Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, §§ 24-2402, 24-2408 and 24A-301, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-5, pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-28, former Code 1933, § 24A-2301, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-34, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-55, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Additionally, many of the annotations found under this Code section were taken from cases decided prior to the adoption of the 1983 Constitution. See Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. I and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I.

Deprivation proceeding not a custody dispute.

- Because the pleadings established that the petition was a properly filed and factually supported deprivation petition, and due to the presence of unchallenged, valid allegations of deprivation, the deprivation proceeding was not a disguised custody matter; accordingly, the juvenile court properly exercised the court's jurisdiction over the proceeding. In the Interest of K.L.H., 281 Ga. App. 394, 636 S.E.2d 117 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Proceeding for termination of parental rights is custody controversy involving deprived child. Moss v. Moss, 233 Ga. 688, 212 S.E.2d 853 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Actions in which one parent seeks termination of the parental rights of the other parent by means of a deprivation petition are not all prima facie custody cases and it is not required that all such actions must be filed in superior court. In re M.C.J., 271 Ga. 546, 523 S.E.2d 6 (1999), reversing In re W. W. W., 213 Ga. App. 732, 445 S.E.2d 832 (1994); In re M.A., 218 Ga. App. 433, 461 S.E.2d 600 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5); In re M.C.J., 236 Ga. App. 225, 511 S.E.2d 533 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(a)(2)(C), the superior court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to terminate the husband's parental rights because the biological father's petition to legitimate a child who was born in wedlock was a petition to terminate the parental rights of the legal father; after the superior court determined that the biological father had not abandoned his opportunity interest, the issue became whether the superior court could grant the petition to legitimate the child, and to grant the legitimation petition required the superior court to first terminate the parental rights of the husband, who was the legal father. Brine v. Shipp, 291 Ga. 376, 729 S.E.2d 393 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Custody dispute of orphaned children.

- In a custody dispute involving children orphaned by the murder-suicide of their parents, a superior court did not err in denying an aunt's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because the superior court correctly held that, in the absence of an earlier-filed action in juvenile court or probate court, it was the first court to take jurisdiction and properly retained jurisdiction. Stone-Crosby v. Mickens-Cook, 318 Ga. App. 313, 733 S.E.2d 842 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Superior court in habeas corpus action for child custody lacks authority to enter order terminating parental rights. Dein v. Mossman, 244 Ga. 866, 262 S.E.2d 83 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

General requirements necessary to terminate parental rights.

- Generally, the requirements necessary to terminate the parental rights of the mother are deprivation, probable continued deprivation, and that the child will probably suffer serious emotional harm. Beasley v. Jones, 149 Ga. App. 317, 254 S.E.2d 472 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Definition of "full age."

- One becomes of "full age" on the day preceding the anniversary of one's birth, on the first moment of that day. Edmonds v. State, 154 Ga. App. 650, 269 S.E.2d 512 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Child turned 17 on the earliest moment of the day before juvenile's birthday.

- Delinquency petition against a juvenile was properly transferred to the state court on the ground that the juvenile was arrested for possessing marijuana on the day before the juvenile's seventeenth birthday; pursuant to former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-28 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-10,15-11-11,15-11-212, and15-11-560), the juvenile was deemed to have been 17 at the earliest moment of the day before the juvenile's birthday, which was the day the juvenile was arrested. In the Interest of A.P.S., 304 Ga. App. 513, 696 S.E.2d 483 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Defendant claimed under 17 at the time offenses were committed.

- Superior court had authority to try the defendant who claimed to be under 17 at the time the offenses were committed since the jury was instructed that the defendant should be found guilty only if the defendant committed the alleged acts after the defendant turned 17. Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. App. 319, 447 S.E.2d 663 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Referral from superior court to juvenile court for special findings.

- Since a custody case was referred to the juvenile court for only an investigation and report with the judgment of the superior court resting on these findings as well as testimony and other evidence before the superior court, the superior court's judgment was not void, but at most was voidable only if an appeal had been perfected. Jackson v. Gamble, 232 Ga. 149, 205 S.E.2d 256 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Custody case could not determine other civil issues.

- Because the trial court relied upon documents other than the pleadings, a motion to dismiss should in fact have been treated as a motion for summary judgment; a juvenile court had no jurisdiction over claims of fraud, breach of contract, perjury, and defamation made by a former husband against his former wife, and thus, a custody case between parties which was litigated in juvenile court was not an adjudication of the husband's claim for purposes of res judicata. Litsky v. Schaub, 269 Ga. App. 254, 603 S.E.2d 754 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Order addressing issue not raised was a nullity.

- Since a written order issued by a juvenile court did not show deprivation of the child with regard to the child's father, and since all parties stipulated that the child was not deprived with regard to the child's father, the order was void to the extent the order directed removal of the child from the father's home; moreover, to the extent that a later contempt finding was based on the trial court's void order, it was a nullity; the trial court's direction as to removal of the child was not binding and the court's later contempt finding based on that order was improper. In re Tidwell, 279 Ga. App. 734, 632 S.E.2d 690 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Termination of parental rights via divorce decree.

- Under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(a)(2)(C) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11, and15-11-212), except in connection with an adoption proceeding, a juvenile court was the sole court for an action involving any proceeding for the termination of parental rights. However, the parent affirmatively invoked the jurisdiction of the superior court for the purpose of obtaining the divorce, consented to the superior court's incorporation of the settlement agreement, and then failed to file a motion to set aside the judgment of divorce for four years; thus, the parent's acts and omissions estopped the parent from attacking the divorce judgment. Amerson v. Vandiver, 285 Ga. 49, 673 S.E.2d 850 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Deprivation and termination of parental rights.

