Scope and purpose of section.

- Statute does not create a new competition between deeds of bargain and sale and judgment liens. Its scope is to fix the time when, and the manner in which, liens acquired by contract or obtained by operation of law are to take effect, and to settle their priorities. Donovan v. Simmons, 96 Ga. 340, 22 S.E. 966 (1895) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2).

Statute was intended not only for the protection of innocent creditors who might acquire liens or transfers of property of a defendant in fi. fa. to secure their debts, but also for the protection of bona fide purchasers for value who obtain title to such property by absolute deed. Harvey & Brown v. Sanders, 107 Ga. 740, 33 S.E. 713 (1899) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2).

Security deed entitled to be recorded.

- In the absence of fraud, a deed which on the deed's face complies with all statutory requirements is entitled to be recorded, and once accepted and filed with the clerk for record, provides constructive notice to the world of the deed's existence. Leeds Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sears Mtg. Corp., 267 Ga. 300, 477 S.E.2d 565 (1996), overruling White v. Magarahan, 87 Ga. 217, 13 S.E. 509 (1891); Propes v. Todd, 89 Ga. App. 308, 79 S.E.2d 346 (1953), overruled on other grounds, Leeds Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sears Mtg. Corp., 267 Ga. 300, 477 S.E.2d 565 (1996).

Effective date of deeds.

- In determining for purposes of an implied easement of necessity when common owners had deeded land now belonging to the parties, the trial court erred in relying on the date of recording rather than on the date of the actual conveyance; there was nothing in O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2 that provided authority for holding that the deeds were not in force or did not take effect until recorded. Burnette v. Caplan, 287 Ga. App. 142, 650 S.E.2d 798 (2007).

Cited in Atlanta Title & Trust Co. v. Tidwell, 173 Ga. 449, 160 S.E. 620 (1931); Lasch v. Columbus Heating & Ventilating Co., 174 Ga. 618, 163 S.E. 486 (1932); Staples v. Heaton, 55 Ga. App. 495, 190 S.E. 420 (1937); Motor Contract Co. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 66 Ga. App. 78, 17 S.E.2d 195 (1941); Blue Ridge Apt. Co. v. Telfair Stockton & Co., 205 Ga. 552, 54 S.E.2d 608 (1949); McEntyre v. Burns, 81 Ga. App. 239, 58 S.E.2d 442 (1950); Burgess v. Simmons, 207 Ga. 291, 61 S.E.2d 410 (1950); Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Fulmer, 84 Ga. App. 101, 65 S.E.2d 636 (1951); United States v. West, 132 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Ga. 1955); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 110 Ga. App. 68, 137 S.E.2d 718 (1964); In re Tinsley, 421 F. Supp. 1007 (M.D. Ga. 1976); Jordan v. Jordan, 246 Ga. 395, 271 S.E.2d 450 (1980); Palmer v. Forrest, Mackey & Assocs., 251 Ga. 304, 304 S.E.2d 704 (1983); Webster v. Snapping Shoals Elec. Membership Corp., 176 Ga. App. 265, 335 S.E.2d 637 (1985); Minor v. McDaniel, 210 Ga. App. 146, 435 S.E.2d 508 (1993); Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Baxter, 312 Ga. App. 826, 720 S.E.2d 292 (2011).

Contests between common-law judgments.

- Statute has no application to contests between ordinary common-law judgments. Griffith v. Posey, 98 Ga. 475, 25 S.E. 515 (1896) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2).

Contests between mortgage and distress warrant.

- Statute is not applied in a contest between a mortgage and distress warrant for the appropriation of a fund arising from a sale of the mortgaged property. Jones v. Howard, 99 Ga. 451, 27 S.E. 765, 59 Am. St. R. 231 (1896) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2).

Waiver was a recordable interest.

- Bankruptcy court rejected the conclusion that a properly executed and attested waiver was not recordable under Georgia law as that conclusion elevated form over substance. The waiver stated that it was incorporated into and deemed to amend and supplement the security deed and, thus, notwithstanding its title, the waiver was in substance an amendment to the security deed and, therefore, a deed that was a recordable instrument under Georgia law. Kelley v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank (In re Jones), 580 Bankr. 916 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2017).

Materialman's lien.

- Rule of this statute is not applicable to a materialman's lien for the reason that actual recording is indispensable to the creation of liens of this character. Jones v. Kern, 101 Ga. 309, 28 S.E. 850 (1897) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2).

Materialman's lien had priority over later recorded security deed.

