CopyCited 48 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 23, 2015 | 780 S.E.2d 291
...rdianship that was filed after January 1, 2014.
We have compared the relevant provisions of the old Juvenile Code and the new Juvenile
Code, and they are, for the most part, substantially identical. Compare OCGA §
15-11-240
et seq. with former OCGA §
15-11-30.1 (a) (2)....
...inasmuch as the relevant provisions of law are the same under both versions.
As under the new Juvenile Code, juvenile courts had original jurisdiction of
proceedings for the appointment of permanent guardians under the old Juvenile Code. See
former OCGA §
15-11-30.1 (a) (2) (A) (2012) (“[T]he juvenile court shall be vested with
jurisdiction to appoint a permanent guardian for a child whose custody is a subject of
controversy before the court as a result of an adjudication that the child is deprived ....
....”); OCGA §
29-2-22 (a) (1) (guardian has “the
exclusive power” to “[t]ake custody of the person of the minor”).7 Accordingly,
a superior court has no authority to award permanent custody of a child under
5
The same was true under the old Juvenile Code. See former OCGA §
15-11-30.1 (a)
(2) (D) (2012) (“The court shall retain jurisdiction over a guardianship action under this
paragraph for the sole purpose of entering an order following the filing of a petition to
modify, vacate, or revoke the guardianship and to appoint a new guardian.”).
6
That too was true under the old Juvenile Code. See former OCGA §
15-11-30.1 (a)
(2) (D) (2012) (“The superior courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction for enforcement or
modification of any child support or visitation order entered pursuant to this Code section.”).
7
A permanent guardian had the same powers under the old Juvenile Code. See former
OCGA §
15-11-30.1 (a) (2) (G) (2012) (“A guardian of the person of a child appointed under
this paragraph shall have the rights and duties of a permanent guardian as are provided in
[OCGA §]
29-2-22 ....
...it is in the best interest of M.F. to be in the custody of her father. See OCGA §
15-11-244 (c)
(providing that certain changed circumstances can form the basis for a modification, vacatur,
or revocation of a permanent guardianship). See also former OCGA §
15-11-30.1 (a) (2) (D)
(2012) (same).
6
Const....
...9
The provision of the new Juvenile Code concerning the modification, vacatur, or
revocation of a permanent guardianship is substantially identical to the provision of the old
Juvenile Code concerning the same subject. See former OCGA §
15-11-30.1 (a) (2) (D)
(2012) (“The guardianship shall be modified, vacated, or revoked based upon a finding, by
clear and convincing evidence, that there has been a material change in the circumstances of
the child or the guardian and that such...
...And most important, the very statutes
that authorize the entry of a permanent guardianship also contemplate that circumstances may
later arise that would be good cause for setting aside the guardianship. See OCGA § 15-11-
244. See also former OCGA §
15-11-30.1 (a) (2) (D) (2012)....
...a permanent guardianship in the first instance only because M.F. was shown, as
11
of January 2012, to be a “deprived” child because she was without a parent then
fit to be responsible for her care and custody. See former OCGA §
15-11-30.1
(a) (2) (A) (2012) (permanent guardianship authorized only following “an
adjudication that the child is deprived”)....
CopyCited 31 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 29, 1996 | 266 Ga. 294, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 362
...of Family and Children Services,
237 Ga. 406, 408,
229 S.E.2d 66 (1976). However, this requirement can be waived, id. at 409,
229 S.E.2d 66; E.S. v. State of Georgia,
134 Ga.App. 724, 725(1),
215 S.E.2d 732 (1975) or continued for the securing of legal representation, OCGA §
15-11-30(b), or for reasons within the discretion of the juvenile court....
...cheduled date; that an arraignment was conducted at the beginning of the hearing; that appellee then requested legal representation and was found eligible to receive same; and that a continuance was granted so appellee could secure counsel. See OCGA §
15-11-30(b)....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 27, 1985 | 255 Ga. 230
...We granted certiorari to consider several issues, only one of which we now find necessary to address. That issue is whether Wilkins, the putative father of J. H. (a minor child born to a woman married to a man other than Wilkins), was entitled to appointed counsel under OCGA §
15-11-30 (b) during a hearing of a petition filed by the Georgia Department of Human Resources (GDHR) to *231 terminate his parental rights to J. H., see OCGA §§
15-11-51 through
15-11-54. The Court of Appeals held that Wilkins was not entitled to appointed counsel. Wilkins v. Dept. of Human Resources, 174 Ga. App., supra. We disagree. OCGA §
15-11-30 (b) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided under this chapter, a party is entitled to representation by legal counsel at all stages of any proceedings alleging delinquency, unruliness, or deprivation and if, as an indigent person,...
