...defendant was armed with a knife). (b) Nevertheless, the State contends that Remy’s status as a convicted felon precluded the trial court’s finding of immunity. We disagree. This Court recently held that, when read together, OCGA §§ 16-3-21 and 16-11-1386 create the following rule of law: 6In addition to amending OCGA § 16-3-24.2 in 2014, the General Assembly enacted OCGA § 16-11-138, which provides that “[d]efense of self or  A person is justified in threatening or using force against another, or in engaging in conduct that is otherwise prohibited under Title 16, Chapter 11, Article 4,...

.... Johnson v. State, 308 Ga. __, __ (__ SE2d __) (2020) (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, “if [Remy’s] possession of a firearm at the time of the shooting was justified under the rule of law produced by the combination of OCGA §§ 16-3-21 and 16-11-138, then it cannot be said that [Remy] was ‘committing ....

...As for the circumstances that may justify the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon or felony first-offender probationer, Johnson points to the Safe Carry Protection Act of 2014, Ga. L. 2014, 5 p. 599, of which OCGA § 16-11-138 is a part.5 Code Section 16-11- 138 provides that “[d]efense of self or others, as contemplated by and provided for under [OCGA § 16-3-21], shall be an absolute defense to any violation under this part.” “This part” — refer...

...statutes prohibiting the unlawful possession and carrying of certain firearms in certain places and by certain persons, including OCGA § 16-11-131, which forbids convicted felons and felony first-offender probationers to possess firearms.6 Under OCGA § 16-11-138, 5 Prior to the enactment of the Safe Carry Protection Act, and in the absence of any statute specifically providing a justification defense for crimes involving the unlawful possession or carrying of firearms, this Court adopte...

...statutory, and common law alike — that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question.” May v. State, 295 Ga. 388, 391-392 (761 SE2d 38) (2014) (citations omitted). Read in its statutory context, the most natural and reasonable understanding of OCGA § 16-11-138 is the one that Johnson proposes. By its plain terms, OCGA § 16-11-138 affords “an absolute defense” to “any violation” of Title 16, Chapter 11, Article 4, Part 3. That “absolute defense” requires a showing of “[d]efense of self or others, as contemplated by and provided for under [OCGA §...

...It offers no defense at all for crimes that merely consist of possessing 8 or carrying a firearm. See Wells v. State, 200 Ga. App. 104, 107 (407 SE2d 86) (1991) (Andrews, J., concurring). Accordingly, if OCGA § 16-11-138 were understood to apply only when OCGA § 16-3-21 applies by its own terms, it would be entirely unnecessary (because OCGA § 16-3-21 would already afford a defense of justification), and it would also appear almost entirely useless (because nearly all of the prohibitions in Title 16, Chapter 11, Article 4, Part 3 concern the possession or carrying of weapons, not the use of such weapons). The only sensible understanding of OCGA § 16-11-138 is that it effectively amends OCGA § 16-3-21 (a) so as to potentially justify not only threats or uses of force in the circumstances described in OCGA § 16-3-21 (a), but also the possession or carrying of a weapon in violation of Title 16, Chapter 11, Article 4, Part 3. As we understand it, OCGA §§ 16-3-21 (a) and 16-11-138 in combination effectively provide this rule of law: A person is justified in threatening or using force against another, or in engaging in conduct that is otherwise prohibited under Title 16, Chapter 11, Article 4,...

...rd person against such other’s imminent use of unlawful force . . . .7 Here, if Johnson’s possession of a firearm at the time of the shooting was justified under the rule of law produced by the combination of OCGA §§ 16-3-21 and 16-11-138, then it cannot be said that Johnson was “committing ....

...a felony” when he shot Jordan, and the preclusive bar of OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (2) would not apply. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied the motion for immunity and granted the motion in limine upon the rationale that 7 Understood in this way, OCGA § 16-11-138 affords a justification defense for the otherwise unlawful possession or carrying of a firearm only “when and to the extent” that the accused reasonably believes that such possession or carrying is necessary to defend himself....

