618 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Fla. 1984)

. . . Count IV alleges violation of Florida Statutes § 943.462 and § 943.464, now § 895.03 and § 895.05, the . . . racketeering activity” sufficient to support a civil action under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 and Fla.Stat. § 895.05 . . .

E. SIMONSON, v. UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., 654 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1981)

. . . Section 895.05(1), Wis.Stats. . . . .

MEDICO, T. v. TIME, INC., 643 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1981)

. . . . § 895.05 (1975). Application of the privilege varies from state to state. . . .

E. SIMONSON, v. UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., 500 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Wis. 1980)

. . . dismissal is mandated by the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Wisconsin Retraction Statute, Sec. 895.05 . . . Madison Newspapers, Inc., (1977), 81 Wis.2d 1, 3, 259 N.W.2d 691-describing 895.05(2) as “a prerequisite . . . conformity with the policy stated above, however, the court is satisfied that the Legislature intended § 895.05 . . . Sec. 895.05(1), Wis.Stats. Williams v. . . .

v., 50 T.C. 635 (T.C. 1968)

. . . Less collection from the Sanders Co- 10. 00 Loss on affiliated companies stock and receivables_ 71, 895.05 . . .

ATKINS v. UNITED STATES, 14 F. Supp. 288 (Ct. Cl. 1936)

. . . In arriving at the loss of $56,186.33, plaintiff claimed deductions in his return of $132,-895.05 on . . .