ERISA preemption of subsection (d)'s notice requirement.

- O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44 relates strictly to the administration of insured benefit plans; to permit the "saving clause" (29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(A)) of the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act to foreclose preemption would undermine a core purpose of ERISA providing uniform standards for administration of benefit plans. Accordingly, the saving clause does not apply to subsection (d), and welfare benefit plan case was required to proceed under federal law. Smith v. Jefferson Pilot Life Ins. Co., 14 F.3d 562 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 808, 115 S. Ct. 57, 130 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1994).

Supreme Court review of notice provisions authorized.

- Question was certified to the state supreme court pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-2-9 as to whether a notice of cancellation, properly given by an insurer after the premium was past due, was ineffective under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44 because the notice provided the insured an opportunity to keep the policy in force by paying the past due premium within the 10-day statutory period. Infinity Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 570 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2009).

Right to cancel and right to limit liability distinguished.

- Policy providing for limitation of insurer's liability upon insured's suicide did not give the insurer the right to cancel the policy following the insured's suicide as cancellation involves discharge from future liability rather than from liability already incurred. Sunbelt Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Alapaha, 176 Ga. App. 628, 337 S.E.2d 410 (1985).

Effect of claim that cancellation not effective.

- Cancellation of a worker's compensation insurance policy in compliance with subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44 and a state board of worker's compensation rule, regardless of other circumstances surrounding the cancellation, does not automatically entitle a workers' compensation insurer to complete relief against a claim that the cancellation was not effective or applicable. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 200 Ga. App. 278, 407 S.E.2d 775 (1991).

Time provisions of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44 were intended to also apply to unearned premiums returned through premium finance companies. Balboa Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 165 Ga. App. 273, 299 S.E.2d 91 (1983).

Expiration or lapse due to nonpayment of premium.

- This section has no application when policy in issue was not canceled, but simply expired or lapsed because of nonpayment of premium. Robertson v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 130 Ga. App. 807, 204 S.E.2d 505 (1974).

Insurer is not required to comply with the notice requirements of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44 when a policy expires or lapses according to the policy's terms upon a policyholder's failure to pay the premiums. King v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 686 F.2d 894 (11th Cir. 1982); Goodley v. Fireman's Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 173 Ga. App. 277, 326 S.E.2d 7 (1985); Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Tippins Bank & Trust Co., 213 Ga. App. 176, 444 S.E.2d 331 (1994), aff'd, 266 Ga. 97, 464 S.E.2d 381 (1995); Ponderosa Collections, Inc. v. Frady, 216 Ga. App. 619, 455 S.E.2d 346 (1995).

O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44 applies only to the cancellation of an insurance policy. It does not apply when an insurer declines to accept coverage, nor does the statute apply to the expiration of a binder. Marchel v. Georgia Mut. Ins. Co., 188 Ga. App. 604, 373 S.E.2d 787, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 912, 373 S.E.2d 787 (1988).

In an action to avoid coverage on an automobile policy, because a jury's determination was required as to whether the insured failed to pay premiums when due and whether the insurer sent notice of cancellation after premiums were due, the trial court properly denied the insurer's motion for summary judgment and erred in granting the insured's motions for summary judgment. Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Boatwright, 244 Ga. App. 36, 534 S.E.2d 516 (2000).

Reinstatement retroactive to cancellation date for nonpayment not required.

- In an insured's action against an automobile insurer that denied coverage, there was no issue of material fact as to whether the policy had been effectively cancelled for nonpayment. The insurer had mailed a notice of cancellation to the insured in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44(d), and the insured, who did not recall seeing the notice, did not maintain that the mailing address was incorrect; moreover, although the policy was reinstated when the premium was received after the cancellation date, nothing in the policy required that the reinstatement be retroactive to the date of cancellation. Zilka v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 291 Ga. App. 665, 662 S.E.2d 777 (2008).

Effect of custom and practice of renewing policy "without interruption."

- When an insurer's practice had been to reinstate coverage "without interruption" upon receipt of premium following cancellation, an issue arose as to whether the policy in question had been effectively cancelled so as to permit the insurer to deny coverage, or whether, by the past conduct of the parties, the policy was reinstated following such cancellation. Holland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 200 Ga. App. 668, 409 S.E.2d 79 (1991).

This section contemplates written notice. Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 116 Ga. App. 433, 157 S.E.2d 807 (1967).

Insurer's history of accepting late payments precludes "automatic termination" defense.

