Written instruments of title favored.

- Law favors title to realty being evidenced by written instruments; conversely, the law does not favor title to realty being evidenced by parol agreements. Freeman v. Saxton, 243 Ga. 571, 255 S.E.2d 28 (1979).

Neighbor's 2008 deeds were recorded before the brothers' 1977 deed and the brother's repeated and visible activities in the riverbed did not put the neighbor on notice of the brothers' claim to own the entire riverbed; all of the brothers' activities were consistent with the brothers' easement rights and the trial court did not err in concluding that the neighbor was an innocent purchaser who bought the riverbed without notice that the brothers claimed ownership. Thomas v. Henry County Water & Sewerage Auth., 317 Ga. App. 258, 731 S.E.2d 66 (2012).

Effect of restrictive covenants in unrecorded instrument.

- Purchaser of land without actual notice may take free of restrictive covenants contained in an unrecorded contract or deed. Jenkins v. Sosebee, 74 Bankr. 440 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987).

For history of this statute, see Downs v. Yonge, 17 Ga. 295 (1855); Bell v. McCawley, 29 Ga. 355 (1859); Riley v. Southwestern R.R., 63 Ga. 325 (1879); Hockenhull v. Oliver, 80 Ga. 89, 4 S.E. 323, 12 Am. St. R. 235 (1887); White v. Interstate Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 106 Ga. 146, 32 S.E. 26 (1898); Lindley v. Frey, 115 Ga. 662, 42 S.E. 79 (1902); Wadley Lumber Co. v. Lott, 130 Ga. 135, 60 S.E. 836 (1908); Wilkes v. Folsom, 154 Ga. 618, 115 S.E. 4 (1922) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-1).

For cases illustrative of the law before enactment of Ga. L. 1889, p. 106, §§ 1 and 4 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2), see Gibson v. Hough & Sons, 60 Ga. 588 (1878); Lowe v. Allen, 68 Ga. 225 (1881); Latham v. Inman, 88 Ga. 505, 15 S.E. 8 (1891).

Cited in Hand v. McKinney, 25 Ga. 648 (1858); Lessee of Dudley v. Bradshaw, 29 Ga. 17 (1859); Dickson v. Chapman, 153 Ga. 547, 112 S.E. 830 (1922); Dorsey v. Clower, 162 Ga. 299, 133 S.E. 249 (1926); Terry v. Ellis, 189 Ga. 698, 7 S.E.2d 282 (1940); Mendenhall v. Holtzclaw, 198 Ga. 95, 31 S.E.2d 171 (1944); Blue Ridge Apt. Co. v. Telfair Stockton & Co., 205 Ga. 552, 54 S.E.2d 608 (1949); Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Fulmer, 84 Ga. App. 101, 65 S.E.2d 636 (1951); United States v. West, 132 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Ga. 1955); Day v. C.O. Smith Guano Co., 95 Ga. App. 581, 98 S.E.2d 173 (1957); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 110 Ga. App. 68, 137 S.E.2d 718 (1964); Pressley v. Jennings, 227 Ga. 366, 180 S.E.2d 896 (1971); Palmer v. Forrest, Mackey & Assocs., 251 Ga. 304, 304 S.E.2d 704 (1983); Tarbutton v. All That Tract or Parcel of Land Known as Carter Place, 641 F. Supp. 521 (M.D. Ga. 1986); Minor v. McDaniel, 210 Ga. App. 146, 435 S.E.2d 508 (1993); Bell v. State, 234 Ga. App. 693, 507 S.E.2d 535 (1998).

Contract took priority over deed.

- Recording of a contract to sell land took priority over a later recorded deed transferring the disputed land. Parks v. Stepp, 277 Ga. 704, 594 S.E.2d 364 (2004).

Section does not apply to security deeds. In re Hammett, 286 F. 392 (N.D. Ga. 1923). See also Randall v. Hamilton, 156 Ga. 661, 119 S.E. 595 (1923) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-1).