- Juvenile court shall be sole court for initiating action for termination of legal parent-child relationship. Dein v. Mossman, 244 Ga. 866, 262 S.E.2d 83 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases involving deprivation and termination of parental rights. Abrams v. Daffron, 155 Ga. App. 182, 270 S.E.2d 278 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Superior court has jurisdiction to consider termination of the rights of a putative father only "in connection with adoption proceedings." Alexander v. Guthrie, 216 Ga. App. 460, 454 S.E.2d 805 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider divorced mother's petition for termination of the father's parental rights. In re A.D.B., 232 Ga. App. 697, 503 S.E.2d 596 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving termination of parental rights. The juvenile court properly exercised jurisdiction over a grandmother's petition to terminate a mother's parental rights because the grandmother already had custody of the children and the mother was facing allegations of having deprived her children. In the Interest of K.N.C., 264 Ga. App. 475, 590 S.E.2d 792 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Matters relating to custody and visitation.

- Superior and juvenile courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction over all matters relating to custody and visitation, except in those situations in which exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the superior court. In re D.N.M., 193 Ga. App. 812, 389 S.E.2d 336, cert. denied, 193 Ga. App. 910, 389 S.E.2d 336 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Concurrent jurisdiction over custody issues.

- Subsection (c) of this section is applicable only in those cases where the juvenile court and the superior court have concurrent jurisdiction and custody is the subject of controversy. Brooks v. Leyva, 147 Ga. App. 616, 249 S.E.2d 628 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

No error to transfer case to juvenile court for investigation.

- If a change of circumstances is alleged subsequent to a decree of divorce awarding custody of a minor child to one of the two parties, it is not error for the judge of the superior court to transfer the investigation thus called for to the juvenile court for investigation. Slate v. Coggins, 181 Ga. 17, 181 S.E. 145 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2402).

Decree of divorce in a case in which the custody of a minor child is involved, awarding the child to one party or the other, is final, except when a change of circumstances is shown; when such change is alleged, it is not error for the judge of the superior court to transfer the investigation thus called for to the juvenile court for investigation. Fortson v. Fortson, 197 Ga. 699, 30 S.E.2d 165 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2402).

Since there was evidence that the living conditions and conduct of children, subjects of a custody award in a divorce decree, were much worse than as shown upon a former trial, the judge did not err in transferring the investigation to the juvenile court for trial and determination. Fortson v. Fortson, 197 Ga. 699, 30 S.E.2d 165 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2402).

In custody litigation, the juvenile court errs in hearing a case in which there is no order transferring the case from the superior court. Further, if an order of a juvenile court fails to recite the jurisdictional facts (i.e., such facts as are necessary to give it jurisdiction of the person and subject matter), the judgment is void. Lockhart v. Stancil, 258 Ga. 634, 373 S.E.2d 355 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5); In re W.W.W., 213 Ga. App. 732, 445 S.E.2d 832 (1994) but see In re M.C.J., 271 Ga. 546, 523 S.E.2d 6 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Juvenile court cannot modify superior court's custody determination.

- Juvenile court, without proper transfer from superior court, is without authority to modify custody provisions of the final divorce decree in regard to the mother's visitation privileges. In re M.M.A., 174 Ga. App. 898, 332 S.E.2d 39 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5) Owen v. Owen, 183 Ga. App. 472, 359 S.E.2d 229 (1987);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

No equal protection violation.

- Treating deprived children who were placed in the legal custody of the Department of Families and Children Services because there was no relative committed to the child who was available for immediate placement differently from deprived children who did have a committed parent or guardian available for immediate placement did not violate the equal protection clause or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II. as the classes were not similarly situated and the laws were rationally related to the goal of minimizing government intervention while ensuring that children were reared in a familial environment. In the Interest of A.N., 281 Ga. 58, 636 S.E.2d 496 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

In a deprivation proceeding, the department of family and child services did not violate equal protection by requiring the parents to pay part of the costs for services mandated under their case plan. The department was not drawing a distinction between similarly situated parties in that a parent who could afford to contribute financially was not similarly situated to one who could not afford to do so; moreover, even if the parents were similarly situated to others who were not required to pay for a portion of services, the goals served by the contribution requirement of requiring parents to take responsibility for conduct that harmed their children and of increasing the likelihood of success for family reunification represented legitimate governmental purposes. In the Interest of P.N., 291 Ga. App. 512, 662 S.E.2d 287 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Determination that deprivation proceeding was not custody dispute.

- Because the pleadings established that a deprivation petition was properly filed and factually supported, and due to the presence of unchallenged, valid allegations of deprivation, the deprivation proceeding was not a disguised custody matter; accordingly, the juvenile court properly exercised the court's jurisdiction over the proceeding. In the Interest of K.L.H., 281 Ga. App. 394, 636 S.E.2d 117 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Authority of juvenile courts to transfer legal custody.

- Juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction over deprivation proceedings, and the juvenile court had the authority to order the disposition best suited to the needs of the children including the transfer of temporary legal custody. In re A.L.L., 211 Ga. App. 767, 440 S.E.2d 517 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

Juvenile court erred in awarding custody of a child to the father even after finding that the child was not deprived because according to a plain reading of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55(a)(2) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-211 and15-11-212), the juvenile court was without authority to transfer custody of the child to the father and paternal grandmother; while under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(c)(1) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-11) the juvenile court had concurrent jurisdiction to hear and determine the issue of custody and support when the issue was transferred by proper order of the superior court, no such order existed in the record, and instead, the juvenile court specifically found that the child was not deprived. In re T.S., 310 Ga. App. 100, 712 S.E.2d 121 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

No need to repeat evidence already presented during adjudicatory portion.

