CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 29, 2018 | 304 Ga. 114
...In its entirety, the Rule reads:
RULE 11.3 CONTINUANCE
On the motion of the court or that of a party, the court may continue a hearing for a reasonable time upon good cause shown. However, in cases involving allegations of deprivation the granting of continuances beyond the statutory limitations as defined in OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) shall be by written order and the specific reason for the continuance must be stated therein.
We note that the most recent amendment of UJCR 11.3 was to take effect August 16, 2001, at which time OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) read:
(a) After the petition has been filed the court shall fix a time for hearing thereon, which, if the child is in detention, shall not be later than ten days after the filing of the petition. In the event the child is not in detention, the court shall fix a time for hearing thereon which shall be not later than 60 days from the date of the filing of the petition.
See Ga. L. 2002, p. 1162, § 3. Currently, OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) does not pertain to dependency hearings, and reads:
In any jurisdiction within which a risk reduction program has been established, when a child comes before the court for disposition, the court may order that a risk assessment or ri...
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 11, 1994 | 448 S.E.2d 690, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 3251
Carley, Justice.
A delinquency petition was filed, alleging that the 16-year-old appellant had committed the offense of murder. Acting pursuant to OCGA §
15-11-39, the juvenile court conducted a hearing to determine whether to transfer for prosecution in the superior court....
...The *603juvenile court ordered the transfer, and appellant appeals.1
1. Before a transfer can be ordered, the juvenile court is required to make various findings, including a determination that there are “reasonable grounds to believe that [t]he child committed the delinquent act alleged[.]” OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) (3) (A)....
...ddition to the showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe the juvenile committed the acts alleged. . . . Although . . . some of [the investigator’s] testimony [may have been] hearsay, which would not suffice to support a conviction, OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) (3) “requires only that the court find that there are ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that the child committed the act alleged, not ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ as is required for a conviction....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 1, 1993 | 263 Ga. 600, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 3884
...To effect a valid transfer of jurisdiction from juvenile court to superior court, the juvenile court must determine, in its discretion, whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that: "The interests of the child and the community require that the child be placed under legal restraint and the transfer be made." OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) (3) (C)....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 29, 2018
...of a party, the court may continue a hearing
for a reasonable time upon good cause shown. However, in cases involving
allegations of deprivation the granting of continuances beyond the statutory
limitations as defined in OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) shall be by written order and the
specific reason for the continuance must be stated therein.
We note that the most recent amendment of UJCR 11.3 was to take effect August 16, 2001, at which
time OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) read:
(a) After the petition has been filed the court shall fix a time for hearing
thereon, which, if the child is in detention, shall not be later than ten days after the
filing of the petition. In the event the child is not in detention, the court shall fix a
time for hearing thereon which shall be not later than 60 days from the date of the
filing of the petition.
See Ga. L. 2002, p. 1162, § 3. Currently, OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) does not pertain to dependency
hearings, and reads:
In any jurisdiction within which a risk reduction program has been
established, when a child comes before the court for disposition, the court may order...
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 12, 1996 | 266 Ga. 235, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 607
...state to follow two procedures with no substantive meaning other than to satisfy procedural requirements, with the end result that the case involving the lesser crime would be instituted in juvenile court and transferred to the superior court, OCGA §
15-11-39, and the juvenile would still be tried for the lesser crime along with the crime giving the superior court concurrent jurisdiction....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 17, 1990 | 260 Ga. 447
...ormed a court-ordered evaluation of J. H.'s mental condition concluded that J. H. was committable as mentally ill under the laws of this state. We find no error in the transfer order, and affirm. The juvenile court held two hearings pursuant to OCGA §
15-11-39 *448 to determine whether J....
...as an adult outweighed J. H.'s interest in being treated in the juvenile system. See State v. M. M.,
259 Ga. 637, 640 (3) (386 SE2d 35) (1989). 2. J. H. next argues that the transfer hearing was not held in conformity with OCGA §
15-11-31 (b), as is required by §
15-11-39 (a) (1)....
...se. For these reasons, we find no merit to J. H.'s contention that the transfer hearing did not conform to §
15-11-31 (b). 3. J. H. next contends that the transfer hearing was not held in conformity with OCGA §
15-11-28 (c), as is required by OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) (1)....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 4, 1992 | 261 Ga. 830, 33 Fulton County D. Rep. 24
...In addition, the juvenile court in the present case also considered appellant's role as the apparent instigator of the offenses. We conclude, therefore, that the juvenile court had sufficient bases other than the nature of the crimes for the finding that the requirements of OCGA §
15-11-39 had been met and that transfer to superior court was proper....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 4, 2013 | 739 S.E.2d 322
...Under the dissent’s analysis, a child, from the moment he or she learns to speak, could mandate an appeal of a trial court’s deprivation finding. This is a radical departure from the idea that a trial court may give weight to the opinions of teenagers 14 years or older in certain codified circumstances. SeeOCGA §
15-11-39 (b)....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 14, 2007 | 644 S.E.2d 812
...The Court of Appeals affirmed (see In the Interest of C. S.,
279 Ga. App. 831 (632 SE2d 665) (2006)), and we granted certiorari to determine whether the delivery by certified mail to Sexton of the termination petition and the summons constituted sufficient service. See OCGA§§
15-11-39.1 and 15-11-96....
