CopyCited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 3, 1985 | 254 Ga. 615, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 289
...OCGA §
11-9-504 (3) provides that, "reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor. ..." OCGA §
11-9-105 (d) defines "debtor" as "the person who owes payment or other performance of the obligation secured, whether or not he has rights in the collateral, and includes the seller of accounts or chattel paper....
...1984) (stockholders of corporation who guaranteed obligation of corporation are debtors). The rationale common to these cases is that persons who face possible deficiency claims arising from a foreclosure sale continue to owe "other performance of the obligation secured," OCGA §
11-9-105 (1) (d), and have an interest in seeing that the collateral is sold for the best possible price....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 7, 1986 | 255 Ga. 718
...The question for decision in Barbree was whether Barbree was a "debtor" within the meaning of §
11-9-504 (3), thereby being entitled to notice of the sale of the repossessed collateral as a condition precedent to Allis-Chalmers' holding him liable for the deficiency. OCGA §
11-9-105 (d) defines "debtor" as "the person who owes payment or other performance of the obligation secured, whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral, and includes the seller of accounts or chattel paper....
...rs within the definition of debtor "where the context requires," and since the context there so required. However, in Barbree we did hold that it was unnecessary to decide whether Barbree was a guarantor or an endorser. In this regard, we noted that §
11-9-105 (d) specifically names sellers of chattel paper (of which Barbree was one) as among those who may be considered debtors who owe payment or other performance of the obligation secured....
...Commercial Bank, supra, and McNulty v. Codd, supra, had held that an endorser of a note is not a "debtor" entitled to notice under the provisions of §
11-9-504 (3). In Gray, the Court of Appeals held that although it could construe an endorser as a debtor under §
11-9-105 (d) because the endorser "owes payment" of the notice, it would instead follow the view "supported in certain of our sister states" that the meaning of "debtor" under §
11-9-504 (3) is limited to the owner of the collateral....
...es the fact that in most commercial dealings the endorser or guarantor has waived [as they have in this case] his rights to the collateral by allowing the secured party to release it in whole or in part, even without default. The provisions of [OCGA §
11-9-105 (d) limiting *721 the definition of `debtor' to `owner' in sections dealing with collateral anticipates this fact." 159 Ga....