CopyCited 98 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 2010 | 287 Ga. 63, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 732
...repealed[,]" Rule 1.2 provided that, "[t]he above provisions notwithstanding, each superior court may retain or adopt without specific Supreme Court approval... an order establishing guidelines governing excuses from jury duty pursuant *324 to OCGA §
15-12-1.0[sic]." [3] OCGA §
15-12-1(a)(1) provides in relevant part that any person who shows "good cause why he or she should be exempt from jury duty may be excused by ......
...[a] person who has been duly appointed by order of the chief judge to excuse jurors" where "guidelines governing excuses" have been established by court order. The Code section further provides for the excusal or deferment of specifically described persons. See OCGA §
15-12-1(a)(2) through (c)(2)....
...dministrator and the deputy court administrator/jury manager "to receive requests for jury deferments and make determinations as to deferments and excusals" in accordance with guidelines contained within the order. While the order does not cite OCGA §
15-12-1, it tracks that statute's language. The second order, which was entered after the original adoption of the Uniform Rules "[p]ursuant to Rule 1.2," provides for the retention of "the local court rules establishing guidelines governing excuses from jury duty pursuant to OCGA
15-12-1.0." That order became effective on July 1, 1985....
...in order to preserve the issue for appeal." Davie v. State,
265 Ga. 800, 802(2),
463 S.E.2d 112 (1995). The question is whether a prospective petit juror serving a sentence under the First Offender Act has been "convicted" within the meaning of OCGA §
15-12-163(b)(5), which provides that, in jury trials in felony cases, either the State or the accused may object to the seating of a juror who "has been convicted of a felony in a federal court or any court of a state of the United States and the...
...v. Town of Register,
278 Ga. 625, 626(1),
604 S.E.2d 175 (2004) (citation omitted). We see no indication that the General Assembly intended to change the common law in this regard. Instead, over a quarter-century before the legislature amended OCGA §
15-12-163 to expressly provide for the excusal for cause of potential jurors who have been "convicted" of a felony, see Ga....
...t offender's eligibility for jury service. For these reasons, we conclude that a person who has been placed on probation or sentenced to a term of confinement pursuant to the First Offender Act is not incompetent to serve as a petit juror under OCGA §
15-12-163(b)(5) either before or after being discharged without an adjudication of guilt....
...102, 107(3),
657 S.E.2d 213 (2008) (declining to address on interim review an issue not set forth in this Court's order granting review and noting that the failure to do so did not "`waive the right to posttrial review'"). [3] The citation should have read simply "OCGA §
15-12-1," as there was no subsection "1.0." [4] Apparently when the Uniform Rules were amended in 1994, the decimal point was omitted from the citation to OCGA § "
15-12-1.0" in Rule 1.2(D). That was clearly a typographical error, as the remainder of Rule 1.2(D) remains the same as that portion of the original Rule 1.2 and OCGA §
15-12-10 concerns delinquent jurors and is obviously inapplicable....
CopyCited 70 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 18, 2011 | 288 Ga. 876, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 794
...(e) Although a prospective juror who was a convicted felon stated that his civil rights had been restored, the trial court granted the State's motion to disqualify the juror over Bryant's objection after the juror failed to provide any information or documentation verifying his claim. See OCGA §
15-12-163(b)(5) (providing that, in jury trials in felony cases, either the State or the accused may object to the seating of a juror who is a convicted felon and whose civil rights have not been restored)....
...is for reversal, because Bryant has not shown that the *373 jurors selected to decide his case were incompetent or biased. See Humphreys v. State,
287 Ga. 63, 71(4),
694 S.E.2d 316 (2010) (holding that a juror's erroneous disqualification under OCGA §
15-12-163(b)(5) was not reversible error)....
...s not likely to recur. 5. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Bryant's motion that the jury not be sequestered. See Lamar v. State,
278 Ga. 150, 155(12),
598 S.E.2d 488 (2004) ("[A] trial court is clearly authorized by OCGA §
15-12-142(a) to maintain jury sequestration over a death penalty defendant's objection"). 6. Bryant contends that the trial court failed to comply with OCGA §
15-12-1(a)(1), (3)....
...uest. Although affidavits were not provided to potential jurors, before granting any excusal the trial court examined on the record individually and under oath those potential jurors who identified themselves as primary caregivers as defined in OCGA §
15-12-1 regarding their role as caregivers and their statutory right to be excused....
CopyCited 64 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 1, 2010 | 286 Ga. 839, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 551
...158, 159-162(1), (2), (
575 S.E.2d 462) (2003) (discussing the alleged under-representation of cognizable groups). 22. The trial court did not err by denying Stinski's request for more peremptory strikes than were provided for by Georgia law at the time of his trial. See OCGA §
15-12-165; Frazier v....
