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(Code 1981, §11-9-623, enacted by Ga. L. 2001, p. 362, § 1.)
- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Article 9 are included in the annotations of this section.
- Where the debtor is told by notification letter that he has ten days to redeem his repossessed collateral, but the collateral is sold after the tenth day, the debtor has not, as a matter of law, been notified that he can redeem his collateral at any time before the sale, as required by §§ 10-1-10 and11-9-506, and a verdict should be directed for the debtor when the creditor sues for a deficiency judgment. Credithrift of Am., Inc. v. Smith, 168 Ga. App. 45, 308 S.E.2d 53 (1983) (decided under former Code Section11-9-506).
Where debtors were informed that payment to redeem the collateral had to be made on or before 10 days from the date of the letter and were not informed that they had a right to redeem the collateral at any time before its sale, this section was violated. Bradford v. GECC, 183 Ga. App. 782, 359 S.E.2d 757, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 905, 359 S.E.2d 757 (1987) (decided under former Code Section11-9-506).
- Right to redeem collateral may be waived by written agreement after default, but not before default. Kellos v. Parker-Sharpe, Inc., 245 Ga. 130, 263 S.E.2d 138 (1980) (decided under former Code Section11-9-506).
§ 11-9-504(3). - Notice in accord with requirements of § 11-9-504(3), and which is not such as misled or prevented debtor from exercising his right of redemption under § 11-9-506, is sufficient to reasonably notify debtor of his rights. Motor Contract Co. v. Sawyer, 123 Ga. App. 207, 180 S.E.2d 282 (1971) (decided under former Code Section11-9-506).
- Act of secured party, in selling collateral without strict compliance with notice of sale provisions of § 11-9-504 precludes purchaser or owner from exercising his right of redemption under this section, and for that reason secured party cannot recover for deficiency owed him by purchaser. Braswell v. American Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968) (decided under former Code Section11-9-506).
Notice only of intention to sell without any notification of time is not in compliance with Uniform Commercial Code, as it precludes purchaser or owner from exercising his right of redemption, and therefore prevents recovery of deficiency. Motor Contract Co. v. Sawyer, 123 Ga. App. 207, 180 S.E.2d 282 (1971) (decided under former Code Section11-9-506).
Selling collateral without strict compliance with notice of sale provisions, thereby precluding purchaser or owner from exercising his right of redemption under this section, precludes second party from recovery for deficiency. GEMC Fed. Credit Union v. Shoemake, 151 Ga. App. 705, 261 S.E.2d 443 (1979) (decided under former Code Section11-9-506).
- Security agreement may impose various charges, not found in promissory note, in event of default. General Fin. Corp. v. Sprouse, 577 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1978) (decided under former Code Section 11-9-506).
- Where plaintiff materialman obtains lien against property and judgment against contractor who used materials, and judgment has not been satisfied, plaintiff is entitled to obtain judgment foreclosing his lien, but cannot enforce it by levy and sale until any prior security deed is satisfied. Bowen v. Kicklighter, 124 Ga. App. 82, 183 S.E.2d 10 (1971) (decided under former Code Section11-9-506).
- An option agreement executed at the same time as the mortgage, giving the mortgagor the option to purchase the collateral, constituted an impermissible attempt to defeat the mortgagee's right to redeem the collateral and could not enforced by specific performance. Lewis Broadcasting Corp. v. Phoenix Broadcasting Partners, 232 Ga. App. 94, 502 S.E.2d 254 (1998).
- Chapter 13 debtor's equipment and furnishings repossessed pre-petition by a creditor remained property of the estate and rightfully subject to turnover pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 542; the debtor could regain possession of the collateral that had been repossessed by redeeming the collateral pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 11-9-623. Dierkes v. Crawford Orthodontic Care, P.C. (In re Dierkes), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2005).
Cited in Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Rozier, 278 Ga. 52, 597 S.E.2d 367 (2004).
- 68A Am. Jur. 2d, Secured Transactions, §§ 564-571.
- 72 C.J.S., Pledges, §§ 47, 48.
- Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 9-623.
- Validity of agreement clogging equity of redemption from mortgage or pledge of personal property, 24 A.L.R. 822.
Jurisdiction of court of state other than that in which property is located to redeem from or enforce a chattel mortgage or debt secured thereby, 69 A.L.R. 622.
Doctrine of equitable conversion as affecting right of redemption from execution or judicial sale, 138 A.L.R. 1296.
Payment or discharge of principal obligation as affecting right of the pledgee to sue or continue pending suit against the maker of the collateral pledged, or judgment previously recovered on the collateral obligations, 157 A.L.R. 261.
Redemption rights of mortgager making timely tender but of inadequate amount because of officer's mistake, 52 A.L.R.2d 1327.
Total Results: 1
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2004-06-07
Citation: 597 S.E.2d 367, 278 Ga. 52, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 1875, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 31, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 470
Snippet: repossession, the right of redemption under OCGA § 11-9-623, and that this right is insufficient to constitute