O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 15-6-50 (2019)

Clerk’s term of office; qualifications; training requirements; appointment of clerk pro tempore during training

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) The clerks of superior courts shall be elected for a term of four years. (b)(1) No person shall be eligible to offer for election to or hold the office of clerk of the superior court unless he: (A) Is a citizen of the United States; (B) Is a resident of the county in which he seeks the office of clerk of the superior court for at least two years prior to his qualifying for the election to the office; (C) Is a registered voter;

(D) Has attained the age of 25 years prior to the date of qualifying for election to the office. This subparagraph shall not apply to any person serving as a clerk of the superior court on July 1, 1981; (E) Has obtained a high school diploma or its recognized equivalent; and (F) Has not been convicted of a felony offense or any offense involving moral turpitude contrary to the laws of this state, any other state, or the United States. (2) Each person offering his candidacy for the office of clerk of the superior court shall file an affidavit with the officer before whom such person has qualified to seek the office of clerk of the superior court prior to or at the time for qualifying, which affidavit shall affirm that he meets all of the qualifications required pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection. (c)(1) Any person who is elected or appointed as a clerk of the superior court after July 1, 1981, but before January 1, 2000, and who was not serving as a clerk of the superior court on July 1, 1981, shall satisfactorily complete 40 hours of training in the performance of his or her duties and shall file a certificate of training issued by the Institute of Continuing Judicial Education of Georgia with the judge of the probate court of the county in which he or she serves within one year from the date of his or her election or appointment in order to become a certified clerk of the superior court. On and after July 1, 1998, each person who is elected or appointed as a clerk of the superior court shall also enter upon the minutes of the superior court in which he or she holds office a copy of the certificate of training issued by the Institute of Continuing Judicial Education of Georgia. Any person subject to the provisions of this paragraph who does not satisfactorily complete the training required by this paragraph or who does not file a certificate of training issued by the Institute of Continuing Judicial Education of Georgia with the judge of the probate court and enter a certificate of training into the minutes of the superior court within the time period required shall become a certified clerk of the superior court upon completion of the requirements at any later time. For each year the training requirements required by this paragraph are not completed and the certificate is not placed on file, the clerk of the superior court will not receive credit for that year of service for determining eligibility for retirement under the Superior Court Clerks’ Retirement Fund of Georgia. (2) Any person elected or appointed clerk of the superior court of any county of this state on or after January 1, 2000, shall satisfactorily complete 40 hours of continuing judicial education prior to

taking office and assuming the duties and responsibilities of his or her office. The clerk of superior court shall file a certificate of training issued by the Institute of Continuing Judicial Education of Georgia with the probate court and shall enter the certificate on the minutes of the superior court in the county in which he or she holds office. Upon completing such 40 hour curriculum, the clerk shall become a certified clerk of the superior court. The training requirements of this paragraph shall not apply to persons subject to the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection. On and after July 1, 1998, the curriculum for all training programs required by this paragraph and paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be approved by the Superior Court Clerks Training Council. (3) Effective July 1, 1983, after the initial year of training as required in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, each clerk of the superior court shall complete 15 hours of additional training per annum during each year in which he or she serves as a clerk of the superior court and shall file a certificate of additional training issued by the Institute of Continuing Judicial Education of Georgia with the judge of the probate court in his or her county. On and after July 1, 1998, the certificate of training shall be entered upon the minutes of the superior court in which the clerk of the superior court holds office. For each year the training requirements of this paragraph are not completed and the certificate is not filed as required by this paragraph, the clerk of the superior court will not receive credit for that year of service for determining eligibility for retirement under the Superior Court Clerks’ Retirement Fund of Georgia; provided, however, that, if a clerk fails to take the required training in any given year, he or she may, upon written notice to the Superior Court Clerks Training Council, make up such deficiency in the next succeeding year. In such event, the clerk shall file the appropriate certificate of additional training in the manner provided in this paragraph. (4) A clerk of the superior court may appoint an employee of his or her office as clerk pro tempore for a period not exceeding five days per year in order for the clerk to attend training authorized or required by this subsection or by any other Code section. If any clerk, because of a lack of personnel in his or her office, is unable to appoint an employee of such office as clerk pro tempore for this purpose, then the judge of the probate court shall serve as clerk pro tempore for such period. The appointment of clerk pro tempore shall be approved by the judge of the superior court and recorded in the minutes of the court. (5) All reasonable expenses of training authorized or required by this subsection, including any tuition which may be fixed by the Institute of Continuing Judicial Education of Georgia, shall be paid

