O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 15-10-42 (2019)

Applicability of the Civil Practice Act

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Except as provided in subsection (g) of Code Sections 15-10-43 and 15-10-50, proceedings in the magistrate court shall not be subject to Chapter 11 of Title 9, the ‘‘Georgia Civil Practice Act.’’

History

Code 1981, § 15-10-42, enacted by Ga. L. 1983, p. 884, § 2-1; Ga. L. 2014, p. 482, § 4/SB 386.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 2014, p. 482,

§ 10/SB 386, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that this Act shall apply to any filings made on or after July 1, 2014.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Magistrate courts may follow Civil Practice Act. - Language of O.C.G.A. § 15-10-42, that magistrate courts are not subject to the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1 et seq., must be read to permit, rather than require, magistrate courts to follow the provisions of the Civil Practice Act, or any other appropriate rules and regulations relating to pleading, practice, and procedure when to do so would ‘‘administer justice’’ under O.C.G.A. § 15-10-44. Howe v. Roberts, 259 Ga. 617, 385 S.E.2d 276 (1989). Voluntary dismissal rule did not apply in magistrate court. - Trial court erred in relying on O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41 in finding that a tenant failed to object to the landlord’s voluntary dismissal of its magistrate court dispossessory action, resulting in the dismissal of the tenant’s counterclaim to that action; the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1 et seq., did not apply to magistrate court suits, O.C.G.A. §§ 15-10-40 and 15-10-42, and there was nothing to indicate that the magistrate court opted to follow the Civil Practice Act as permitted by O.C.G.A. § 15-10-44. Howell v. Beauly, LLC, 337 Ga. App. 898, 789 S.E.2d 214 (2016). Buyer’s denial of liability or indebtedness to seller satisfied O.C.G.A. § 15-10-43(c). - In magistrate court proceedings, the buyers were not required to specifically answer each allegation in a seller’s complaint, and the buyers were permitted to controvert liability through a general denial pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(b); thus, pretermitting whether the buyers’ answer met the requirements for a general denial under the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1 et seq., the

answer amounted to a sufficient response in the magistrate court, denying any liability or indebtedness to the seller. Jones v. Equip. King Int’l, 287 Ga. App. 867, 652 S.E.2d 811 (2007). Relation back of amendment. - Magistrate court was authorized to allow an amendment adding a corporate defendant to relate back to the initial filing. Howe v. Roberts, 259 Ga. 617, 385 S.E.2d 276 (1989). Constitutional right to jury trial in dispossessory actions. - After the appellants sought a jury trial in a local magistrate court on the issue of possession in a landlord-tenant dispute, the appellee denied the appellants’ request, the appellants filed a writ of prohibition against the appellee in the superior court, and the superior court denied the appellants’ writ and issued a certificate of immediate review to the Supreme Court of Georgia, the magistrate court did not err in denying the appellants a jury trial since the right to jury trial on appeal is expressly given in O.C.G.A. § 5-3-30, and the appellants are not being denied a jury trial, but instead, only endure a procedural delay in the magistrate court before receiving a jury trial on appeal to the state or superior court. Hill v. Levenson, 259 Ga. 395, 383 S.E.2d 110 (1989). Voluntary dismissal of magistrate court action was not res judicata. - Trial court erred by granting the debtors’ motion to dismiss by applying res judicata to the voluntary dismissal of the prior magistrate court actions because the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 15-10-42, was inapplicable to magistrate courts, thus, the voluntary dismissal under O.C.G.A.

§ 9-11-41(a)(1) did not operate as an adjudication upon the merits of the case. Target Nat’l Bank v. Luffman, 324 Ga. App. 442, 750 S.E.2d 750 (2013).

Cited in Jorree v. PMB Rentals, LLC, 349 Ga. App. 332, 825 S.E.2d 817 (2019).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Discovery is not available in post-judgment matters before the mag-

istrate court. 1984 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U84-24.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1989–2023 · leading case: Howe v. Roberts, 385 S.E.2d 276 (Ga. 1989).
Howe v. Roberts, 385 S.E.2d 276 (Ga. 1989). · cites it 4× “4 We agree with the Court of Appeals that proceedings in magistrate court are not directly subject to the Civil Practice Act by the express language to that effect in OCGA § 15-10-42. However, we disagree that the magistrate court had no authority for allowing the amendment.”
Howell Et Al. v. Beauly, LLC, 789 S.E.2d 214 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 2× “’” OCGA § 15-10-42. Rather, OCGA § 15-10-40 expressly provides: “This article shall govern civil proceedings in the magistrate court.”
Howe v. Roberts, 381 S.E.2d 117 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 26× “The Civil Practice Act cannot possibly be construed as a statute which is in pari materia with OCGA § 15-10-42. OCGA § 15-10-42 expressly states that “[proceedings in the magistrate court shall not be subject to Chapter 11 of Title 9, the ‘Georgia Civil Practice Act.”
Jones v. Equip. King Int'l, 652 S.E.2d 811 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 2× “13 See OCGA § 15-10-42; UMCR 38; but see Howe v.”
Hill v. Levenson, 383 S.E.2d 110 (Ga. 1989). “Section 15-10-41 provides that no jury trials shall be had in the magistrate court and § 15-10-42 provides that proceedings in the magistrate court are not subject to OCGA § 9-11-38.”
Oh v. Bell, 470 S.E.2d 807 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 2× “Although the compulsory counterclaim provisions of OCGA § 9-11-13 (a) of the Civil Practice Act did not apply in the magistrate court action brought by Oh (OCGA § 15-10-42; see Howe v. Roberts, 259 Ga.”
Target Nat'l Bank v. Luffman, 750 S.E.2d 750 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 15-10-42 (“Civil Practice Act inapplicable to magistrate courts.”
Brown v. Adams, 506 S.E.2d 135 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 2× “Although OCGA § 15-10-42 makes the Civil Practice Act inapplicable to magistrate courts, 2 OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) outlines the finality of an “involuntary dismissal.”
Ron Leslie v. Ppf Amli Roxboro Road, LLC D/B/A Amil Buckhead Apts. (Ga. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 4× “See OCGA § 15-10-42 (e). Leslie thereafter moved pursuant to OCGA § 15-10-42 (g) to set aside the default.”
Basmatie Jorree v. Pmb Rentals, LLC (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “”11 Under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (1), however, “[a] motion to set aside may be brought to set aside a judgment based upon [l]ack of jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter[.”
Strickland v. Alexander, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2015). · cites it 2× “’” O.C.G.A. § 15-10-42. Furthermore, even though the procedure in garnishment cases filed both in state court, as in this case, and in magistrate court “shall be subject to Chapter 4 of Title 18,” O.”
Butler v. Joseph, 605 S.E.2d 823 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 2× “See OCGA§ 15-10-42. (Citations omitted.) Franchell, supra.”
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