Section controls money raised by legal process.

- Judgment creditor, in the collection of a fieri facias, is not restricted to the creditor's right to rule the officer who has levied another process on the creditor's debtor's property, nor is a creditor required to anticipate that such a levy will be made; this section refers to money raised by legal process. Barkley v. May, 3 Ga. App. 101, 59 S.E. 440 (1907).

Funds not disbursed if money rule filed.

- Trial court may not order the sheriff to disburse funds held in accord with O.C.G.A. § 15-13-13 if valid money rules claiming a portion of the funds are filed against the sheriff. Henson & Henson v. Myszka, 160 Ga. App. 135, 286 S.E.2d 456 (1981).

Plaintiff may agree that purchaser pay others.

- Sheriff is relieved from liability by an agreement of the plaintiff in fieri facias that the purchaser at a sheriff's sale should make payments to others. Scott v. Ward, 22 Ga. App. 680, 97 S.E. 207 (1918).

Cited in Armour Car Lines v. Summerour, 5 Ga. App. 619, 63 S.E. 667 (1909); Morris v. First Nat'l Bank, 20 Ga. App. 60, 92 S.E. 396 (1917); Coweta Fertilizer Co. v. Kiser Co., 33 Ga. App. 278, 125 S.E. 793 (1924); Brown v. Smith, 50 Ga. App. 332, 178 S.E. 180 (1935); Holbrook v. Stewart, 55 Ga. App. 720, 191 S.E. 165 (1937); Edmonds v. Beatie, 62 Ga. App. 246, 8 S.E.2d 559 (1940); Head v. Trustees of Jessee Parker Williams Hosp., 190 Ga. 360, 9 S.E.2d 171 (1940); Masters v. Pardue, 91 Ga. App. 684, 86 S.E.2d 704 (1955); Milam v. Adams, 101 Ga. App. 880, 115 S.E.2d 252 (1960); Golfland, Inc. v. Thomas, 107 Ga. App. 563, 130 S.E.2d 757 (1963); Sabino v. United States, 220 Ga. 391, 139 S.E.2d 295 (1964); Imperial Body Works, Inc. v. Waters, 156 Ga. App. 887, 275 S.E.2d 822 (1981); Myszka v. Henson & Henson, 170 Ga. App. 878, 318 S.E.2d 672 (1984).

Court proceeds upon equitable principles.

- That the court shall proceed in making a disposition of money rule upon equitable principles is expressly provided. Barron Buick, Inc. v. Kennesaw Fin. Co., 105 Ga. App. 451, 124 S.E.2d 918 (1962).

Unless only legal rights invoked.

- If holder of unforeclosed mortgage invokes equitable principles, such as the insolvency of the debtor, the court will apply equitable principles in a money rule proceeding, but if such claimant invokes only legal rights, the court will proceed upon legal principles. General Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Bank of Wrightsville, 92 Ga. App. 808, 90 S.E.2d 93 (1955).

Effect being given to all claimants' rights.

- Rule to distribute money in the hands of an officer proceeds upon equitable principles, effect being given, so far as may be warranted by the pleadings and the evidence, to the rights of all the claimants to the fund. Coleman v. Slade & Etheridge, 75 Ga. 61 (1885); Heard & Sutton v. W.J. Adams & Bro., 17 Ga. App. 33, 86 S.E. 260 (1915); Georgia Realty Co. v. Bank of Covington, 19 Ga. App. 219, 91 S.E. 267 (1917); J.A. Thrash & Co. v. Harman, 21 Ga. App. 98, 94 S.E. 54 (1917).

Cases of setoff not equity cases.

- By parity of reasoning regarding those cases of statutory money rule against levying officers which are not equity cases, and those of setoff allowed by statute, the pursuit of the remedy allowed by former Code 1933, § 108-51 (see now O.C.G.A. § 53-12-150) does not make an "equity case" of which the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction. Robinson v. Lindsey, 184 Ga. 684, 192 S.E. 910 (1937) (decided under prior law; see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para III).

Supreme Court without equity jurisdiction under section.

- If a petition contains no allegations showing any right in plaintiffs to equitable relief, but the only judgment sought is one requiring officers to pay over to the county treasurer certain sums alleged to be in the officer's hands and to which the county is entitled, it is not a case of which the Supreme Court has equity jurisdiction. Rucker v. Stark, 209 Ga. 496, 74 S.E.2d 74, transferred to Banks County v. Stark, 88 Ga. App. 368, 77 S.E.2d 33 (1953).

Equitable principles may be invoked by pleading and evidence. Continental Fertilizer Co. v. J.F. Madden & Sons, 140 Ga. 39, 78 S.E. 460 (1913).

Resort to court of equity need not be had. Georgia Realty Co. v. Bank of Covington, 19 Ga. App. 219, 91 S.E. 267 (1917).