- There is no error in refusing to have the dispositional phase include a repetition of the same evidence and witnesses previously presented during the adjudicatory portion. D.C.A. v. State, 135 Ga. App. 234, 217 S.E.2d 470 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2301).

Standard of proof for finding deprivation.

- If deprivation forms the predicate upon which a third party seeks a temporary transfer of the child's legal custody, in order to support such a disposition the child must first be adjudicated to be a deprived child. By statute, that finding of deprivation must be made by "clear and convincing evidence." In re J.C.P., 167 Ga. App. 572, 307 S.E.2d 1 (1983); but see In re A.W., 240 Ga. App. 259, 523 S.E.2d 88 (1999).(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

Juvenile courts are given wide discretion once deprivation is found to either terminate the rights of the parent or issue an order under former Code 1933, § 24A-2301 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-212). Painter v. Barkley, 157 Ga. App. 69, 276 S.E.2d 850 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2301).

When a trial court, upon finding a mother's children were deprived, left their custody with the mother upon certain conditions, this was not a protective order, despite the fact that this was what was prayed for at the hearing resulting in the order, but it was, rather, a deprivation order under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55(a)(1) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-1-212), so, when the specified conditions were violated, the trial court was not limited to the remedies available in the protection order statute, but was authorized to remove the children from the mother's custody. In the Interest of S.Y., 264 Ga. App. 623, 591 S.E.2d 489 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Physical and legal custody may not be divided.

- Former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-212) did not authorize the court to transfer "legal custody" of the child to one person or agency while awarding another person or agency the right to physical custody. In re R.R.M.R., 169 Ga. App. 373, 312 S.E.2d 832 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

Juvenile court erred in awarding legal custody of two children to the Department of Family and Children Services (DFACS) and then ordering that physical custody be given to the maternal grandparents as: (1) once legal custody of a deprived child had been granted to DFACS, the juvenile court could not dictate physical custody; (2) nothing in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55(a)(2) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-211) allowed any redefinition of legal custody as defined in O.C.G.A. § 49-5-3(12); (3) using the rules of construction, former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55(a)(2) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-211) followed the statutory and legal precedent that the grant of legal custody to DFACS included the right to determine physical custody; and (4) the 2003 amendment to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-211 and15-11-212) did not reject the statutory definition of legal custody. In the Interest of A.N., 281 Ga. 58, 636 S.E.2d 496 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Finding of parental unfitness is essential to support an adjudication of present deprivation since parental rights are terminated as well as the transfer of temporary or permanent custody to a third party. In re J.C.P., 167 Ga. App. 572, 307 S.E.2d 1 (1983); but see In re A.W., 240 Ga. App. 259, 523 S.E.2d 88 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

Circumstances in which custody may be lost.

- Custody may be lost if a child is found to be destitute or suffering, if the child is being reared under immoral influences, or if the child is found to be deprived and likely to be harmed thereby. In re M.M.A., 166 Ga. App. 620, 305 S.E.2d 139 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

Prima-facie right of custodial parent.

- In a contest between the parents, the award of custody by a divorce court vests the custodial parent with a prima facie right. Ordinarily, the trial court should favor the parent having such a right. In re M.M.A., 166 Ga. App. 620, 305 S.E.2d 139 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

Overcoming prima-facie right.

- In order to forfeit the custodial parent's prima-facie right to custody, the court must find either that the original custodian is no longer able or suited to retain custody or that conditions surrounding the child have so changed that modification of the original judgment would have the effect of promoting the child's welfare. It is a change for the worse in the conditions of the child's present home environment rather than any purported change for the better in the environment of the noncustodial parent that the law contemplates under this theory. In re M.M.A., 166 Ga. App. 620, 305 S.E.2d 139 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

Habeas relief when no showing of compliance with statute.

- When the parents in their petition seeking return of their children, allege that there had been no hearing as required by former Code 1933, § 24A-1701 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39), and the record of prior juvenile court proceedings was silent as to whether such a hearing was ever set, continued, or held, and since the hearing requirement of former Code 1933, § 24A-1701 was mandatory, the defendant County Family and Children Services Department did not show compliance with the hearing requirement, and the parents stated claims for habeas relief which may be granted. Chaffins v. Lowndes County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 243 Ga. 528, 255 S.E.2d 360 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2301).

No habeas corpus if court enters orders.

- Habeas corpus will not lie if the juvenile court, after notice and hearing, enters an order pursuant to former provisions an disposition of deprived children. Chaffins v. Lowndes County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 243 Ga. 528, 255 S.E.2d 360 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2301).

Temporary custody order does not deprive all parental rights.

- An order of the juvenile court awarding custody of a child to a named individual pending further order of the court, not having awarded itself permanent custody of the child, does not deprive the parents of all parental rights or the right to notice in an adoption proceeding. Jackson v. Anglin, 193 Ga. 737, 19 S.E.2d 914 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, Chs. 24-24 and Ga. L. 1941, p. 300).

Orders beyond court's authority.

- Since the record contained no support for a finding that three children, ranging in age from nine to 13, suffered any deprivation as a result of their living conditions, it was beyond the court's authority to order that the children be "encouraged to communicate and have contact with neighbors," and it was none of the state's business whether the children were allowed to sleep outside at night, so long as that was what the children were happy doing and no ill effects could be attributed to it. In re D.H., 178 Ga. App. 119, 342 S.E.2d 367 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

Limited restraining order appropriate disposition.

- Since a juvenile attacked a store detective, and subsequently displayed violent behavior and threatened another store employee, the court's conclusion that the juvenile was in need of treatment and rehabilitation, and the court's limited restraining order preventing the juvenile from entering any store owned by the company in Fulton County, except in the immediate presence of a parent or adult relative, was an appropriate disposition and justified by the evidence. In re J.M., 237 Ga. App. 298, 513 S.E.2d 742 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

Consideration of parent's behavior at hearing.

