Execution dockets are in their essence public records.

- Clerk is under a duty to keep dockets and to record such entries therein. In making such entries with the dates shown, the clerk is presumed as a public officer to faithfully and accurately perform the duties devolving upon the clerk by law, and being public records, these dockets are to be taken as speaking the truth and as justifying an examiner to rely on their contents, as otherwise the examiner might be misled to the examiner's injury and damage. Pope v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 200 Ga. 69, 35 S.E.2d 899 (1945).

Appearance docket should not be dispensed with. Rock Island Paper Mills Co. v. Todd & Rafferty, 37 Ga. 667 (1868).

Dismissal for want of appearance improper when incorrect docket.

- If a case belongs on the issue docket and is entered on the motion docket, the case should not, on the calling of the latter docket, be dismissed for want of appearance. Harris & Bussey v. Lowe & Bro., 81 Ga. 676, 8 S.E. 419 (1888).

Entry on the general execution docket operates as notice under former Civil Code 1910, § 3321 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-12-81). Merrick v. Taylor, 14 Ga. App. 81, 80 S.E. 343 (1913).

Defect in fieri facias amount may be cured by amendment.

- If a judgment for alimony is payable in installments, and more than one fieri facias has been issued, no fieri facias can lawfully include any amount which has been included in a previous fieri facias; but, if such is done, it is a defect which may be cured by amendment. Stephens v. Stephens, 171 Ga. 590, 156 S.E. 188 (1930).

City court clerk not authorized to issue distress warrant.

- Act which establishes a city court and gives the clerk thereof the same powers as the clerk of the superior court does not authorize such clerk to issue a distress warrant. Woolsey v. Lawshe, 1 Ga. App. 817, 57 S.E. 1039 (1907).

Time of commencement of suit is date of filing as entered upon the petition when such filing is followed by appropriate service. Thompson v. Thompson, 214 Ga. 776, 107 S.E.2d 655 (1959).

No defense that process not signed by clerk when clerk is defendant.

- In an action against an individual who is the clerk of the court in which the action is filed, the individual defendant is estopped to assert as a defense that the process attached to the petition was not signed by the clerk of the court. Jones v. Bland, 69 Ga. App. 883, 27 S.E.2d 102 (1943).

Contracts to publish public records.

- Contract between the county and a company allowing that company to obtain copies of certain public indices and records and make those copies available for a fee is not invalid as an attempt to control or expand the clerk's duties. Price v. Fulton County Comm'n, 170 Ga. App. 736, 318 S.E.2d 153 (1984).

Foreclosure confirmation proceeding.

- Filing of a confirmation petition with the clerk of court was insufficient to meet the mandates of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161(a). Lanier Bank & Trust Co. v. Nix, 221 Ga. App. 323, 471 S.E.2d 229 (1996).

Attorney for defendant cannot sign clerk's name. Horton v. State, 112 Ga. 27, 37 S.E. 100 (1900).

Workers' compensation case is civil case.

- Every civil case of whatever nature must be entered on either the issue docket or the motion docket, and a workmen's (now workers') compensation case which has been appealed to the superior court from the State Board of Workmen's (now Workers') Compensation is a civil case. Bryant v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 114 Ga. App. 853, 152 S.E.2d 759 (1966).

Cited in Deveney, Hood & Co. v. Burton, 110 Ga. 56, 35 S.E. 268 (1900); Skinner v. Stewart Plumbing Co., 42 Ga. App. 42, 155 S.E. 97 (1930); Atlanta Title & Trust Co. v. Tidwell, 173 Ga. 499, 160 S.E. 620 (1931); Brinson v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co., 45 Ga. App. 459, 165 S.E. 321 (1932); Mize v. Harber, 189 Ga. 737, 8 S.E.2d 1 (1940); Chappell v. Kilgore, 196 Ga. 591, 27 S.E.2d 89 (1943); Georgia Sec. Co. v. Sanders, 74 Ga. App. 295, 39 S.E.2d 570 (1946); Godfrey v. City of Cochran, 208 Ga. 149, 65 S.E.2d 605 (1951); DeKalb County v. Deason, 221 Ga. 237, 144 S.E.2d 446 (1965); Birt v. State, 127 Ga. App. 532, 194 S.E.2d 335 (1972); Purvis v. Tatum, 131 Ga. App. 116, 205 S.E.2d 75 (1974); Jeffries v. State, 140 Ga. App. 477, 231 S.E.2d 369 (1976); Dozier v. Norris, 241 Ga. 230, 244 S.E.2d 853 (1978); Duckett v. State, 158 Ga. App. 285, 279 S.E.2d 734 (1981); Orr v. Culpepper, 161 Ga. App. 801, 288 S.E.2d 898 (1982); Grimsley v. Twiggs County, 249 Ga. 632, 292 S.E.2d 675 (1982); Vanderbreggen v. Hodge, 171 Ga. App. 868, 321 S.E.2d 218 (1984); Bowen v. Ball, 215 Ga. App. 640, 451 S.E.2d 502 (1994); City of Lawrenceville v. Davis, 233 Ga. App. 1, 502 S.E.2d 794 (1998).