by the clerk taking the training but shall be reimbursed from county funds by the county governing authority. (6) The failure to file the certificate required by this subsection or the failure to complete the judicial education required by this subsection shall not invalidate any act or actions taken by the clerk.

History

Laws 1794, Cobb’s 1851 Digest, p. 574; Code 1863, § 249; Code 1868, § 243; Code 1873, § 255; Code 1882, § 255; Civil Code 1895, § 4347; Civil Code 1910, § 4878; Code 1933, § 24-2701; Ga. L. 1981, p. 921, § 2; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 15; Ga. L. 1983, p. 1306, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 213, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1091, § 1; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1159, § 6.

Annotations

Code Commission notes. - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1998, ‘‘Institute’’ was substituted for ‘‘institute’’ near the end of the second sentence in paragraph (c)(1). Law reviews. - For article surveying legislative and judicial developments in Georgia local government law for 1978-79, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 155 (1979).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Breach of duty. - Trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of a former clerk and a deputy clerk in an inmate’s action alleging that the clerks breached the clerks’ duty to notify the department of corrections of the inmate’s amended sentence as required by O.C.G.A. § 42-5-50(a) because the court of appeals previously ruled in the case that the clerks were not entitled to official immunity in the clerks’ individual capac-

ities for failing to perform the ministerial act of communicating the inmate’s sentence to the DOC, and nothing in the record following remand changed that ruling; § 42-5-50(a) is imperative, and the statute’s performance is neither discretionary nor dependent upon a direction from the parties at interest. McGee v. Hicks, 303 Ga. App. 130, 693 S.E.2d 130 (2010), aff ’d, 289 Ga. 573, 713 S.E.2d 841 (2011).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Annual training requirements as set by the 1983 amendment apply to all superior court clerks and not just those

who took office after July 1, 1981. 1983 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U83-18.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court, § 6.

C.J.S. - 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 328 et seq.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 6 cases, 1994–2017 · leading case: Dean v. Schreeder, Wheeler & Flint, 474 S.E.2d 648 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
Dean v. Schreeder, Wheeler & Flint, 474 S.E.2d 648 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 15-6-50 provides that, as a prerequisite for holding the office of clerk of the superior court, the person shall be “a resident of the county in which he seeks the office of clerk of the superior court for at least two years prior to his qualifying for the election to the…”
Taylor v. Bartow Cnty., Ga., 860 F. Supp. 1526 (N.D. Ga. 1994). · cites it 2× “§ 15-16-28 (providing that merit board for deputy sheriffs may be created if approved and adopted by sheriff); but see O.C.G.A. §§ 15-6-50 et seq. (no authority for clerks to establish such merit boards for their employees).”
Wells v. Smith, 455 S.E.2d 321 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 2× “See generally OCGA § 15-6-50 et seq. Nonetheless, even assuming Smith owed Wells a duty to correctly address the notice and a duty to inform the court immediately upon receiving notice that it was not delivered, there is no evidence that either duty was breached.”
McGee v. Hicks, 693 S.E.2d 130 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 2× “OCGA §§ 15-6-50; 15-6-59 (b) (powers and duties of appointed deputy clerks are same as clerk’s).”
Kicklighter v. McIntosh Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 694 F. App'x 711 (11th Cir. 2017). “See O.C.G.A. § 15-6-50; Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at 781-82 (examining state-mandated training in weighing second factor).”
Kicklighter v. McIntosh Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1363 (2016). “IX, § 1, ¶ 111(a); O.C.G.A. §§ 15-6-50, 15-6-61. Though the McIntosh County Clerk of Superior Court is also the county’s state and juvenile court clerk, this arrangement is not the result of a county delegation.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.