Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 944.275 (2025)

Gain-time.

✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session

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944.275 Gain-time.—

(1) The department is authorized to grant deductions from sentences in the form of gain-time in order to encourage satisfactory prisoner behavior, to provide incentive for prisoners to participate in productive activities, and to reward prisoners who perform outstanding deeds or services.

(2)(a) The department shall establish for each prisoner sentenced to a term of years a “maximum sentence expiration date,” which shall be the date when the sentence or combined sentences imposed on a prisoner will expire. In establishing this date, the department shall reduce the total time to be served by any time lawfully credited.

(b) When a prisoner with an established maximum sentence expiration date is sentenced to an additional term or terms without having been released from custody, the department shall extend the maximum sentence expiration date by the length of time imposed in the new sentence or sentences, less lawful credits.

(c) When an escaped prisoner or a parole violator is returned to the custody of the department, the maximum sentence expiration date in effect when the escape occurred or the parole was effective shall be extended by the amount of time the prisoner was not in custody plus the time imposed in any new sentence or sentences, but reduced by any lawful credits.

(3)(a) The department shall also establish for each prisoner sentenced to a term of years a “tentative release date” which shall be the date projected for the prisoner’s release from custody by virtue of gain-time granted or forfeited as described in this section. The initial tentative release date shall be determined by deducting basic gain-time granted from the maximum sentence expiration date. Other gain-time shall be applied when granted or restored to make the tentative release date proportionately earlier; and forfeitures of gain-time, when ordered, shall be applied to make the tentative release date proportionately later.

(b) When an initial tentative release date is reestablished because of additional sentences imposed before the prisoner has completely served all prior sentences, any gain-time granted during service of a prior sentence and not forfeited shall be applied.

(4)(a) As a means of encouraging satisfactory behavior, the department shall grant basic gain-time at the rate of 10 days for each month of each sentence imposed on a prisoner, subject to the following:

1. Portions of any sentences to be served concurrently shall be treated as a single sentence when determining basic gain-time.

2. Basic gain-time for a partial month shall be prorated on the basis of a 30-day month.

3. When a prisoner receives a new maximum sentence expiration date because of additional sentences imposed, basic gain-time shall be granted for the amount of time the maximum sentence expiration date was extended.

(b) For each month in which an inmate works diligently, participates in training, uses time constructively, or otherwise engages in positive activities, the department may grant incentive gain-time in accordance with this paragraph. The rate of incentive gain-time in effect on the date the inmate committed the offense which resulted in his or her incarceration shall be the inmate’s rate of eligibility to earn incentive gain-time throughout the period of incarceration and shall not be altered by a subsequent change in the severity level of the offense for which the inmate was sentenced.

1. For sentences imposed for offenses committed prior to January 1, 1994, up to 20 days of incentive gain-time may be granted. If granted, such gain-time shall be credited and applied monthly.

2. For sentences imposed for offenses committed on or after January 1, 1994, and before October 1, 1995:

a. For offenses ranked in offense severity levels 1 through 7, under former s. 921.0012 or former s. 921.0013, up to 25 days of incentive gain-time may be granted. If granted, such gain-time shall be credited and applied monthly.

b. For offenses ranked in offense severity levels 8, 9, and 10, under former s. 921.0012 or former s. 921.0013, up to 20 days of incentive gain-time may be granted. If granted, such gain-time shall be credited and applied monthly.

3. For sentences imposed for offenses committed on or after October 1, 1995, the department may grant up to 10 days per month of incentive gain-time.

(c) An inmate who performs some outstanding deed, such as saving a life or assisting in recapturing an escaped inmate, or who in some manner performs an outstanding service that would merit the granting of additional deductions from the term of his or her sentence may be granted meritorious gain-time of from 1 to 60 days.

(d) Notwithstanding the monthly maximum awards of incentive gain-time under subparagraphs (b)1., 2., and 3., the education program manager shall recommend, and the Department of Corrections may grant, a one-time award of 60 additional days of incentive gain-time to an inmate who is otherwise eligible and who successfully completes requirements for and is, or has been during the current commitment, awarded a high school equivalency diploma or vocational certificate. Under no circumstances may an inmate receive more than 60 days for educational attainment pursuant to this section.