- Subcontractor's lien filed before a lender's security deed was superior to the deed pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2(b). The general contractor's affidavit that the subcontractors had been or will be paid was insufficient to satisfy the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.2(a), requiring a statement that payment had been made, and did not extinguish the lien. Ga. Primary Bank v. Atlanta Paving, Inc., 309 Ga. App. 851, 711 S.E.2d 409 (2011).

Tax claims.

- Provisions of this statute, declaring effective from the date of filing "deeds, mortgages, and liens of all kinds" as against third persons acting in good faith and without notice, have no application to claims for taxes. Suttles v. Dickey, 192 Ga. 382, 15 S.E.2d 445 (1941) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2).

Construed with § 9-13-60. - Former Civil Code 1910, §§ 3320 and 3323 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2) did not affect statutory method in former Civil Code 1910, §§ 6038 and 6039 (see O.C.G.A. § 9-13-60) for redeeming land of judgment debtor and subjecting the land to the judgment. Dedge v. Bennett, 138 Ga. 787, 76 S.E. 52 (1912).

Section does not change rule in claim case.

- Well settled rule, in a claim case, that the plaintiff in execution makes out a prima facie case by proving that the property claim was in possession of the defendant in fi. fa. after the rendition of the judgment, was not changed by the passage of this statute. Russell & Co. v. Morris, 134 Ga. 65, 67 S.E. 404 (1910) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2).

Section does not affect dormancy of judgment provision.

- Former Civil Code 1910, §§ 4355, 4356, and 4357 (see O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60) as to dormancy of judgments was not affected by the passage of former Civil Code 1910, §§ 3320 and 3323 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2). Columbus Fertilizer Co. v. Hanks, 119 Ga. 950, 47 S.E. 222 (1904).

One book for realty liens and another for personalty liens constitute docket.

- If the clerk keeps one book as part of the clerk's docket in which are entered notations of the filing for record of deeds and mortgages and other liens on realty, which show the day and hour of filing, and another book as part of the clerk's docket in which are entered notations of the filing of record of deeds and mortgages and other liens on personalty, both books will constitute the docket. An entry of filing which states the day and hour of filing, made in either book, of an instrument retaining title in a vendor as security for the purchase price of personalty and also creating a mortgage on realty by the purchaser as additional security for the purchase price will comply with the law. Touchstone Live Stock Co. v. Easters, 172 Ga. 454, 157 S.E. 683 (1931).

Deeds not recorded within 12 months.

- Before the passage of this statute, when there was a contest between two deeds whereby a person conveyed the same land to different persons, and neither deed was recorded within 12 months from the date of the deed's execution, the older deed would prevail. Davis v. Harden, 143 Ga. 98, 84 S.E. 426 (1915); Roles v. Shivers, 152 Ga. 798, 111 S.E. 189 (1922); Randall v. Hamilton, 156 Ga. 661, 119 S.E. 595 (1923) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2).

Vendor must record out-of-state retention of title contract within six months.

- When a person sells personal property in another state under a contract retaining title in the vendor until the payment of the purchase price, and the property is afterwards brought into this state, the vendor must, within six months after the property is so removed, record the instrument in the county where the vendee resided at the time of executing the instrument if a resident of this state, or in the county where the property is if the vendee is a nonresident, in order for the vendor to have priority over third persons acquiring in good faith and without notice interests in the property by a transfer or lien. Northern Fin. Corp. v. Hollingsworth, 52 Ga. App. 337, 183 S.E. 73 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 67-108, prior to adoption of T. 11).

Heir's recorded deed inferior to ancestor's unrecorded deed.

- Prior to this statute, a recorded deed from an heir or devisee was inferior in dignity to an unrecorded deed of the ancestor. McCandless v. Inland Acid Co., 108 Ga. 618, 34 S.E. 142 (1899); Equitable Loan & Sec. Co. v. Lewman, 124 Ga. 190, 52 S.E. 599, 33 L.R.A. (n.s.) 879 (1905) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2).

Senior unrecorded deed loses priority over junior deed recorded without notice.

- Following the passage of this statute, a senior unrecorded deed loses the deed's priority over a subsequent recorded deed from the same vendor, taken for a valuable consideration and without notice of the existence of the older deed. Dickson v. Champman, 153 Ga. 547, 112 S.E. 830 (1922) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2).

A junior deed, properly recorded, taken without notice of an unrecorded senior deed from the same vendor and for a valuable consideration, has priority over the unrecorded senior deed. Fourth Nat'l Bank v. Howell, 92 Ga. App. 868, 90 S.E.2d 78 (1955).