- Insurer's history of accepting late payment premiums, coupled with the insurer's failure to give notice of the insurer's intent to insist upon timely payment under the original contractual provisions of a health insurance policy, precludes the establishment, as a matter of law, of an "automatic termination" defense to an action on the policy. If there is no "automatic termination" of the policy as the result of this history of late payment, the jury is authorized to consider whether or not the insurer validly cancelled the policy at any time by notice to the insured. General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Samples, 167 Ga. App. 622, 307 S.E.2d 51 (1983).

Premium return after notice of cancellation.

- Belated return of premium (or a failure itself) following a 10-day notice of cancellation pursuant to subsection (d) of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44 has no greater detrimental impact upon the notice of cancellation than such a delinquent or failed return following a 30-day notice of a cancellation pursuant to subsection (b), which, under subsection (c)(1), does not invalidate a properly executed notice of cancellation. Southern Ins. Co. v. Walker, 184 Ga. App. 369, 361 S.E.2d 502, cert. denied, 184 Ga. App. 910, 361 S.E.2d 502 (1987).

Prior cancellation notice ineffective.

- Insurer's acceptance of a late monthly premium payment rendered a prior notice of cancellation ineffective; thus, a cancellation in the next month required additional notice. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ackley, 227 Ga. App. 104, 488 S.E.2d 85 (1997).

New policy does not automatically cancel old.

- Procurement of new insurance as an intended substitution for an existing policy does not constitute an effective cancellation of the policy unless the terms of the policy specifically provide for cancellation in this manner or the parties have otherwise mutually agreed upon this method of cancellation. Davidson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 161 Ga. App. 21, 288 S.E.2d 832 (1982).

Computation of period of time anterior to commencement of action.

- Ten-day notice period required by subsection (e) for cancellation of an insurance policy is not a statute of limitations, but it does involve the computation, under O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1 and not under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-6, of a period of time anterior to the commencement of an action. Southern Trust Ins. Co. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 168 Ga. App. 899, 310 S.E.2d 712 (1983).

Until the notice requirements of this section are met the policy remains in effect. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bridges, 140 Ga. App. 242, 230 S.E.2d 491 (1976).

Lessor of automobile was entitled to prior notice of policy cancellation as a "lienholder" under subsection (d) of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Zeller, 246 Ga. App. 637, 541 S.E.2d 433 (2000).

Regardless of terms of policy, minimum requirement for cancellation includes return of unearned premium within 15 days unless a rate investigation is necessary. Powell v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1969).

Subsection (c) is mandatory, and failure to refund the unearned premium within 15 days renders the attempted cancellation ineffective. Chicago Ins. Co. v. Camors, 296 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 420 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1970).

Definite requirement for cancellation is that tender of unearned premiums be made within prescribed time limits. Georgia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fraser, 152 Ga. App. 866, 264 S.E.2d 315 (1980).

Under Georgia law, O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44, any unearned premium which has been paid by the insured must be refunded when a policy is cancelled; however, the legislature has not provided such relief when premiums are "unearned" in the sense that a policyholder has accepted the terms of a policy under which the policyholder may be paying a premium for a period when the policyholder is not insured. Bogard v. Inter-State Assur. Co., 263 Ga. App. 767, 589 S.E.2d 317 (2003).

Tender of unearned premiums is not a necessary condition preceding cancellation. International Serv. Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Underwriters, 125 Ga. App. 786, 189 S.E.2d 123 (1972).

Policy in effect at time of loss since written notice ineffective prior to loss.

- When written notice of cancellation of a policy would not have been effective prior to the occurrence of the property loss, any actual notice could not have accomplished a prior cancellation and the policy was still in effect at the time of the loss. Pennsylvania Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 118 Ga. App. 655, 165 S.E.2d 309 (1968).

Mortgagee entitled to sue when no notice of nonrenewal given.

- When the loss payee, first mortgagee of the destroyed premises, never received notice that the insurance policy had not been renewed and did not know that the premises were therefore uninsured, the payee was not precluded from recovering for the damages to the premises under the policy since the insurance company failed to follow the applicable notice provisions. Waco Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 180 Ga. App. 26, 348 S.E.2d 547 (1986).

Applicability to termination of insurance agent.

- O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44 governed the cancellation of insurance policies but did not govern the termination of insurance agents which may have had the ancillary effect of terminating an insurance policy and, thus, the court could not reasonably conclude that the retroactive termination of the financial planner was the harm § 33-24-44 was intended to guard against. Therefore, the financial planner did not allege a viable negligence per se claim and the negligence claims against the insurance company were required to be dismissed. Rosen v. Protective Life Ins. Co., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. May 20, 2010).

Trial court's jury instruction, based on entirety of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44, was not an error since subsection (c) was applicable to the situation, found in the case at hand, in which a policy financed through a premium finance company was cancelled. Thico Plan, Inc. v. Ashkouti, 171 Ga. App. 536, 320 S.E.2d 604 (1984).

