O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 10-1-396 (2019)

Acts exempt from part

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Nothing in this part shall apply to: (1) Actions or transactions specifically authorized under laws administered by or rules and regulations promulgated by any regulatory agency of this state or the United States; (2) Acts done by the publisher, owner, agent, or employee of a newspaper, periodical, radio station or network, or television station or network in the publication or dissemination in print or electronically of: (A) News or commentary; or (B) An advertisement of or for another person, when the publisher, owner, agent, or employee did not have actual knowledge of the false, misleading, or deceptive character of the advertisement, did not prepare the advertisement, or did not have a direct financial interest in the sale or distribution of the advertised product or service.

History

Ga. L. 1975, p. 376, § 6; Ga. L. 2013, p.

613, § 2/HB 150; Ga. L. 2015, p. 1088, § 2/SB 148.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Insurance transactions are among those types of transactions which are exempt from the Fair Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 et seq. Ferguson v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 163 Ga. App. 282, 293 S.E.2d 736, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 2467 (1982). Trades by brokerage firms and brokers. - Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 et seq., does not apply to an investor’s claims against brokerage firms and a broker for allegedly unauthorized trades; the alleged

wrongful transactions that provide the basis for the action entail conduct that is “specifically authorized and regulated” by the Securities and Commodity Exchange Acts. Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13167 (N.D. Ga. 1983). Area of finance charges, disclosure, and truth in lending falls outside the Fair Business Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 et seq., except where expressly covered. Chancellor v. Gateway Lincoln-Mercury, 233 Ga. App. 38, 502

S.E.2d 799, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 885 (1998). Publisher of advertising periodical. - Publisher of telephone “yellow pages” was exempt from a claim under the Fair Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 et seq., because the allegedly improper acts were committed in the course of the publisher’s business as the publisher of an advertising periodical. Robin v. BellSouth Adv. & Publishing Co., 221 Ga. App. 360, 471 S.E.2d 294, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 491 (1996). Regulation under another act. - In an action in which the plaintiff consumer filed a complaint under the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act (FBPA), O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 et seq., and the Georgia Unfair or Deceptive Practices Toward the Elderly Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-850 et seq., alleging that the lender deceptively and without the consumer’s knowledge inflated the amount of the consumer’s income on the loan application, causing the loan to be underwritten in a far greater amount and in turn making the loan payments much larger than the consumer could afford, while “settlement services” under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2602, included taking of loan applications, loan processing, and the underwriting and funding of loans, the lender failed to show that the alleged conduct was regulated by RESPA such that, under O.C.G.A. § 10-1-396(a), the Georgia Fair Business

