O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 16-10-33 (2019)

Removal or attempted removal of weapon from public official; punishment

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) For the purposes of this Code section, the term ‘‘firearm’’ shall include stun guns and tasers. A stun gun or taser is any device that is powered by electrical charging units such as batteries and emits an electrical charge in excess of 20,000 volts or is otherwise capable of incapacitating a person by an electrical charge.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to remove or attempt to remove a firearm, chemical spray, or baton from the possession of another person if:

(1) The other person is lawfully acting within the course and scope of employment; and

(2) The person has knowledge or reason to know that the other person is employed as:

(A) A peace officer as defined in paragraph (8) of Code Section 35-8-2;

(B) An employee with the power of arrest by the Department of Corrections;

(C) An employee with the power of arrest by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles;

(D) A community supervision officer or other employee with the power of arrest by the Department of Community Supervision;

(E) A jail officer or guard by a county or municipality and has the responsibility of supervising inmates who are confined in a county or municipal jail or other detention facility; or

(F) A juvenile correctional officer by the Department of Juvenile Justice and has the primary responsibility for the supervision and control of youth confined in such department’s programs and facilities.

(c) Any person who violates subsection (b) of this Code section shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both.

(d) A violation of this Code section shall constitute a separate offense. A sentence imposed under this Code section may be imposed separately from and consecutive to or concurrent with a sentence for any other offense related to the act or acts establishing the offense under this Code section.

History

(Code 1981, § 16-10-33, enacted by Ga. L. 2000, p. 1267, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 4, § 16; Ga. L. 2011, p. 503, § 1/HB 123; Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 5-23/HB 310.)

Annotations

Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 2011, p. 503, § 2/HB 123, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that the amendment to this Code section shall apply to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2011. Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 6-1/HB 310, not

codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that this Act shall apply to sentences entered on or after July 1, 2015.

Law reviews. - For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 231 (2015).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Evidence sufficient to support conviction. - Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of attempting to remove a firearm from a police officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-33(a) (now subsection (b)) and obstruction of an officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b) because the defendant refused to comply with the officer’s demands that the defendant show the defendant’s hands, which

were hidden under a pillow and under a bed, and the defendant lunged at an officer, grabbing the barrel of the officer’s gun, and trying to take the gun away from the officer. The defendant also kicked and flailed at the officers, preventing the officers from handcuffing the defendant. Daniel v. State, 303 Ga. App. 1, 692 S.E.2d 682 (2010).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 7 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 2004–2025 · leading case: State v. Hammond, 723 S.E.2d 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
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State v. Hammond, 723 S.E.2d 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 2× “2 See OCGA § 16-10-33 (b). 3 See OCGA § 16-13-30 (a).”
Waller v. State, 600 S.E.2d 706 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 2× “, was charged in a nine-count indictment with aggravated assault, attempted removal of a weapon from a public official (OCGA§ 16-10-33), criminal attempt to commit arson, obstruction of an officer (three counts), and terroristic threats (three counts).”
McClary v. State, 663 S.E.2d 809 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “2 OCGA § 16-10-33 (a). 3 Vansant v. State, 264 Ga.”
Taylor v. State, 761 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 16-10-33 (b) (2) (A). OCGA § 16-5-90 (a) (1).”
Daniel v. State, 692 S.E.2d 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 4× “2 OCGA § 16-10-33 (a). 3 OCGA § 16-10-24 (b).”
Daniel W. Taylor v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 4× “9 Thereafter, on May 7, 2008, Taylor left multiple threatening voice mails for Norman in which he threatened to kill her.”
Venson v. Davis (N.D. Ga. 2025). “§ 16-10-33(b)(1). So Venson’s convictions preclude him from pursuing any claims against Davis that necessarily imply Davis was not acting lawfully within the scope of her employment and did not use excessive force at the time she shot him.”
— 16-10-33(b)(1) — 1 case
Venson v. Davis (N.D. Ga. 2025). “§ 16-10-33(b)(1). So Venson’s convictions preclude him from pursuing any claims against Davis that necessarily imply Davis was not acting lawfully within the scope of her employment and did not use excessive force at the time she shot him.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.