Cited in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 108 Ga. App. 643, 134 S.E.2d 552 (1963); Brown v. Quality Fin. Co., 112 Ga. App. 369, 145 S.E.2d 99 (1965); Georgia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ragan, 122 Ga. App. 56, 176 S.E.2d 230 (1970); Brewer v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 122 Ga. App. 270, 176 S.E.2d 556 (1970); Canal Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 123 Ga. App. 376, 181 S.E.2d 91 (1971); Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 126 Ga. App. 215, 190 S.E.2d 447 (1972); Reserve Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 127 Ga. App. 193, 192 S.E.2d 925 (1972); Thames v. Piedmont Life Ins. Co., 128 Ga. App. 630, 197 S.E.2d 412 (1973); Republic Ins. Co. v. Cook, 129 Ga. App. 833, 201 S.E.2d 668 (1973); American Indem. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 134 Ga. App. 34, 213 S.E.2d 135 (1975); Motors Ins. Corp. v. Roper, 136 Ga. App. 224, 221 S.E.2d 55 (1975); Ector v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 138 Ga. App. 519, 226 S.E.2d 788 (1976); Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 146 Ga. App. 38, 245 S.E.2d 316 (1978); American Int'l Life Ins. Co. v. Hartsfield, 147 Ga. App. 213, 248 S.E.2d 518 (1978); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Smith, 147 Ga. App. 574, 249 S.E.2d 663 (1978); Pearce v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 246 Ga. 33, 268 S.E.2d 623 (1980); Speir Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Lee, 158 Ga. App. 512, 281 S.E.2d 279 (1981); Lumbermen's Inv. Corp. v. American Modern Home Ins. Co., 158 Ga. App. 705, 282 S.E.2d 178 (1981); Daniels v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 Ga. App. 758, 293 S.E.2d 39 (1982); Maddox v. Allstate Ins. Co., 164 Ga. App. 21, 296 S.E.2d 84 (1982); Smith v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Bush v. Vanguard Ins. Co., 172 Ga. App. 704, 324 S.E.2d 554 (1984); Doxie v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 603 F. Supp. 624 (S.D. Ga. 1984); Perry & Co. v. New S. Ins. Brokers of Ga., Inc., 182 Ga. App. 84, 354 S.E.2d 852 (1987); Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. O'Berry, 184 Ga. App. 606, 362 S.E.2d 157 (1987); Leader Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Gaydon, 185 Ga. App. 322, 363 S.E.2d 859 (1987); Dupree v. Georgia Mut. Ins. Co., 188 Ga. App. 857, 374 S.E.2d 546 (1988); Georgia Ins. Co. v. White, 190 Ga. App. 208, 378 S.E.2d 523 (1989); Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. v. Photographic Assistance Corp., 732 F. Supp. 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1990); Timely Entertainment Int'l, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 208 Ga. App. 467, 430 S.E.2d 844 (1993).

Thirty-day notice for cancellation not required.

- Thirty-day notice of cancellation was not required when, even if a child's actions in requesting that a vehicle be added to the parent's existing policy were contractually and legally unauthorized so that the policy should not have been modified to provide coverage for the vehicle and require a premium increase, coverage on all of the vehicles was cancelled because of nonpayment of premiums which included an amount due on a truck added by the parent. Buffington v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 192 Ga. App. 389, 384 S.E.2d 873, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 901, 384 S.E.2d 873 (1989).

Trial court erred in finding that the insurance company had to give notice of cancellation for nonpayment of premiums under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44 as that statute did not apply because the insurance contract stated that cancellation was automatic upon failure to pay premiums; thus, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a wife in an action to recover benefits under a life insurance policy. Guideone Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 275 Ga. App. 1, 619 S.E.2d 723 (2005).

Notice provisions of O.C.G.A. § 33-34-44 are inapplicable to a policy which expires due to an insured's affirmative rejection of renewal. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Haynes, 163 Ga. App. 288, 293 S.E.2d 744 (1982).

Failure to follow statutory requirements.

- Insurer's notice which failed to provide 30 days' notice of cancellation and failed to state a valid reason for cancellation resulted in noncancellation of a policy and, because no notice of nonrenewal was given, the policy was extended under the policy's terms for another six months. Bank of Toccoa v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 211 Ga. App. 389, 439 S.E.2d 60 (1993).

Notice of insurance policy cancellation was not effective under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44(b) because the insurer did not provide the statutorily-acceptable proof that the mailing of the notice to the insured took place not less than 30 days before the date of cancellation contained in the notice. Cresent Hill Apts. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 277 Ga. 396, 589 S.E.2d 96 (2003).