...counsel, he is entitled to have the court provide counsel for him. If a party appears without counsel, the court shall ascertain whether he knows of his right to counsel and to be provided with counsel by the court if he is an indigent person." OCGA §
15-11-30 (b)....
...(Emphasis supplied.) [1] Wilkins appeared and testified at the termination hearing held in the instant case but was unrepresented by counsel. The trial court noted that Wilkins, who was shown to be indigent, was not represented by counsel, but it did not ask him, despite the requirement of OCGA §
15-11-30 (b), whether he understood that he had a right to court-appointed counsel....
...The order further terminated whatever parental rights Wilkins may have had in J. H., on the grounds that Wilkins had abandoned the child and that the child was deprived. Wilkins appealed on numerous grounds, but he chiefly contended that under OCGA §
15-11-30 (b) he was entitled to appointed counsel, and that the trial court erred by failing to inform him of that right at the termination hearing....
...We find, however, that an indigent putative father's performance of the duties of a parent does not control the determination of whether he is entitled to appointed representation. Rather, the crucial *232 inquiry is whether the putative father was a "party" to any of the proceedings within the meaning of OCGA §
15-11-30 (b). The outcome of this question depends, in turn, upon an interpretation of OCGA §
15-11-52 (b), as it relates to OCGA §
15-11-30 (b)....
...ome the presumption of legitimacy created by OCGA §
19-7-20. 3. Having decided that OCGA §
15-11-52 (b) applies to Wilkins, we now address the issue of whether he is entitled, as an indigent, to have court-appointed counsel assist him. First, OCGA §
15-11-30 (b) directs that we look to all stages of any proceedings to determine if a person is a "party" and entitled to counsel within the meaning of that Code section. Clearly, the determination of a putative father's paternity is a stage of a termination proceeding. OCGA §
15-11-30 (b) does not define the term "party"; however, in general, Georgia law broadly defines a "party" to include one who is directly interested in the subject matter of the litigation, has the right to adduce testimony, to cross-examine witnesses, to control the proceedings, and to appeal from the judgment....
...because of the burden imposed upon *236 him by OCGA §
15-11-52 (b), is one at which he has a critical need for legal representation. For the foregoing reasons we conclude that Wilkins was a party to the instant proceeding within the meaning of OCGA §
15-11-30 (b) for the initial purpose of the paternity determination, and was therefore entitled to appointed counsel....
...this dissent. NOTES [1] A termination petition alleging that a parent has abandoned the child, OCGA §
15-11-52 (a) (1), or that the child is a deprived child, OCGA §
15-11-52 (a) (2), is a proceeding alleging deprivation within the meaning of OCGA §
15-11-30 (b)....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 30, 2005 | 279 Ga. 518, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 2013
...te to follow two procedures with no substantive meaning other than to satisfy procedural requirements, with the end result that the case involving the lesser crime would be instituted in juvenile court and transferred to the superior court, OCGA § [
15-11-30.2], and the juvenile would still be tried for the lesser crime along with the crime giving the superior court concurrent jurisdiction....
...[5] These challenged charges include burglary, aggravated assault, and influencing a witness, which were alleged to have occurred on different dates than the armed robbery and murder charges, and involved different victims. The record does not show that any of these charges were transferred from juvenile court. See OCGA §
15-11-30.2....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 1, 1985 | 334 S.E.2d 668
...juvenile code, by defining an “indigent person,” as “one who at the time of requesting counsel is unable without undue financial hardship to provide for full payment of legal counsel and all other necessary expenses for representation.” OCGA §
15-11-30 (a)....
...“[A] party is entitled to representation by legal counsel at all stages of any proceeding alleging . . . deprivation and if, as an indigent person, he is unable to employ counsel, he is entitled to have the court provide counsel for him.” OCGA §
15-11-30 (b)....
...The only asset the appellant owns is her small home. She somehow managed to provide for the child with no assistance from the state with her minimal social security check and her small food stamp allowance. We find the appellant is an “indigent person,” as defined by OCGA §
15-11-30 (a).
Judgment reversed in Case Nos....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 23, 2022
...bar[red] her from allowing the children to get vaccinated.” DFCS
related that it sought immunization to facilitate the children’s
health care, schooling, and foster placement, and asserted the
authority to provide “ordinary medical care” to the children under
OCGA §
15-11-30.4 At the end of the hearing, John interjected that
the Chandlers’ eldest child had started saying his first words when
he was three months old, but then stopped talking after receiving a
vaccine (for how long, John did not specify)....
...John also mentioned
having a religious objection to vaccination, without elaborating. The
juvenile court denied Brittani’s motion.
John then moved for reconsideration and for a stay of
vaccination. Brittani joined in this motion, and another hearing was
4 OCGA §
15-11-30 reads:
A legal custodian has the right to physical custody of a child,
the right to determine the nature of the care and treatment of such
child, including ordinary medical care, and the right and duty to
pro...