(e)1. Notwithstanding subparagraph (b)3., for sentences imposed for offenses committed on or after October 1, 2014, and before July 1, 2023, the department may not grant incentive gain-time if the offense is a violation of s. 782.04(1)(a)2.c.; s. 787.01(3)(a)2. or 3.; s. 787.02(3)(a)2. or 3.; s. 794.011, excluding s. 794.011(10); s. 800.04; s. 825.1025; or s. 847.0135(5).

2. Notwithstanding subparagraph (b)3., for sentences imposed for offenses committed on or after July 1, 2023, the department may not grant incentive gain-time if the offense is for committing or attempting, soliciting, or conspiring to commit a violation of s. 782.04(1)(a)2.c.; s. 787.01(3)(a)2. or 3.; s. 787.02(3)(a)2. or 3.; s. 794.011, excluding s. 794.011(10); s. 800.04; s. 825.1025; or s. 847.0135(5).

(f) An inmate who is subject to subparagraph (b)3. is not eligible to earn or receive gain-time under paragraph (a), paragraph (b), paragraph (c), or paragraph (d) or any other type of gain-time in an amount that would cause a sentence to expire, end, or terminate, or that would result in a prisoner’s release, prior to serving a minimum of 85 percent of the sentence imposed. For purposes of this paragraph, credits awarded by the court for time physically incarcerated shall be credited toward satisfaction of 85 percent of the sentence imposed. Except as provided by this section, a prisoner may not accumulate further gain-time awards at any point when the tentative release date is the same as that date at which the prisoner will have served 85 percent of the sentence imposed. State prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment shall be incarcerated for the rest of their natural lives, unless granted pardon or clemency.

(5) When a prisoner is found guilty of an infraction of the laws of this state or the rules of the department, gain-time may be forfeited according to law.

(6)(a) Basic gain-time under this section shall be computed on and applied to all sentences imposed for offenses committed on or after July 1, 1978, and before January 1, 1994.

(b) All incentive and meritorious gain-time is granted according to this section.

(c) All additional gain-time previously awarded under former subsections (2) and (3) and all forfeitures ordered prior to the effective date of the act that created this section shall remain in effect and be applied in establishing an initial tentative release date.

(7) The department shall adopt rules to implement the granting, forfeiture, restoration, and deletion of gain-time.

History.—s. 1, ch. 78-304; s. 57, ch. 79-3; s. 8, ch. 83-131; s. 3, ch. 91-281; s. 26, ch. 93-406; s. 26, ch. 95-184; s. 2, ch. 95-294; s. 59, ch. 96-388; s. 1853, ch. 97-102; s. 12, ch. 2014-4; s. 11, ch. 2014-20; s. 100, ch. 2015-2; s. 4, ch. 2017-31; s. 2, ch. 2023-146.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 227 cases (16 in the last 5 years), 1979–2026 · leading case: Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981).

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Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981). · cites it 33× “" Fla. Stat. § 944.275 (1) (1979). [3] *27 The new provision was implemented on January 1, 1979, and since that time the State has applied it not only to prisoners sentenced for crimes committed since its enactment in 1978, but also to all other prisoners, including petitioner,…”

Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1990). · cites it 22× “The taint, in other words, would infect every portion of section 944.275, Florida Statutes (1987), as applied to inmates such as Waldrup.”

Clyde E. Johnson v. State of Florida, 215 So. 3d 1237 (Fla. 2017). · cites it 5× “Under section 944.275, Florida Statutes, Johnson was ineligible for any gain time while he was serving life sentences.”

Moore v. Pearson, 789 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 2001). · cites it 9× “5th DCA 1996); see also § 944.275(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). The authority to regulate gain time resides exclusively within the Department of Corrections pursuant to chapter 944, Florida Statutes.”

Cox v. Crosby, 27 So. 3d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). · cites it 8× “Cox argued in the Circuit Court for Leon County that a 1993 amendment to section 944.275, Florida Statutes, which precluded him from receiving basic gain time, was unconstitutional.”

Smith v. State, 93 So. 3d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). · cites it 8× “Applying only the basic gain-time statute to Smith’s eighty-year sentence, assuming no forfeiture of the basic gain time he is entitled to under the statute, Smith would serve a sentence of roughly sixty-three years, making him eligible for release when he is eighty-one years…”

Gay v. Singletary, 700 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 1997). · cites it 8× “See § 944.275, Fla. Stat. (1995). First, Gay argues that the Department of Corrections does not have authority to deny him credit for the time he spent on Control Release because section 944.”