...a weapon that they carried or possessed in violation of Title 16, Chapter 11, Article 4, Part 3, even if they otherwise could show that the use of force was justified. But the Safe Carry Protection Act of 2014 amended OCGA § 16-3- 24.2 to remove this limitation (at the same time OCGA § 16-11-138 was added). See Ga. L. 2014, p. 599, § 1-3. 9 We express no opinion about the extent to which the limitations of OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) apply to a justification defense under OCGA § 16-11-138. 11  DECIDED FEBRUARY 28, 2020. Murder....

...But nothing in this opinion should be read to undermine existing law— which, we note, has changed since the trial in this case—governing the circumstances under which justification may be barred for those violating gun possession laws. See OCGA § 16-11-138 (“Defense of self or others . . . shall be an absolute defense to any violation under this part.”); Johnson v. State, 308 Ga. 141 (839 SE2d 521) (2020) (examining the effect of OCGA § 16-11-138 on OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (2)). 10 counsel performed reasonably, the defendant must show that “no reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did, or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not.” Id....

...We recognized in Johnson that, though justification is generally not available as a defense to someone who commits a crime while otherwise engaged in the commission of a felony, see OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (2), the interplay between OCGA §§ 16-3-21 (b) (2) and 16-11-138 creates the following rule of law: 10  A person is justified in threatening or using force against another, or in engaging in conduct that is otherwise prohibited under Title 16, Chapter 1...

...668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), for failing to understand the law governing a convicted felon’s statutory right to use a firearm in self-defense, which resulted in counsel’s failure “to ensure that the jury knew — either through an explicit instruction on OCGA § 16-11-138 or through clear argument — that [the appellant] had an absolute defense to felony murder predicated on felon-in-possession if the jury believed that the shooting was in self-defense.” Floyd, 318 Ga....

...State, 309 Ga. 76, 83 n.10 (844 SE2d 791) (2020). 15 criminalizing the carrying and possession of firearms in specified ways, including prohibiting the possession of firearms by a convicted felon. See OCGA § 16-11-131 (b). OCGA § 16-11-138 became effective in 2014, see Ga. L. 2014, p. 599, § 1-10,8 three years before the shooting and five years before the trial of this case. We have previously explained that OCGA § 16-11-138 “potentially justif[ies] not only threats or uses of force ....

...141, 145 (839 SE2d 521) (2020).9 Thus, under this statute, if the jury believed that Appellant was acting in self-defense when he shot Ortiz, the jury was required to acquit him of felony murder based on felon-in-possession. See generally State v. Remy, 308 Ga. 296, 300 (840 SE2d 385) (2020) (stating that under OCGA § 16-11-138, if defendant, who was 8 OCGA § 16-11-138 was amended in a non-substantive way in 2015. See Ga. L. 2015, p. 9, § 16. 9 Prior to the enactment of OCGA § 16-11-138, justification was not generally available as a defense for a convicted felon in possession of a gun, although our case law recognized an exception “where, upon a sudden emergency, one suddenly acquires actual possession of a pistol for the purpose of defending himself.” Copeland v....

...ncluded offense of malice murder, and the trial court so instructed the jury. Appellant’s sole defense was that he was acting in self-defense when he shot Ortiz.10 However, Appellant’s trial counsel did not request a jury instruction on OCGA § 16-11-138 and acknowledged during the motion for new trial hearing that he was unfamiliar with OCGA § 16-11-138 at the time of the trial.11 During closing arguments, trial counsel told the jury that 10 Although the trial court charged the jury on voluntary manslaughter, Appellant’s trial counsel relied solely on self-defense i...

...at 694. (a) Deficiency prong. As noted above, the record establishes that trial counsel’s lack of understanding of the law governing a convicted felon’s statutory right to use a firearm in self-defense underlies his failure to request a charge on OCGA § 16-11-138, his failure to argue that self-defense applied to felony murder based on felon-in-possession, and his agreement with the trial court’s response to the jury’s second question....

...a clear understanding about how to structure the argument in light of the trial court’s decision to instruct the jury on felony murder predicated on felon-in-possession; he also had no strategic reason for failing to request an instruction on OCGA § 16-11-138....

...And there is nothing in the record or our case law that would support the conclusion that under these particular circumstances, it could be a reasonable strategic decision to fail to ensure that the jury knew — either through an explicit instruction on OCGA § 16-11-138 or through clear argument — that Appellant had an absolute defense to felony murder predicated on felon-in-possession if the jury 22 believed that the shooting was in self-defense.13 See id.; Benham v. State, 277 Ga....