No application to question of bona fides where occupant seeking to setoff permanent improvements.

- Construction notice is evidence, as a matter of course. In a contest between deeds involving merely title, it would be conclusive. However, this statute does not purport to deal with the question of bona fides where an occupant of land is seeking to setoff permanent improvements. The burden on this question is on the party asserting notice. Harper v. Durden, 177 Ga. 216, 170 S.E. 45 (1933) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-1).

This statute does not purport to deal with the question of bona fides when an occupant of land is seeking to setoff permanent improvements. The burden on this question is on the party asserting notice. McKaig v. Hardy, 196 Ga. 582, 27 S.E.2d 11 (1943) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-1).

Security deeds not properly attested or acknowledged, although recorded, did not provide subsequent purchasers of property constructive notice of their content and the deeds lost whatever priority the deeds may have had over the purchasers' title. Sears Mtg. Corp. v. Leeds Bldg. Prods., Inc., 219 Ga. App. 349, 464 S.E.2d 907 (1995), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 267 Ga. 300, 477 S.E.2d 565 (1996).

In the absence of fraud, a deed which on the deed's face complies with all statutory requirements is entitled to be recorded, and once accepted and filed with the clerk for record, provides constructive notice to the world of the deed's existence. Leeds Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sears Mtg. Corp., 267 Ga. 300, 477 S.E.2d 565 (1996), overruling White v. Magarahan, 87 Ga. 217, 13 S.E. 509 (1891); Propes v. Todd, 89 Ga. App. 308, 79 S.E.2d 346 (1953), overruled on other grounds, Leeds Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sears Mtg. Corp., 267 Ga. 300, 477 S.E.2d 565 (1996).

Donor need not own land at time of first deed.

- Falling within the scope of this statute are not only cases in which the donor owns the land at the time the donor makes the first of the two deeds, but also those cases in which the donor does not, at that time, own the land but has come to own the land when the donor makes the second deed. Faircloth v. Jordan, 18 Ga. 350 (1855) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-1).

As against each other, deeds take priority from date of filing for record.

- In a contest between deeds upon a valuable consideration from the same grantor conveying the same property, such deeds, as against each other, when taken without notice, will take priority only from and after the date of lawful record or filing for record, and neither deed, upon being recorded, will relate back so as to affect the rights of the parties touching the subject matter of the deed at any time before the deed is filed for record. Fourth Nat'l Bank v. Howell, 92 Ga. App. 868, 90 S.E.2d 78 (1955).

Statute operates only in favor of purchaser in good faith when there is valuable consideration. Webb v. John Doe, 33 Ga. 565 (1863); Byrd v. Aspinwall, 108 Ga. 1, 33 S.E. 688 (1899); Lindley v. Frey, 115 Ga. 662, 42 S.E. 79 (1902); Wadley Lumber Co. v. Lott, 130 Ga. 135, 60 S.E. 836 (1908); Dix v. Wilkinson, 149 Ga. 103, 99 S.E. 437 (1919) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-1).

Section does not apply in a contest between deeds unless the junior grantee is a bona fide purchaser for value. Minor v. Georgia Kraft Co., 219 Ga. 434, 134 S.E.2d 19 (1963); Price v. Watts, 223 Ga. 805, 158 S.E.2d 406 (1967) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-1).

Voluntary deeds not included.

- If the legislature had intended to include voluntary deeds, the word "grantor," and not "vendor," would have been used. Toole v. Toole, 107 Ga. 472, 33 S.E. 686 (1899).

Junior deed recorded without notice of unrecorded senior deed given priority.

- To give priority to a junior recorded deed over a senior unrecorded deed, it must appear that the junior deed was for a valuable consideration and taken without notice of the unrecorded deed. Nickerson v. Porter, 189 Ga. 671, 7 S.E.2d 231 (1940).

