Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Code 1863, §§ 4227, 4228, former Code 1868, §§ 4264, 4265, former Code 1873, §§ 4330, 4331, former Code 1882, §§ 4330, 4331, former Penal Code 1895, §§ 70, 71, former Penal Code 1910, §§ 70, 71, and former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Conflict with other statutes and administrative rules.

- Neither the self-defense statute nor the arrest statute automatically prohibits the discharge of a firearm if the lives of innocent people may be in danger, and, where a mandatory prohibition against such an action in a police department work rule conflicted with these statutes, it was invalid, and could not form the basis for a police officer's suspension. Allen v. City of Atlanta, 235 Ga. App. 516, 510 S.E.2d 64 (1998).

Justification, if established, should always result in acquittal. Gordy v. State, 93 Ga. App. 743, 92 S.E.2d 737 (1956) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Justification is affirmative defense.

- In a wrongful death action, because justification is an affirmative defense, defendant bore the burden of proving actions met the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21. Bell v. Smith, 227 Ga. App. 17, 488 S.E.2d 91 (1997).

In an action in which the defendant was convicted of the murder of the defendant's parent's love interest, defense counsel failure to investigate the victim's violent nature was not ineffective; the jury was given considerable information concerning the victim's violent nature, that the victim had beaten the defendant's parent, and had consumed cocaine; even with further investigation, the outcome of the trial would not have changed; the jury rejected both the justification defense and the lesser charge because there was overwhelming evidence that the defendant committed malice murder. Cooper v. State, 279 Ga. 189, 612 S.E.2d 256 (2005).

State has burden to disprove defense.

- When a defendant presents evidence that defendant was justified in using deadly force, the burden is on the state to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Hall v. State, 235 Ga. App. 44, 508 S.E.2d 703 (1998).

Failure to consider student's affirmative defense of self-defense.

- Judgment upholding the decision of a local board of education (local board) expelling a student for fighting was reversed because the record fully supported that the student properly raised the issue of self-defense before the local board and that the board failed to apply the proper law and make the board's own findings of fact on the issue. Henry County Bd. of Educ. v. S. G., 301 Ga. 794, 804 S.E.2d 427 (2017).

Justifiable homicide is a substantive and affirmative defense and, if found well supported in fact, the accused is entitled to acquittal without reference to the evidence which apparently tends to convict the accused of the offense of murder or voluntary manslaughter. Fountain v. State, 207 Ga. 144, 60 S.E.2d 433 (1950), overruled on other grounds, Lavender v. State, 234 Ga. 608, 216 S.E.2d 855 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012) Farr v. State, 83 Ga. App. 855, 65 S.E.2d 270 (1951);(decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Controlling elements of self-defense.

- Controlling element of self-defense is protecting against impending danger which either actually or as it reasonably appears to slayer cannot be otherwise prevented than by death of assailant. Green v. State, 52 Ga. App. 290, 183 S.E. 204 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Two elements must be present before the use of deadly force is justified: (1) the danger to either the actor or a third person must be imminent; and (2) the actor must reasonably believe that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to self or a third person. Coley v. State, 201 Ga. App. 722, 411 S.E.2d 804 (1991).

Where witnesses testified that the victim of a stabbing started a fight with the juvenile defendant by "slamming" the defendant, this evidence did not demand a finding that the defendant acted solely in self-defense. In re T.T., 236 Ga. App. 46, 510 S.E.2d 901 (1999).

When sole defense is denial of killing, justifiable homicide in self-defense is not applicable. Stevens v. State, 8 Ga. App. 217, 68 S.E. 874 (1910) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, §§ 70, 71).

It is permissible to rely upon both defenses: that defendant did not kill, and that if defendant did kill, it was justifiable. Green v. State, 7 Ga. App. 803, 68 S.E. 318 (1910).

Admission to specific allegations not required.

- There is no requirement that a defendant has to admit to the specific allegations of violence in order to obtain the protection of O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a). State v. Yapo, 296 Ga. App. 158, 674 S.E.2d 44 (2009).