No irregularities should defeat the real equities of parties and justice of case. Coleman v. Slade & Etheridge, 75 Ga. 61 (1885); J.A. Thrash & Co. v. Harman, 21 Ga. App. 98, 94 S.E. 54 (1917).

Defendant to be protected against multiple actions.

- If a case as disclosed by the pleadings is somewhat like a money judgment and also discloses possible grounds for the grant of an interpleader in equity (see now O.C.G.A. § 23-3-90), the trial judge, although powerless to act in equity, acts properly in invoking equitable principles, as countenanced by the Civil Practice Act (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9), and in thus ordering the plaintiff to proceed in a manner which will enable the court to resolve possible conflicting claims to the surplus funds held by the defendants and thereby protect the defendants from multiple actions. Leon Inv. Co. v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 123 Ga. App. 668, 182 S.E.2d 151 (1971).

Fund in controversy awarded to oldest lien.

- Final award of compensation by a federal deputy commissioner was a lien against the assets of insurance carriers who became sureties upon the bonds of the employer of the longshoremen, and in a competition between such an award and judgments of this state, the matter of priority is to be determined by the comparative dates, and the fund in controversy should be awarded to the oldest lien. Ford ex rel. Southern Stevedoring Co. v. Lone Star Cement Co., 181 Ga. 212, 181 S.E. 773 (1935).

Prior lien must be higher dignity, foreclosed.

- Upon the trial of a money rule, in order for the priority of a lien to be asserted, it must not only be of higher dignity than other liens contesting for the funds in the hands of the officer, but it must be a lien that has been duly foreclosed. General Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Bank of Wrightsville, 92 Ga. App. 808, 90 S.E.2d 93 (1955).

Unforeclosed retention-of-title contract invalid as claim.

- An unforeclosed retention-of-title contract, as far as foreclosure and enforcement against the property or maker are concerned, is the same as an unforeclosed mortgage and cannot, in a court of law, claim money which is in court for distribution. General Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Bank of Wrightsville, 92 Ga. App. 808, 90 S.E.2d 93 (1955).

Rights of assignee of retention-of-title contract.

- While bank by the assignment of the retention-of-title contract is subrogated to all the rights of the original holder thereof, it does not by reason of such assignment gain any right which the original holder did not have; since the original holder did not have the right to claim the proceeds of funds brought into court under a money rule unless such holder's contract was foreclosed, the bank has no more right to claim the proceeds on such unforeclosed instrument than the original holder had. General Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Bank of Wrightsville, 92 Ga. App. 808, 90 S.E.2d 93 (1955).

Bank's unforeclosed conditional sale contract invalid.

- Though a bank's conditional sale contract is a lien of higher dignity than a finance company's bill of sale, the conditional sale contract is eliminated from the contest for the money in the hands of the sheriff when it has not been foreclosed. General Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Bank of Wrightsville, 92 Ga. App. 808, 90 S.E.2d 93 (1955).

Unforeclosed mortgage as basis for claim.

- Unforeclosed mortgage cannot be basis of a claim for money on a rule to distribute, unless it is shown that the holder of the mortgage would otherwise be remediless. General Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Bank of Wrightsville, 92 Ga. App. 808, 90 S.E.2d 93 (1955).

Proceeds paid to vendors retaining note title.

- Although a note cannot be foreclosed by affidavit like a chattel mortgage, on a rule to distribute money equitable principles are applied and, under the facts of this case, there was no error in ordering the proceeds of the sale to be paid to vendors who retained title by note against judgment creditors. Browder, Manget & Co. v. Blake & Madden, 135 Ga. 71, 68 S.E. 837 (1910).

Proceeds of sale applied to third person's debt.

- If title to property sold as the property of the defendant in attachment is in a third person by reason of that person having reserved the property in writing as security for the purchase money, that third person may waive the right to follow the property and to recover the property from the purchaser at the sale, and in that event can, on money rule, have the proceeds of the sale applied upon the person's debt; and this is true even though the person gave public notice on the day of the sale that whoever bought would buy subject to that title. Wright, Williams & Wadley v. Brown, 7 Ga. App. 389, 66 S.E. 1034 (1910); J.A. Thrash & Co. v. Harman, 21 Ga. App. 98, 94 S.E. 54 (1917).

No right to excess funds generated by tax sale.

- Trial court did not err in granting a tax commissioner summary judgment in a lienholder's action under O.C.G.A. § 15-13-3 to recover excess funds from a tax sale because at the time of the tax sale, at the time the tax commissioner notified the record owner of the property and record lienholders of the excess tax sale funds, and at the time the tax commissioner paid the excess tax sale funds to the record owner of the property, the lienholder had no recorded lien or interest in the property; after the tax commissioner fulfilled the obligation under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-5(a) to give notice to the record property owner and lienholders, the property owner submitted the only claim to the tax commissioner for the excess tax sale funds, and the lienholder failed to show that more was required of the tax commissioner before the funds were disbursed. Brina Bay Holdings, LLC v. Echols, 314 Ga. App. 242, 723 S.E.2d 533 (2012), overruled on other grounds, DLT List, Inc. v. M7ven Supportive Hous. & Dev. Group, 335 Ga. App. 318, 779 S.E.2d 436 (2015).