Senior unrecorded deed loses the deed's priority over a junior recorded deed for value from the same vendor, taken without knowledge or notice of the existence of the senior deed, and in a proper case may be canceled at the instance of the grantee in the junior recorded deed. Terry v. Ellis, 189 Ga. 698, 7 S.E.2d 282 (1940).

Deed of prior date loses the deed's priority over a subsequent deed from the same vendor, which is based on a valuable consideration, taken without notice of the existence of the first and being the first to go to record in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county where the land lies; even if the vendee in the second deed took with notice, a grantee of the latter who took without notice would be protected. Patellis v. Tanner, 199 Ga. 304, 34 S.E.2d 84 (1945).

Senior unrecorded deed loses the deed's priority over a junior recorded deed for value from the same vendor, taken without knowledge or notice of the existence of the senior deed. Whether the defendant purchased without notice of the senior deed in the petitioner's chain of title was a question for the jury. Tucker v. Long, 207 Ga. 730, 64 S.E.2d 69 (1951).

Junior deed, properly recorded, taken without notice of an unrecorded senior deed from the same vendor and for a valuable consideration, has priority over the unrecorded senior deed. Michael v. Poss, 209 Ga. 559, 74 S.E.2d 742 (1953); Fourth Nat'l Bank v. Howell, 92 Ga. App. 868, 90 S.E.2d 78 (1955).

When, in a contest between plaintiff and defendant as to title to certain described land, each claiming under a deed from a common grantor, the deed under which defendant claims having been given for a valuable consideration and executed prior to the deed under which plaintiff claims but recorded after plaintiff's deed, the deed under which plaintiff claims reciting a consideration of love and affection, the defendant's deed has priority over the plaintiff's deed. Minor v. Georgia Kraft Co., 219 Ga. 434, 134 S.E.2d 19 (1963).

Deed which is executed between a grantor and grantee, recorded, but never actually delivered to the grantee until after the grantor's death, is a superior title to a different deed between the same grantee and grantor that is actually delivered to the grantee but is recorded later than the undelivered deed. Dawson v. Keitt, 232 Ga. 10, 205 S.E.2d 309 (1974).

Recorded quitclaim deed, taken in good faith for valuable consideration, without notice, also prevails over a prior unrecorded deed. This rule is not altered by the fact that the quitclaim deed conveys only the grantor's rights, title, and interest in and to the land, instead of conveying the land itself. Archer v. Kelley, 194 Ga. 117, 21 S.E.2d 51 (1942).

Sheriff's deed recorded ahead of prior deed by defendant in execution comes within statute. McCandless v. Inland Acid Co., 108 Ga. 618, 34 S.E. 142 (1899); Maddox v. Arthur, 122 Ga. 671, 50 S.E. 668 (1905); Bennett v. Southern Pine Co., 123 Ga. 618, 51 S.E. 654 (1905); Culbreath v. Martin, 129 Ga. 280, 58 S.E. 832 (1907) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-1).

Recorded security deed superior to unrecorded title bond.

- When, at the time that a security deed was executed and recorded, a bond for title was not recorded, and the obligee on the bond for title was not in possession of the property, and when the grantee in the security deed had no actual notice of the outstanding bond for title, the rights conveyed by the security deed were superior to those held by the obligee in the bond for title. Kelley v. Spivey, 182 Ga. 507, 185 S.E. 783 (1936).

Section in conflict with common-law rule of estoppel.

- As to those cases which come within the provisions of this statute, it is in conflict with the common-law rule of estoppel by deed. Faircloth v. Jordan, 18 Ga. 350 (1855) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-1).

What constitutes notice.

- Any sort of notice, actual or constructive, will suffice to give notice. Wyatt v. Elam, 23 Ga. 201, 68 Am. Dec. 518 (1857).

Actual possession is such notice. Wyatt v. Elam, 23 Ga. 201, 68 Am. Dec. 518 (1857). See also Wyatt v. Elam, 19 Ga. 335 (1856).