- Consideration by a juvenile court of a noncustodial parent's behavior in a hearing to determine the need for continuing the temporary suspension of custody does not deprive a noncustodial parent of due process. In re A.S., 185 Ga. App. 11, 363 S.E.2d 325 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

Recommendations by juvenile court.

- Juvenile court does not exceed the court's authority in a hearing to determine the need for continuing the temporary suspension of custody by making recommendations as to the placement, care, and supervision of a child. In re A.S., 185 Ga. App. 11, 363 S.E.2d 325 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

If a juvenile court's finding as to custody is in the nature of a recommendation to the superior court, the custody issue remains pending below and is not before the appellate court on appeal. In the Interest of M.E., 265 Ga. App. 412, 593 S.E.2d 924 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Court not required to follow recommended disposition.

- In a deprivation proceeding, the trial court was authorized to find that a child's deprivation resulted from the mother's unfitness in failing to protect the child from sexual abuse and in refusing to believe the child's allegations against the child's father. Thus, the trial court was not required to follow a recommended disposition that the child be returned to the mother, who had stipulated to the petition in return for a recommendation by the Department of Family and Children Services and the child advocate that the child be returned to the mother. Finally, after refusing to return the child to the mother, the court did not err in not allowing the mother to withdraw the mother's stipulation to the allegations of the petition since there was no indication that the stipulation was conditional on the trial court's acceptance of the parties' proposed disposition or that the stipulation was obtained by fraud or mistake. In re R. J. M., 295 Ga. App. 886, 673 S.E.2d 527 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Visitation rights of a parent of a child in custody of the Department of Family and Children Services are a residual "parental tie" which is not severed by the mere placement of the child in the temporary custody of the department, without a specific finding as to that right. In re K.B., 188 Ga. App. 199, 372 S.E.2d 476 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

Reasonable efforts at reunification required.

- Disposition portion of the Juvenile Court's order giving temporary legal custody of the child to relatives failed to comply with the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-134, and15-11-201) because the order did not contain the necessary findings about reasonable efforts by any appropriate agencies to reunify a parent with the child and foreclosed any consideration of a plan to provide reunification services. In the Interest of J.W.K., 254 Ga. App. 661, 563 S.E.2d 514 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Retransfer provision necessary.

- Because an order finding that children adopted by their grandparent were deprived did not contain a provision under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55(a)(2) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-212) stating the circumstances under which the children would be returned to the grandparent's care, the case was remanded for the trial court to enter such a provision. In the Interest of T.R., 284 Ga. App. 742, 644 S.E.2d 880 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Determination that deprivation proceeding not custody dispute.

- Juvenile court did not have jurisdiction of a deprivation proceeding brought against a mother brought by the child's temporary guardian in a transparent attempt to use the juvenile court to seek custody of the child. In re B.C.P., 229 Ga. App. 111, 493 S.E.2d 258 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Specific custody controversies not within supreme court appellate jurisdiction.

- Custody controversies involving delinquent children, unruly children, or deprived children are not cases "in the nature of habeas corpus" and are not within the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court. Moss v. Moss, 233 Ga. 688, 212 S.E.2d 853 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Juvenile court does not lose jurisdiction if agency has custody.

- That a "deprived child" may be in agency custody at the time of the hearing on termination of parental rights does not oust the juvenile court from jurisdiction to determine the ultimate issue. In re K.C.O., 142 Ga. App. 216, 235 S.E.2d 602 (1977) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Petition to terminate the parental rights to a child previously adjudicated "deprived" and in agency custody is cognizable in the juvenile court. In re K.C.O., 142 Ga. App. 216, 235 S.E.2d 602 (1977) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Juvenile court has jurisdiction despite indictment for noncapital felony.

- Indictment of a juvenile for a noncapital felony in the superior court does not oust the juvenile court of the court's first obtained jurisdiction under the Georgia Constitution and statute law. J.W.A. v. State, 233 Ga. 683, 212 S.E.2d 849 (1975), commented on in 27 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Juvenile court not divested of jurisdiction unless transfer proceeding held.

- Since jurisdiction is first acquired by the juvenile court, a subsequent superior court indictment does not divest the juvenile court of the juvenile court's jurisdiction unless a proper transfer proceeding has been held. Hartley v. Clack, 239 Ga. 113, 236 S.E.2d 63 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Superior court referral of custody case retained juvenile court's jurisdiction.

- Jurisdiction of divorce in superior court, and referral by the superior court to the juvenile court for custody determination, gave the juvenile court jurisdiction over the custody issue. Order by the superior court, in response to a party's motion for modification of custody, when the custody issue had not yet been resolved by the juvenile court, was void. Owen v. Owen, 195 Ga. App. 545, 394 S.E.2d 580 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Juvenile court did not retain jurisdiction to hear grandparents' petition for permanent custody after determining that the mother's four children were deprived since the grandparents' complaint for permanent custody was not in the nature of a deprivation petition and did not allege that the grandparents should be granted permanent custody of the children on the basis that the children were deprived. In re C.C., 193 Ga. App. 120, 387 S.E.2d 46 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Jurisdiction over children born in U.S. to Mexican citizens.

- Juvenile court had jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of Mexican citizens because, when the termination petition was filed, the children, who were born in the United States, were citizens of Georgia and thereby entitled to the protection of Georgia law, which specifically provides for the termination of parental rights. In the Interest of J.H., 244 Ga. App. 788, 536 S.E.2d 805 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Transferral of custody habeas corpus case by superior court.