Insurer's notice of intent to cancel failed to satisfy insurance cancellation notice requirements because the notice never stated unequivocally that the car insurance policy would have been cancelled for non-payment of premiums, the notice did not unequivocally state that premiums were past due, and the notice also suggested that it was a "billing" notice. Southern Pilot Ins. Co. v. CECS, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Apr. 19, 2013).

Noncompliance with statutory requirements not excused.

- Insurer's failure to strictly comply with the notice of cancellation requirements of subsection (b) was not excused, when there was undisputed evidence that the insured did not receive notice at least 30 days in advance of the stated cancellation date. Trammell Crowe Constr. Co. v. Rumph, 198 Ga. App. 754, 403 S.E.2d 72 (1991).

Regardless of when it was generated, under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45(d), an auto insurer's cancellation notice could not take effect until the date of mailing, at which point the insurer had received payment satisfying the insured's past-due balance. Therefore, cancellation for non-payment was improper under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 293 Ga. App. 459, 667 S.E.2d 628 (2008).

Notice that policy will be cancelled upon nonpayment of future premiums.

- Notice of cancellation which states that a policy will be cancelled on a specified date unless premiums due are paid prior to that date is merely a demand for payment and ineffective as a notice of cancellation. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Person, 164 Ga. App. 488, 297 S.E.2d 80 (1982).

When notice of cancellation was not given to the insured upon the insured's failure to pay the premium when due, but rather, was given before the premium was due, there was a failure to adhere to statutory requirements resulting in noncancellation of the policy. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Person, 164 Ga. App. 755, 297 S.E.2d 337 (1982).

Upon the insured's failure to pay the insured's premiums on June 27, 2003, the insurer followed the proper procedure under Georgia law for cancellation of an insurance policy when the insurer sent a certified letter to the insured informing the insured of the payment problems and noticing the insured that the policy would be cancelled if the premium was not paid by July 20, 2003; the insurer had no duty, under the original written policy, to defend the insured in any civil action arising from the July 31, 2003, crash since this was subsequent to the date coverage was cancelled due to nonpayment of premium. Rutland v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., F.3d (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2010)(Unpublished).

This section authorizes mailing as minimum requirement and makes this method sufficient only when policy so provides. Powell v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1969).

Policy cannot be cancelled unless notice is at least mailed to insured. Powell v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1969).

Cancellation accomplished only by strict compliance with cancellation. Powell v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1969).

When the parties have provided stricter notice provisions, cancellation of an insurance policy may be accomplished only by complying with the strict terms of the policy. Powell v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1969).

Mailing notice of cancellation without proof of receipt is sufficient to accomplish cancellation of an insurance policy only when that method is specifically provided in the policy. Powell v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1969).

When by the terms of an insurance policy more than mere mailing was required, if the notice was not received by the insured, the policy was not cancelled. Powell v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1969).

Insurer failed to comply with O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44(b) when the insurer attempted to cancel a commercial property insurance policy issued to an insured by taping an envelope containing the cancellation notice to the outside of a mailbox with an attached note asking the letter carrier to date and sign or postmark the certified mail receipt with the date it was picked up for delivery and deliver the envelope via certified mail to the insured; therefore, the insurer was not entitled to summary judgment in the insurer's action for a declaration that the insurer was not obligated to pay the insured's claim because the insurer had cancelled the policy. Admiral Ins. Co. v. Cresent Hills Apts., 354 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2003).

Following procedures of company in giving notice of cancellation.

- Insurer's evidence establishing that on the same date of the mailing receipt, the insureds were sent a cancellation notice, and that it was the insurer's practice to have cancellation notices inserted into envelopes manually or by machine before being matched to the appropriate mailing receipt, was sufficient to establish that the mailing contained a notice of cancellation sent to the insureds. Burnside v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 309 Ga. App. 897, 714 S.E.2d 606 (2011).

Certified or registered mailings.

- There is no requirement under this section that mailing should be either certified or registered, and there is nothing in the statute with reference to "return receipt requested." Bituminous Cas. Co. v. Renfroe, 130 Ga. App. 621, 204 S.E.2d 317 (1974).

Receipt of notice by insured.

- Stamped notice of cancellation, plus meeting the other requisites of this section, satisfies the notice requirements of this section whether notice has in fact been received by the insured. Favati v. National Property Owners Ins., 153 Ga. App. 723, 266 S.E.2d 359 (1980).

Mandatory that notice be properly addressed and mailed.

