O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
If a juror is found competent and is not challenged peremptorily by the state, he shall be put upon the accused. Unless he is challenged peremptorily by the accused, the juror shall be sworn to try the case.
History
(Ga. L. 1855-56, p. 229, § 11; Code 1863, § 4571; Code 1868, § 4591; Code 1873, § 4684; Code 1882, § 4684; Penal Code 1895, § 977; Penal Code 1910, § 1003; Code 1933, § 59-808.)
Annotations
JUDICIAL DECISIONS State cannot change state’s mind after acceptance by both sides. - This section requires that a juror, after acceptance by both the state and the defense, shall be sworn (unless for cause such as sickness) and that the state, after the state discovers the defense accepts a juror, cannot then change the state’s mind and excuse the juror. Sakobie v. State, 115 Ga. App. 460, 154 S.E.2d 830 (1967). Excusing juror for sickness after the juror has been accepted but not sworn is no ground for new trial. Cason v. State, 134 Ga. 786, 68 S.E. 554 (1910). New trial not required by striking of accepted juror. - Defendant was not entitled to a new trial since the trial court corrected the clerk’s mistaken assertion that the state had used all of the state’s peremptory strikes, even though such correction allowed the state to peremptorily strike a juror already accepted by defense counsel. Thompkins v. State, 181 Ga. App. 158, 351 S.E.2d 475 (1986).
There is no error in postponing swearing jurors in chief until full panel of 12 is obtained. Roberts v. State, 65 Ga. 430 (1880). Impact of failure to record intention to strike juror. - With regard to defendant’s trial and conviction on one count of armed robbery, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in allowing the state to strike a juror after the entire panel had been selected as the state mistakenly failed to record the state’s intention to strike a juror, and the prosecutor promptly recognized the mistake and informed the trial court, who had the discretion to then allow the state to exercise one of the state’s remaining strikes to excuse the juror. Cox v. State, 293 Ga. App. 98, 666 S.E.2d 379 (2008). Cited in Blankenship v. State, 247 Ga. 590, 280 S.E.2d 623 (1981); Leeks v. State, 188 Ga. App. 625, 373 S.E.2d 777 (1988); Rogers v. State, 282 Ga. 659, 653 S.E.2d 31 (2007).
RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury, § 191 et seq.
C.J.S. - 50A C.J.S., Juries, § 520 et seq.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
9
cases, 1986–2018 · leading case:
Stephens v. State, 816 S.E.2d 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
Stephens v. State, 816 S.E.2d 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 4× “He contends that OCGA § 15-12-166 requires that once a juror is accepted by the State, the juror must be sworn.”
Cox v. State, 666 S.E.2d 379 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 8× “Cox next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to strike a juror after the entire panel had been selected in violation of OCGA § 15-12-166. That section requires that “a juror, after acceptance by both the State and the defense, shall be sworn”…”
Rogers v. State, 653 S.E.2d 31 (Ga. 2007).
· cites it 2× “Specifically, Rogers argues that the trial court erred by failing to follow *662 OCGA § 15-12-166, which provides that in criminal cases the State must accept or reject each potential juror before the defendant is required to do so.”
Chambers v. State, 556 S.E.2d 444 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 4× “OCGA § 15-12-166 10 applies procedurally to the selection of juries in felony cases, and thus Chambers’ claim of error thereunder presents no basis for reversal in this misdemeanor case.”
Strozier v. Clark, 424 S.E.2d 368 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 2× “OCGA § 15-12-166; Gamble v. State, 141 Ga.”
John Washington Hightower v. Derrick Schofield, 365 F.3d 1008 (11th Cir. 2004).
“O.C.G.A. § 15-12-166 provides that "[i]f a juror is found competent and is not challenged peremptorily by the state, he shall be put upon the accused.”
Thompkins v. State, 351 S.E.2d 475 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
· cites it 2× “Appellant then moved for mistrial on the ground that under OCGA § 15-12-166 after acceptance by both the State and the defense a juror must be sworn, because only the defendant can strike a juror after discovering the State is willing to accept him.”
Leeks v. State, 373 S.E.2d 777 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 2× “As to the white former client of defendant Leeks’ attorney, defendant did *628 not insist that she be permitted to serve and did not challenge the State’s striking of her.”
Carltavius Stephens v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 4× “He contends that OCGA § 15-12-166 requires that once a juror is accepted by the State, the juror must be sworn.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.