- In a custody controversy in the nature of habeas corpus, the juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction to decide the issue only if the case is transferred to the juvenile court by proper order of the superior court; and in such a transferred case, appellate jurisdiction is lodged in the supreme court of this state. In re J.R.T., 233 Ga. 204, 210 S.E.2d 684 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301); Moss v. Moss, 233 Ga. 688, 212 S.E.2d 853 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Original and appellate jurisdiction in certain custody controversies.

- Juvenile court has original jurisdiction in a custody controversy involving a delinquent child, an unruly child, or a deprived child and appellate jurisdiction in such cases is vested in the court of appeals. In re J.R.T., 233 Ga. 204, 210 S.E.2d 684 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301); Moss v. Moss, 233 Ga. 688, 212 S.E.2d 853 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Jurisdiction over offenses committed when juvenile 16.

- Juvenile court retained jurisdiction over the defendant for an offense the defendant committed when the defendant was 16 years old until the entry of the court's order transferring the case to the superior court. In re D.L., 228 Ga. App. 503, 492 S.E.2d 273 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Lack of jurisdiction to award permanent custody.

- Judgment was reversed because the juvenile court's authority to place a child in the custody of a "willing" and "qualified" relative was not authority to award permanent custody of the child as custody was determined by discerning the best interests of the child and not the willingness or the qualifications of a person to take temporary custody of the child. Ertter v. Dunbar, 292 Ga. 103, 734 S.E.2d 403 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Order which fails to recite jurisdictional grounds is void.

- If the order of the juvenile court taking custody, control, and supervision of a minor child fails to show that it was by reason of one of the several grounds set out in the statute, such order is void for want of jurisdiction. Ferguson v. Hunt, 221 Ga. 728, 146 S.E.2d 756 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2402).

Jurisdiction of juvenile court, being civil in nature, extends only to those minors who are residents of the county. Giles v. State, 123 Ga. App. 700, 182 S.E.2d 140 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2402).

Jurisdiction to enter child support award.

- Since a parent's children were found to be deprived and were placed temporarily with relatives, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(c)(2)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11, and15-11-212), the trial court had jurisdiction to order the parent to pay temporary support. However, the court lacked jurisdiction to enter a final award of support under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 as no final order was entered disposing of the case. In the Interest of R.F., 295 Ga. App. 739, 673 S.E.2d 108 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Granting of temporary custody of the mother's child to the mother's ex-boyfriend and his wife following their petition to have the boy adjudicated deprived was inappropriate because the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over the proceeding under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(a)(1)(C) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11, and15-11-212). The petition did not contain valid allegations of deprivation and nothing in the record demonstrated that present drug use on the part of the mother had a negative effect on the child rising to the level of present deprivation; the petition was an attempt to obtain custody of the child. In the Interest of C. L. C., 299 Ga. App. 729, 683 S.E.2d 690 (2009); Mauldin v. Mauldin, 322 Ga. App. 507, 745 S.E.2d 754 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Juvenile Code confers exclusive original jurisdiction to juvenile court over certain juvenile matters, and designates the juvenile court the sole court for initiating action concerning any child that is alleged to be deprived and for the termination of the legal parent-child relationship. Brooks v. Leyva, 147 Ga. App. 616, 249 S.E.2d 628 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Juvenile court does not have original jurisdiction over custody controversy.

- It was not the intention of the General Assembly to give original jurisdiction of the custody of a child to a juvenile court when there is a dispute over the custody between the parents. Bartlett v. Bartlett, 99 Ga. App. 770, 109 S.E.2d 821 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2402).

Original and appellate jurisdiction in custody disputes between parents.

- In a case of dispute over custody between parents, original jurisdiction exists exclusively in courts having jurisdiction of habeas corpus or divorce and alimony actions, in both of which the supreme court has exclusive jurisdiction on appeal. Bartlett v. Bartlett, 99 Ga. App. 770, 109 S.E.2d 821 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2402).

Noncapital juvenile cases.

- Juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over noncapital juvenile cases. State v. Crankshaw, 243 Ga. 183, 253 S.E.2d 69 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Jurisdiction over deprivation cases is exclusive.

- Subparagraph (a)(1)(C) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11, and15-11-212) clearly placed exclusive jurisdiction in the juvenile court as the sole court for initiating an action concerning any child who is alleged to be deprived. Williams v. Davenport, 159 Ga. App. 531, 284 S.E.2d 45 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction over deprivation proceedings, and the juvenile court had the authority to order the disposition best suited to the needs of the children, including the transfer of temporary legal custody. In re A.L.L., 211 Ga. App. 767, 440 S.E.2d 517 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Because the action appealed from involved a deprivation proceeding, and the court's order reflected on the order's face that the order was addressing the alleged deprivation of the child at issue, the juvenile court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction over the deprivation petition. In the Interest of T. L., 269 Ga. App. 842, 605 S.E.2d 432 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Absent evidence of a custody dispute, a deprivation proceeding was not a pretextual custody battle which divested the juvenile court of the juvenile court's exclusive jurisdiction. In the Interest of D.T., 284 Ga. App. 336, 643 S.E.2d 842 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Exclusive jurisdiction for two years over children found deprived.

- Juvenile Code vests exclusive jurisdiction in the juvenile court for at least two years over matters concerning children whom the juvenile court has duly found to be deprived. West v. Cobb County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 243 Ga. 425, 254 S.E.2d 373 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Child was not deprived so as to confer jurisdiction since it was admitted that both grandparental homes were suitable as placements for the child. In re C.F., 199 Ga. App. 858, 406 S.E.2d 279 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Exclusive original jurisdiction existed in juvenile court.