- While it is not essential that the notice of cancellation be received by the insured to effectuate a cancellation, it is mandatory that the notice be properly addressed and mailed to bring about a cancellation. Harris v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 134 Ga. App. 739, 216 S.E.2d 127 (1975).

Actual receipt of notice not required under insurance contract.

- When there is uncontradicted direct proof of a proper mailing, and uncontradicted and direct proof that the post office receipt introduced in evidence was taken for such mailing, which mailing, according to this section and to the insurance contract, constitutes delivery to the insured, the failure of the insured's agent (the Post Office Department) to deliver insured mail to insured is not evidence which contradicts the prior proof of mailing (by evidence not circumstantial in nature); actual receipt of the mail by the insured is not required before a cancellation of the policy occurs. Harris v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 134 Ga. App. 739, 216 S.E.2d 127 (1975).

That carrier does not make delivery is insufficient to raise issue that delivery was not made to the carrier, which has been proved by a receipt of the carrier showing delivery, when delivery to the carrier is not otherwise assailed. Harris v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 134 Ga. App. 739, 216 S.E.2d 127 (1975).

Delivery legally effected by act of mailing and securing post office receipt.

- When notice of cancellation has been mailed, proof of the subsequent failure of the Post Office Department to deliver the mails is not proof of nondelivery of the notice as delivery was legally effected by the act of mailing and securing the post office receipt. Harris v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 134 Ga. App. 739, 216 S.E.2d 127 (1975).

Insurer was entitled to a declaration that the insurer cancelled a policy before a collision because when the premium payments were overdue, the insurer sent a timely and sufficient cancellation notice, as the insurer had done twice before, and the insureds failed to make a premium payment by the effective cancellation date, and there was record evidence that the insurer mailed the cancellation notice, which, combined with a Post Office receipt, gave the notice of cancellation its legal effect. S. Pilot Ins. Co. v. CECS, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Sept. 12, 2014).

When insured admits receipt of notice of cancellation of policy, it is error to deny a motion for summary judgment by the insurer as to the issue of notice under the policy and to grant summary judgment to the insured because the insurer failed to obtain a Post Office Department receipt at the time of mailing the cancellation notice as required. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Guess, 243 Ga. 559, 255 S.E.2d 55 (1979).

Issue of receipt of notice by insured irrelevant when section satisfied.

- When evidence showed without contradiction that this section had been satisfied, whether notice of cancellation had in fact been received by the insured was legally irrelevant and was not an issue which would preclude summary judgment. Hill v. Allstate Ins. Co., 151 Ga. App. 542, 260 S.E.2d 370 (1979).

Even assuming that the insured was entitled to assert that notice had not in fact been received, the insured's affidavits to the effect that the insured did not remember receiving any cancellation notice did not demand summary judgment in the insured's favor. Hill v. Allstate Ins. Co., 151 Ga. App. 542, 260 S.E.2d 370 (1979).

Whether the notice actually had been received by the insured is legally irrelevant when all the requisites of the delivery to the postal authorities had met sufficient compliance and the fact of nondelivery is not an issue which would preclude summary judgment. Favati v. National Property Owners Ins., 153 Ga. App. 723, 266 S.E.2d 359 (1980).

Because the mailing receipt and other uncontradicted evidence showed that the requisites of O.C.G.A. §§ 33-24-44 and33-24-45(c) were satisfied, whether the insureds actually received notice of cancellation of the insureds' auto insurance policy was irrelevant and did not preclude the insurer from cancelling the insureds' policy due to non-payment. Burnside v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 309 Ga. App. 897, 714 S.E.2d 606 (2011).

Computer mailing list of insurer stamped by post office constituted proper receipt.

- "PORS" list (a computer compilation prepared in insurer's ordinary course of business containing the names, addresses, and policy numbers of all those policyholder's whose policies were to be cancelled by mail) stamped by postal authorities to indicate receipt of the letters addressed to those persons appearing on the list, constituted the post office receipt for the mailing within the contemplation of this section. Hill v. Allstate Ins. Co., 151 Ga. App. 542, 260 S.E.2d 370 (1979); Continental Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 212 Ga. App. 839, 443 S.E.2d 509 (1994).

Stamped post-office list of names and addresses, showing mailing of notice of cancellation, constituted an appropriate receipt that the mail was in the hands of the postal authorities. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Harris, 177 Ga. App. 826, 341 S.E.2d 472 (1986).

This section requires written notice to effect cancellation of policy which protects interest of lienholder. Pennsylvania Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 118 Ga. App. 655, 165 S.E.2d 309 (1968).

Effect of notice on bank as lienholder.

