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(Code 1981, §15-11-601, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242; Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 5-15/HB 310; Ga. L. 2017, p. 604, § 1-4/SB 175.)
The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, in subsection (a), inserted "community supervision officers," near the beginning of the last sentence of paragraph (a)(2) and added "or a community supervision officer" at the end of subparagraph (a)(3)(A). See editor's note for applicability.
The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, deleted "or" at the end of subparagraph (a)(10)(B); substituted "; or" for a period at the end of paragraph (a)(11); and added paragraph (a)(12).
- Diploma requirement as condition of probated or suspended sentence in criminal proceedings, § 17-10-1.
Power of juvenile court to require restitution by delinquent child as condition or limitation of probation, § 17-14-5.
Power of court to place delinquent children pursuant to Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, § 39-4-7.
Further provisions regarding commitment of delinquent child to Department of Juvenile Justice, §§ 49-4A-8 and49-5-7.
Post-adjudication transfer of Juvenile Court cases for supervision, Uniform Rules for the Juvenile Courts of Georgia, Rule 5.3(c).
- Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 6-1/HB 310, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that the amendment by this Act shall apply to sentences entered on or after July 1, 2015.
- For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 231 (2015).
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2302, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-35, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-66, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
- Contrary to a juvenile's claim that the juvenile court erred in committing the juvenile into the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice for two years consecutive to a 60-day boot camp program, the disposition was valid under both former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-66(b)(1) and15-11-70(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-443,15-11-601, and15-11-607) as: (1) the former granted the court the discretion, in a case involving a felony offense, to order the juvenile to serve up to a maximum of 60 days in a youth development center in addition to any other treatment or rehabilitation; and (2) under the latter, an order of disposition continued in force for two years, or until the child was sooner discharged by the department. In the Interest of J.R., 280 Ga. App. 143, 633 S.E.2d 447 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-66).
- After hearing evidence during the adjudicatory phase, the juvenile court makes a single determination of whether the child is delinquent, regardless of the number of offenses committed; thus, the court did not have the power to order a juvenile to serve two consecutive 90-day terms in a youth development center for separate acts of delinquency. In re M.D., 233 Ga. App. 261, 503 S.E.2d 888 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-35).
- After a juvenile attacked a store detective, and subsequently displayed violent behavior and threatened another store employee, the court's conclusion that the juvenile was in need of treatment and rehabilitation, and the court's limited restraining order preventing the juvenile from entering any store owned by the company in Fulton County, except in the immediate presence of a parent or adult relative, was an appropriate disposition and justified by the evidence. In re J.M., 237 Ga. App. 298, 513 S.E.2d 742 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-35).
Designation of work of public purpose for destruction of public property is constructive rather than punitive. It comes within the statutory mandate that juvenile court judges are to make such disposition of a delinquent child as is "best suited to his treatment, rehabilitation, and welfare." M.J.W. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 350, 210 S.E.2d 842 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2302).
- Both power and necessity to require restitution as condition for probation exist under the Juvenile Code. P.R. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 346, 210 S.E.2d 839 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2302).
Term "conditions and limitations" must include right to order restitution. This right is inherent in the power of the court, in what is, in effect, the burden upon the court, to make such disposition of a delinquent child as is "best suited to his treatment, rehabilitation, and welfare." P.R. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 346, 210 S.E.2d 839 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2302).
- Paragraph (a)(5) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-35 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-601) fixes the restitution obligation on the juvenile, the offending party, and does not confer liability for restitution on the parents. In re C.R.D., 197 Ga. App. 571, 398 S.E.2d 845 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-35).
- Reasonable reading of the concluding language of paragraph (a)(5) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-35 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-601) was that the language specified acceptable means or conduits by which the money owed by the juvenile offender could be paid, i.e., the mechanics of forwarding the restitution funds to the court. It was a statement of practical administrative convenience deemed necessary to implement restitution. It did not independently broaden restitution liability. In re C.R.D., 197 Ga. App. 571, 398 S.E.2d 845 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-35).
- Despite the 41-day confinement of the first juvenile, the juvenile court complied with the statutory limits relied upon by the first juvenile as the disposition order did not include any confinement in a secure residential facility, so the 30-day confinement limit was not directly implicated by the disposition order and, by its plain terms, the credit-for-time-served requirement only addressed dispositional confinement, not other confinement. In the Interest of B. L., 333 Ga. App. 860, 777 S.E.2d 705 (2015).
- Juvenile defendant's commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) was proper because the defendant was on probation for a delinquent act and the defendant's violation of probation terms was also a delinquent act, and commitment to DJJ was found to be the treatment or rehabilitation best suited to the child's needs. In the Interest of B. Q. L. E., 297 Ga. App. 273, 676 S.E.2d 742 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1197, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 787 (Ga. 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-66).
- Since the defendant's delinquent act of public indecency did not constitute an act which, if committed by an adult, would be punishable either as a felony or as a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature involving bodily injury or a substantial likelihood of injury under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-66 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-601), the juvenile court's sentence which included confinement exceeded that allowed by law and was void. In the Interest of C. H., 319 Ga. App. 373, 735 S.E.2d 291 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-66).
- After a juvenile was found delinquent, the court did not exceed the court's authority by prohibiting the juvenile from driving until the expiration of the juvenile's probation, rather than the juvenile's eighteenth birthday. In re A.H.S., 223 Ga. App. 824, 479 S.E.2d 157 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-35).
- Juvenile court erred in expressly denying a juvenile credit for the time served in detention prior to the delinquency adjudication because under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-601(11)(c), the juvenile court was required to give a child credit for time served in a secure residential facility and the credit for time served applies to the disposition of all offenses, including felonies, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-604(b). In the Interest of D. D., 335 Ga. App. 676, 782 S.E.2d 728 (2016).
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-35, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-66, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.
- Juvenile court had no authority to impose court costs on child as part of conditions of probation. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U82-14 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-35).
All costs related to subsistence and detention, including emergency medical costs, incurred on behalf of juveniles held in Department of Juvenile Justice facilities prior to a formal commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice are properly assessed to the counties. 2002 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2002-6 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-66).
- School-age children placed in facilities by the Department of Human Resources or the Department of Children and Youth Services must be provided with a free education by the local school system in which the facility is located. 1996 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 96-23 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-35).
- 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, § 50. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, §§ 59 et seq., 116.
- 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 234 et seq.
- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 31.
- Defense of infancy in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 83 A.L.R.4th 1135.
Total Results: 2
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2022-06-01
Snippet: rehabilitation.” Id. §§ 15-11-582 (e); 15-11-600 (b); 15-11-601 (a). The question here is whether, during
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-05-20
Citation: 828 S.E.2d 350, 305 Ga. 820
Snippet: adjudications *352during sentencing. See OCGA § 15-11-601 (a) (directing a juvenile court to consider, among