- Because there was a bona fide allegation that a child was deprived, because the issue of permanent custody or modification of the divorce decree had not been transferred to the juvenile court, and because a mother's temporary custody had expired, the juvenile court had authority to exercise the court's exclusive original jurisdiction under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(a)(1)(C) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11, and15-11-212); therefore, the habeas court erred in denying the father's petition for relief. Douglas v. Douglas, 285 Ga. 548, 678 S.E.2d 904 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Juvenile court properly exercised jurisdiction over termination proceedings pursuant to former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-28 and15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11,15-11-212,15-11-310,15-11-311, and15-11-320) as the petition was filed by the mother, who had already been awarded sole physical custody of the child and as the termination petition dealt specifically with factors relating to the father's inability to provide proper care and support for the child such that the father's parental rights should be terminated. In the Interest of A.R.K.L., 314 Ga. App. 847, 726 S.E.2d 77 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Juvenile court did not retain jurisdiction.

- Although a great aunt and great step-uncle argued that the trial court erred in exercising subject matter jurisdiction in a custody matter at a time when the juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction, there was no order of the superior court transferring the petition to the juvenile court, and the jurisdiction obtained during an original deprivation proceeding did not serve to retain such jurisdiction; therefore, the juvenile court did not retain jurisdiction. The complaint for permanent custody filed by the grandmother and the step-grandfather was not in the nature of a deprivation petition. Wiepert v. Stover, 298 Ga. App. 683, 680 S.E.2d 707 (2009), overruled on other grounds, Artson, LLC v. Hudson, 322 Ga. App. 859, 747 S.E.2d 68 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

No transfer hearing required when concurrent jurisdiction.

- Transfer hearing is not required when the offense is one over which the juvenile and superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction and the superior court first takes jurisdiction. Lewis v. State, 246 Ga. 101, 268 S.E.2d 915 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

If either the juvenile court or the superior court properly could have exercised jurisdiction, no petition alleging delinquency was ever filed in the juvenile court, and the superior court first took jurisdiction through indictment, jurisdiction properly vested in the superior court and no transfer hearing pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-561,15-11-563, and15-11-566) was required. Taylor v. State, 194 Ga. App. 871, 392 S.E.2d 57 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Jurisdiction in temporary custody matters.

- Trial court erred when the court prohibited the Department of Human Resources from placing children with their mother or allowing the children to visit with the mother unsupervised and by staying any decision of a juvenile court that would be contrary to the court's order because, although the trial court and the juvenile court had concurrent jurisdiction over the temporary custody of the children, the juvenile court in the contemporaneous deprivation proceeding had the authority to order the disposition best suited to the needs of the children, including the transfer of temporary legal custody, and the juvenile court had already exercised the court's jurisdiction over the temporary custody of the children in light of the deprivation action; although the trial court expressed the court's concern about the department's decision to recommend that the children be physically placed with the mother, the juvenile court was competent to oversee the department, and there was no good reason for the trial court to conclude that the trial court was in a better position to address the department's placement decisions than the juvenile court. Long v. Long, 303 Ga. App. 215, 692 S.E.2d 811 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Juvenile court lacked jurisdiction since there was no order of the superior court transferring the issue of custody so as to meet the requirements of subsection (c) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-212). In re C.F., 199 Ga. App. 858, 406 S.E.2d 279 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Jurisdiction between courts.

- Trial court erred when the court prohibited the Department of Human Resources from placing children with their mother or allowing the children to visit with the mother unsupervised and by staying any decision of a juvenile court that would be contrary to the court's order because, although the trial court and the juvenile court had concurrent jurisdiction over the temporary custody of the children, the juvenile court in the contemporaneous deprivation proceeding had the authority to order the disposition best suited to the needs of the children, including the transfer of temporary legal custody, and the juvenile court had already exercised the court's jurisdiction over the temporary custody of the children in light of the deprivation action; although the trial court expressed the court's concern about the department's decision to recommend that the children be physically placed with the mother, the juvenile court was competent to oversee the department, and there was no good reason for the trial court to conclude that the trial court was in a better position to address the department's placement decisions than the juvenile court. Long v. Long, 303 Ga. App. 215, 692 S.E.2d 811 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Superior court without jurisdiction over habeas corpus petition.

- If a juvenile court order entered pursuant to former provisions an disposition of deprived children after notice and hearing was still in effect, the superior court had no jurisdiction of the related habeas corpus petition. West v. Cobb County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 243 Ga. 425, 254 S.E.2d 373 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2301).

Termination-of-rights petition which seeks adoption of child.

- If a petition for termination of the rights of a putative father of an illegitimate child specifically states that it is in pursuance of the petitioners' prospective adoption of the child, the petition is "in connection with adoption proceedings" within the meaning of subparagraph (a)(2)(C) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11, and15-11-212). H.C.S. v. Grebel, 253 Ga. 404, 321 S.E.2d 321 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5) H.C.S. v. Grebel, 172 Ga. App. 819, 325 S.E.2d 925 (1984);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to consider a petition for termination of parental rights because the termination was sought "in connection with" an adoption proceeding. In re B.G.D., 224 Ga. App. 124, 479 S.E.2d 439 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Termination action in which adoption will be pursued at a later date.

- Under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(a)(2)(C) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-10,15-11-11, and15-11-212), the juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction over a child's grandparents' action seeking termination of the child's parents' parental rights. Although the grandparents planned to adopt the child, the grandparents intended to adopt the child under the laws of Florida, where the grandparents lived. In re J. S., 302 Ga. App. 342, 691 S.E.2d 250 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Matters relating to adoption.