Defenses of self-defense and accident inconsistent.

- Defenses of self-defense and justification do not deny the intent to inflict injury, but claim authority for the act under the legal excuse of reasonable fear of immediate serious harm to oneself or another. Since an accident defense involves the lack of intent to do the act at all, the two defenses are inconsistent. Fields v. State, 167 Ga. App. 816, 307 S.E.2d 712 (1983).

Defenses of self-defense and accident are inconsistent. Wilkerson v. State, 183 Ga. App. 26, 357 S.E.2d 814 (1987).

Instructions on accident and justification authorized.

- Where there is evidence of both justification and accident, and timely requests for instructions on both topics have been made, the trial court should instruct the jury as to both. Koritta v. State, 263 Ga. 703, 438 S.E.2d 68 (1994).

Prevention or defense against impending or progressing wrong must enter into all cases of justifiable homicide. Lakeland v. State, 53 Ga. App. 345, 185 S.E. 583 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

One is justified in slaying an antagonist to avoid a felony being committed on that one. Ellison v. State, 50 Ga. App. 58, 176 S.E. 885 (1934) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Use of deadly force not justified.

- Evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not justifiably use deadly force to protect self from the victim's assault. Brown v. State, 242 Ga. App. 106, 528 S.E.2d 868 (2000).

Mental anguish not justification for killing.

- Mental anguish does not constitute "great bodily harm"; therefore, its alleged infliction does not justify killing the inflictor. Chancellor v. State, 165 Ga. App. 365, 301 S.E.2d 294 (1983) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, §§ 70, 71).

Law, in cases of homicide, does not take into account actual fears of slayer, but considers all circumstances, with reference to determination as to whether the circumstances were sufficient to excite fears of a reasonable person. Daniels v. State, 248 Ga. 591, 285 S.E.2d 516 (1981).

Apprehensions or opinions of third parties that accused is in imminent danger are not relevant. But facts from which apprehension might reasonably be inferred, as distinct from opinion, are relevant when stated or shown by third parties. Melear v. State, 159 Ga. App. 574, 284 S.E.2d 79 (1981).

On a trial for murder, as to the defendant's theory of self-defense, apprehensions or opinions of third parties that the accused is in imminent danger are not relevant. But facts from which apprehension might reasonably be inferred, as distinct from opinions, are relevant when stated or shown by third parties. Lancaster v. State, 250 Ga. 871, 301 S.E.2d 882 (1983).

Means of inflicting threatened injury must apparently be at hand to warrant reasonable fear which may justify homicide. Lee v. State, 42 Ga. App. 360, 156 S.E. 296 (1930) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, §§ 70, 71).

Victim's threats may be communicated by third persons.

- Victim's prior threats need not be directly related to the defendant but may be communicated via third persons from the deceased to defendant. McDonald v. State, 182 Ga. App. 509, 356 S.E.2d 264 (1987).

Previous attack not relevant to justification defense.

- Evidence of a previous attack upon defendant by a third party which occurred two years before the crime on trial was not relevant to defendant's justification defense. Lara v. State, 216 Ga. App. 117, 453 S.E.2d 137 (1995).

Previous attack upon defendant is relevant to reasonableness of belief.

- Evidence that defendant was previously attacked with a knife and received scars to defendant's chest is relevant to whether defendant reasonably and honestly believed that deadly force was "necessary" to prevent death or great bodily injury to self. Daniels v. State, 248 Ga. 591, 285 S.E.2d 516 (1981).

Prior acts of violence admissible to corroborate justification defense.

- If the defendant's res gestae evidence establishes a prima facie justification defense, evidence of the victim's prior acts of violence against the accused, or against third parties, may be relevant to corroborate the defendant's contention that defendant did not act with the requisite criminal intent. Johnson v. State, 270 Ga. 234, 507 S.E.2d 737 (1998).

Lapse of time between prior occurrences and homicide.