...So I don’t really have no
family time.” Construed liberally, John argued that (1) the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution forbade vaccinating
the children over the Chandlers’ objection, (2) parents retain a
statutory right to object on religious grounds to the vaccination of
their children under OCGA §
15-11-30, and (3) OCGA §
15-11-30’s
reference to “ordinary medical care” is void for vagueness as applied
to children of parents with religious objections to vaccinations.
Brittani’s counsel proffered that Brittani “could get on the stand and
testify as to t...
...have a sincere religious objection, the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution would not prohibit DFCS from
5
vaccinating the children. And the juvenile court determined that the
Chandlers lacked any rights arising under OCGA §
15-11-30 to
object to the vaccinations and that OCGA §
15-11-30 was not void
for vagueness....
...tection,
training, and education and the physical, mental, and
moral welfare of such child, subject to the conditions and
limitations of the order and to the remaining rights and
duties of such child’s parent or guardian.
OCGA §
15-11-30....
...(citations and punctuation omitted)); Thomas v. Review Bd. of
Indiana Emp. Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 713 (101 SCt 1425, 67 LE2d
624) (1981) (“Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free
Exercise Clause[.]”). Their claim that OCGA §
15-11-30 is void for
vagueness is also rooted in their asserted religious beliefs, because
they argue that the statute is void for vagueness as applied to cases
where parents have religious objections to vaccinations....
...Enters., Inc.,
312 Ga. 752, 768
16
(3) (b) (865 SE2d 135) (2021); State v. Raybon,
242 Ga. 858, 862 (252
SE2d 417) (1979) (per curiam).9 So the Chandlers can raise their as-
applied vagueness challenge to OCGA §
15-11-30 only if they in fact
sincerely hold religious beliefs that would be infringed upon by its
application.10
Religious sincerity is necessary for the Chandlers to pursue
their statutory claim, too. OCGA §
15-11-30 provides that legal
custodians of children — such as DFCS in relation to the Chandlers’
9 As we noted in Rockdale County, “our vagueness cases all address
claims brought under the United States Constitution or both the U...
...United States Constitution. “Accordingly, we will proceed in our analysis in
reliance on the existing federal and heavily-federally-influenced Georgia
precedent.” Id.
10 In their brief before this Court, the Chandlers also assert that OCGA
§
15-11-30 is void for vagueness due to its use of the ambiguous term “legal
custodian.” But the Chandlers did not present this argument to the juvenile
court, so it is not preserved for our consideration....
...17
children — have “the right to determine the nature of the care and
treatment of such child, including ordinary medical care . . . subject
to . . . the remaining rights and duties of such child’s parent or
guardian.” OCGA §
15-11-30.11 The Chandlers argue that the
remaining rights and duties recognized by OCGA §
15-11-30 include
“the right to a religious exemption to immunization.” But they
identify no authority for the curious proposition that any religious
rights preserved by OCGA §
15-11-30 can arise from religious beliefs
that parents do not actually hold. Cf. United States v. Seeger, 380
11 The Court of Appeals has held that “the right to lodge religious
objections to a child’s immunizations . . . are not residual rights of the child’s
parents” under the precursor to OCGA §
15-11-30....
...III (“The decisions of the Court of Appeals
insofar as not in conflict with those of the Supreme Court shall bind all courts
except the Supreme Court as precedents.”). But some of us have significant
concerns regarding that case’s analysis. In particular, the court conflated the
“right and duty” imposed by OCGA §
15-11-30 on the custodian of a deprived
child — such as DFCS here — to provide for the child’s “moral welfare,” with
the separate right vested through OCGA §
19-9-6 (11) in a fit custodial parent
to provide for a child’s “religious training” without being subject to a
noncustodial parent’s preferences....
...order or, at the discretion of the court, may do additional analysis
on the merits.
Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. All the
Justices concur.
27
Decided August 23, 2022.
OCGA §
15-11-30; constitutional question....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 1, 1985 | 254 Ga. 748
...Our legislature provided special protection for the needy under the juvenile code, by defining an "indigent person," as "one who at the time of requesting counsel is unable without undue financial hardship to provide for full payment of legal counsel and all other necessary expenses for representation." OCGA §
15-11-30 (a)....
...234, 235 (217 SE2d 470) (1975). "[A] party is entitled to representation by legal counsel at all stages of any proceeding alleging . . . deprivation and if, as an indigent person, he is unable to employ counsel, he is entitled to have the court provide counsel for him." OCGA §
15-11-30 (b)....
...The only asset the appellant owns is her small home. She somehow managed to provide for the child with no assistance from the state with her minimal social security check and her small food stamp allowance. We find the appellant is an "indigent person," as defined by OCGA §
15-11-30 (a)....
