Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2001, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-30 and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-6, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Due process requires notice of right to counsel.

- Due process clause of U.S. Const., amend. 14, requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and the child's parents must be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by the parents, or if the parents are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child. Freeman v. Wilcox, 119 Ga. App. 325, 167 S.E.2d 163 (1969), disapproved in Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 226 S.E.2d 922 (1976), to the extent that no automatic exclusionary rule should be applied to incriminating statements made by a juvenile whose parents were not separately advised of the right to counsel (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2001).

Right to counsel at delinquency hearing.

- General Assembly intended that in a juvenile court a child is of right entitled to counsel at a hearing which covers a determination by the court concerning the existence of delinquency by reason of the violation of probation conditions. K.E.S. v. State, 134 Ga. App. 843, 216 S.E.2d 670 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2001).

No right to counsel before judicial citizens review panel.

- Former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6(b) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-103,15-11-402, and15-11-475) did not apply to reviews by a judicial citizens review panel as the proceedings mentioned in former § 15-11-6(b) were proceedings before the juvenile court; the citizen's review panel's findings of fact and recommendations are not legal evidence as the panel were not a court of record and the panel's actions were not necessarily in compliance with regard to legal due process considerations. In the Interest of K.M.C., 273 Ga. App. 276, 614 S.E.2d 896 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6).

Parent entitled to representation at all stages of deprivation proceeding.

- Under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6(b), a parent was entitled to representation at all stages of the proceedings alleging deprivation. In the Interest of A. R., 296 Ga. App. 62, 673 S.E.2d 586 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6).

Parent entitled to effective representation.

- Mother was entitled to effective representation in termination hearing. In re A.H.P., 232 Ga. App. 330, 500 S.E.2d 418 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30).

Right applies to informal detention hearing and other stages.

- Accused juvenile was entitled to counsel at an "informal detention hearing" required by Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-60), or at any of the other stages of any proceedings alleging delinquency, unruliness, and deprivation. A.C.G. v. State, 131 Ga. App. 156, 205 S.E.2d 435 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2001).

Juvenile entitled to principles necessary for fair trial.

- Juvenile charged with "delinquency" is entitled by right to have the court apply those common-law jurisprudential principles which experience and reason have shown are necessary to give the accused the essence of a fair trial. T.L.T. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 895, 212 S.E.2d 650 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2001).

Ingredients of fair trial.

- To give one accused in a juvenile proceeding a fair trial, the trial must include such ingredients as the presumption of innocence, the requirement that if the conviction is based entirely upon circumstantial evidence then the proved facts shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt, and the necessity of producing independent corroborative evidence to that of an accomplice for a finding of guilt when based upon the latter's testimony. T.L.T. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 895, 212 S.E.2d 650 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2001).

Cannot reverse delinquency adjudication unless deprivation of counsel harmful.

- Although an accused is entitled to counsel at the stage known as "a detention hearing", there is no authority for reversing an adjudication of delinquency after a fair trial with legal representation because of lack of counsel at the detention hearing, unless it appears that deprivation of counsel at that stage resulted in harm to the juvenile. T.K. v. State, 126 Ga. App. 269, 190 S.E.2d 588 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2001).

Juvenile Code recognizes that a parent is a "party" to proceedings involving the parent's child. Sanchez v. Walker County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2001).

Physical presence of parent cannot be equated with meaningful representation. K.E.S. v. State, 134 Ga. App. 843, 216 S.E.2d 670 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2001).

Indigent putative father's performance of the duties of a parent does not control the determination of whether he is entitled to appointed representation; the crucial inquiry is whether the putative father was a "party" to any of the proceedings within the meaning of the former statute. Wilkins v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources, 255 Ga. 230, 337 S.E.2d 20 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30).

Former Code section did not imply that foster parents may have certain rights. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 237 Ga. 449, 228 S.E.2d 839 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 905, 97 S. Ct. 2949, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1077 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2001).

Parent's right to representation not violated.

- Mother's right to appointed counsel was not violated since, after being notified of such right, she did not request counsel until shortly before the termination hearing and did not identify any proceeding at which she appeared unrepresented. In re A.M.R., 230 Ga. App. 133, 495 S.E.2d 615 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30).

Juvenile court did not err by refusing to dismiss the proceedings to terminate a mother's parental rights for the failure of the mother to be represented by counsel at the judicial citizens review panel as the proceedings mentioned in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6(b) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-103,15-11-402, and15-11-475) were proceedings before the juvenile court and were not reviews by the panel; further, any error was harmless as the juvenile court did not rely on the panel's recommendations in terminating the mother's parental rights. In the Interest of K.M.C., 273 Ga. App. 276, 614 S.E.2d 896 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6).

Parent, who was represented by counsel during the course of a termination of parental rights proceeding, could not prove that the parent was denied counsel during the proceeding because, beyond the claim that the parent was denied counsel, the parent failed to show what arguments the parent would have advanced, what evidence the parent would have produced in the parent's favor, or how the parent would have been successful had the parent been represented by counsel; moreover, in light of the overwhelming evidence supporting the termination of the parent's parental rights, there was nothing in the record that would support a finding of harm. In the Interest of M.S., 279 Ga. App. 254, 630 S.E.2d 856 (2006), overruled on other grounds, In re J.M.B., 296 Ga. App. 786, 676 S.E.2d 9 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6).