- Lapse of time between prior occurrences and homicide go to weight and credit to be accorded testimony by jury and not to its admissibility. In cases of doubt, the testimony should be admitted. Daniels v. State, 248 Ga. 591, 285 S.E.2d 516 (1981).

Distinction between voluntary manslaughter and justifiable homicide.

- In voluntary manslaughter, killing is done solely because of passion or anger created in defendant by attempt on part of deceased to commit a serious injury upon defendant; whereas, justifiable homicide occurs when defendant kills because defendant reasonably believes such force is necessary to prevent great bodily injury. Williams v. State, 126 Ga. App. 454, 191 S.E.2d 100 (1972).

Double jeopardy did not bar retrial.

- Defendant's acquittal on malice murder charges under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c) did not bar retrial on a voluntary manslaughter charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a) as the collateral estoppel doctrine under the Double Jeopardy Clause, U.S. Const., amend. V, and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII, did not apply because the acquittal did not necessarily mean that the defendant acted in self-defense under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a); if the jury did not find that the defendant acted with either express or implied malice, the jury had to acquit the defendant of malice murder. Roesser v. State, 316 Ga. App. 850, 730 S.E.2d 641 (2012).

Unlawfulness, in sense of absence of excuse or justification, is essential element of murder and voluntary manslaughter. Tennon v. Ricketts, 642 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1981).

Absence of self-defense is an essential element of crime of voluntary manslaughter, and where trial court's charge operated to place burden of persuasion on defendant on this issue, defendant's conviction violates defendant's due process rights under the United States Constitution. Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028, 101 S. Ct. 3019, 69 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1981).

Lawfulness is proved by establishing self-defense. Tennon v. Ricketts, 642 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1981).

In prosecution for voluntary manslaughter state bears burden of persuasion in negating presence of self-defense. Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028, 101 S. Ct. 3019, 69 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1981).

Trial court's charge in homicide case shifting burden of persuasion to defendant on issue of self-defense in violation of due process clause of U.S. Const., amend. 14 is not harmless error. Tennon v. Ricketts, 642 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1981).

Mistake of fact and self-defense inconsistent.

- Inasmuch as the appellant's defense was based on justification and self-defense, and inasmuch as the trial court gave a full jury charge with respect thereto, the appellant was not entitled to a charge on mistake of fact under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-5. Pullin v. State, 257 Ga. 815, 364 S.E.2d 848 (1988).

Conduct of lawful abortion not "imminent use of unlawful force."

- To constitute justification under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21, the defendant must be acting in response to another's "imminent use of unlawful force." A lawful abortion conducted in compliance with O.C.G.A. § 16-12-141 would not constitute "imminent use of unlawful force". Hoover v. State, 198 Ga. App. 481, 402 S.E.2d 92 (1991).

Ruling on self-defense claim before trial.

- Upon the filing of a motion for immunity, a trial court must determine before trial whether a person is immune from prosecution; thus, the trial court did not err in ruling on the defendant's self-defense claim before trial. State v. Sutton, 297 Ga. 222, 773 S.E.2d 222 (2015).

Jury selection.

- Defendant's counsel was properly limited to questioning prospective jurors about whether they knew anyone who had acted in self-defense but not in asking them anything further, as that limit properly omitted jurors' personal beliefs on the defense while still allowing the necessary questioning as to their degree of fairness and impartiality, in defendant's trial for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Stewart v. State, 262 Ga. App. 426, 585 S.E.2d 622 (2003).

