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(Code 1981, §11-9-406, enacted by Ga. L. 2001, p. 362, § 1; Ga. L. 2010, p. 579, § 6/SB 131; Ga. L. 2013, p. 690, § 8/SB 185.)
The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, in the introductory paragraph of subsection (d), substituted "and 53-12-80 through 53-12-83" for "and 53-12-28" in the middle and substituted "shall be" for "is" near the end.
The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added ", other than a sale pursuant to a disposition under Code Section 11-9-610 or an acceptance of collateral under Code Section 11-9-620" at the end of subsection (e).
- For article, "Commercial Law," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 153 (2001).
- Trial court properly granted a surety's motion for summary judgment because the security interest in the accounts owed was covered by the Uniform Commercial Code, and to the extent that the anti-assignment clauses of the construction contract could be construed to prohibit the roofing company from assigning the surety's right to those accounts to the surety, the contracts were unenforceable as a matter of law under O.C.G.A. § 11-9-406(d)(1). State Dep't of Corr. v. Developers Sur. & Indem. Co., 324 Ga. App. 371, 750 S.E.2d 697 (2013).
Cited in Callaway Blue Springs, LLLP v. West Basin Capital, LLC, 341 Ga. App. 535, 801 S.E.2d 325 (2017).
- Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 9-406.
- Construction and application of U.C.C. § 9-406 and former U.C.C. § 9-318(3) providing that account debtor is authorized to pay assignor until receipt of notification to pay assignee, 35 A.L.R.6th 437.
Total Results: 7
Court: Ga. | Date Filed: 2017-10-30T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 302 Ga. 444, 807 S.E.2d 381
Snippet: 18-2-71 (3). And, as the trial court correctly noted, we must also consider the separate nonassignment provision of OCGA § 44-12-24 (What rights of action may and may not be assigned): Except for those situations governed by Code Sections 11-2-210 and 11-9-406, a right of action is assignable if it involves, directly or indirectly, a right of property. A right of action for personal torts, for legal malpractice, or for injuries arising from fraud to the assignor may not be assigned. Our Court of Appeals
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2017-06-05T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 341 Ga. App. 535, 801 S.E.2d 325, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 244
Snippet: assignments of such claims.” 18 But in Georgia, a separate statute sets forth certain claims that are not assignable. 19 Specifically, under OCGA § 44-12-24, [e]xcept for those situations governed by Code Sections 11-2-210 and 11-9-406, a right of action is assignable if it involves, directly or indirectly, a right of property[, but] [a] right of action for personal torts, for legal malpractice, or for injuries arising from fraud to the assignor may not be assigned.
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2015-10-22T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 334 Ga. App. 176, 778 S.E.2d 805
Snippet: has a “claim,” but nothing in the UFTA specifically addresses assignments of such claims. In Georgia, a separate statute delineates certain claims that are not assignable: Except for those situations governed by Code Sections 11-2-210 and 11-9-406, a right of action is assignable if it involves, directly or indirectly, a right of property. Aright of action for personal torts, for legal malpractice, or for injuries arising from fraud to the assignor may not be assigned. OCGA § 44-12-24
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2013-10-28T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 324 Ga. App. 371, 750 S.E.2d 697, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 3366, 2013 WL 5779779, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 847
Snippet: Surety. However, in its order, the trial court *377held that the anti-assignment clauses contained in the construction contract were unenforceable because “the Uniform Commercial Code [‘UCC’] at OCGA § 11-9-406 . . . nullifies these [a]nti-[assignment provisions.” GDOC argues that OCGA § 11-9-406 (d), the UCC provision prohibiting no-assignment clauses in contracts, does not apply in the present case because the construction contract between GDOC and Walker Roofing was not a “secured transaction”
Court: Ga. | Date Filed: 2013-03-18T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 292 Ga. 630, 740 S.E.2d 108, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 602
Snippet: decision of the Court of Appeals that legal malpractice claims are not per se unassignable is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. OCGA § 44-12-24 provides that “[e]xcept for those situations governed by Code Sections 11-2-210 and 11-9-406, a right of action is assignable if it involves, directly or indirectly, a right of property. Aright of action for personal torts or for injuries arising from fraud to the assignor may not be assigned.” The Court of Appeals ruled that appellants
Court: N.D. Ga. | Date Filed: 2006-03-28T00:00:00-08:00
Citation: 424 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 59 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 270, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19607, 2006 WL 826291
Snippet: The failure to give notice of an assignment simply allows the account debtor to pay the assignor directly, whereas providing notice requires the account debtor to pay the assignee in order to discharge its obligation. UCC § 9-406(a), O.C.G.A. § 11-9-406(a). Notification is for the benefit of the assignee, who would otherwise have no recourse against the account debtor if the assignor failed to forward payment that the account debtor made directly to the assignor. Thus, lack of notice has no effect
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 1988-01-26T00:00:00-08:00
Citation: 185 Ga. App. 632, 365 S.E.2d 490, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 177
Snippet: remedies of an unsecured creditor.” (Emphasis supplied and punctuation omitted.) ITT Terryphone Corp. v. Modems Plus, 171 Ga. App. 710, 712 (320 SE2d 784) (1984); McCullough v. Mobiland, Inc., 139 Ga. App. 260 (2) (228 SE2d 146) (1976); see also OCGA § 11-9-406. Decided January 26, 1988. David. R. Bundrick, for appellant. Jeffrey B. Talley, for appellee. The arguments raised by Curtis on appeal provide no ground for reversal of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Butler. Judgment affirmed.