...704, 716(17),
532 S.E.2d 677 (2000); McMichen,
265 Ga. at 611(28),
458 S.E.2d 833 (citing Lockhart v. McCree,
476 U.S. 162, 173,
106 S.Ct. 1758,
90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986)). 26. The trial court did not err by asking jurors the question on death penalty views prescribed by OCGA §
15-12-164(a)(4), allowing follow-up questions by both parties, and then excusing jurors in accordance with constitutional standards. King,
273 Ga. at 262(8),
539 S.E.2d 783. In addition, Stinski lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of OCGA §
15-12-164(c), because no prospective jurors were excused based on that statute....
...is not an appropriate matter for voir dire." Zellmer v. State,
272 Ga. 735, 736(1),
534 S.E.2d 802 (2000). We disagree with Stinski's argument that constitutional law requires any modification of this holding. 31. Stinski's claim that application of OCGA §§
15-12-1 and
15-12-60 in his case resulted in the unconstitutional under-representation of certain cognizable groups is not supported by the evidence of record and, therefore, must fail....
CopyCited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 23, 2012 | 721 S.E.2d 855, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 205
...307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Appellant contends that the trial court erred by excusing several potential jurors because, according to Appellant, there is no evidence that these jurors filed a request to be excused or an affidavit as required by OCGA §
15-12-1.1. He further argues that the jurors were excused indiscriminately in violation of this Court’s holding in Yates v. State,
274 Ga. 312, 314-316 (2) (553 SE2d 563) (2001).
Pursuant to OCGA §
15-12-1.1 (a), a trial court may excuse a potential juror if he or she is engaged “in work necessary to the public health, safety, or good order,” is a full-time student, is the *394primary caregiver of a child six years of age or younger, is a “primary teacher in a home study program,” or shows other good cause....
...o alter, deliberately or inadvertently, the representative nature of the jury lists. [Cit.]” English v. State, supra. Finally, “[t]he jury panels which were put upon the accused contained [101] veniremen, substantially more than required by OCGA §
15-12-160.” Hall v....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 23, 2013 | 748 S.E.2d 896, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 2954
...Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to challenge the array of the traverse jury on the ground that the clerk of court exempted or deferred service for a number of jurors without requiring them to produce written documentation. See OCGA §
15-12-1.1, effective July 1, 2011, which redesignated former OCGA §
15-12-1 as OCGA §
15-12-1.1 and deleted the former last sentence of certain paragraphs which read: “It shall be the duty of the court to provide affidavits for the purpose of this paragraph.” The record is devoid of a ruling by the trial court upon appellant’s motion to challenge the array....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 15, 2017 | 800 S.E.2d 307
...jury-eligible population. To this end, the Act gave centralized responsibility for preparing each county’s master jury list to the Council of Superior Court Clerks (“the Clerks Council”). See Ga. L. 2011, p. 59, §§ 1-5, 1-16 (amending OCGA §§
15-12-1 and
15-12-40.1)....
...the inclusiveness threshold.
6. Local clerks and jury commissioners shall not add or delete names from the county master jury list, but may excuse, defer, or inactivate names of jurors known to be ineligible or incompetent to serve pursuant to OCGA §
15-12-1.1....
...Paragraph 6 of the Rule says: “Local clerks and jury commissioners shall not add or delete names from the county master jury list, but may excuse, defer, or inactivate names of jurors known to be ineligible or incompetent to serve pursuant to OCGA §
15-12-1.1.” In turn, that statute sets forth a list of reasons for which a person may be temporarily “excused or deferred from jury duty” by the court or its designee, including being “engaged ......
...imary caregiver of a young child or a disabled person; being a primary teacher in a home study program (during the period the person is teaching); and being a military service member or a service member’s spouse under specified circumstances. OCGA §
15-12-1.1 (a), (c). Persons age 70 or older may be excused and “inactivate[d]” permanently, OCGA §
15-12-1.1 (b), as may “permanently mentally or physically disabled persons,” OCGA §
15-12-1.1 (a) (1)....
...493 other names on the Council’s list; and added 1,141 names from the “legacy data.”7 The resulting new list contained 790,654 names.
*181From this new list, the vendor “inactivated” 64,190 names for reasons clearly not addressed by OCGA §
15-12-1.1 — 38,438 that were deemed duplicates by the vendor’s system; 24,554 marked with a code indicating an undeliverable address; and 1,198 marked with a code indicating a duplicate and also an undeliverable address....