Cited in Head v. State, 168 Ga. 843, 149 S.E. 145 (1929); Johnson v. State, 122 Ga. App. 542, 178 S.E.2d 42 (1970); Tate v. State, 123 Ga. App. 18, 179 S.E.2d 307 (1970); Witt v. State, 124 Ga. App. 535, 184 S.E.2d 517 (1971); Butts v. State, 126 Ga. App. 512, 191 S.E.2d 329 (1972); Chambers v. State, 127 Ga. App. 196, 192 S.E.2d 916 (1972); Hewitt v. State, 127 Ga. App. 180, 193 S.E.2d 47 (1972); Harper v. State, 127 Ga. App. 359, 193 S.E.2d 259 (1972); Highland v. State, 127 Ga. App. 518, 194 S.E.2d 332 (1972); Towns v. State, 127 Ga. App. 751, 195 S.E.2d 235 (1972); Walters v. State, 128 Ga. App. 232, 196 S.E.2d 326 (1973); Howard v. State, 128 Ga. App. 807, 198 S.E.2d 334 (1973); White v. State, 129 Ga. App. 353, 199 S.E.2d 624 (1973); Nolan v. State, 129 Ga. App. 653, 200 S.E.2d 474 (1973); Ford v. State, 232 Ga. 511, 207 S.E.2d 494 (1974); Wilson v. State, 233 Ga. 479, 211 S.E.2d 757 (1975); Barker v. State, 233 Ga. 781, 213 S.E.2d 624 (1975); Stewart v. State, 234 Ga. 3, 214 S.E.2d 509 (1975); Mitchell v. State, 134 Ga. App. 376, 214 S.E.2d 593 (1975); Parham v. State, 135 Ga. App. 315, 217 S.E.2d 493 (1975); Hale v. State, 135 Ga. App. 625, 218 S.E.2d 643 (1975); Smith v. State, 235 Ga. 327, 219 S.E.2d 440 (1975); Franklin v. State, 136 Ga. App. 47, 220 S.E.2d 60 (1975); Henderson v. State, 136 Ga. App. 490, 221 S.E.2d 633 (1975); Mathis v. State, 136 Ga. App. 701, 222 S.E.2d 647 (1975); Holloway v. State, 137 Ga. App. 124, 222 S.E.2d 898 (1975); Mason v. State, 236 Ga. 46, 222 S.E.2d 339 (1976); Graham v. State, 236 Ga. 378, 223 S.E.2d 803 (1976); Kessel v. State, 236 Ga. 373, 223 S.E.2d 811 (1976); Stovall v. State, 236 Ga. 840, 225 S.E.2d 292 (1976); Adams v. State, 138 Ga. App. 242, 225 S.E.2d 699 (1976); Colson v. State, 138 Ga. App. 366, 226 S.E.2d 154 (1976); Harris v. State, 138 Ga. App. 461, 226 S.E.2d 301 (1976); Harrison v. State, 138 Ga. App. 419, 226 S.E.2d 480 (1976); Copeland v. State, 139 Ga. App. 55, 227 S.E.2d 850 (1976); King v. State, 238 Ga. 240, 232 S.E.2d 236 (1977); Jackson v. State, 239 Ga. 40, 235 S.E.2d 477 (1977); Johnson v. State, 142 Ga. App. 526, 236 S.E.2d 493 (1977); Veasley v. State, 142 Ga. App. 863, 237 S.E.2d 464 (1977); Aguilar v. State, 240 Ga. 830, 242 S.E.2d 620 (1978); Dasher v. State, 146 Ga. App. 118, 245 S.E.2d 476 (1978); Pullen v. State, 146 Ga. App. 665, 247 S.E.2d 128 (1978); Griffin v. State, 242 Ga. 51, 247 S.E.2d 853 (1978); Upshaw v. State, 147 Ga. App. 57, 248 S.E.2d 17 (1978); Mason v. State, 147 Ga. App. 179, 248 S.E.2d 302 (1978); Riner v. State, 147 Ga. App. 707, 250 S.E.2d 161 (1978); Nordmann v. International Follies, Inc., 147 Ga. App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 794 (1978); Tabb v. State, 148 Ga. App. 13, 251 S.E.2d 16 (1978); Lanham v. State, 243 Ga. 576, 255 S.E.2d 52 (1979); Simpkins v. State, 149 Ga. App. 763, 256 S.E.2d 63 (1979); P.D. v. State, 151 Ga. App. 662, 261 S.E.2d 413 (1979); Boling v. State, 244 Ga. 825, 262 S.E.2d 123 (1979); Jarrard v. State, 152 Ga. App. 553, 263 S.E.2d 444 (1979); Lemley v. State, 245 Ga. 350, 264 S.E.2d 881 (1980); Keller v. State, 245 Ga. 522, 265 S.E.2d 813 (1980); Davis v. State, 153 Ga. App. 528, 265 S.E.2d 857 (1980); Walston v. State, 245 Ga. 572, 266 S.E.2d 185 (1980); Bagley v. State, 153 Ga. App. 777, 266 S.E.2d 804 (1980); Powell v. State, 154 Ga. App. 568, 269 S.E.2d 70 (1980); Jones v. State, 154 