When, in a contest between plaintiff and defendant as to title to certain described land, each claiming under a deed from a common grantor, the deed under which defendant claims having been given for a valuable consideration and executed prior to the deed under which plaintiff claims but recorded after plaintiff's deed, the deed under which plaintiff claims reciting a consideration of love and affection, the defendant's deed has priority over the plaintiff's deed. Minor v. Georgia Kraft Co., 219 Ga. 434, 134 S.E.2d 19 (1963).

Recorded quitclaim deed, taken in good faith for valuable consideration, without notice, prevails over a prior unrecorded deed. This rule is not altered by the fact that the quitclaim deed conveys only the grantor's rights, title, and interest in and to the land, instead of conveying the land itself. Archer v. Kelley, 194 Ga. 117, 21 S.E.2d 51 (1942).

Purchaser at judicial sale.

- Under this statute, a purchaser of land at a judicial sale, acting in good faith and without notice, acquires title as against a prior conveyance by the owner, unrecorded at the time of the making and confirmation of the latter sale. Ousley & Bro. v. Bailey & Co., 111 Ga. 783, 36 S.E. 750 (1900) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2).

Valid deed, though unrecorded, is superior to subsequent judgment or attachment against the same property. Smith v. Worley, 10 Ga. App. 280, 73 S.E. 428 (1912).

Effect of failure to record deeds and bills of sale.

- Failure to record deeds and bills of sale has the same effect as failing to record deeds and bargains of sale. Carrollton Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Allen, 93 Ga. App. 150, 91 S.E.2d 93 (1955).

Effect of a failure to record a security deed as against ordinary judgment liens is the same as the effect of a failure to record a deed of bargain and sale. Caldwell v. Northwest Atlanta Bank, 194 Ga. 370, 21 S.E.2d 619 (1942).

Effect of a failure to record a mortgage or bill of sale to secure a debt shall be the same as is the effect of a failure to record a deed of bargain and sale. Manchester Motors, Inc. v. F & M Bank, 91 Ga. App. 811, 87 S.E.2d 342 (1955), for comment, see 18 Ga. B.J. 82 (1955).

Right of transferee of second security deed.

- When grantor made a deed to secure a debt, which was filed for record, and subsequently the same grantor made to another grantee a deed conveying the same property to secure a debt, which deed was filed for record at an earlier time, and when this grantee transferred and assigned the grantee's deed and the indebtedness thereby secured, receiving the full amount of the secured debt, as the transferee had no actual or constructive notice of the first deed, the grantee's right in and to the property conveyed in the deeds was unaffected by the prior deed. Nightingale v. Juniata College, 186 Ga. 365, 197 S.E. 831 (1938).

Recorded conditional bill of sale.

- Conditional bill of sale having been duly executed, attested, and recorded prior to the time of the issuing of the execution on the distress warrant, it had priority over a subsequent lien under a distress warrant for rent. Blackmar Co. v. Wright Co., 62 Ga. App. 861, 10 S.E.2d 117 (1940).

Interests of innocent third parties.

- Under this statute, an unrecorded contract retaining title in the vendor of personal property until full payment of the purchase money is not good as against the interests of third parties acting in good faith and without notice, who may have acquired a transfer or lien binding the same property. Bradley & Co. v. Cochran, 27 Ga. App. 463, 108 S.E. 624 (1921) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2).

Priority of attachment lien.

- Attachment lien is superior to the lien of an unrecorded conditional sale contract executed before the issuance and levy of the attachment. Rhodes v. Jones, 55 Ga. App. 803, 191 S.E. 503 (1937).

Not applicable unless junior grantee is bona fide purchaser.

- Former Civil Code 1933, §§ 29-401, 67-2501, and 67-2503 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 44-2-1 and44-2-2) were construed together, and did not apply in a contest between deeds unless the junior grantee was a bona fide purchaser for value. Minor v. Georgia Kraft Co., 219 Ga. 434, 134 S.E.2d 19 (1963).

Recorded voluntary deed not given priority over prior unrecorded deed.

- Construing former Civil Code 1895, §§ 2778, 2781, and 3618 (see O.C.G.A §§ 44-2-1 and44-2-2), a voluntary deed, though duly recorded and taken without notice of a prior voluntary deed executed by the same grantor and not recorded, did not give to the second grantee a priority over the first. Toole v. Toole, 107 Ga. 472, 33 S.E. 686 (1899).

