O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29 (2019)

Protective orders

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) In any proceeding under this chapter, either on application of a party or on the court’s own motion, the court may make an order restraining or otherwise controlling the conduct of a person if due notice of the application or motion and the grounds therefor and an opportunity to be heard thereon have been given to the person against whom the order is directed. Such an order may require any such person: (1) To stay away from a person’s home or a child; (2) To permit a parent to visit his or her child at stated periods; (3) To abstain from offensive conduct against a child, his or her parent, or any person to whom custody of such child is awarded; (4) To give proper attention to the care of his or her home; (5) To cooperate in good faith with an agency to which custody of a child is entrusted by the court or with an agency or association to which a child is referred by the court;

(6) To refrain from acts of commission or omission that tend to make a home not a proper place for a child; (7) To ensure that a child attends school pursuant to any valid law relating to compulsory attendance; (8) To participate with a child in any counseling or treatment deemed necessary after consideration of employment and other family needs; and (9) To enter into and complete successfully a substance abuse program approved by the court. (b) After notice and opportunity for hearing afforded to a person subject to a protective order, a protective order may be modified or extended for a further specified period, or both, or may be terminated if the court finds that the best interests of the child and the public will be served thereby. (c) Protective orders may be enforced by citation to show cause for contempt of court by reason of any violation thereof and, where protection of the welfare of a child so requires, by the issuance of a warrant to take the alleged violator into custody and bring him or her before the court.

History

Code 1981, § 15-11-29, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-57 and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-11, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor’s notes at the beginning of the chapter. Psychological counseling. - Juvenile court order requiring a noncustodial parent to seek psychological counseling with a particular psychologist who is located 50 miles from the residence and work of the noncustodial parent is unreasonable and has to be stricken. In re A.S., 185 Ga. App. 11, 363 S.E.2d 325 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-57).

Order was not a protective order. - When a trial court, upon finding a mother’s children were deprived, left the children’s custody with the mother upon certain conditions, this was not a protective order, despite the fact that this was what was prayed for at the hearing resulting in the order, but it was, rather, a deprivation order under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55(a)(1) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-212), so, when the specified conditions were violated, the trial court was not limited to the remedies available in the protection order statute, but was authorized to remove the children from the mother’s custody. In the Interest of S.Y., 264 Ga. App. 623, 591 S.E.2d 489 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-11).

RESEARCH REFERENCES C.J.S. - 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 4 et seq. U.L.A. - Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) §§ 53, 54.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24 cases, 1993–2017 · leading case: Lewis v. Winzenreid, 435 S.E.2d 602 (Ga. 1993).
Lewis v. Winzenreid, 435 S.E.2d 602 (Ga. 1993). · cites it 12× “[OCGA § 15-11-29.] Any challenge to the service or to the temporary order must be made by the appellant in the juvenile court where the proceedings are still pending.”
In the Interest of D. D., 651 S.E.2d 817 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 4× “VI; OCGA § 15-11-29 (a). Cases against juveniles alleging delinquent conduct may be brought in either the county of the juvenile’s residence or the county in which the allegedly delinquent acts occurred.”
In the Interest of C. H., Child., 805 S.E.2d 637 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “" However, these conditions did not constitute a protective order as defined in OCGA § 15-11-29. See In the Interest of S.”
In the Interest of C. R., 665 S.E.2d 39 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 15-11-29 (a) provides that a juvenile proceeding “may be commenced in the county in which the child resides,” or “[i]f deprivation is alleged, the proceeding may be brought in the county in which the child is present when it is commenced.”
In the Interest of B. R., 656 S.E.2d 172 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 2× “See also OCGA§ 15-11-29. Jones, supra at 904-905 (4), citing Wilkett v.”
In the Interest of R. J. D. B., 700 S.E.2d 898 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 15-11-29 (a) provides that a juvenile proceeding “may be commenced in the county in which the child resides,” or “[i]f deprivation is alleged, the proceeding may be brought in the county in which the child is present when it is commenced.”
In the Interest of T. B. R., 480 S.E.2d 901 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 2× “After several unsuccessful attempts to locate Robison, DFCS *472 petitioned the court to allow service by publication, as allowed by OCGA §§ 15-11-29 and 9-11-4 (e) (1); the petition was granted and service was effected on May 3, 1996.”
In the Interest of J. B., 658 S.E.2d 194 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 15-11-29 (a).” In the Interest of D.”
In the Interest of M. C., 744 S.E.2d 436 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 15-11-29 (a).’ [Cit.]” In the Interest of J.”
In the Interest of B. T. H., 757 S.E.2d 167 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “*535 OCGA § 15-11-29 (a) 3 of the juvenile code provides as to venue: A proceeding under this article may be commenced in the county in which the child resides.”
In the Interest of R. B., 710 S.E.2d 611 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 15-11-29 (a) provides that a juvenile proceeding “may be commenced in the county in which the child resides,” or “[i]f deprivation is alleged, the proceeding may be brought in the county in which the child is present when it is commenced.”
In the Interest of A. J. M., 627 S.E.2d 399 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 2× “was under DFACS’s custody and control, and that she had been in its custody since March 8, 2005 under an emergency shelter care order.”
— 15-11-29(a) — 7 cases
In Re Bas, 563 S.E.2d 141 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
In Re Dd, 651 S.E.2d 817 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
In Re Cr, 665 S.E.2d 39 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
In Re Ajm, 627 S.E.2d 399 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
In Re Jb, 658 S.E.2d 194 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.