O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 15-11-390 (2019)

Filing of complaint

✓ O.C.G.A.: 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) A complaint alleging a child is a child in need of services may be made by any person, including a law enforcement officer, who has knowledge of the facts alleged or is informed and believes that such facts are true. A prosecuting attorney may file a complaint alleging a child is in need of services or intervene in such matter to represent the interest of the state as parens patriae.

(b) The complaint shall set forth plainly and with particularity:

(1) The name, date of birth, and residence address of the child alleged to be a child in need of services;

(2) The facts alleging why the court has jurisdiction of the complaint;

(3) The reasons why the complaint is in the best interests of the child and the public;

(4) The names and residence addresses of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian, any other family members, or any other individuals living within such child’s home;

(5) The name of any public institution or agency having the responsibility or ability to supply services alleged to be needed by such child; and

(6) Whether any of the matters required by this subsection are unknown.

(c) When a school official is filing a complaint alleging a child is a child in need of services, information shall be included which shows that:

(1) The legally liable school district has sought to resolve the expressed problem through available educational approaches; and

(2) The school district has sought to engage the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of such child in solving the problem but such person has been unwilling or unable to do so, that the problem remains, and that court intervention is needed.

(d) When a school official is filing a complaint alleging a child is a child in need of services involving a child who is eligible or suspected to be eligible for services under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act or Section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, information shall be included which demonstrates that the legally liable school district:

(1) Has determined that such child is eligible or suspected to be eligible under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act or Section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973; and

(2) Has reviewed for appropriateness such child’s current Individualized Education Program (IEP) and placement and has made modifications where appropriate.

(e) The juvenile court intake officer shall be responsible for receiving complaints alleging that a child is a child in need of services.

History

Code 1981, § 15-11-390, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242; Ga. L. 2014, p. 780, § 1-24/SB 364; Ga. L. 2015, p. 540, § 2-1/HB 361.

Annotations

Cross references. - Definition of grandparent and securing of rights, § 19-7-3.

U.S. Code. - The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, referred to in this Code section, is codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, referred to in this Code section, is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794.

Law reviews. - For article discussing due process in juvenile court procedures in California and Georgia, in light of In re

Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967), see 8 Ga. St. B. J. 9 (1971). For article, ‘‘Child Custody - Jurisdiction and Procedure,’’ see 35 Emory L. J. 291 (1986). For article, ‘‘See No Evil, Speak No Evil: Georgia Supreme Court Narrows Requirements for Mandatory Reporters in May v. State,’’ see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 837 (2015). For note criticizing jurisdiction of juvenile justice system over runaways and advocating alternative legal approaches, see 24 Emory L. J. 1075 (1975). For comment on grandparents’ visitation rights in Georgia, see 29 Emory L. J. 1083 (1980).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-24, former Code 1933, § 24A-1603, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-25 and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-38.1, which were subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor’s notes at the beginning of the chapter. Construction with former provisions. - Nonprofit advocacy organization was authorized to file a deprivation petition which was separate and distinct from the initial deprivation adjudication since there is no statutory requirement that a petition for modification must be filed un-

der former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-42 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-312), instead of a deprivation petition under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-24 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-150, 15-11-390, and 15-11-420). In re A.V.B., 222 Ga. App. 241, 474 S.E.2d 114 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-24). Great aunt and uncle. - Child’s great aunt and uncle had standing to bring a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s father and mother. In re J.J., 225 Ga. App. 682, 484 S.E.2d 681 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-24). Juvenile petition must satisfy ‘‘due process.’’ - Although a juvenile petition does not have to be drafted with the exac-