Priority of unrecorded deed in Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act action.

- Judgment voiding a transfer of property as fraudulent under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA) (now Uniform Voidable Transactions Act), O.C.G.A. § 18-2-70 et seq., was reversed because, despite not being recorded, the 2002 security deed executed in favor of a former sister-in-law, pledging the property as collateral for a promissory note, gave the former sister-in-law, as one of the defendant's creditors, priority over the plaintiff's judgment, such that the property could not be characterized as the defendant's asset under the UFTA. Wallin v. Wallin, 341 Ga. App. 440, 800 S.E.2d 617 (2017).

What constitutes notice of prior deed.

- Any circumstance which would place a person of ordinary prudence fully upon the person's guard and induce serious inquiry is sufficient to constitute notice of a prior unrecorded deed, and a younger deed, taken with such notice, acquires no preference by being recorded in due time. Price v. Watts, 223 Ga. 805, 158 S.E.2d 406 (1967).

Neighbor's 2008 deeds were recorded before the brothers' 1977 deed and the brother's repeated and visible activities in the riverbed did not put the neighbor on notice of the brothers' claim to own the entire riverbed; all of the brothers' activities were consistent with the brothers' easement rights and the trial court did not err in concluding that the neighbor was an innocent purchaser who bought the riverbed without notice that the brothers claimed ownership. Thomas v. Henry County Water & Sewerage Auth., 317 Ga. App. 258, 731 S.E.2d 66 (2012).

Unrecorded deed by testatrix is inferior as without notice.

- Following the passage of this statute, an unrecorded deed made by a testatrix is ordinarily to be regarded as inferior in dignity to a deed, duly recorded, subsequently made by her devisee to an innocent purchaser for value without notice of the prior conveyance. But this statute has no application to a case where the testatrix recognized in her will the title of her donee, and the purchaser from her devisee was thus put upon notice that the property conveyed to him formed no part of the estate of the testatrix and could not be regarded as passing to the devisee under the residuary clause of the will. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co. v. Lewman, 124 Ga. 190, 52 S.E. 599, 33 L.R.A. (n.s.) 879 (1905) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2).

Burden of proof.

- Onus is on third party in possession of property covered by retention of title contract entered into in another state and not recorded in this state within the statutory period to show that the third party acquired that party's interest in good faith and without actual notice of the vendor's retention of title. Northern Fin. Corp. v. Hollingsworth, 52 Ga. App. 337, 183 S.E. 73 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 67-108, and prior to adoption of T. 11).

Burden of showing notice of secret equity on equity's owner.

- When a creditor sought to enforce a legal right arising from a judgment lien on land while title was in the husband, the burden of showing that the creditor had notice of wife's secret equity was on the wife. Word v. Bowen, 181 Ga. 736, 184 S.E. 303 (1936).

Duty of grantee to record deed.

- It is plain duty of a grantee to record the grantee's deed, thereby giving constructive notice to everyone of the deed's existence and of the grantee's rights thereunder; and since it is thus made the duty of the grantee to supply notice, everyone is justified in relying upon an examination of the record and believing that a purchase of land will convey all title which the record fails to disclose is in another. Archer v. Kelley, 194 Ga. 117, 21 S.E.2d 51 (1942).

When recording does not constitute notice.

- Registry of a deed not legally attested, proved, or acknowledged is not constructive notice to a subsequent bona fide purchaser. Coniff v. Hunnicutt, 157 Ga. 823, 122 S.E. 694 (1924).

Even if deed is recorded, in order to operate as constructive notice to a bona fide purchaser, the deed must not lie outside the purchaser's chain of title. Jenkins v. Sosebee, 74 Bankr. 440 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987).

Filing mortgage lien constitutes notice.

- Filing of a mortgage in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county in which the land lies is, from the time of filing, notice to the world of the mortgage's existence; therefore, the lien of a mortgage so filed, though not properly recorded, is superior to that of common-law executions entered on the docket after the filing of the mortgage. Merrick v. Taylor, 14 Ga. App. 81, 80 S.E. 343 (1913).

An entry of filing, made in a book kept by a clerk for the filing for record of mortgages and other liens on personalty, of an instrument retaining title in a vendor as security for the purchase price of personalty, and also creating a mortgage on the realty by the purchaser as additional security for the purchase price, will be notice to a subsequent purchaser of the realty. Lasch v. Columbus Heating & Ventilating Co., 174 Ga. 618, 163 S.E. 486, answer conformed to, 45 Ga. App. 200, 164 S.E. 211 (1932).