Indigent parent entitled to paupered transcript for use in appeal.

- Indigent parent, whose parental rights have been terminated by an order of the juvenile court on a petition filed by an agency of the state, is entitled to a paupered transcript of the proceeding in the juvenile court for use in appealing the decision of that court. Nix v. Department of Human Resources, 236 Ga. 794, 225 S.E.2d 306 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2001).

Trial court committed reversible error in failing to determine whether appointed counsel was required for parent.

- Fact that there was sufficient evidence to support the termination of a parent's rights did not relieve the trial court of the court's obligation to determine whether counsel should have been appointed for the parent under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6(b) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-103,15-11-402, and15-11-475). The trial court's limited inquiry as to whether the parent waived the right to counsel, and the court's failure to ascertain the parent's financial status was reversible error. In the Interest of P. D. W., 296 Ga. App. 189, 674 S.E.2d 338 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6).

Determination of voluntary and knowing waiver of right.

- Question of a voluntary and knowing waiver of a juvenile's right to counsel depends on the totality of the circumstances and the state has a heavy burden in showing that the juvenile did understand and waive the juvenile's right to counsel. Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321, 240 S.E.2d 824 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2001).

Trial court apparently determined that, given the court's finding that the mother was not competent, the mother was unable to show a knowing and voluntary waiver of her right to appointed counsel at the child deprivation hearing; thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to allow her to proceed pro se. Additionally, the mother failed to establish that she was harmed by her counsel's representation; thus, without harm, the mother's alleged error presented no basis for reversal. In the Interest of B.B., 267 Ga. App. 360, 599 S.E.2d 304 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6).

Factors considered in determining proper waiver.

- Several of the factors to be considered among the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the juvenile's waiver of counsel is made knowingly and voluntarily are: (1) age of the accused; (2) education of the accused; (3) knowledge of the accused as to both the substance of the charge and the nature of the accused's rights to consult with an attorney and remain silent; (4) whether the accused was held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends, or an attorney; (5) whether the accused was interrogated before or after formal charges were filed; (6) methods used in interrogations; (7) length of interrogations; (8) whether vel non the accused refused to voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and (9) whether the accused repudiated an extra-judicial statement at a later date. Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321, 240 S.E.2d 824 (1977) (decided under former 1933, § 24A-2001).

Juvenile court proceeding null if no waiver.

- If in a juvenile court proceeding, there was neither waiver of right of a mother, nor proper service upon the parties and since the hearing was not taken under oath, or waived by any of the parties, the proceeding was an absolute nullity. McBurrough v. Dep't of Human Resources, 150 Ga. App. 130, 257 S.E.2d 35 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933 § 24A-2001).

Mother who waives child's rights must be unbiased mother, free of interests conflicting with the needs of her daughter whom she undertakes to represent; an ally, not an adversary. K.E.S. v. State, 134 Ga. App. 843, 216 S.E.2d 670 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933 § 24A-2001).

Right to counsel waived.

- Trial judge's determination that a 15-year-old girl knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to counsel in a murder case was not clearly erroneous since she was interrogated before formal charges were filed, was not held incommunicado, and there was no evidence that coercive or deceptive interrogation techniques were employed. J.E.W. v. State, 256 Ga. 464, 349 S.E.2d 713 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-6 and15-11-30).

Right to counsel not waived.

- In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, an indigent parent did not waive the right to appointed counsel in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner simply because the parent failed to request counsel prior to the hearing as directed by the court. The court's denial of the parent's request for counsel was reversible error. In re J. M. B., 296 Ga. App. 786, 676 S.E.2d 9 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6).

Error in proceeding without counsel harmless.

- As a juvenile court in a mother's parental rights termination proceeding failed to make inquiry as to whether the mother was indigent and whether she was waiving the right to counsel pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6(b), the judgment terminating her parental rights over her three children could not stand. Moreover, the record demonstrated many instances of harm caused by the mother's lack of counsel. In the Interest of P. D. W., 296 Ga. App. 189, 674 S.E.2d 338 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6).

Juvenile did not make a knowing and intelligent decision to proceed without counsel where the referee did not warn her or her mother of the danger of proceeding without counsel or of the consequences of an affirmative finding or admission of the charge enumerated in the petition; the juvenile appellant and her mother did not stand before the court with open eyes, knowing the danger and consequences of proceeding without the benefit of legal representation. In re W.M.F., 180 Ga. App. 397, 349 S.E.2d 265 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-10-30).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 84 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 43 C.J.S., Infants, §§ 172 et seq., 181.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 26.

ALR.

- Right to an appointment of counsel in juvenile court proceedings, 60 A.L.R.2d 691; 25 A.L.R.4th 1072.

Right of juvenile court defendant to be represented during court proceedings by parent, 11 A.L.R.4th 719.

Validity and efficacy of minor's waiver of right to counsel - modern cases, 25 A.L.R.4th 1072.