O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 11-2-602 (2019)

Manner and effect of rightful rejection

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(1) Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after their delivery or tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller.

(2) Subject to the provisions of Code Sections 11-2-603 and 11-2-604 on rejected goods:

(a) After rejection any exercise of ownership by the buyer with respect to any commercial unit is wrongful as against the seller; and

(b) If the buyer has before rejection taken physical possession of goods in which he does not have a security interest under the provisions of this article (subsection (3) of Code Section 11-2-711), he is under a duty after rejection to hold them with reasonable care at the seller’s disposition for a time sufficient to permit the seller to remove them; but

(c) The buyer has no further obligations with regard to goods rightfully rejected.

(3) The seller’s rights with respect to goods wrongfully rejected are governed by the provisions of this article on seller’s remedies in general (Code Section 11-2-703).

History

Code 1933, § 109A-2-602, enacted by Ga. L. 1962, p. 156, § 1.

Annotations

Law reviews. For article, “Buyer’s Right of Rejection:

A Quarter Century Under the Uniform Commercial Code, and Recent International Developments,” see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 805 (1979).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Rejection based on title. - O.C.G.A. § 11-2-602 is intended to apply where quantity or quality of goods, or time of delivery, etc., do not conform to terms of sale, but even if this section also has relation to status of title and a rejection is made on that account, the question becomes one of whether rejection is rightful or wrongful, which determination will, of course, ultimately depend on whether or not seller had type of title seller warranted. Cochran v. Horner, 121 Ga. App. 297, 173 S.E.2d 448, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1204 (1970). O.C.G.A. § 11-2-602 recognizes that wrongful rejections may occur and refers to O.C.G.A. § 11-2-703 for seller’s remedies in such event, one of which is an action for price. Cochran v. Horner, 121 Ga. App. 297, 173 S.E.2d 448, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1204 (1970); Lipsey Motors v. Karp Motors, Inc., 194 Ga. App. 15, 389

S.E.2d 537, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1712 (1989). Reacceptance of goods. - A buyer who has attempted to reject rather than to accept goods may nonetheless accept them by virtue of buyer’s post-rejection conduct with respect to them. Likewise, a buyer who purports to revoke acceptance of goods may be found to have reaccepted them if, after such revocation, buyer performs acts which are inconsistent with the seller’s ownership of the goods. Griffith v. Stovall Tire & Marine, Inc., 174 Ga. App. 137, 329 S.E.2d 234, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 1764 (1985). A buyer reaccepted a motor vehicle after purported revocation of acceptance, even though the buyer gave sufficient notice that buyer revoked acceptance of the vehicle, when the buyer refused the seller access to it, persisted in efforts to have the vehicle repaired by entities other than the

seller, and continued to possess and use the vehicle, which had been driven over 120,000 miles. Griffith v. Stovall Tire & Marine, Inc., 174 Ga. App. 137, 329 S.E.2d 234, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 1764 (1985). Rejection of nonconforming goods. - Within a reasonable time after delivery or tender, the buyer is entitled to reject nonconforming goods under the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 11-2-602 if the buyer reasonably notifies the seller of the rejection. Prudential Metal Supply Corp. v. Atlantic Freight Sales Co., 204 Ga. App. 439, 419 S.E.2d 520, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 861 (1992). Buyer’s continued use of a defective copying machine in furtherance of the efficient running of its business was a reacceptance of the machine, and the buyer was not entitled to recover the full contract price of the machine in an action against the seller. W.M. Hobbs, Ltd. v. Accusystems of Ga., Inc., 177 Ga. App. 432, 339 S.E.2d 646, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 1420 (1986). Proper rejection of delivered peanuts. - Seller breached the implied warranty of merchantability by delivering peanuts that were not fit for the ordinary purposes and did not run of even kind, quality, and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; buyer’s rejection was proper because it came within a reasonable time, and seller was seasonably notified of the proper rejection. Alimenta (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 803 F.2d 1160, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 33393 (11th Cir. 1986). Issues of fact for trial court. - Issues such as whether an effective revocation of acceptance was made, whether reasonable notification of revocation was given to the seller, and whether the value of the goods was substantially impaired