Inquiry notice.

- When a Chapter 7 debtor purchased a home and paid off a bank's existing security interest with funds borrowed from a creditor, the creditor's security deeds, which were recorded along with the debtor's warranty deed several weeks after the closing of the home purchase and the creditor's loan, were perfected at the time the loans were executed and delivered within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(A) because a bona fide purchaser would have had inquiry notice of the loans at all times prior to their recordation based on the debtor's absence of record title and the existence of the cancelled security deed on the property in favor of the bank. Watts v. Argent Mortg. Co., LLC (In re Hunt), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Feb. 23, 2007).

Lis pendens and Lost Deed Affidavit, with the accompanying copy of the Security Deed, were filed pre-petition and were sufficient to put a person of ordinary prudence fully upon guard, and induce serious inquiry. For these reasons, under Georgia law, the trustee could not qualify as a bona fide purchaser on the bankruptcy petition date and therefore could not be availed of the strong-arm powers of 11 U.S.C.S. § 544(a)(3). Elec. Registration Sys. v. Pyke (In re Pyke), Bankr. (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2007).

Chapter 13 trustee was bona fide purchaser.

- When a security deed executed by Chapter 13 debtors had the correct street address for the collateral but an incorrect legal description, the secured creditor was not entitled to postconfirmation reformation of the deed because the Chapter 13 trustee was a hypothetical bona fide purchaser; there was nothing in the chain of title that would have put the trustee on constructive or inquiry notice of the defect. Midfirst Bank v. Hill (In re Hill), Bankr. (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2010).

Any circumstance placing ordinary prudent person upon guard constitutes notice.

- Any circumstance which would place a person of ordinary prudence fully upon the person's guard, and induce serious injury, is sufficient to constitute notice of a prior unrecorded deed, and a younger deed, taken with such notice, acquires no preference by being recorded in due time. Price v. Watts, 223 Ga. 805, 158 S.E.2d 406 (1967).

When recitals contained in a deed clearly put any subsequent purchaser on notice of the existence of an earlier misplaced or lost deed, the later deed, though recorded first, would not be entitled to priority. Harper v. Paradise, 233 Ga. 194, 210 S.E.2d 710 (1974).

Admissions against title not estoppel in behalf of one to whom not made.

- Admissions against one's title to land, and in favor of the title of a third person, will be no estoppel in behalf of one to whom the admissions were not made, and who has merely heard of the admissions, it not appearing that the admissions were made for the purpose of being acted upon, or with any design or intention that the admissions should be acted upon. Randolph v. Merchants & Mechanics Banking & Loan Co., 181 Ga. 671, 183 S.E. 801 (1936).

Sole purpose and effect of recording of deed is to afford third parties constructive notice of the existence of the deed. City Whsle. Co. v. Harper, 100 Ga. App. 151, 110 S.E.2d 561 (1959).

Recording is necessary to give constructive notice. See Fourth Nat'l Bank v. Howell, 92 Ga. App. 868, 90 S.E.2d 78 (1955).

Grantee's duty to record deed thereby supplying notice.

- It is made the plain duty of a grantee to record the grantee's deed, thereby giving constructive notice to every one of the deed's existence and of the grantee's rights thereunder; since it is thus made the duty of the grantee to supply notice, every one is justified in relying upon an examination of the record and believing that a purchase of land will convey all title which the record fails to disclose is in another. Archer v. Kelley, 194 Ga. 117, 21 S.E.2d 51 (1942).

Recorded tax deed gives notice of a defeasible title. Bennett v. Southern Pine Co., 123 Ga. 618, 51 S.E. 654 (1905).

Purchaser has notice whether or not purchaser knows of record.

- Properly recorded deed gives notice whether or not the subsequent purchaser knows of the record. McElwaney v. MacDiarmid, 131 Ga. 97, 62 S.E. 20 (1908).