Clerk to number separately distinct and separate actions.

- Since an action in attachment is separate and distinct from a common law action, failure to number and document the entries separately is error on the part of a clerk. Dollar v. Fred W. Amend Co., 184 Ga. 432, 191 S.E. 696 (1937).

Subpoena must be signed by clerk. Horton v. State, 112 Ga. 27, 37 S.E. 100 (1900).

Duty of clerk to sign all processes on all suits filed is ministerial solely, and it is beyond the duties or powers of the clerk to pass on the legal sufficiency of pleadings. The clerk could not be protected in the exercise of a judicial function which the clerk did not possess by virtue of the clerk's office. Jones v. Bland, 69 Ga. App. 883, 27 S.E.2d 102 (1943).

Presumption that clerk fully and properly performed duties.

- Attorneys have the right to presume that a clerk of the court has fully and properly performed the clerk's official duties as to docketing a case. Dollar v. Fred W. Amend Co., 184 Ga. 432, 191 S.E. 696 (1937).

Clerk required by law to issue fieri facias for payment of alimony award on request of plaintiff; and a judgment need not be obtained from the court for that purpose. Stephens v. Stephens, 171 Ga. 590, 156 S.E. 188 (1930).

Duty of clerk for validation certificate and validated county bonds.

- It is the duty of the clerk of the superior court to sign a validation certificate and attach the seal of the clerk's office to all county bonds regularly validated; the law contemplates, however, that a certification by the clerk shall speak the truth, and the clerk may not be required by a mandamus, or otherwise, to certify an instrument that does not conform to the records in the clerk's office. Touchton v. Echols County, 211 Ga. 85, 84 S.E.2d 81 (1954).

Clerk of court authorized to sign rule nisi allowing former city attorney to seek writ of quo warranto.

- Former city attorney followed correct procedure to obtain a writ of quo warranto by filing an application for leave of court to file an information in the nature of a quo warranto, and the trial court issued a rule nisi granting leave to file the petition; the order granting leave was not improper because it was signed by the clerk of court, because under O.C.G.A. § 15-6-61(a)(3), the clerk was authorized to sign orders at the direction of a superior court judge. Jones v. Boone, 297 Ga. 437, 774 S.E.2d 668 (2015).

Presence in courtroom not required.

- Duties of a superior court clerk do not require his or her presence in the courtroom nor the provision of aid to criminal defendants during trial. Williams v. State, 233 Ga. App. 70, 503 S.E.2d 324 (1998).

Placing case on dead docket does not terminate case.

- There is no language whatsoever in this section which states that the case can be reinstated at the pleasure of the court, or any other language indicating that a case is terminated in favor of the defendant when the case is placed upon the dead docket. Courtenay v. Randolph, 125 Ga. App. 581, 188 S.E.2d 396 (1972).

Cases on dead docket still pending in court.

- Since no reinstatement of the case is necessary before the case can be called for trial, the case must, as a necessity, still be pending in the court. Courtenay v. Randolph, 125 Ga. App. 581, 188 S.E.2d 396 (1972).

Placing a case upon the dead docket under this section constitutes neither a dismissal nor a termination of the prosecution in the accused's favor; such case is still pending and can be called for trial at the judge's pleasure, or the accused can make a demand for trial. Courtenay v. Randolph, 125 Ga. App. 581, 188 S.E.2d 396 (1972).

Order placing case on dead docket not appealable.

- Trial court's order placing a case on the court's dead docket was not a dismissal of the accusation from which the state could bring an appeal. State v. Creel, 216 Ga. App. 394, 454 S.E.2d 804 (1995).

Court's discretion to transfer cases to dead docket may not be used in unlawful manner, for instance, to keep an indictment hanging over the head of the defendant merely to toll the running of the statute of limitations. Underhill v. State, 129 Ga. App. 65, 198 S.E.2d 703 (1973).

Defendant's recourse when dead docket device delays trial.

- When mere lapse of time, less than that set out in the statute of limitations, is involved, and the defendant has not objected to the case being dead docketed, and has made no demand for early trial, it will take a showing of prejudice to the defendant's interests or oppressive and harassing tactics by the government to justify a finding of encroachment on the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Three such interests have been identified: (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Underhill v. State, 129 Ga. App. 65, 198 S.E.2d 703 (1973).

Presumption that facts do not exist.

- If the facts do not appear on the minutes, the legal presumption is that those facts do not exist. Garner v. State, 42 Ga. 203 (1871).

Unsigned entry on deed is not evidence of time it was filed. First Nat'l Bank v. Cody, 93 Ga. 127, 19 S.E. 831 (1894).

Clerk's execution docket is admissible as evidence. Ross v. Davis, 30 Ga. 823 (1860).

Fieri facias as evidence.

- Fieri facias issuing from justice of the peace court may be admitted in evidence in claim case. Turner v. Duncan, 152 Ga. 54, 108 S.E. 532 (1921).

Execution dockets not affected by parol evidence.