- Fact that the natural mother of a child, who sought the termination of the natural father's parental rights, contemplated a possible adoption did not automatically render the proceeding one "in connection with" an adoption. In re D.L.N., 234 Ga. App. 123, 506 S.E.2d 403 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Trial court did not err in concluding that the court had jurisdiction over an adoption and termination of parental rights proceeding as statutory law granted the trial court jurisdiction over adoption proceedings and other proceedings that were not granted exclusively to the juvenile courts; since the juvenile courts were granted exclusive jurisdiction over deprivation proceedings, those types of matters were to be heard by the juvenile courts, but the trial court had the authority to hear adoption and other matters, such as the adoptive parents' adoption petition filed to adopt the biological parents' minor child. Snyder v. Carter, 276 Ga. App. 426, 623 S.E.2d 241 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Court lacked jurisdiction in adoption.

- Georgia superior court erred by ordering a father's parental rights terminated and granting a couple's petition for adoption because the court lacked jurisdiction in the case since adoption had already commenced via a deprivation proceeding in a Georgia juvenile court; thus, the juvenile court should have presided over the termination proceeding. Alizota v. Stanfield, 319 Ga. App. 256, 734 S.E.2d 497 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Jurisdiction of adoption while deprivation proceeding pending.

- Superior court has exclusive jurisdiction in adoption matters and had jurisdiction to entertain an adoption petition notwithstanding the pendency of deprivation proceedings in the juvenile court involving the same child. Edgar v. Shave, 205 Ga. App. 337, 422 S.E.2d 234 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

Purpose of division of juvenile trials into two phases.

- In dividing juvenile trials into two phases, lawmakers intended to give the juvenile judge an opportunity to conduct the "functional equivalent" of a regular trial (the adjudicatory hearing) in a manner which would satisfy the required constitutional procedures concomitant with the usual legal rules, such as those dealing with admissibility of evidence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and similar requirements applicable to adults. Thereafter, at the dispositional phase, the judge was to explore all available additional avenues, including psychiatric and sociological studies, which would enable the judge to provide a solution for the youngster and the family aimed at making the child a secure law-abiding member of society. D.C.A. v. State, 135 Ga. App. 234, 217 S.E.2d 470 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2301).

Juvenile subject to criminal adjudication when case transferred to superior court.

- Juvenile whose case is properly transferred to the superior court is subject to the criminal sanctions which may be imposed in that court. Thus, an adjudication of guilt of a juvenile in superior court is a criminal adjudication. Carrindine v. Ricketts, 236 Ga. 283, 223 S.E.2d 627 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Confinement implies juvenile in need of supervision, correction, and training.

- Confinement necessarily deprives the parents of their prima facie prerogative of training and supervision, and implies that the juvenile is, within the terms of the juvenile law, one who is in need of supervision beyond the control of the parents and in need of correction and training which the parents cannot provide. Young v. State, 120 Ga. App. 605, 171 S.E.2d 756 (1969) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Violation of probation.

- Although the violation of probation may constitute a "delinquent act" in and of itself, a violation of probation which occurs after the juvenile's 17th birthday will not authorize the initiation of a new delinquency petition against the juvenile. The juvenile court's jurisdiction would extend only to revoking the juvenile's probation for the juvenile's previous adjudication of delinquency. In re B.S.L., 200 Ga. App. 170, 407 S.E.2d 123 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Sufficient evidence of deprivation.

- Evidence was sufficient to permit the juvenile court to find clear and convincing evidence of the child's deprivation and that the child's parent's misconduct or inability to care for the child's needs resulted in abuse or neglect sufficient to render the parent unfit to retain custody. In re C.N., 231 Ga. App. 639, 500 S.E.2d 400 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

Since the evidence in the record showed that the child had been subjected to numerous medical examinations for sexual abuse at the mother's behest, in an apparent effort to frustrate or foreclose the father's right of visitation, and she persisted in having the child examined for possible sexual abuse, the juvenile court did not abuse the court's discretion in finding that: (1) such examinations were so numerous as to be psychologically harmful to the child; and (2) the circumstances under which future examinations might proceed were to be limited. In the Interest of M.E., 265 Ga. App. 412, 593 S.E.2d 924 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Juvenile court's order finding a one-year-old child to be deprived was upheld on appeal as clear and convincing evidence existed that: (1) one parent suffered from a psychological disorder, which was not controlled by medication, and caused that parent to have delusions; and (2) the other parent, knowing the aforementioned condition of the first parent, left the child in that parent's care. In the Interest of M.D., 283 Ga. App. 805, 642 S.E.2d 863 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Given the judicial notice taken by the juvenile judge who entered a prior deprivation finding against a parent's older two children, and the presumption of correctness that attached to those findings, as the pleadings and evidence from those proceedings were not included in the appellate record, sufficient evidence supported the court's deprivation finding involving the parent's youngest child. In the Interest of A.B., 285 Ga. App. 288, 645 S.E.2d 716 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Adequate care from grandparent does not inhibit deprivation by parent.

- Juvenile court properly focused on the subject parent's abandonment of the child in support of the court's deprivation finding and not on the adequate level of care given by the child's maternal grandparent when making a deprivation finding. Moreover, the state showed that the parent was incapable of caring for any child, let alone a premature infant with special medical needs. In the Interest of A.B., 289 Ga. App. 655, 658 S.E.2d 205 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Abuse by stepparent resulted in deprivation by parent.

- In a mother's appeal of a juvenile court's declaration that a child was deprived, the juvenile court did not abuse the court's discretion in making that conclusion based on the sexual abuse of the child by the stepfather because the record established by clear and convincing evidence that the mother did not fully appreciate all that had to be done to protect the child and the child was minimizing the abuse and masking the continuing emotional impact of the experience due to psychological pressure from the mother. In the Interest of A. P., 299 Ga. App. 886, 684 S.E.2d 22 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Custody with department following finding of deprivation.