Ga. App. 806, 270 S.E.2d 201 (1980); Townsend v. State, 155 Ga. App. 422, 271 S.E.2d 7 (1980); Lastinger v. State, 155 Ga. App. 707, 272 S.E.2d 571 (1980); Hill v. State, 156 Ga. App. 518, 275 S.E.2d 104 (1980); Stevens v. State, 247 Ga. 698, 278 S.E.2d 398 (1981); Booker v. State, 157 Ga. App. 872, 278 S.E.2d 745 (1981); Daniels v. State, 158 Ga. App. 476, 282 S.E.2d 118 (1981); Mullis v. State, 248 Ga. 338, 282 S.E.2d 334 (1981); Webb v. State, 159 Ga. App. 403, 283 S.E.2d 636 (1981); Lett v. State, 160 Ga. App. 476, 287 S.E.2d 384 (1981); Cooper v. State, 249 Ga. 58, 287 S.E.2d 212 (1982); Sawyer v. State, 161 Ga. App. 479, 288 S.E.2d 108 (1982); Coppola v. State, 161 Ga. App. 517, 288 S.E.2d 744 (1982); Hanlon v. State, 162 Ga. App. 46, 290 S.E.2d 285 (1982); Whatley v. State, 163 Ga. App. 106, 290 S.E.2d 316 (1982); Roland v. State, 161 Ga. App. 197, 291 S.E.2d 41 (1982); Miller v. State, 162 Ga. App. 759, 292 S.E.2d 481 (1982); Respres v. State, 249 Ga. 731, 293 S.E.2d 319 (1982); Allen v. State, 249 Ga. 779, 294 S.E.2d 491 (1982); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. 822, 295 S.E.2d 293 (1982); Talley v. State, 164 Ga. App. 150, 296 S.E.2d 173 (1982); Millwood v. State, 164 Ga. App. 699, 296 S.E.2d 239 (1982); Walker v. State, 250 Ga. 230, 297 S.E.2d 33 (1982); Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 288, 298 S.E.2d 10 (1982); Payment v. State, 164 Ga. App. 841, 298 S.E.2d 298 (1982); Yeargin v. State, 164 Ga. App. 835, 298 S.E.2d 606 (1982); Hunter v. State, 167 Ga. App. 349, 306 S.E.2d 408 (1983); McNeil v. Parker, 169 Ga. App. 756, 315 S.E.2d 270 (1984); Syms v. State, 175 Ga. App. 179, 332 S.E.2d 689 (1985); White v. State, 179 Ga. App. 276, 346 S.E.2d 91 (1986); Hambrick v. State, 256 Ga. 688, 353 S.E.2d 177 (1987); Mitchell v. State, 187 Ga. App. 40, 369 S.E.2d 487 (1988); Young v. State, 188 Ga. App. 601, 373 S.E.2d 837 (1988); Thomas v. State, 189 Ga. App. 774, 377 S.E.2d 539 (1989); Nobles v. State, 191 Ga. App. 594, 382 S.E.2d 637 (1989); McWhorter v. State, 198 Ga. App. 493, 402 S.E.2d 60 (1991); Shackleford v. State, 198 Ga. App. 768, 403 S.E.2d 74 (1991); McKissic v. State, 201 Ga. App. 525, 411 S.E.2d 516 (1991); Dye v. State, 202 Ga. App. 31, 413 S.E.2d 500 (1991); Campbell v. State, 207 Ga. App. 902, 429 S.E.2d 538 (1993); Pardue v. State, 214 Ga. App. 690, 448 S.E.2d 768 (1994); Cox v. State, 216 Ga. App. 86, 453 S.E.2d 471 (1995); Selman v. State, 267 Ga. 198, 475 S.E.2d 892 (1996); McCracken v. State, 224 Ga. App. 356, 480 S.E.2d 361 (1997); Crawford v. State, 267 Ga. 543, 480 S.E.2d 573 (1997); Young v. State, 229 Ga. App. 497, 494 S.E.2d 226 (1997); Nguyen v. State, 234 Ga. App. 185, 505 S.E.2d 846 (1998); Hodo v. State, 272 Ga. 272, 528 S.E.2d 250 (2000); Etheridge v. State, 249 Ga. App. 111, 547 S.E.2d 744 (2001); Smith v. State, 249 Ga. App. 736, 550 S.E.2d 106 (2001); Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 554 S.E.2d 458 (2001); Daniley v. State, 274 Ga. 474, 554 S.E.2d 483 (2001); Price v. State, 280 Ga. 193, 625 S.E.2d 397 (2006); Dukes v. State, 285 Ga. App. 172, 645 S.E.2d 664 (2007); McClendon v. State, 287 Ga. App. 238, 651 S.E.2d 165 (2007); Branton v. State, 292 Ga. App. 104, 663 S.E.2d 414 (2008); State v. Burks, 285 Ga. 781, 684 S.E.2d 269 (2009); Hipp v. State, 293 Ga. 415, 746 S.E.2d 95 (2013); Fleming v. State, 324 Ga. App. 481, 749 S.E.2d 54 (2013).