Erroneous index in record book.

- Properly recorded deed gives notice even when erroneous index in record book fails to show where deed is found. Chatham v. Bradford, 50 Ga. 327, 15 Am. R. 692 (1873).

Irregular registration does not give notice to anyone. Williams v. Adams, 43 Ga. 407 (1871).

Want of notice can only be set up by subsequent bona fide purchaser. Zorn v. Thompson, 108 Ga. 78, 34 S.E. 303 (1899). See also Avera v. Southern Mtg. Co., 147 Ga. 24, 92 S.E. 533 (1917); Dix v. Wilkinson, 149 Ga. 103, 99 S.E. 437 (1919).

Failure to conduct title examination.

- When purchaser was under constructive notice as to the legal description of the purchaser's own deed, which incorporated the recorded plat by reference, and as to the ownership of the lot the purchaser believed the purchaser was buying but that was owned by another, the purchaser's failure to conduct a title examination was the sole proximate cause of injuries and the purchaser's negligence action was barred. Reidling v. Holcomb, 225 Ga. App. 229, 483 S.E.2d 624 (1997).

"Same vendor" construed.

- Words "same vendor" cannot be construed to mean the heir of the vendor. Webb v. John Doe, 33 Ga. 565 (1863); Dodge v. Briggs, 27 F. 160 (S.D. Ga. 1886).

It is sufficient if the second deed is made by the vendor's representative, either during the vendor's lifetime or after the vendor's death. Culbreath v. Martin, 129 Ga. 280, 58 S.E. 832 (1907).

One getting title, and legal obligation to pay, is bona fide purchaser.

- To be a bona fide purchaser in the full sense, one must pay the purchase money, or at least become legally bound to do so, and get title before getting notice of the rights of third persons. Gleaton v. Wright, 149 Ga. 220, 100 S.E. 72 (1919).

Presumption of good faith attaches to one who is a purchaser for value, which remains until overcome by proof. Patellis v. Tanner, 199 Ga. 304, 34 S.E.2d 84 (1945).

Lender was bona fide purchaser.

- Trial court erred in determining that a second wife acquired a one-half interest in property quitclaimed to her by her husband because the husband had only a life estate in the property, and she was not a bona fide purchaser. The parties' lender, however, was a bona fide purchaser for value pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 44-2-1,44-2-2, and44-2-4(b). Price v. Price, 286 Ga. 753, 692 S.E.2d 601 (2010).

Effect of unrecorded deed.

- Unrecorded deed of bargain and sale is postponed only to later bona fide purchasers for value without notice. Ivey v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 566 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1978).

Penalty of failure to record a deed of bargain and sale has reference only to the rights of a subsequent vendee, taking a deed from the same vendor without notice of the existence of the prior unrecorded deed. Caldwell v. Northwest Atlanta Bank, 194 Ga. 370, 21 S.E.2d 619 (1942).

Statute is exclusive and is intended to describe the one situation recognized by law in which a deed of bargain and sale loses its priority, namely, a subsequent recorded deed from the same vendor, taken without notice of the existence of the first. Thus, this statute places an unrecorded deed of bargain and sale ahead of all other assertions of priority except a contract conveyance or a lien recorded before the first deed. Manchester Motors, Inc. v. F & M Bank, 91 Ga. App. 811, 87 S.E.2d 342 (1955), for comment, see 18 Ga. B.J. 82 (1955) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-1).

Appellate court reversed the portion of the trial court's order ruling on a bank's motion for a declaratory judgment on its reformation counterclaim because another non-party held an interest in the real property in question via an unrecorded quit claim deed and that individual needed to be added as a party. Salas v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 334 Ga. App. 274, 779 S.E.2d 48 (2015).

Unrecorded deeds of bargain and sale are not postponed to subsequent judgment liens. Webb v. United-American Soda Fountain Co., 59 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1932).

