Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-401, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-62 and pre-2014 Code Sections 15-11-2 and 15-11-5, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

No exclusive original jurisdiction over certain youthful offenders.

- Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1 does not vest exclusive original jurisdiction in the juvenile court over the following class of youthful offenders: persons between the ages of 17 and 21 years, who have committed noncapital felonies, and who are under the supervision of or are on probation to a juvenile court for acts of delinquency committed before reaching the age of 17 years. State v. Crankshaw, 243 Ga. 183, 253 S.E.2d 69 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-401).

Contempt power not limited to adults, but applicable to juveniles as well.

- There was nothing in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5 to indicate an intent to limit the contempt power of any Georgia court to adults alone. In the Interest of P.W., 289 Ga. App. 323, 657 S.E.2d 270 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

When criminal contemnor is a child, the case is recognized to be a juvenile matter, and a contempt of court proceeding can be viewed as a delinquency proceeding predicated on an allegation that the juvenile has committed criminal contempt of court. In re J.E.H., 202 Ga. App. 29, 413 S.E.2d 227 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-62).

Error in finding contempt.

- Because a custody transfer order had not been filed with the court clerk, in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58(b), when an administrative employee allegedly failed to comply with the order, the trial court erred by finding the employee in contempt under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5(a). In the Interest of K.D., 272 Ga. App. 803, 613 S.E.2d 239 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Because a written order issued by a juvenile court did not show deprivation of the child with regard to the child's father, the order was void to the extent the order directed removal of the child from the father's home, and a later contempt finding based on the trial court's void order was a nullity. The trial court's direction as to removal of the child was not binding and the court's later contempt finding based on that order was improper. In re Tidwell, 279 Ga. App. 734, 632 S.E.2d 690 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Order holding an attorney in contempt pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5 was improper because, inter alia, the trial court immediately imposed punishment and did not provide the attorney the opportunity to speak on the attorney's own behalf, the attorney was not put on notice that a continuation of the offending conduct would have constituted contempt, it was highly unlikely that the attorney's allegedly offending conduct should have had any impact on the deliberations of the factfinder, a juvenile judge, and the trial court acted without warning and had obviously lost the court's patience with the attorney and the attorney's client and imposed sanctions for contempt when other actions might have achieved the same result without the disruption to the case that these contempt citations caused. In re Hughes, 299 Ga. App. 66, 681 S.E.2d 745 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Father properly held in contempt.

- In a situation where a juvenile protective order required a father to bring the father's son to the son's probation officer as required by the officer, and did not limit the number of visits, sufficient evidence supported a contempt finding against the father based on the father's decision to forgo a meeting requested by the probation officer. In re Liles, 278 Ga. App. 496, 629 S.E.2d 492 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Attorney not in contempt.

- Although a juvenile court has the power to hold a party in contempt of court, a juvenile court erred by holding an attorney in contempt based on a per se rule. The juvenile court determined that a per se rule existed that an attorney was in contempt when the attorney claimed ineffectiveness against themselves, but no such per se rule existed and, therefore, it was error to have adjudicated the attorney in contempt. Morris v. State, 295 Ga. App. 579, 672 S.E.2d 531 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Criminal contempt finding and resulting sentence upheld.

- Juvenile court properly held a juvenile defendant in contempt for not writing a required letter of apology and essay on courtroom conduct and for violating electronic monitoring, and sentenced the juvenile to 20 days in detention: (1) the juvenile court had the authority to order the defendant to write the letter and essay; (2) former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5 did not limit the contempt power of a Georgia court to adults; and (3) juvenile courts had the power to punish contempt by imprisonment. In the Interest of P.W., 289 Ga. App. 323, 657 S.E.2d 270 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Cited in In the Interest of C. W., 342 Ga. App. 484, 803 S.E.2d 618 (2017).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contempt, § 33 et seq. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 6.

C.J.S.

- 17 C.J.S., Contempt, § 84 et seq.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 58.

ALR.

- Who may institute civil contempt proceedings, 61 A.L.R.2d 1083.

Court's power to punish for contempt a child within the age group subject to jurisdiction of juvenile court, 77 A.L.R.2d 1004.

Interference with enforcement of judgment in criminal or juvenile delinquent case as contempt, 8 A.L.R.3d 657.

Media's dissemination of material in violation of injunction or restraining order as contempt - federal cases, 91 A.L.R. Fed. 270.