Practices Act would not apply. Kitchen v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., No. 1:04-CV-2750-BBM, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43937 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 29, 2005). Mortgage borrower stated a claim against a loan servicer under the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act (FBPA), O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 et seq., based on allegations that the servicer failed to properly credit payments, sent harassing collection letters, wrongfully threatened foreclosure, and improperly reported to credit bureaus that the loan was in default. Residential mortgage transactions were not categorically excluded from the FBPA, and the unfair and deceptive conduct alleged by the borrower was not specifically authorized under another statute. Stroman v. Bank of Am. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54677 (N.D. Ga. 2012). Homeowner’s Fair Business Practices Act (FBPA), O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 et seq., claim against the homeowner’s mortgage lender arising out of foreclosure of the homeowner’s home failed because the Georgia Residential Mortgage Act, O.C.G.A. § 7-1-1000 et seq., prohibited mortgage businesses from, among other things, pursuing a course of misrepresentation by use of fraudulent or unauthorized documents or other means, O.C.G.A. § 7-1-1013(1), foreclosing a claim under the FBPA, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 10-1-396. Stewart v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., 331 Ga. App. 635, 770 S.E.2d 892, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 216 (2015).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 20 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1983–2024 · leading case: Taylor v. Jacques (In Re Taylor), 292 B.R. 434 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002).
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Taylor v. Jacques (In Re Taylor), 292 B.R. 434 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002). · cites it 16× “1 The complaint alleges that defendant’s conduct violated the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, and the defendant contends that the conduct at issue is exempt from the Act’s coverage under Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-396 (1). The plaintiff Bobby Joe Taylor, Jr.”
Chancellor v. Gateway Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 502 S.E.2d 799 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 10-1-396 (1) provides that the FBPA shall not “apply to .”
Quynh Truong v. Allstate Ins., 227 P.3d 73 (N.M. 2010). “In fact, the only other state with the term “expressly permitted” in its exemption statute is Indiana, and no case has yet construed the term.”
State Ex Rel. Doyle v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assocs., P.C., 695 S.E.2d 612 (Ga. 2010). · cites it 4× “to be unlawful [by the FBPA]") (emphasis supplied); OCGA § 10-1-396 (no mention of attorneys in exemptions from application of FBPA).”
Colonial Life & Accident Ins. v. Am. Fam. Life Assurance Co., 846 F. Supp. 454 (D.S.C. 1994). · cites it 5× “The Ferguson court undertook a considered analysis and specifically construed the scope of the exemption in Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-396 (1). Thus, in light of Ferguson (and Taylor), the Court concludes that conduct which is specifically regulated in the Insurance Code — including…”
Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983). · cites it 2× “O.C.G.A. § 10-1-396(a). The second exemption protects the news media from the consequences of violations found in advertisements which are printed for others.”
Ne. Georgia Cancer Care, LLC v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc., 676 S.E.2d 428 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 10-1-396 (1) of the FBPA provides that “[n]oth-ing in this part shall apply to .”
Stewart v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 770 S.E.2d 892 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 10-1-396 (1). Thus, where the action or transaction at issue is authorized or regulated by a state or federal regulatory agency, the FBPA does not apply.”
Stroman v. Bank of Am. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2012). · cites it 2× “” O.C.G.A. § 10-1-396(1) (emphasis added); see Kitchen v.”
Brogdon Ex Rel. Cline v. Nat'l Healthcare Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2000). “” § 10-1-396(1). Indeed, the legislature “intended that the Georgia FBPA have a restricted application only to the unregulated consumer marketplace and that the FBPA not apply in regulated areas of activity, because regulatory agencies provide protection or the ability to…”
James v. Bank of Am., N.A. Et Al., 772 S.E.2d 812 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 10-1-393 (a). Exempted from its scope, however, are “[ajctions or transactions specifically authorized under laws administered by or rules and regulations promulgated by any regulatory agency of this state or the United States.”
In Re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 534 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (D. Kan. 2008). “Ga.Code Ann. § 10-1-396(1). Defendants have not shown as a matter of law that any state or federal agency has specifically authorized them to sell motor fuel by the gallon without compensating for temperature.”
Show all 20 citing cases →
— 10-1-396(1) — 10 cases
Quynh Truong v. Allstate Ins., 227 P.3d 73 (N.M. 2010). “In fact, the only other state with the term “expressly permitted” in its exemption statute is Indiana, and no case has yet construed the term.”
Taylor v. Jacques (In Re Taylor), 292 B.R. 434 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002). “1 The complaint alleges that defendant’s conduct violated the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, and the defendant contends that the conduct at issue is exempt from the Act’s coverage under Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-396 (1). The plaintiff Bobby Joe Taylor, Jr.”
Stroman v. Bank of Am. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2012). “” O.C.G.A. § 10-1-396(1) (emphasis added); see Kitchen v.”
Colonial Life & Accident Ins. v. Am. Fam. Life Assurance Co., 846 F. Supp. 454 (D.S.C. 1994). “The Ferguson court undertook a considered analysis and specifically construed the scope of the exemption in Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-396 (1). Thus, in light of Ferguson (and Taylor), the Court concludes that conduct which is specifically regulated in the Insurance Code — including…”
Brogdon Ex Rel. Cline v. Nat'l Healthcare Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2000). “” § 10-1-396(1). Indeed, the legislature “intended that the Georgia FBPA have a restricted application only to the unregulated consumer marketplace and that the FBPA not apply in regulated areas of activity, because regulatory agencies provide protection or the ability to…”
— 10-1-396(a) — 1 case
Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983). “O.C.G.A. § 10-1-396(a). The second exemption protects the news media from the consequences of violations found in advertisements which are printed for others.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.