O.C.G.A. § 15-11-566 (2019)
Dismissal order upon transfer to superior court
(a) If the court decides to transfer a child for trial in superior court, it shall dismiss the juvenile court petition alleging delinquency for the offense or offenses being transferred, set forth the offense or offenses which are being transferred, and make the following findings of fact in its dismissal order: (1) That the court had jurisdiction of the cause and the parties; (2) That the child subject to transfer was represented by an attorney; and (3) That the hearing was held in the presence of the child subject to transfer and his or her attorney.
(b) The dismissal order shall also recount the reasons underlying the decision to transfer jurisdiction. (c) A dismissal of the petition alleging delinquency terminates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over such child as to those offenses which are transferred. If the petition alleging delinquency alleges multiple offenses that constitute a single criminal transaction, the court shall either retain or transfer all offenses relating to a single criminal transaction. (d) Once juvenile court jurisdiction is terminated, the superior court shall retain jurisdiction even though, thereafter, a child pleads guilty to, or is convicted of, a lesser included offense. The plea to, or conviction of, a lesser included offense shall not revest juvenile jurisdiction over such child. (e) A copy of the petition alleging delinquency and order of dismissal shall be sent to the district attorney of the judicial circuit in which the proceeding is taking place. (f ) If the court decides not to transfer a child for trial in superior court, it shall set a date for an adjudication hearing in juvenile court on the petition alleging delinquency.
History
Code 1981, § 15-11-566, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242; Ga. L. 2014, p. 780, § 1-42/SB 364.
Annotations
Cross references. - Duties of the clerk of the Juvenile Court, Uniform Rules for the Juvenile Courts of Georgia, Rule 2.2(a). Law reviews. - For article suggesting upward adjustment to age 15 of the age of criminal responsibility and creation of a rebuttable presumption of adult account-
ability for youths aged 15 to 18, see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 341 (1972). For article, ‘‘An Outline of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction with Focus on Child Custody,’’ see 10 Ga. St. B. J. 275 (1973). For article, ‘‘The Prosecuting Attorney in Georgia’s Juvenile Courts,’’ see 13 Ga. St. B. J. 27 (2008). For comment on J.W.A. v. State, 233 Ga. 683, 212 S.E.2d 849 (1975), see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (1975).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, annotations taken from cases decided prior to the adoption of the 1983 Constitution are included in the annotations for this Code section. See Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. I and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I. In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-39, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-30.2, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions
in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor’s notes at the beginning of the chapter. Legislature may restrict or qualify right to treatment as juvenile. - Treatment as a juvenile is not an inherent right but one granted by the state legislature, and the legislature may restrict or qualify that right as the legislature sees fit as long as no arbitrary or discriminatory classification is involved. Lane v. Jones, 244 Ga. 17, 257 S.E.2d 525 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933,
§ 24A-2501); In re J.J.S., 246 Ga. 617, 272 S.E.2d 294 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501). Subsection (c) of former statute (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-566) did not enlarge scope of former statute be-
yond that specified in former subsection (a) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561). Williams v. State, 238 Ga. 298, 232 S.E.2d 535 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501).