are ordinarily matters for determination by the trier of fact, even where the buyer has continued to use nonconforming goods after an alleged revocation of acceptance. Griffith v. Stovall Tire & Marine, Inc., 174 Ga. App. 137, 329 S.E.2d 234, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 1764 (1985). Granting defendants a directed verdict on a truck buyer’s revocation of acceptance claim under O.C.G.A. § 11-2-608 was error when the buyer testified that the truck had been in for repairs more than 30 times, that the buyer had tried to get a replacement or a refund, and that the buyer had continued to use the truck and to pay the note, taxes, and insurance on the truck because the buyer could not afford to buy another truck while attempting to resolve the problems with this one and because the buyer had no other means of transportation; although certain provisions in O.C.G.A. §§ 11-2-602 and 11-2-606 might support the unqualified proposition that continued use was inconsistent with a revocation of acceptance, issues such as whether there was effective revocation of acceptance were ordinarily jury matters, and expecting a buyer to discontinue use could be contrary to the UCC’s rule of reasonableness. Franklin v. Augusta Dodge, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 818, 652 S.E.2d 862, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1109 (2007). Instructions. - Where the court fully instructed the jury as to the determinative contract and warranty principles involved in the case, and the charge was adjusted to the evidence, it is not reversible error to fail to charge the precise language of provisions outlining rules and recourses for buyers and sellers. Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. Patron Aviation, Inc., 161 Ga. App. 596, 288 S.E.2d 911, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 1951 (1982).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 67 Am. Jur. 2d, Sales, §§ 647-650. Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms. 6 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Commercial Code, §§ 2:506, 2:519. C.J.S. 77A C.J.S., Sales, §§ 189, 197.

U.L.A. Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 2602. ALR. Contracts of sale or return as distinguished from contracts for sale on approval, 52 A.L.R. 589. Time within which buyer must make

inspection, trial, or test to determine whether goods are of requisite quality, 52 A.L.R.2d 900.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 17 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1985–2026 · leading case: Imex Int'l, Inc. v. Wires Eng'g, 583 S.E.2d 117 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
Imex Int'l, Inc. v. Wires Eng'g, 583 S.E.2d 117 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 6× “OCGA § 11-2-602; Prudential Metal Supply Corp.”
Griffith v. Stovall Tire & Marine, Inc., 329 S.E.2d 234 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 4× “See OCGA § 11-2-602 (2) (b); White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, § 8-3 at p.”
Atwood v. Se. Bedding Co., Inc., 485 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 8× “Nor does OCGA § 11-2-602 (1) apply, as there is no issue of timely notification of rejection but only timely notification of defects under OCGA § 11-2-607 (3) (a).”
Heart of Texas Dodge, Inc. v. Star Coach, LLC, 567 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 2× “15 See OCGA §§ 11-2-602 (1); 11-2-508 (2). 16 See generally Crolley v.”
Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Mat Factory, Inc., 452 S.E.2d 140 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 2× “’ OCGA *703 § 11-2-607 (3) requires a buyer who has accepted goods to notify the seller within a reasonable time after he discovered or should have discovered any breach, or be barred from any remedy.”
Rodgers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 627 S.E.2d 151 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 13× “OCGA §§ 11-2-602 through 11-2-609 are a portion of Georgia’s Uniform Commercial Code governing the sale of goods.”
Franklin v. Augusta Dodge, Inc., 652 S.E.2d 862 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 11-2-602 (2) (a). Moreover, when a buyer fails to make an effective rejection or when he does any act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership of goods, he has accepted them.”
SPS Indus., Inc. v. Atl. Steel Co., 366 S.E.2d 410 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 11-2-602 (1). Whether a buyer rejected goods within a “reasonable time after their delivery” and seasonably notified the seller of the rejection is ordinarily a question of fact for determination by a jury under all of the facts and circumstances of the case.”
Lipsey Motors v. Karp Motors, Inc., 389 S.E.2d 537 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 11-2-602 (3) “recognizes that wrongful rejections may occur and refers to [OCGA § 11-2-703] for the seller’s remedies in such event, one of which is an action for the price.”
Prudential Metal Supply Corp. v. Atl. Freight Sales Co., 419 S.E.2d 520 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 11-2-606. Acceptance of any part of a commercial unit is acceptance of the whole unit.”
Mauk v. Pioneer Ford Mercury, 709 S.E.2d 353 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 2× “Finally, if a buyer justifiably revokes her acceptance, OCGA § 11-2-711 (3) grants the buyer a security interest in the noncomforming goods for certain payments and expenses incurred, and even allows the buyer to resell the goods under certain circumstances.”
W. M. Hobbs, Ltd. v. Accusystems of Georgia, Inc., 339 S.E.2d 646 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 2× “” Continued use of the equipment in furtherance of the efficient running of its business is an “exercise of ownership” by appellant (OCGA § 11-2-602 (2) (a)) and an “act inconsistent with [appellee’s] ownership.”
— 11-2-602(1) — 3 cases
Atwood v. Se. Bedding Co., Inc., 485 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). “Nor does OCGA § 11-2-602 (1) apply, as there is no issue of timely notification of rejection but only timely notification of defects under OCGA § 11-2-607 (3) (a).”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.