Unrecorded deed valid between original parties.

- Grantee in a security deed is under no duty to the grantor to have the deed recorded. Such a deed, as between the original parties, is valid irrespective of whether it is recorded or not. It is only as against third persons, acting in good faith without notice, that recording is required. Corbin v. Shadburn, 49 Ga. App. 91, 174 S.E. 259 (1934).

Effect of unrecorded sale deed in action for sale of timber.

- Purchaser at sale who fails to record the purchaser's sale deed, and leaves the grantor in possession, cannot maintain a suit for trespass, or a trover action for timber felled by the grantor and sold to an innocent purchaser who has no notice of the sale of the land or of the landlord/tenant relationship between the purchaser and the grantor. Beavers v. Reynolds Bros. Lumber Co., 68 Ga. App. 858, 24 S.E.2d 813 (1943).

Issue of fact as to inquiry notice.

- Trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the plaintiff because the record showed that there was an issue of fact as to whether the defendants' possession of the property put the plaintiff on inquiry notice of the defendants' title despite the defendants' deed not being recorded. Caraway v. Spillers, 332 Ga. App. 588, 774 S.E.2d 162 (2015).

Priority of unrecorded deed under Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act.

- Judgment voiding a transfer of property as fraudulent under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA) (now Uniform Voidable Transactions Act), O.C.G.A. § 18-2-70 et seq., was reversed because, despite not being recorded, the 2002 security deed executed in favor of a former sister-in-law, pledging the property as collateral for a promissory note, gave the former sister-in-law, as one of the defendant's creditors, priority over the plaintiff's judgment, such that the property could not be characterized as the defendant's asset under the UFTA. Wallin v. Wallin, 341 Ga. App. 440, 800 S.E.2d 617 (2017).

Power of attorney need not be recorded with deed.

- Power of attorney, under which a deed is made, is a muniment of title, and may be recorded along with the deed, but its record is not necessary to the validity of the record of the deed. Johnson v. Johnson, 184 Ga. 783, 193 S.E. 345 (1937).

Record of deed affords constructive notice of power's execution.

- Since the record of a power of attorney merely affords proof of the validity of a deed executed thereunder, as distinguished from the validity itself, the record of a deed executed under a power of attorney affords constructive notice of its execution, even though the power of attorney substantiating its validity is not recorded with the deed. Johnson v. Johnson, 184 Ga. 783, 193 S.E. 345 (1937).

Conditional bills of sale must be recorded within 30 days of their date.

- Registration and record of conditional bills of sale shall be governed in all respects by the laws relating to the registration of mortgages on personal property, except that they must be recorded within 30 days from their date, and in this respect the instruments differ from mortgages, deeds, and bills of sale to secure debt, since these latter instruments date only from the time the instruments are filed for record as to innocent purchasers without notice thereof. Scoggins v. General Fin. & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 847, 57 S.E.2d 686 (1950) (decided under former Code 1933, § 67-1403, prior to enactment of Title 11).

When not recorded within time allowed, subsequent valid liens superior to seller's rights.

- When a conditional bill of sale or retention title contract is executed in another state on property afterward brought into this state, and this instrument is not recorded in the county of the buyer's residence within the time allowed, bona fide valid liens subsequently created against the property by the buyer would be superior to the rights of the seller, there being no question of actual knowledge of the rights of the seller under the conditional sale contract, or any fraud. Allen v. Dickey, 54 Ga. App. 451, 188 S.E. 273 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 67-1403, prior to enactment of Title 11).

Bill of sale to personalty to secure debt stands on same footing as realty deed to secure debt. Carrollton Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Allen, 93 Ga. App. 150, 91 S.E.2d 93 (1955).

Effect of failure to record bill.

- Effect of failure to record deeds and bills of sale to secure debt shall be the same as the effect of failure to record a deed of bargain and sale. Commercial Bank v. Pharr, 75 Ga. App. 364, 43 S.E.2d 439 (1947).