- Record supported the juvenile court's judgment that a parent did not fulfill the terms of a case plan that was established by the Department of Family and Children's Services because the parent continued using cocaine and refused to attend substance abuse treatment; thus, the child was deprived and custody was properly placed in the department. In the Interest of J.L., 269 Ga. App. 226, 603 S.E.2d 742 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Custody with department only suspends parental right of custody.

- Removal of custody of the child from the parents is a determination that, for whatever length of time custody is exercised by the Department of Family and Children Services, this right has been suspended, although not finally terminated. Rodgers v. Department of Human Resources, 157 Ga. App. 235, 276 S.E.2d 902 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2301).

Actions by department not action of district attorney.

- When the Department of Family and Children Services, acting as the legal custodian of a child, declines to permit a pretrial witness interview, that action is not the action of a party to the suit, i.e., the district attorney's office. Pendergrass v. State, 168 Ga. App. 190, 308 S.E.2d 585 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

Order requiring compulsory school attendance affirmed.

- In re D.H., 178 Ga. App. 119, 342 S.E.2d 367 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-34).

Provision for transfer of child to mother not required.

- Juvenile court was not required to include a provision for transfer of a child back to the child's mother after the child was found to be deprived under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55(a)(1) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-212) as the child remained in the custody of the father, who lived in another state. In the Interest of K.J., 268 Ga. App. 843, 602 S.E.2d 861 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Insufficient evidence of deprivation.

- Juvenile court's finding of deprivation was in error because there was no evidence presented at the hearing to support the court's finding. In the court's dispositional order, the juvenile court made no specific factual findings that the child was deprived as to the father, but merely listed reasons as to why the court was declining to transfer custody to the father and stated that the court found the child deprived as to the father due to the child's current needs and welfare, a finding which was not supported by any evidence. In the Interest of L. A., 322 Ga. App. 94, 744 S.E.2d 88 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 24A-301, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-5 and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-28, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

No conflict with jurisdictional grant over adoptions to superior courts.

- Jurisdiction of superior courts over adoptions does not conflict with the general grant of "exclusive original jurisdiction over juvenile matters" to the juvenile courts. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U76-15 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Superior court may terminate parent-child relationship only with adoption.

- Although both superior and juvenile courts have jurisdiction to terminate the parent-child relationship, the superior court may do so only in conjunction with an adoption proceeding which has been filed in that court; the juvenile court remains the sole court for initiating a parental termination proceeding if there is no concomitant adoption proceeding in process. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U77-52 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Jurisdiction of superior courts not affected by interstate compact on juveniles.

- No provision of the interstate compact on juveniles has any effect on the jurisdiction and authority of superior courts over matters of adoption. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U76-15 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-301).

Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act proceedings.

- Superior court may not transfer a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 11, T. 19, proceeding to a juvenile court. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U89-7 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Paternity questions.

- Since no provision would permit the transfer of paternity questions to a juvenile court, no case in which paternity is involved may be transferred by a superior court to a juvenile court. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U89-7 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, §§ 27 et seq., 50.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, §§ 7, 40 et seq., 53, 68, 116.

C.J.S.

- 21 C.J.S., Courts, §§ 144, 393 et seq. 43 C.J.S., Infants, §§ 180 et seq., 373 et seq. 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child, §§ 63 et seq., 99 et seq., 122 et seq., 378 et seq.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) §§ 3, 4, 30.

ALR.

- Constitutionality of statute as affected by discrimination in punishments for same offense based upon age, color, or sex, 3 A.L.R. 1614; 8 A.L.R. 854.

Jurisdiction of another court over child as affected by assumption of jurisdiction by juvenile court, 11 A.L.R. 147; 78 A.L.R. 317; 146 A.L.R. 1153.

What constitutes delinquency or incorrigibility, justifying commitment of infant, 45 A.L.R. 1533; 85 A.L.R. 1099.

Power of juvenile court to exercise continuing jurisdiction over infant delinquent or offender, 76 A.L.R. 657.

Enlistment or mustering of minors into military service, 137 A.L.R. 1467; 147 A.L.R. 1311; 148 A.L.R. 1388; 149 A.L.R. 1457; 150 A.L.R. 1420; 151 A.L.R. 1455; 151 A.L.R. 1456; 152 A.L.R. 1452; 153 A.L.R. 1420; 153 A.L.R. 1422; 154 A.L.R. 1448; 155 A.L.R. 1451; 155 A.L.R. 1452; 156 A.L.R. 1450; 157 A.L.R. 1449; 157 A.L.R. 1450; 158 A.L.R. 1450.

Marriage as affecting jurisdiction of juvenile court over delinquent or dependent, 14 A.L.R.2d 336.

Homicide by juvenile as within jurisdiction of a juvenile court, 48 A.L.R.2d 663.

Age of child at time of alleged offense or delinquency, or at time of legal proceedings, as criterion of jurisdiction of juvenile court, 89 A.L.R.2d 506.

Parent's involuntary confinement, for failure to care for child as result thereof, as evincing neglect, unfitness, or the like in dependency or divestiture proceeding, 79 A.L.R.3d 417.

Right of indigent parent to appointed counsel in proceeding for involuntary termination of parental rights, 80 A.L.R.3d 1141.

Authority of court to order juvenile delinquent incarcerated in adult penal institution, 95 A.L.R.3d 568.

Applicability of double jeopardy to juvenile court proceedings, 5 A.L.R.4th 234.

Jurisdiction or power of juvenile court to order parent of juvenile to make restitution for juvenile's offense, 66 A.L.R.4th 985.