...Under the circumstances of this case, OCGA *8§
9-11-4 required that Sexton be served personally. See OCGA §
9-11-4 (e) (7). That was not done here.1
Because OCGA § 15-11-96 (c) relates specifically to service in termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, the trial court’s reliance on the service provisions of OCGA§
15-11-39.1, a statute dealing with service in juvenile court proceedings generally, was misplaced....
...d). See also OCGA §
15-11-104 (statutory provisions relating generally to juvenile court proceedings do not apply where in conflict with provisions relating specifically to termination of parental rights proceedings). The general provisions of OCGA §
15-11-39.1 (a) that would allow an out-of-state party in a termination proceeding to be served by certified mail alone cannot trump the clear and specific provisions of OCGA §§ 15-11-96 (c) and
9-11-4 that would deem such a method of service to be insufficient. OCGA§
15-11-39.1 simply does not apply in this case.
Our holding in In the Interest of M....
...645 (261 SE2d 590) (1979) is inapplicable here, as that case was decided several years before the legislature enacted OCGA§ 15-11-96 (c), the specific statute relating to service in termination proceedings. See Ga. L. 1986, p. 1017. In In the Interest of M. A. C., we determined that the former version of OCGA §
15-11-39.1 (a) was constitutional, and that service by certified mail on an out-of-state parent 70 days before a termination hearing provided sufficient notice....
...eLong v. Welch,
272 Ga. 730, 731 (533 SE2d 724) (2000). Thus, by passing a specific statute relating to service in termination proceedings after our decision in In the Interest of M. A. C., the legislature has made clear that service pursuant to OCGA§
15-11-39.1 (a) by certified mail alone on an out-of-state party in a termination proceeding is no longer sufficient.
*9Decided May 14, 2007.
McCamy, Phillips, Tuggle & Fordham, Curtis A....
...This Code section allows for alternative methods of service in situations where there are other, applicable statutes besides OCGA §
9-11-4 that provide for service; or where the provisions for service are unclear. OCGA §
9-11-4 (j). It does not allow inapplicable service provisions such as OCGA §
15-11-39.1 (a) to apply where they do not. Here, OCGA § 15-11-96 (c) provides a clear and specific method for service in termination of parental rights proceedings, and OCGA §
9-11-4 (j) does not create an avenue through which the general provisions of OCGA §
15-11-39.1 can override the specific mandates of OCGA § 15-11-96 (c). OCGA§
9-11-4 (j) only allows for additional methods of service where those additional methods would be inherently applicable. Because OCGA§
15-11-39.1 (a) has no inherent applicability here, OCGA §
9-11-4 (j) does not operate to make it applicable.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that service on Sexton by certified mail pursuant to OCGA §
15-11-39.1 (a) was proper....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 2, 1995 | 462 S.E.2d 148, 95 Fulton County D. Rep. 3062
...See OCGA §
15-11-21 (c) (1); Uniform Juvenile Court Rule 8.1 et seq. After issuance of the petition of delinquency and denial of the State’s request to transfer the matter to superior court, on June 25, 1993, L. A. E. was adjudicated delinquent. He was sentenced in July 1993.
This notice conformed with OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) (2).
This Court already has affirmed the timeliness of L....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 25, 1994 | 441 S.E.2d 842, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 1433
...e filing of a juvenile complaint form not only initiated proceedings in the juvenile court, as specified in Rule 4.1, but also vested jurisdiction therein, subject to the authority of the juvenile court to conduct a transfer hearing pursuant to OCGA §
15-11-39....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 1, 1993 | 263 Ga. 155, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 1962
...e imprisonment or by death. Generally, the first court to assume jurisdiction of the case will retain it, Couch v. State,
253 Ga. 764 (325 SE2d 366) (1985), subject to the right of the juvenile court to transfer the case to superior court under OCGA §
15-11-39....
...n the juvenile complaint form was filed in that court, and the superior court correctly transferred the case back to that court. Our opinion, however, does not affect the authority of the juvenile court to conduct a transfer hearing pursuant to OCGA §
15-11-39....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 17, 1995 | 452 S.E.2d 105, 95 Fulton County D. Rep. 264
...Justice.