- Execution dockets come within rule that what ought to be of record must be proved by record. The record cannot be contradicted or enlarged by parol evidence. The necessary presumption arising from a record cannot be contradicted by parol evidence any more than the express words of the record itself. Pope v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 200 Ga. 69, 35 S.E.2d 899 (1945).

Entries on execution dockets conclusive as to facts and dates.

- Entries on the general execution dockets required by law to be kept by the clerk of the superior court, in the absence of a timely direct attack as to their verity, supported by proof, are conclusive as to the facts and dates recited in such public records. Pope v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 200 Ga. 69, 35 S.E.2d 899 (1945).

In equitable proceedings evidence can impeach record.

- Certain limitations upon doctrine that parol evidence inadmissible to vary or contradict record. In direct attacks upon these records, in the nature of equitable proceedings, evidence has been held admissible to impeach the record. Pope v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 200 Ga. 69, 35 S.E.2d 899 (1945).

Incomplete record not to be certified.

- This section does not contemplate that an incomplete record, or one that does not represent the whole truth, shall be certified by the clerk as being the record on file in the clerk's office. Touchton v. Echols County, 211 Ga. 85, 84 S.E.2d 81 (1954).

Employment of counsel.

- General Assembly has not expressly granted clerks of superior court the power to hire attorneys, and there is no legislative grant of power from which it is necessarily implied that clerks have the power to contract for the services of an attorney. Stephenson v. Board of Comm'rs, 261 Ga. 399, 405 S.E.2d 488 (1991).

County governing authority's employment of counsel to represent a superior court clerk did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Paras. I(c)(1) or (7), which preclude the authority from exercising any power in a manner affecting "any elective county office" or "any court or the personnel thereof." Stephenson v. Board of Comm'rs, 261 Ga. 399, 405 S.E.2d 488 (1991).

Authority of officers over expenditures.

- County commissioners approved a budget for the office of the superior court clerk that included a miscellaneous line item for a specified amount of money for certain years; thus, the item had already been budgeted to the clerk by the commission in the exercise of the commission's authority over the clerk's budget and the decision of how to spend this money fell solely to the clerk in the exercise of the clerk's duties, not to the commission. Griffies v. Coweta County, 272 Ga. 506, 530 S.E.2d 718 (2000).

Editor's notes.

- Some of the following annotations are taken from opinions rendered prior to the 1989 amendment, which rewrote this Code section.

Clerk responsible for own negligence if failure to publish notice.

- If the clerk fails to publish the notice pursuant to Ga. L. 1958, p. 686, §§ 1 and 2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-12-81), the clerk would be responsible for the clerk's own negligence under former Code 1933, §§ 24-2721, 24-2714, and 24-2715 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-6-61 and15-6-81). 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 107.

Requirements for final recording of civil proceedings by microfilm.

- Former Code 1933, §§ 24-2714 and 24-2715 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-6-61), when construed with Ga. L. 1962, p. 639, § 2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-6-87), can be interpreted to permit the final recording of civil proceedings by microfilm in lieu of in "well-bound" volumes provided proper indices and adequate equipment are maintained in addition to the necessary personnel for viewing these records. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-23.

Instruments evidencing title to real property not kept on microfilm.

- Clerks of the superior court may microfilm and keep all instruments and records in the clerks' court "excepting only instruments evidencing the title to real property." 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-125.

Clerk of the superior court must keep the dockets identified and described in paragraph (4) of O.C.G.A. § 15-6-61 either by microfilm, photographic or photostatic process, or in well-bound books, except that all instruments evidencing the title to real property, including the docket identified and described in O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2(a), and title instruments for personal property if recorded for ten years or less, must be kept and recorded in well-bound books only. For real property instruments which identify a grantor and a grantee, either a duplex index book or a cross-referenced card index system for indexing such instruments must be maintained. The clerk may use the computer services of the county in which the clerk's office is located as a supplemental means of providing access to the information contained in the dockets and indexes maintained by the clerk. 1988 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U88-26.

Once indictment filed, consent required to nolle prosequi.

- Once an indictment or accusation has been filed, a district attorney's motion to nolle prosequi or dead docket requires consent of the court. If the trial court refuses to grant the district attorney's motion to nolle prosequi or dead docket the case, the district attorney is not thereby disqualified. 1988 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U88-25.

Trial judge is ultimately responsible for reducing sentence to writing, even though this duty may be delegated to another officer; in any event, the judge must sign the sentence. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-85.

Control over dead docket reposes in court as opposed to the prosecuting attorney of the court. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-70.

Pauper's affidavit.

- Clerk of superior court has no discretion as to acceptance and transmittal of pauper's affidavit. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-169.

Clerks through whom documents are transmitted under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-32 have no duty to file or record the documents. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-38.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court, § 20 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 337 et seq.

ALR.

- Formality in authentication of judicial acts, 30 A.L.R. 700.

Record of instrument which comprises or includes an interest or right that is not a proper subject of record, 3 A.L.R.2d 577.

Omission of signature of issuing officer on civil process or summons as affecting jurisdiction of the person, 37 A.L.R.2d 928.