Failure to record a bill of sale to secure debt has the same result as a failure to record a security deed or a deed of bargain and sale. Williams v. General Fin. Corp., 98 Ga. App. 31, 104 S.E.2d 649 (1958).

Recording of bill serves as constructive notice.

- When bills of sale to secure debt have been recorded in the county of the residence of the maker thereof, the registration serves as constructive notice from the date the bills of sale are filed for record. General Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Bank of Wrightsville, 92 Ga. App. 808, 90 S.E.2d 93 (1955).

Assignee's rights against holder of junior bill of sale.

- Since the undisputed evidence showed that the defendants owed a certain sum on a note and bill of sale to secure debt on certain personalty, the transferee for value of these instruments was entitled to claim the property to the extent of the amount due, as against the holder of notes secured by a junior bill of sale to the same property which was executed subsequent to the first instruments but prior to the assignment thereof. Adel Banking Co. v. Parrish, 84 Ga. App. 329, 66 S.E.2d 150 (1951).

Effect of lien on unrecorded bill of sale.

- Unrecorded bill of sale is uniformly superior to any lien arising by operation of law as is the case with any mechanic's lien. Manchester Motors, Inc. v. F & M Bank, 91 Ga. App. 811, 87 S.E.2d 342 (1955), for comment, see 18 Ga. B.J. 82 (1955).

Instruments effective against third parties only from date filed for record.

- Deeds, mortgages, and liens take effect against third parties acting in good faith and without notice only from the time those documents are filed for record. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 120.

Constructive delivery of a warranty deed may be effected by delivery to an escrow agent within 120 days after the execution of the sales contract provided all of the following elements are present: (1) the escrow agent must be the agent of both the seller and the buyer, not just that of the seller; (2) the seller must release all control over the warranty deed when the seller delivers the deed to the escrow agent; (3) the escrow agent must be instructed to deliver the warranty deed to the buyer on the happening of a specific future event involving monetary consideration; (4) the escrow agent must be able to enforce the covenants and warranties found in former Code 1933, § 29-301 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60) on behalf of the buyer; and (5) the real estate transaction must be properly recorded to put the world on notice of the buyer's equitable interest in the realty. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-17 (rendered prior to revision of Chapter 3, Article 1 of this Title).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds, § 270. 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Records and Recording Laws, § 46.

C.J.S.

- 26A C.J.S., Deeds, §§ 159, 160. 76 C.J.S., Records, §§ 6, 7.

ALR.

- Priority where senior instrument affecting real property is recorded after execution but before recording of junior instrument, 32 A.L.R. 344.

Neglect or fault of recording or filing officer as affecting consequences of failure properly to record or file instrument affecting property, 70 A.L.R. 595.

Recording laws as applied to assignments of mortgages on real estate, 89 A.L.R. 171; 104 A.L.R. 1301.

Presumption and burden of proof as regards good faith and consideration on part of purchaser or one taking encumbrance subsequent to unrecorded conveyance or encumbrance, 107 A.L.R. 502.

Recording laws as applied to power of attorney under which deed or mortgage is executed, 114 A.L.R. 660.

Federal government or agencies of federal government as subject to payment of tax or fee imposed upon, or for, recording or filing instrument, 124 A.L.R. 1267.

Delivery of a deed without manual transfer or record, 129 A.L.R. 11; 87 A.L.R.2d 787.

Rule which makes priority of title depend upon priority of record as applied to record of later instrument in second chain title which antedates record of original instrument in first chain record of which, however, antedated record of original instrument in second chain, 133 A.L.R. 886.

Priority between devisee under devise pursuant to testator's agreement and third person claiming under or through testator's unrecorded deed, 7 A.L.R.2d 544.

Sufficiency of delivery of deed where grantor retains, or recovers, physical possession, 87 A.L.R.2d 787.