O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 11-9-612 (2019)

Timeliness of notification before disposition of collateral

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section GA-LEGlegis.ga.gov (official) JustiaJustia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

(a) Reasonable time is question of fact. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, whether a notification is sent within a reasonable time is a question of fact.

(b) Ten-day period sufficient in nonconsumer transaction. In a transaction other than a consumer transaction, a notification of disposition sent after default and ten days or more before the earliest time of disposition set forth in the notification is sent within a reasonable time before the disposition.

History

Code 1981, § 11-9-612, enacted by Ga. L. 2001, p. 362, § 1.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, annotations decided under former Article 9 are included in the annotations for this Code section. For a table of comparable provisions, see the table at the beginning of the Article. Definition of O.C.G.A. § 11-1-201 not of itself sufficient for making determination. - Question of whether reasonable notification of time after which private sale or other intended disposition is to be made has been sent by secured party to debtor cannot be determined solely on definitional basis of former Code 1933, § 109A-1-201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 11-1201). Geohagan v. Commercial Credit Corp., 130 Ga. App. 828, 204 S.E.2d 784, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1276 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 109A-9-504). Notice stating intent to sell ten days from postmark. - Notice sent to debtor, at address given when debtor ex-

ecuted security agreement, by certified mail, return receipt requested, and received by debtor two days after mailing notifying debtor of creditor’s intention to sell collateral at private sale ten days after postmark was effective, was a satisfactory and reasonable method of notification. Motor Contract Co. v. Sawyer, 123 Ga. App. 207, 180 S.E.2d 282, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 1164 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 109A-9-504). Conflicting evidence presents jury question. - Where there is conflicting evidence as to nature and extent of debtor’s knowledge, debtor should not be estopped from raising lack of notice as a defense. Rather, question of “reasonable notification ” should be submitted to jury. Comfort Trane Air Conditioning Co. v. Trane Co., 592 F.2d 1373, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 15418 (5th Cir. 1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 109A-9-504).

RESEARCH REFERENCES U.L.A. Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 9612.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 2 cases, 2014–2014 · leading case: John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co. v. Parham, 755 S.E.2d 825 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co. v. Parham, 755 S.E.2d 825 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 4× “Parham also argues in passing that Deere’s notification was not timely under OCGA § 11-9-612. However, this argument is without merit.”
John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co. v. Carl S. Parham (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 4× “3 Parham also argues in passing that Deere’s notification was not timely under OCGA § 11-9-612. However, this argument is without merit.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.