- Notice of cancellation sent to insured is ineffective as to bank as lienholder, and the insurance company remains liable to the bank. South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Glennville Bank, 111 Ga. App. 174, 141 S.E.2d 168 (1965).

Issue raised of whether notice was mailed.

- Evidence to the effect that insured and lienholder on the insured property never received the notice required by this section is sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether the notice was or was not mailed. Powell v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1969).

No cancellation when evidence failed to show mail contained notice.

- When the evidence adduced failed to show that the mail addressed to the insured and receipted for by the United States Post Office contained the notice of cancellation of the policy as required under former Code 1933 §§ 56-2430 and 56-2430.1 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 33-24-44 and33-24-45), no cancellation was effected, in the absence of a showing of actual receipt of the cancellation notice by the insured. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cody, 123 Ga. App. 265, 180 S.E.2d 596 (1971).

Issue of fact as to whether notice mailed.

- Introduction of evidence that cancellation notice was never received raises an issue of fact as to whether the notice was mailed. Bituminous Cas. Co. v. Renfroe, 130 Ga. App. 621, 204 S.E.2d 317 (1974).

Determination of the conflict between the contentions of the sender and the addressee as to whether cancellation notice was sent is for the fact-finding body, whether it be a jury in law cases or an administrative agency in administrative matters. Bituminous Cas. Co. v. Renfroe, 130 Ga. App. 621, 204 S.E.2d 317 (1974).

Presumption of receipt of notice rebuttable.

- Evidence showing that a letter was written, properly addressed, stamped with sufficient postage, and deposited in the United States mail gives rise to the presumption of receipt of the letter by the addressee, but the presumption arising that it was received by the addressee is merely prima facie, and may be successfully rebutted by uncontradicted evidence of the addressee that the addressee did not in fact receive the letter. Bituminous Cas. Co. v. Renfroe, 130 Ga. App. 621, 204 S.E.2d 317 (1974).

Evidence of sufficient postage.

- Manager's testimony that a cancellation notice was mailed to the insureds pursuant to the insurer's policies regarding the handling of mail was sufficient to establish that the notice was given the proper amount of postage. Burnside v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 309 Ga. App. 897, 714 S.E.2d 606 (2011).

Notice sufficient.

- In response to a certified question, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a cancellation notice, given after an insurance premium was past due, which clearly stated that cancellation was occurring, was not ineffective simply because the notice also provided the insured with an opportunity to reinstate coverage. Reynolds v. Infinity Gen. Ins. Co., 287 Ga. 86, 694 S.E.2d 337 (2010).

When an insured was in a car crash after an insurer canceled the policy for failing to pay the premium, the insurer had no duty to defend the insured because, inter alia, the insurer followed the proper procedure under Georgia law for cancellation of an insurance policy, and the insurer did not waive cancellation of the insured's policy by accepting a late premium payment. Rutland v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., F.3d (11th Cir. May 12, 2011)(Unpublished).

Fact that the insurer's Notice of Intent to Cancel contained an option to avoid imminent cancellation by promptly paying the amount due did not render the Notice of Cancellation purportedly sent with the Notice of Intent ineffective. Southern Pilot Ins. Co. v. CECS, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2013).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 387.

C.J.S.

- 45 C.J.S., Insurance, § 817 et seq.

ALR.

- Insurance: incorrect statement of age, 1 A.L.R. 459; 160 A.L.R. 295.

Provision suspending insurance during default in payment of premiums or assessments as affected by failure of insurer to declare a suspension before loss, 8 A.L.R. 395.

Automobile liability insurance, 13 A.L.R. 135; 19 A.L.R. 879; 23 A.L.R. 1472; 28 A.L.R. 1301; 41 A.L.R. 507.

Insurance: guaranty fund as preventing forfeiture for nonpayment of premiums or assessments, 29 A.L.R. 517.

Contract providing that obligation thereof shall be canceled in case of death or other extrinsic event as contract of insurance, 35 A.L.R. 1039; 63 A.L.R. 711; 100 A.L.R. 1449; 119 A.L.R. 1241.

Liability in respect of premium where policy is rejected by applicant or prospect, 41 A.L.R. 644.

Validity and enforceability of contractual stipulation for payment of additional amount in case of delay in payment of insurance dues, premiums, or assessments, 41 A.L.R. 979.

Necessity of giving beneficiary notice before cancellation or forfeiture of insurance for nonpayment of premiums or assessments, 44 A.L.R. 1372.

Practice of taking notes for premiums as waiver of requirement of payment as to premium for which note not given, 53 A.L.R. 915.

Avoidance of renewed fire policy for breach of warranty or representation first made in original application or policy, 62 A.L.R. 823.