titude of a criminal accusation, the petition must satisfy ‘‘due process.’’ T.L.T. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 895, 212 S.E.2d 650 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603). Since the state’s petition failed to set forth in ordinary and concise language the facts demonstrating the nature of the parent’s alleged failure to provide proper parental care or control, the parent lacked sufficient information to enable the parent to prepare a defense, and this amounted to a denial of due process. In re D.R.C., 191 Ga. App. 278, 381 S.E.2d 426 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-25). To meet constitutional requirement of due process the language of a juvenile petition must pass two tests: (1) the petition must contain sufficient factual details to inform the juvenile of the nature of the offense; and (2) the petition must provide data adequate to enable the accused to prepare a defense. T.L.T. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 895, 212 S.E.2d 650 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603). Allege with particularity. - Due process requires that the petition alleging delinquency must set forth with specificity the alleged violation of law either in the language of the particular section, or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood by the child and the child’s parents or guardian. D.P. v. State, 129 Ga. App. 680, 200 S.E.2d 499 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603). Petition filed alleging delinquency, deprivation, or unruliness must set forth alleged misconduct with particularity. A.C.G. v. State, 131 Ga. App. 156, 205 S.E.2d 435 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603). Insufficient notice to juvenile of alleged offense. - If a juvenile is brought to trial on a petition alleging delinquency based on a violation of former Code 1933, § 26-1601 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1) but was adjudicated delinquent for violating former Code 1933, § 26-1806 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7), there was insufficient notice to the juvenile of the offense alleged to be the basis of the juvenile’s delinquency and the trial court must be reversed. D.P. v. State, 129 Ga. App. 680,

200 S.E.2d 499 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603). Statement of custody irrelevant if jurisdiction otherwise exists. - If jurisdiction otherwise existed, such as if the action was brought in the county of the residence of both mother and son, then the requirement in paragraph (4) of former Code 1933, § 24A-1603 had no relevancy to the right of the trial court to handle the case. Sanchez v. Walker County Dep’t of Family & Children Servs., 138 Ga. App. 49, 225 S.E.2d 441, rev’d on other grounds, 237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603). Assumption of jurisdiction linked to authorized petition. - An order for detention clearly did not meet the requirements of a petition filed pursuant to former Code 1933, § 24A-1603 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-152, 15-11-280, 15-11-390, 15-11-420, 15-11-422, and 15-11-522) to commence proceedings under former Code 1933, § 24A-1601 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-420), and the assumption of jurisdiction by the juvenile court is linked to the authorized petition. Hartley v. Clack, 239 Ga. 113, 236 S.E.2d 63 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603). In a hearing on parental custody in a divorce action, the trial court erred in awarding custody of the parties’ minor children to the Department of Family and Children Services based upon findings that the children were deprived and the parents unfit because the mother had no notice that the superior court judge might award custody of the children to a third party based upon standards of deprivation. Watkins v. Watkins, 266 Ga. 269, 466 S.E.2d 860 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-25). Preparation and verification. - Because counsel for the Department of Children & Family Services stated to the court that counsel prepared the termination petition, that the petition was reviewed, verified, and then signed by counsel the next day, this was sufficient to comply with the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-25 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-152, 15-11-280, 15-11-390, 15-11-422, and 15-11-522). In re A.K.M.,

235 Ga. App. 853, 510 S.E.2d 611 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-25). Service by correctional officer upon incarcerated father. - Personal service of a summons and a petition of deprivation by a correctional officer upon an incarcerated father was sufficient as the service procedures in the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1 et seq., were not

adopted nor were binding on the juvenile court, and the correctional officer was acting under the direction of the court for the purposes of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39.1(c) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-161, 15-11-282, 15-11-400, 15-11-424, and 15-11-531). In the Interest of A.J.M., 277 Ga. App. 646, 627 S.E.2d 399 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-38.1).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 24-2403, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor’s notes at the beginning of the chapter. School official not liable for investi-

gative referral of deprivation. - School official would not be held liable in a legal action founded upon the official’s good faith referral of a child neglect, abuse, or abandonment situation to a county department of family and children services for investigation. 1963-65 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 746 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2403).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 75 et seq. C.J.S. - 43 C.J.S., Infants, §§ 184 et seq., 191 et seq.

U.L.A. - Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 20.

PART 3 FORMAL COURT PROCEDURES

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 1 case (1 in the last 5 years), 2022–2022 · leading case: In the Interest of T.b., a Child, 313 Ga. 846 (Ga. 2022).
In the Interest of T.b., a Child, 313 Ga. 846 (Ga. 2022). · cites it 4× “See OCGA § 15-11-390 (a). 13 Although an affirmative defense of insanity excuses rather than justifies charged criminal conduct, we note that our construction of “[a]n act .”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.