Laborer's lien superior to mortgage.

- If after the foreclosure of a mortgage and the levy of the execution issues thereon, a laborer's general lien is foreclosed and execution duly issued thereon and placed in the hands of the levying officer for the purpose of claiming the fund arising from the sale of the property under the mortgage execution, the laborer's lien should be first satisfied, although the execution issued upon the lien foreclosure has never been levied upon the property. Mathews v. Fields, 12 Ga. App. 225, 77 S.E. 11 (1913).

Common law fieri facias inferior to mortgage.

- If property is sold by virtue of certain common law fieri facias, the liens of which are inferior in dignity to an older recorded mortgage, which has been duly foreclosed and the mortgage fieri facias placed in the hands of the levying officer prior to the sale, such officer would be subject to rule by the owner of the superior mortgage fieri facias upon the money so raised being paid out to satisfy the liens of the inferior judgment fieri facias, notwithstanding the fact that the officer may have held up the fund for a period of six months subsequent to the sale, and paid it out to the owners of the inferior liens prior to the bringing of any rule or other proceeding claiming the fund by virtue of the older lien. Kennedy v. Bank of Collins, 21 Ga. App. 461, 94 S.E. 628 (1917).

Distress warrant effective as lien.

- Although a distress warrant cannot be levied upon property which has already been seized under judicial process, such a distress warrant may be placed in the hands of the levying officer and, upon a rule to distribute the fund, may assert its lien. Mulherin v. Porter, 1 Ga. App. 153, 58 S.E. 60 (1907).

Bill of exceptions.

- Motion to dismiss a bill of exceptions (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-49 and5-6-50) was denied after the fund for distribution was raised by the levy of the execution of the plaintiff in error, and the rule and notice thereof served by the sheriff on the plaintiff in error made the plaintiff a party. Thomasville Live Stock Co. v. Burney, 19 Ga. App. 703, 91 S.E. 1062 (1917).

Sale by alleged transferee may be restrained.

- If an alleged transferee of an execution is seeking to have the property levied on and sold, contrary to the wishes of the real transferee, a rule to distribute the funds arising from the sale of the property as provided by statute is not such an adequate remedy at law as will preclude the real transferee from obtaining an injunction to restrain the sheriff and such claimant from selling the property of the execution debtor against the wishes and to the injury of the owner of the process. Colter v. Livingston, 154 Ga. 401, 114 S.E. 430 (1922).

Admissions of original movant admissible after transfer.

- If money rule was brought against a sheriff and, while it was pending, the movant transferred to another the mortgage fi. fa. under which the property had been sold, and such transferee, by order of court, was substituted as the movant, admissions made by the original movant prior to the transfer, when offered in evidence on the hearing of the rule by contestants for the fund, were not subject to objection on the ground that the original movant's admissions could not affect the transferee and that the original movant should be sworn as a witness. Continental Fertilizer Co. v. J.F. Madden & Sons, 140 Ga. 39, 78 S.E. 460 (1913).

Single judgment despite separate payments to creditors.

- If the judge before whom a money rule proceeding was tried refused to stay the proceeding and make the rule absolute as to both judgment creditors, and instead entered two separate orders requiring the clerk to pay each judgment creditor out of the funds, the money rule proceeding was not two separate and distinct cases and the two orders were not two such separate and distinct judgments. Shouse v. Gober, 46 Ga. App. 231, 167 S.E. 316 (1933).

Lien holders not bound if notice lacking.

- If the other claimants to the fund who were not notified in writing by the sheriff or the movant of the pendency of the rule so that they would "be bound by the judgment of distribution," did not waive service, and did not participate in the trial of the case, the holders of a tax lien were not bound by the judgment awarding the funds. Riley v. Bank of Jersey, 43 Ga. App. 836, 160 S.E. 540 (1931).

Appeal from magistrate's judgment to superior court.

- From the judgment of a magistrate on a rule to require a constable to show cause at a regular term of court why the constable should not pay over to a lien creditor funds in the constable's hands, arising from the sale of personal property by virtue of a mortgage execution, when another creditor intervenes and claims the fund by virtue of a lien alleged to be superior, an appeal to a jury in the superior court will lie, if the amount involved exceeds $50.00, regardless of whether the questions for determination are of law or fact, except in cases where the effect of the magistrate's ruling is to dismiss the case and thus leave no case for appeal. Crawford County Bank v. Britt-Hightower Co., 17 Ga. App. 804, 88 S.E. 691 (1916).