...ddress or an unspecified reason within the general category of “other permanent disqualifications.” To the extent that the names the vendor inactivated under this general category were based on permanent excuses or inactivations pursuant to OCGA §
15-12-1.1 made before the last submission of the county exception list, which the Rule has required the county to submit to the Clerks Council every March, the same names already should have been purged from the Council’s county master jury list...
...on Rule. The management order provides that the jury clerk will not add or delete names from the [Clerks Council’s] County Master Jury List. *188The jury clerk does, however, have the authority to defer, excuse and inactivate jurors. See OCGA [§]
15-12-1.1....
...Jurors are inactivated by flagging the person’s name and identifying information. A juror name that is flagged on the County Master Jury List is exempt from being selected for jury service. Jurors are flagged if they are statutorily ineligible or incompetent to serve or if they request inactivation pursuant to OCGA [§]
15-12-1.1....
...nty may have moved back; and a person who was a non-citizen may have been naturalized. Indeed, to the extent the “legacy data” includes names inactivated for unspecified “statutory” reasons, most of the reasons for removing jurors under OCGA §
15-12-1.1, including status as a student, caregiver, home study teacher, or military service member, are not permanent in nature.
Instead of using locally carried-over “legacy data,” we understand the Jury Composition Rule to require that the...
...ar to year and to excuse, defer, or inactivate names on the Council’s most recent county master jury list based on those temporary records where doing so is authorized by statute and the Rule, including temporary excusáis and deferrals under OCGA §
15-12-1.1 and temporary deferrals for prior jury service....
...nown to be ineligible or incompetent to serve.” The State’s argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, this authority of local jury clerks is expressly limited to “jurors known to be ineligible or incom-petentto serve pursuant to OCGA§
15-12-1.1.” (Emphasis added.) As discussed previously, OCGA §
15-12-1.1 provides a list of grounds for granting a prospective juror a permanent or temporary exemption from jury service, but none of those statutory grounds expressly concerns the following reasons for which Fulton County has permanently inacti...
...ury list for any reason that has not become known to the county since it last submitted its annual county exception list to the Council; and that names are temporarily inactivated on the county master jury list only for the reasons set forth in OCGA §
15-12-1.1 or for other valid reasons for which the Rule has not given the Council responsibility, such as jurors’ recent service and non-statutory personal reasons justifying an individual juror’s temporary excusal or deferral.
Judgment rever...
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 6, 2012 | 722 S.E.2d 725, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 352
...Nonetheless, after review of the transcript and the evidence in the record, we find that Hagins has failed to fulfill his burden of showing prejudice.
In his appeal to the Court of Appeals, Hagins contended that the trial court erred by excusing potential jurors indiscriminately in violation of OCGA §
15-12-1.1 and of this Court’s holding in Yates v. State,
274 Ga. 312, 314-316 (2) (553 SE2d 563) (2001). Pursuant to OCGA §
15-12-1.1 (a), a trial court may excuse a potential juror if he or she is engaged “in work necessary to the public health, safety, or good order,” is a full-time student, is the primary caregiver of a child six years of age or younger, is a “primary teacher in a home study program,” or shows other good cause....
...617, 620 (8) (593 SE2d 335) (2004).
In the present case, it is undisputed that the clerk of the court, rather than the trial judge, granted exemptions from jury duty. However, it is undisputed that the clerk was duly appointed to excuse jurors, as permitted by OCGA §
15-12-1.1 (a) (1), and followed a standing order issued by the judges of the Ocmulgee Judicial Circuit....
...Out of the total 500 jurors drawn, only 30 were given statutory or discretionary excusáis. Out of this 30, Hagins challenged the excusa! of only 11, either on the basis that an affidavit was not filed or that the proffered excuse does not neatly fit into the statutory scheme of OCGA §
15-12-1.1....
...presentative nature of the jury lists. [Cit.]” English v. State,
290 Ga. App. 378, 383 (3) (b) (659 SE2d 783) (2008). Finally, “[t]he jury panels which were put upon the accused contained [115] veniremen, substantially more than required by OCGA §
15-12-160.” Hall v....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 21, 2014 | 754 S.E.2d 29, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 145
...After a hearing on May 21, 2012, the court denied the motion by order dated June 26, 2012. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on July 2, 2012. The case was docketed in this Court to the September 2013 term and submitted for decision on the briefs.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SCt 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986).
OCGA§
15-12-1.1 (a) (2).
The trial judge found the State’s explanation that Weaver was “bucking” to be on the jury persuasive, remarking that Weaver was the only potential juror that seemed to be campaigning for selection.
The trial judge allo...
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 1, 2022 | 313 Ga. 811
...with [him] for the first time as the jury was being selected”); Harris v. State,
278 Ga. 596, 597 (1) (604 SE2d 788) (2004) (based on facts in the record, trial
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that good cause existed to seat
alternate juror under OCGA §
15-12-172); Yates v....