Sufficiency of description of land conveyed.

- Registered security deed reciting as matter of description that the land thereby conveyed is situated in a named city, county, and state, and further describing the land by reference to a designated map and other papers, is sufficient to put a subsequent purchaser of this lot from the same grantor on notice as to what land was in fact conveyed by the deed. Talmadge Bros. & Co. v. Interstate Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 105 Ga. 550, 31 S.E. 618 (1898).

That a recorded security deed from a grantor to the grantee contained an incorrect land lot designation did not mean that a mortgagee of the property was not on notice of the deed under O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2(b) because the incorporation of the subdivision plat in the deed provided a key to locating the property. Therefore, the grantee's deed was valid. Deljoo v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., 284 Ga. 438, 668 S.E.2d 245 (2008).

Notice of foreclosure sale held sufficient.

- Because the debtor failed to send written notice of the correct address of the subject property to the bank or the bank's agents, and could not assert an absent grantee's priority to escape the consequences of the debtor's own failure to provide a correct property address to all future holders of the note and deed, the foreclosure sale was not set aside; thus, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the bank and the assignees of the security interest on the ground that the bank provided sufficient notice of the foreclosure sale. Jackson v. Bank One, 287 Ga. App. 791, 652 S.E.2d 849 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0335, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 169 (Ga. 2008).

Only deed to same land constitutes muniment of purchaser's title.

- In view of the provisions of this statute, a deed which constitutes one of the muniments of a purchaser's title is a deed to the same land, and not a deed from the purchaser's grantor to other land, and this is true even though the prior deed of the purchaser's grantor conveys a lot or parcel of the same general tract. Hancock v. Gumm, 151 Ga. 667, 107 S.E. 872, 16 A.L.R. 1003 (1921) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2).

Instrument takes effect from time of filing.

- Following the passage of this statute, the filing for record of a mortgage which on the mortgage's face is entitled to be recorded is notice to all third persons without notice, although the mortgage may be afterwards so defectively recorded that the actual record is not such notice. In such a case, the filing for record is sufficient notice to all third persons without notice. Durrence v. Northern Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. 385, 43 S.E. 726 (1903); Greenfield v. Stout, 122 Ga. 303, 50 S.E. 111 (1905); Henderson v. Armstrong, 128 Ga. 804, 58 S.E. 624 (1907); Wadley Lumber Co. v. Lott, 130 Ga. 135, 60 S.E. 836 (1908); Albany Nat'l Bank v. Georgia Banking Co., 137 Ga. 776, 74 S.E. 267 (1912); Blakely Artesian Ice Co. v. Clarke, 13 Ga. App. 574, 79 S.E. 526 (1913); Brown v. Aaron, 20 Ga. App. 592, 93 S.E. 258 (1917).

Lien of a mortgage on realty will be effective, as against subsequent purchasers from the mortgagor, from the date of the filing. Touchstone Live Stock Co. v. Easters, 172 Ga. 454, 157 S.E. 683 (1931).

Competing deeds, as against each other, were effective only from and after being filed for record. Such was the clear import of the language of former Code 1933, §§ 29-401, 67-2501, and 67-2503 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 44-2-1 and44-2-2). Fourth Nat'l Bank v. Howell, 92 Ga. App. 868, 90 S.E.2d 78 (1955).

Deed providing easement took priority.

- Deed to the appellee, which provided an easement over the appellant's property, took priority over a deed to the appellant, which did not mention the easement, since the deed to the appellee was recorded first. Church of the Nativity, Inc. v. Whitener, 249 Ga. App. 45, 547 S.E.2d 587 (2001).

It is the date of filing, not the date of recording, that fixes rights under the law with respect to instruments required to be recorded. Giordano v. Stubbs, 228 Ga. 75, 184 S.E.2d 165 (1971), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 405 U.S. 908, 92 S. Ct. 960, 30 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1972).

Effectiveness of filing not affected by manner of recording.

- Owner and holder of a deed, mortgage, conditional sales contract, and other liens required by law to be recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court, is protected by filing the owner's paper with the clerk of the court, whose duty it is to record the filing on a public docket required for that purpose. Improper record, or no record at all, has no effect on the efficacy of the filing. Buchanan v. Georgia Acceptance Co., 61 Ga. App. 476, 6 S.E.2d 162 (1939).