Outstanding interest in one to whom loss is payable as ground of forfeiture under condition on insurance policy respecting title or encumbrances, 65 A.L.R. 913.

Contractual provision for lapse of policy or certificate in event of disappearance of insured or his failure to report to insurer, 65 A.L.R. 1038.

Exercise of reserved right to cancel policy of insurance as affected by motive or reason for cancellation, 68 A.L.R. 1171.

Rescission of policy of life or accident insurance after death of insured by agreement, express or implied, with beneficiaries, 80 A.L.R. 185.

Action of insurer in regard to unpaid premium note after maturity as waiver of, or estoppel to claim, forfeiture for nonpayment, 83 A.L.R. 846.

Disability feature of insurance contract as subject of rescission apart from life insurance feature, 91 A.L.R. 1470.

Increase in insurance rates or loss of opportunity to obtain insurance in consequence of another's tort as ground of liability, 92 A.L.R. 1205.

Burden of proof as regards payment or nonpayment of renewal premiums or assessments on policy of life or accident insurance, 95 A.L.R. 745.

Impaired eyesight as within representation, warranty, or condition of insurance policy as regards health or physical condition, 96 A.L.R. 429.

Construction, application, and effect of provisions of war risk insurance precluding or terminating, because of misconduct, the right of one otherwise entitled to benefits, 99 A.L.R. 1284.

Continued acceptance of insurance premiums or dues as basis of waiver of, or estoppel to assert, misrepresentation or breach affected by alternative obligation which survived misrepresentation or breach, 101 A.L.R. 1138.

Conclusiveness of insurer's statement to insured or beneficiary after lapse as to period of extended insurance or amount of paid-up insurance, 103 A.L.R. 1364.

Death of insured or other loss pending application not effectively granted, for reinstatement of life or accident insurance, after lapse, 105 A.L.R. 478; 164 A.L.R. 1057.

Scope and application of limitation provision of statute or policy against actions under forfeited policy, 105 A.L.R. 1093.

Equity jurisdiction for cancelation of insurance policy upon ground within incontestable clause prior to termination of period, 111 A.L.R. 1275.

Computation of cash surrender value or extended or paid-up insurance as affected by loan on policy, 113 A.L.R. 606.

Payment or tender, after lapse of policy for nonpayment of premium, of amount of loan on policy as affecting computation of paid-up or extended insurance, 114 A.L.R. 901.

Admissibility and weight on question of materiality of misrepresentation, of testimony of officers or employees of insurer to effect that application would not have been accepted but for misrepresentation, or that there was a rule or policy to reject risks of the kind that would have been shown but for the misrepresentation, 115 A.L.R. 100.

Rights and obligations of conditional purchaser of automobile, or one in same right, and insurer, as affected by notice of cancelation of policy given by insurer to conditional seller or finance company, 115 A.L.R. 482.

False answer in application for life insurance to question regarding previous rejection, 120 A.L.R. 1425.

Wrongful termination of policy by insurer, or false information to insured in that regard, as excusing further tend and payment of premiums or assessments, 122 A.L.R. 385; 160 A.L.R. 629.

Cancellation of life insurance policy for nonpayment of loan, 126 A.L.R. 102.

Repayment or tender of unearned premium as condition precedent to exercise by insurer of right to cancel policy, 127 A.L.R. 1341; 16 A.L.R.2d 1200.

Right to return of premiums paid upon insurance policy which is void ab initio, 129 A.L.R. 57.

Grounds for cancellation or rescission of annuity agreement, or for recovery back of property conveyed, or money paid, thereunder, 131 A.L.R. 424.

Materiality of false representation, in application for policy of insurance, as to whether applicant has consulted physicians, 131 A.L.R. 617.

Duty of life insurer, or its agents, to inform or explain to insured his rights under policy before accepting his surrender the same, 131 A.L.R. 1299.

Notice to insured of insufficiency to meet premiums of cash or loan value, reserve, or dividends, 140 A.L.R. 683.

Falsity of representation or warranty as defense to action upon policy of insurance on life of infant, 143 A.L.R. 331.

Mutual rescission, waiver, ratification, or estoppel, as regards insurer's attempt to rescind policy of insurance or particular provisions thereof, 152 A.L.R. 95.

Defense predicated upon falsity of answer to question in original application for insurance, or in application for reinstatement, as to whether applicant has had any serious illness or disease, 153 A.L.R. 709.

Suspension of contestable period of incontestable clause of life insurance policy pending appointment of personal representative of insured or of beneficiary, 157 A.L.R. 1204.