Darriue Montgomery v. State, 230 So. 3d 1256 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). · cites it 4× “This is still true even though section 944.275(4)(f), Florida Statutes (2014), which mandates prisoners to serve at least eighty-five percent of the sentence imposed, would require the juvenile offender to serve a minimum of thirty-four years.”

Jeffrey Raske v. Bob Martinez, Governor, State of Florida, & Richard Dugger, Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 876 F.2d 1496 (11th Cir. 1989). · cites it 9× “Laws 870, 870-71 (codified, as amended, at Fla.Stat. § 944.275 (1979-1981)) [hereinafter the 1978 act].”

Harris v. Wainwright, 376 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1979). · cites it 8× “In original habeas corpus proceedings, petitioner asserts that section 944.275 Florida Statutes (1978 Supplement) is unconstitutional as it is applied to him, in that he is harmfully required to remain in prison for an indeterminate number of months or years past the original…”

Avera v. Barton, 632 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). · cites it 20× “§ 944.275, Fla. Stat. (1983). Here, DOC calculated Avera's gain time by first establishing a percentage of days served by dividing the days served up to the escape (842) by the total days in a 30-year sentence (10,950).”

Florida Parole Comm'n v. Spaziano, 48 So. 3d 714 (Fla. 2010). · cites it 6× “In Cox, the First District had for consideration the question of whether Cox's petition for writ of mandamus challenging the constitutionality of a 1993 amendment to section 944.275, Florida Statutes, was exempt from the fee and lien requirements under section 57.”

Show all 227 citing cases →

— 944.275(1) — 18 cases

Moore v. Pearson, 789 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 2001). “5th DCA 1996); see also § 944.275(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). The authority to regulate gain time resides exclusively within the Department of Corrections pursuant to chapter 944, Florida Statutes.”

Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1990). “The taint, in other words, would infect every portion of section 944.275, Florida Statutes (1987), as applied to inmates such as Waldrup.”

May v. Florida Parole & Prob. Com'n, 435 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1983).

Heuring v. State, 559 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1990).

Eldridge v. Moore, 760 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2000).

— 944.275(2) — 3 cases

State v. Braddy, 687 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

Crosby v. Bolden, 867 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 2004).

Batista v. State, 993 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

— 944.275(2)(a) — 10 cases

Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1990). “The taint, in other words, would infect every portion of section 944.275, Florida Statutes (1987), as applied to inmates such as Waldrup.”

Burdick v. State, 584 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

Smith v. McNeil, 49 So. 3d 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Gaston v. State, 613 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).

Gibson v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 828 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

— 944.275(2)(b) — 9 cases

Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1990). “The taint, in other words, would infect every portion of section 944.275, Florida Statutes (1987), as applied to inmates such as Waldrup.”

Jeffrey Raske v. Bob Martinez, Governor, State of Florida, & Richard Dugger, Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 876 F.2d 1496 (11th Cir. 1989). “Laws 870, 870-71 (codified, as amended, at Fla.Stat. § 944.275 (1979-1981)) [hereinafter the 1978 act].”

Gwong v. Singletary, 683 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1996).

Dickinson v. Wainwright, 416 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

Pizano v. State, 829 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

— 944.275(2)(c) — 3 cases

Gay v. Singletary, 700 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 1997). “See § 944.275, Fla. Stat. (1995). First, Gay argues that the Department of Corrections does not have authority to deny him credit for the time he spent on Control Release because section 944.”

Hull v. Moore, 790 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

Drago v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr. (Pinellas Cnty.) (M.D. Fla. 2022).

— 944.275(2)(d) — 1 case

Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1990). “The taint, in other words, would infect every portion of section 944.275, Florida Statutes (1987), as applied to inmates such as Waldrup.”

— 944.275(2)(e) — 1 case

Fleming v. State, 697 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).

— 944.275(3)(a) — 18 cases

Eldridge v. Moore, 760 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2000).

Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1990). “The taint, in other words, would infect every portion of section 944.275, Florida Statutes (1987), as applied to inmates such as Waldrup.”

McNeil v. Canty, 12 So. 3d 215 (Fla. 2009).

Singletary v. Jones, 681 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

Tal-Mason v. State, 700 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

— 944.275(3)(b) — 4 cases

Miller v. State, 882 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).