When a deed which appears on the deed's face to be entitled to record is filed for record in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county in which the land lies, it takes effect, as against third persons without notice, from the time it is so filed. The actual recording is the duty of the clerk, and this statute does not contemplate that an erroneous performance shall operate to defeat the grantee who has properly filed the grantee's deed. Thomas v. Hudson, 190 Ga. 622, 10 S.E.2d 396 (1940) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2).

When a deed is filed for record in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county in which the land lies, the deed takes effect, as against third persons without notice, from the time the deed is so filed, and the deed is admissible in evidence as "a registered deed" without further proof of the deed's execution, although the clerk may have failed to record the deed or may have recorded the deed in the wrong book. Pease & Elliman Realty Trust v. Gaines, 160 Ga. App. 125, 286 S.E.2d 448 (1981).

Clerk liable for improper filing or recording.

- If any injury is done by the failure to record a paper, or by the improper recording of a paper, the clerk would be liable to the injured party for a breach of duty; filing puts the world on notice as to the contents of papers filed for record, whether the papers are recorded or not. This law, however, can only apply if there is a proper filing of the paper to be recorded, and a filing under circumstances in which an improper filing and indexing and an improper recording occurs could be charged as a breach of duty on the part of the clerk. Buchanan v. Georgia Acceptance Co., 61 Ga. App. 476, 6 S.E.2d 162 (1939).

Recordation unnecessary as between maker of security deed and grantee.

- It is not essential, in order to convey title to land to secure a debt as between the maker and the grantee, that the deed should be recorded. As between the maker of the security deed and the grantee, the latter would get a good title. Cooper v. Bacon, 143 Ga. 64, 84 S.E. 123 (1915).

Because the security deed between debtors and lender was effective as between those parties at execution, it was not relevant that the security deed was recorded within 90 days prior to debtors filing a petition in bankruptcy; under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, the security deed was not avoidable as a preferential transfer. Gordon v. NovaStar Mortg., Inc. (In re Hedrick), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 31, 2005), aff'd, 524 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 2008); modified and reh'g denied, 529 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2008).

Wife of deceased life estate holder.

- Trial court erred in determining that a second wife acquired a one-half interest in property quitclaimed to her by her husband because the husband had only a life estate in the property, and she was not a bona fide purchaser. The parties' lender, however, was a bona fide purchaser for value pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 44-2-1,44-2-2, and44-2-4(b). Price v. Price, 286 Ga. 753, 692 S.E.2d 601 (2010).

Instruments effective against third parties only from date filed for record.

- Deeds, mortgages, and liens take effect against third parties acting in good faith and without notice only from the time those instruments are filed for record. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 120.

Docket kept and recorded in well-bound books.

- Clerk of the superior court must keep the dockets identified and described in O.C.G.A. § 15-6-61(4) either by microfilm, photographic or photostatic process, or in well-bound books, except that all instruments evidencing the title to real property, including the docket identified and described in subsection (a), and title instruments for personal property if recorded for ten years or less, must be kept and recorded in well-bound books only. For real property instruments which identify a grantor and a grantee, either a duplex index book or a cross-reference card index system for indexing such instruments must be maintained. The clerk may use the computer services of the county in which the clerk's office is located as a supplemental means of providing access to the information contained in the dockets and indexes maintained by the clerk. 1988 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U88-26.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Records and Recording Laws, § 133 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 76 C.J.S., Records, §§ 20, 37 et seq.

ALR.

- Priority where senior instrument affecting real property is recorded after execution but before recording of junior instrument, 32 A.L.R. 344.

Constructive notice by record of instrument relating to specific chattels as affected by changes therein, 63 A.L.R. 1456.

Validity of unfiled chattel mortgage as against persons with actual notice thereof, 68 A.L.R. 274.

Purchase-money mortgage as within provision of statute defeating or postponing lien of unrecorded or unfiled mortgage, 137 A.L.R. 571; 168 A.L.R. 1164.

Priority between devisee under devise pursuant to testator's agreement and third person claiming under or through testator's unrecorded deed, 7 A.L.R.2d 544.

Priority, as between holder of unfiled or unrecorded chattel mortgage who secures possession of goods or chattels, and subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer, 53 A.L.R.2d 936.

Sale of real property as affecting time for filing notice of or perfecting mechanic's lien as against purchaser's interest, 76 A.L.R.2d 1163.

Right of vendee under executory land contract to lien for amount paid on purchase price as against subsequent creditors of, or purchasers from, vendor, 82 A.L.R.3d 1040.