Wrongful termination of policy by insurer, or false information to insured in that regard, as excusing further tend and payment of premiums or assessments, 160 A.L.R. 629.

Express provisions in life, accident, or health policies that authorize refusal of renewal premiums or otherwise make renewal optional with insurer, 161 A.L.R. 193.

Sale of land with reservation of insured building as violation of provisions of insurance policy, 173 A.L.R. 1207.

Construction and application of provision of statute designed to prevent avoidance of automobile liability policy by reason of violation of its exclusions or conditions, or other terms, 1 A.L.R.2d 822.

Clause in life, accident, or health policy excluding or limiting liability in case of insured's use of intoxicants or narcotics, 13 A.L.R.2d 987.

Judgment avoiding indemnity or liability policy for fraud as barring recovery from insurer by or on behalf of third person, 18 A.L.R.2d 891.

Limitations governing action to recover unearned premium retained by insurer upon cancelation of policy, 29 A.L.R.2d 938.

Insured's discontinued breach of warranty relating to use or keeping of prohibited articles as barring recovery on fire policy, 44 A.L.R.2d 1048.

Receipt of check for insurance premium as preventing forfeiture for nonpayment, 50 A.L.R.2d 630.

Insurer's previous custom in giving notice of due date of premiums as affecting its right to declare liability policy forfeited or canceled for failure to pay premium, 52 A.L.R.2d 1157.

Provision of policy for mailing of notice to insured's address as stated therein, as affected by change of address, 63 A.L.R.2d 570.

Cancellation or modification of master policy as termination of coverage under group policy, 68 A.L.R.2d 249.

False statements favorable to defense, made and persisted in by insured, as breach of cooperation clause, 79 A.L.R.2d 1040.

Insurer's denial of renewal of policy: waiver and estoppel, 85 A.L.R.2d 1410.

Right of insurance agent to sue in his own name for unpaid premium, 90 A.L.R.2d 1291.

Physician giving medical examination to insurance applicant as agent of insured or of insurer, 94 A.L.R.2d 1389.

Effect of attempt to terminate insurance or fidelity contract upon notice allowing a shorter period than that stipulated in contract, 96 A.L.R.2d 286.

Insurance agent's statement or conduct indicating that insurer's cancellation of policy shall not take effect as binding on insurer, 3 A.L.R.3d 1135.

Dividends as preventing lapse of policy for nonpayment of premiums, 8 A.L.R.3d 862.

Insured's cooperation with claimant in establishing valid claim against insurer as breach of cooperation clause, 8 A.L.R.3d 1345.

Insured's failure to inform insurer of pending condemnation proceedings as concealment of fraud within provision of fire policy, 9 A.L.R.3d 1411.

Overvaluation in proof of loss of property insured as fraud avoiding fire insurance policy, 16 A.L.R.3d 774.

Construction of express insurance policy provision restricting insurer's right to cancel or otherwise terminate coverage, 19 A.L.R.3d 1429.

Insured's misrepresentation or misstatement as to his name or marital status as ground for avoiding liability insurance, 27 A.L.R.3d 849.

What constitutes "serious illness," "serious disease," or equivalent language used in insurance application, 28 A.L.R.3d 1255.

Remedies and measure of damages for wrongful cancellation of life, health, and accident insurance, 34 A.L.R.3d 245.

Remedies and measure of damages for wrongful cancellation of liability and property insurance, 34 A.L.R.3d 385.

Liability insurer's unconditional right to cancel policy as affected by considerations of public policy, 40 A.L.R.3d 1439.

Construction and effect of arrangement under which insurance premiums are paid automatically via insurer's draft on insured's bank account, 45 A.L.R.3d 1349.

Elimination of particular coverage, or termination, of health, hospitalization, or medical care insurance policy as affecting insurer's liability for insured's continuing hospitalization or medical expenses relating to previously covered illness, 66 A.L.R.3d 1205.

Libel and slander: privileged nature of communications between insurer and insured, 85 A.L.R.3d 1161.

Wrongful cancellation of medical malpractice insurance, 99 A.L.R.3d 469.

Construction, application, and effect of clause that liability insurance policy may be canceled by insured by mailing to insurer written notice stating when thereafter such cancellation shall be effective, 11 A.L.R.4th 456.

Obtaining new property insurance as cancellation of existing insurance, 11 A.L.R.4th 774.

Termination of employee's individual coverage under group policy for nonpayment of premiums, 22 A.L.R.4th 321.

Actual receipt of cancellation notice mailed by insurer as prerequisite to cancellation of insurance, 40 A.L.R.4th 867.

Cancellation of compulsory or "financial responsibility" automobile insurance, 44 A.L.R.4th 13.