Daniels v. State, 870 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

Webb v. State, 642 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

McBride v. State, 601 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

— 944.275(3)(c) — 1 case

Baranko v. Wainwright, 448 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

— 944.275(4) — 8 cases

Brazeail v. State, 821 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

Simmons v. State, 611 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

Ciambrone v. State, 938 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

Orosz v. Singletary, 693 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1997).

Sanchez v. State, 765 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).

— 944.275(4)(a) — 16 cases

Smith v. State, 93 So. 3d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). “Applying only the basic gain-time statute to Smith’s eighty-year sentence, assuming no forfeiture of the basic gain time he is entitled to under the statute, Smith would serve a sentence of roughly sixty-three years, making him eligible for release when he is eighty-one years…”

Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1990). “The taint, in other words, would infect every portion of section 944.275, Florida Statutes (1987), as applied to inmates such as Waldrup.”

Clyde E. Johnson v. State of Florida, 215 So. 3d 1237 (Fla. 2017). “Under section 944.275, Florida Statutes, Johnson was ineligible for any gain time while he was serving life sentences.”

Singletary v. Jones, 681 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

Hull v. Moore, 790 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

— 944.275(4)(b) — 53 cases

Young v. Moore, 820 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 2002).

Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1990). “The taint, in other words, would infect every portion of section 944.275, Florida Statutes (1987), as applied to inmates such as Waldrup.”

Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2004).

— 944.275(4)(b)(3) — 5 cases

Bishop v. Sheldon, 68 So. 3d 259 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).

Denizard v. State, 79 So. 3d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).

Cornett v. State, 922 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

Rollman v. State, 855 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

Vasquez v. State, 714 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).

— 944.275(4)(c) — 2 cases

Sanchez v. State, 765 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).

Weeks v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.(Polk Cnty.) (M.D. Fla. 2022).

— 944.275(4)(c)(2) — 1 case

Ciambrone v. State, 938 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

— 944.275(4)(d) — 1 case

Nairn D. Newell v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 214 So. 3d 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).

— 944.275(4)(e) — 2 cases

Giovani Guerra v. State of Florida (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).

Weeks v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.(Polk Cnty.) (M.D. Fla. 2022).

— 944.275(4)(f) — 4 cases

Darriue Montgomery v. State, 230 So. 3d 1256 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). “This is still true even though section 944.275(4)(f), Florida Statutes (2014), which mandates prisoners to serve at least eighty-five percent of the sentence imposed, would require the juvenile offender to serve a minimum of thirty-four years.”

Willie K. Clay v. State, 226 So. 3d 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).

Labronx Bailey v. State of Florida (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).

— 944.275(5) — 3 cases

Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1990). “The taint, in other words, would infect every portion of section 944.275, Florida Statutes (1987), as applied to inmates such as Waldrup.”

Hull v. Moore, 790 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

Britt v. Chiles, 704 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1997).

— 944.275(6) — 1 case

Williams v. State, 651 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).

— 944.275(6)(a) — 9 cases

Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1990). “The taint, in other words, would infect every portion of section 944.275, Florida Statutes (1987), as applied to inmates such as Waldrup.”

Heath v. State, 656 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

Surinach v. State, 676 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).

Smith v. State, 126 So. 3d 397 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

Avera v. Barton, 632 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). “§ 944.275, Fla. Stat. (1983). Here, DOC calculated Avera's gain time by first establishing a percentage of days served by dividing the days served up to the escape (842) by the total days in a 30-year sentence (10,950).”

— 944.275(6)(b) — 1 case

Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1990). “The taint, in other words, would infect every portion of section 944.275, Florida Statutes (1987), as applied to inmates such as Waldrup.”

— 944.275(6)(c) — 1 case

Baranko v. Wainwright, 448 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

— 944.275(b) — 1 case

Raines v. State of Fla., 987 F. Supp. 1416 (N.D. Fla. 1997).

— 944.275(b)(c) — 1 case

Raske v. Dep't of Corr., 17 Fla. Supp. 2d 158 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'g 1985).

— 944.275(c) — 1 case

Crosby v. Bolden, 867 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 2004).

— 944.275(l)(a) — 1 case

Rogers v. Wainwright, 379 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).

— 944.275(l)(c) — 1 case

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