Fifteen-year-old J. D. was charged with burglary and felony murder in connection with the shooting death of eighty-six-year-old Ida Dodson. The juvenile court conducted a hearing and ordered the case transferred to superior court under OCGA §
15-11-39....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 21, 1991 | 401 S.E.2d 254
Fletcher, Justice.
M. E. J., a juvenile, was charged with three counts of murder. There is evidence that on June 15, 1990, the state served M. E. J. with notice of its intent to transfer his case to superior court under OCGA §
15-11-39....
...I, Par. XVIII of the Georgia Constitution. The juvenile court found that M. E. J.’s admission of the crimes went only to the issue of whether there were “reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the child committed the delinquent act alleged,” OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) (3) (A), in order to transfer the case to superior court.2 The juvenile court also *806found that the two hearings were for the sole purpose of determining whether the case should be transferred to superior court, and as no evidence o...
...epted and he had been sentenced in juvenile court.
In the circumstances of this case, M. E. J.’s admission of the crimes did not constitute a “hearing on the merits” which would prevent the juvenile court from transferring the case under OCGA §
15-11-39 (a)....
...It is clear that the court did not accept M. E. J.’s admission within the meaning of Rule 10.4.
The juvenile court did not err in transferring the offense for prosecution to Fulton Superior Court.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.
Under OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) (2), the state is not required to give notice to the attorney of the juvenile.
We note that any statements made by the child at a transfer hearing “are not admissible against him over objection in the criminal proceedings following the transfer.” OCGA §
15-11-39 (d), effective July 1, 1991; OCGA §
15-11-39 (e).
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 26, 1995 | 458 S.E.2d 343, 95 Fulton County D. Rep. 2078
...e.
Sixteen-year-old A. G. was charged with malice murder and felony murder in connection with the shooting of another 16-year-old at their high school. Following a hearing, the juvenile court ordered the case transferred to superior court under OCGA §
15-11-39....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 25, 1994 | 442 S.E.2d 737, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 1432
...Subsequent to our earlier decision involving this juvenile, see In re C. R.,
263 Ga. 155 (430 SE2d 3) (1993), the juvenile court conducted a transfer hearing and entered an order transferring the case to superior court for prosecution. At issue in this appeal is whether the statutory requirement imposed by OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) (3) (C)1 was met....
...We conclude that this finding was sufficient to warrant the transfer. State v. M. M.,
259 Ga. 637 (3) (386 SE2d 35) (1989). Accord In the Interest of J. H.,
260 Ga. 447 (1) (396 SE2d 885) (1990). Thus, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in transferring the case. OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) (3).
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.
Appellant concedes that the requirements of OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) (3) (A) and (B) were met.
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 14, 2007
...The Court of Appeals affirmed (see In the Interest of C.S.,
279 Ga.App. 831,
632 S.E.2d 665 (2006)), and we granted certiorari to determine whether the delivery by certified mail to Sexton of the termination petition and the summons constituted sufficient service. See OCGA §
15-11-39.1 and OCGA § 15-11-96....
...Under the circumstances of this case, OCGA §
9-11-4 required that Sexton be served personally. See OCGA §
9-11-4(e)(7). That was not done here. [1] Because OCGA § 15-11-96(c) relates specifically to service in termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, the trial court's reliance on the service provisions of OCGA §
15-11-39.1, a statute dealing with service in juvenile court proceedings generally, was misplaced....
...d). See also OCGA §
15-11-104 (statutory provisions relating generally to juvenile court proceedings do not apply where in conflict with provisions relating specifically to termination of parental rights proceedings). The general provisions of OCGA §
15-11-39.1(a) that would allow an out-of-state party in a termination proceeding to be served by certified mail alone cannot trump the clear and specific provisions of OCGA §§ 15-11-96(c) and
9-11-4 that would deem such a method of service to be insufficient. OCGA §
15-11-39.1 simply does not apply in this case....
...645,
261 S.E.2d 590 (1979) is inapplicable here, as that case was decided several years before the legislature enacted OCGA § 15-11-96(c), the specific statute relating to service in termination proceedings. See Ga. L. 1986, p. 1017. In In the Interest of M.A.C., we determined that the former version of OCGA §
15-11-39.1(a) was constitutional, and that service by certified mail on an out-of-state parent seventy days before a termination hearing provided sufficient notice....
...elong v. Welch,
272 Ga. 730, 731,
533 S.E.2d 724 (2000). Thus, by passing a specific statute relating to service in termination proceedings after our decision in In the Interest of M.A.C., the legislature has made clear that service pursuant to OCGA §
15-11-39.1(a) by certified mail alone on an out-of-state party in a termination proceeding is no longer sufficient....