...ant acted in self-defense, the response utterly failed to inform the jury that Georgia statutory law provides an absolute defense to felony murder based on felon- in-possession if the jury believed that Appellant acted in self- defense. See OCGA § 16-11-138....

...State, 309 Ga. 400, 407 (845 SE2d 643) (2020) (failure to object to trial court’s legally correct response to jury question was not deficient performance). Accordingly, we conclude that trial counsel’s failure to request a charge on OCGA § 16-11-138, coupled with his failure to clearly explain that self-defense applied to felony murder based on felon-in- possession and his agreement with the trial court’s response to the jury’s second question, constitutes deficient performance. 26  (b) Prejudice prong....

...In addition, the jury note indicated that the jury was contemplating whether Appellant’s claim of self-defense could apply to the felon-in-possession charge and was confused about the subject. However, counsel’s deficiencies deprived the jury of understanding that OCGA § 16-11-138 provided an absolute defense to felony murder predicated on felon-in- possession if it believed that Appellant was acting in self-defense when he shot Ortiz....

...76, 83 n.10 (844 SE2d 791) (2020).16 Judgment reversed in part. All the Justices concur. LAGRUA, Justice, concurring. I agree with the majority opinion that our prior cases on ineffective assistance of counsel and felony murder require reversal here, so I concur. Under OCGA § 16-11-138, Appellant indeed had an absolute defense to felony murder predicated on possession of a 16 We express no opinion as to whether the State may reindict Appellant on these charges....

...141, 145 (839 SE2d 521) (2020); State v. Remy, 308 Ga. 296, 300 (840 SE2d 385) (2020). I write separately because the jury’s confusion over the interplay between self-defense and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is understandable. I question whether OCGA § 16-11-138 was intended to protect felons who intentionally arm themselves and then use those weapons in situations like this....

...A defendant is not justified in threatening or using force if he is attempting to commit a felony of aggravated assault or possession of firearm by a convicted felon. However, members of the jury, under Georgia self-defense laws under [OCGA §] 16-11-138, affords the justification defense for the otherwise unlawful possession or carrying of a firearm only and when to the extent the accused reasonably believes that such possession or carrying is necessary to defend himself....

...At the time of the shooting and also at the time of trial, if the jury concluded that Brundage was acting in self- defense when he shot Matthews, the jury was required to acquit him of felony murder, whether predicated on aggravated assault or on felon-in-possession. See OCGA § 16-11-138 (“Defense of self or others, as contemplated by and provided for under Article 2 of Chapter 3 of this title, shall be an absolute defense to any violation under this part.”); Floyd v. State, 318 Ga. 312, 318 (2) (898 SE2d 431) (2024) (“[U]nder [OCGA § 16-11-138], if the jury believed that 12 Appellant was acting in self-defense when he shot [the deceased], the jury was required to acquit him of felony murder based on felon- in-possession.”) (citing State v....

...rt, and case remanded. All the Justices concur. LAGRUA, Justice, concurring. I agree with the majority opinion that our prior cases on ineffective assistance of counsel and felony murder require reversal here, so I concur. Under OCGA § 16-11-138, Brundage indeed had an absolute defense to felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon if the jury believed that the shooting was in self-defense....

...State, 308 Ga. 296, 300 (3) (b) (840 SE2d 385) (2020). I write separately because, once again, while the jury’s confusion over the interplay between self-defense and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is understandable, I question whether OCGA § 16-11-138 was intended to protect felons who intentionally arm themselves and then use those weapons in situations like this. 27 I reiterate that, if that was not the General Assembly’s intent, the General Assembly should clarify the statute....

...Brown acknowledges that he did not object to the justification charge at his trial, but he asserts that the charge was plainly erroneous. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b). Our decision in Johnson was based upon our understanding of “the rule of law produced by the combination of OCGA §§ 16-3-21 and 16-11-138.” Johnson, 308 Ga. at 146. But Brown shot Tucker in February 2014, and the Safe Carry Protection Act of 2014 — of which OCGA § 16-11-138 was a part — did not become law until July 2014....