...trial court has “broad discretion” in determining whether good cause exists to
excuse a juror for service, “that discretion is abused when the trial court fails
to make any inquiry into whether the proffered excuse constitutes ‘good cause’”
under OCGA §
15-12-1 (a)); Crider v....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 16, 2023 | 316 Ga. 490
...that he had failed to identify a violation of a jury selection statute,
Moody argues for the first time in his reply brief that the altered
master jury list used by Fulton County was not the county master
jury list actually compiled by the Council as required by OCGA §§
15-12-120.1 (providing that, “[o]n and after July 1, 2012, trial juries
shall be chosen from a county master jury list”) and
15-12-1 (5)
(defining the term “‘[c]ounty master jury list’” as “a list compiled by
the council”)....
...and a defect “[w]here th[e] role of the
jury commission ha[d] been entirely circumvented by the service of a grand
juror it never selected for service, [which was] an ‘essential and substantial’
56
OCGA §
15-12-120.1 was violated in the manner that Moody alleges,
Moody has not established a fair-cross-section violation, as
discussed below, or that the alleged violation amounted to “such
disregard of the essential and substantial provisions of the statute
as would vitiate the array[ ]” to warrant automatic reversal....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 17, 2021 | 311 Ga. 524
...selection
statutes). Cf. Yates v. State,
274 Ga. 312, 315-316 (553 SE2d 563)
(2001) (reversing convictions where the trial court abused its
discretion by excusing jurors without conducting a “good cause”
inquiry under former version of OCGA §
15-12-1.1 (a) (1)); Joyner v.
State,
251 Ga. 84, 85 (303 SE2d 106) (1983) (reversing convictions
due to unauthorized excusal of prospective jurors in “plain violation”
of the former version of OCGA §
15-12-1.1 (a) (1)); Blevins v....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 21, 2019
...ter
its adoption of most of the other provisions of our modern scheme for
selecting juries. See Ga. L. 2011, p. 59. That suggests that the
General Assembly thought it important to require that all grand
jurors be selected randomly. See also OCGA §
15-12-1 (2) (defining
“choose” and “chosen” for purposes of the jury selection statutes as
“the act of randomly selecting potential jurors” (emphasis
supplied)).11,12 We are not inclined to disagree with that assessment.
A gr...
...igible and competent
to serve on the grand jury that indicted Towns.21 Further, just as the
statutes for selecting, drawing, and summoning jurors for the array
form no part of our system for procuring an impartial jury, the
20 See OCGA §
15-12-1 (2) (“Choose” or “chosen” means the act of
randomly selecting potential jurors from the county master jury list in a
manner that does not deliberately or systematically exclude identifiable and
distinct groups from the venire.”); OCGA §
15-12-120.1 (“On and after July 1,
2012, trial juries shall be chosen from a county master jury list....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 9, 2019
...2. Davis contends that the trial court erred when it granted
the State’s motion to strike a prospective juror over his objection.
Specifically, he contends the trial court improperly questioned the
juror regarding a topic not covered in OCGA §
15-12-164 (a)....
...explained that “the Court excused [Juror 36] based on her hardship
situation, taking the juror at her word on her problems
concentrating on the case.”
Davis complains that the trial court’s questioning of Juror 36
did not pertain to the topics covered in OCGA §
15-12-164 (a),2 but
2 OCGA §
15-12-164 (a) provides:
On voir dire examination in a felony trial, the jurors shall be
asked the following questions:
(1) “Have you, for any reason, formed and expressed any
opinion in regard to the guilt or...
...ers in the
negative, the question in paragraph (3) of this subsection
shall be propounded to him;
8
to the juror’s claim that she had a death in the family. Davis’s
reliance on OCGA §
15-12-164 is inapposite....
...does not limit the trial court’s inquiry to those issues. See Morrow v.
State,
272 Ga. 691, 698 (6) (532 SE2d 78) (2000) (the scope of voir
dire is left to the trial court’s discretion); Croft v. State,
73 Ga. App.
318, 319 (1) (36 SE2d 200) (1945) (predecessor to OCGA §
15-12-164
did not “exclude by its language all other questions not mentioned
therein which may be asked the juror when put on the voir dire”).
Davis argues that “it is evident” that the State’s motion to
strike Juror 36 was based not on hardship but on her bias against
law enforcement....
...d inability to
be fair and impartial. The trial court then excused Juror 36 on the
basis of hardship. “It is well-settled that a trial court may excuse a
potential juror for ‘good cause’ if jury service would impose an undue
hardship. OCGA §
15-12-1 (a).” Stewart v....