...This code section allows for alternative methods of service in situations where there are other, applicable statutes besides OCGA §
9-11-4 that provide for service; or where the provisions for service are unclear. OCGA §
9-11-4(j). It does not allow inapplicable service provisions such as OCGA §
15-11-39.1(a) to apply where they do not. Here, OCGA § 15-11-96(c) provides a clear and specific method for service in termination of parental rights proceedings, and OCGA §
9-11-4(j) does not create an avenue through which the general provisions of OCGA §
15-11-39.1 can override the specific mandates of OCGA § 15-11-96(c). OCGA §
9-11-4(j) only allows for additional methods of service where those additional methods would be inherently applicable. Because OCGA §
15-11-39.1(a) has no inherent applicability here, OCGA §
9-11-4(j) does not operate to make it applicable. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that service on Sexton by certified mail pursuant to OCGA §
15-11-39.1(a) was proper....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 13, 1995 | 453 S.E.2d 457, 95 Fulton County D. Rep. 555
Thompson, Justice.
A delinquency petition was filed, alleging that the 16-year-old appellant had committed the criminal offense of murder. The juvenile court conducted a hearing pursuant to OCGA §
15-11-39, to determine whether the offense should be transferred for prosecution to the superior court....
...The juvenile court ordered the transfer, and this appeal followed.
1. Before transfer of jurisdiction from juvenile court to superior court can be ordered, the juvenile court must in its discretion find, inter alia, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child committed the delinquent act alleged, OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) (3) (A), and the interests of the child and the community require that the child be placed under legal restraint and the transfer be made, OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) (3) (C). In the Interest of R. B.,
264 Ga. 602 (448 SE2d 690) (1994). Appellant contends that neither requirement was satisfied.
2. With regard to OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) (3) (A), appellant admits firing the fatal shot, but asserts that the affirmative defense of justification precludes a finding that he committed the delinquent act alleged....
...Alternatively, he asserts that the elements of provocation and mutual combat reduced the act to a lesser offense.
*9Decided February 13, 1995.
Peter D. Johnson, for appellant.
Daniel J. Craig, District Attorney, Charles R. Sheppard, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
The function of the juvenile court under OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) (3) (A) is to determine whether “reasonable grounds” exist to believe the child committed the alleged act; it does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt as for a conviction....
...52 (1) (365 SE2d 820) (1988). Appellant’s proffered defenses are for the trier of fact to consider at trial. The evidence supports the court’s finding that reasonable grounds exist to believe appellant committed the offense of murder.
3. With regard to OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) (3) (C), the juvenile court found that the nature of the crimes alleged and the manner in which they were committed demonstrate a callous and wanton disregard for the value of human life, and that the juvenile is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation through the juvenile court....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 11, 1994
...Slaton, District Attorney, Carl P. Greenberg, Sally Butler, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee. CARLEY, Justice. A delinquency petition was filed, alleging that the 16-year-old appellant had committed the offense of murder. Acting pursuant to OCGA §
15-11-39, the juvenile court conducted a hearing to determine whether to transfer for prosecution in the superior court....
...The *603 juvenile court ordered the transfer, and appellant appeals. [1] 1. Before a transfer can be ordered, the juvenile court is required to make various findings, including a determination that there are "reasonable grounds to believe that [t]he child committed the delinquent act alleged[.]" OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) (3) (A)....
...de in addition to the showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe the juvenile committed the acts alleged.... Although ... some of [the investigator's] testimony [may have been] hearsay, which would not suffice to support a conviction, OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) (3) "requires only that the court find that there are `reasonable grounds to believe' that the child committed the act alleged, not `proof beyond a reasonable doubt' as is required for a conviction....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 21, 1991 | 260 Ga. 805
...Bowers, Attorney General, for appellee. FLETCHER, Justice. M. E. J., a juvenile, was charged with three counts of murder. There is evidence that on June 15, 1990, the state served M. E. J. with notice of its intent to transfer his case to superior court under OCGA §
15-11-39....
...I, Sec. I, Par. XVIII of the Georgia Constitution. The juvenile court found that M. E. J.'s admission of the crimes went only to the issue of whether there were "reasonable grounds to believe that ... the child committed the delinquent act alleged," OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) (3) (A), in order to transfer the case to superior court....
...een accepted and he had been sentenced in juvenile court. In the circumstances of this case, M. E. J.'s admission of the crimes did not constitute a "hearing on the merits" which would prevent the juvenile court from transferring the case under OCGA §
15-11-39 (a)....
...It is clear that the court did not accept M. E. J.'s admission within the meaning of Rule 10.4. The juvenile court did not err in transferring the offense for prosecution to Fulton Superior Court. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] Under OCGA §
15-11-39 (a) (2), the state is not required to give notice to the attorney of the juvenile. [2] We note that any statements made by the child at a transfer hearing "are not admissible against him over objection in the criminal proceedings following the transfer." OCGA §
15-11-39 (d), effective July 1, 1991; OCGA §
15-11-39 (e).