Fear justifying homicide refers to fear of reasonable man.

- In cases of homicide, the law does not consider actual fears of slayer, but considers all circumstances with reference to determination as to whether they were sufficient to excite fears of a reasonable person. Bivins v. State, 200 Ga. 729, 38 S.E.2d 273 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Standard of reasonable fear determined by jurors' observations, common knowledge and experience.

- Standard of a reasonable man, as related to defense of reasonable fears in trial for murder, is one which jury must determine from their own observation and their common knowledge and experience. Fudge v. State, 190 Ga. 340, 9 S.E.2d 259 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012.

To establish plea of self-defense, defendant must show that circumstances were such as to excite fears of a reasonable man that his life was in danger; a mere unreasonable apprehension or suspicion of harm being insufficient. Young v. State, 160 Ga. App. 51, 286 S.E.2d 54 (1981).

Homicide justified where caused by victim's threats inducing reasonable fear.

- If threats and menaces of the victim were found by the jury to be sufficient to arouse, in a reasonable man, fears for his life or great bodily injury and that he acted from such fears, they would be authorized to find the homicide was justified as self-defense. Facison v. State, 152 Ga. App. 645, 263 S.E.2d 523 (1979).

Force likely to cause death may be justified where it appears necessary to repel assault.

- One who is assaulted by another need no longer stop and determine whether assault constitutes attempt to commit felony upon him or a mere misdemeanor upon him but may use such force in defense of his person as seems to him to be necessary even though such force may be intended to, or likely will, cause death or great bodily harm to the other. Henderson v. State, 227 Ga. 68, 179 S.E.2d 76 (1970).

Fears causing use of force must be those of a reasonable man, and not just defendant's fears based on prior experiences. Moore v. State, 228 Ga. 662, 187 S.E.2d 277 (1972).

Doctrine of reasonable fears inapplicable when danger apprehended not urgent and pressing actually or apparently at time of homicide. Jackson v. State, 91 Ga. 271, 18 S.E. 298, 44 Am. St. R. 22 (1893) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, §§ 70, 71); Williams v. State, 120 Ga. 870, 48 S.E. 368 (1904) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, §§ 70, 71); Ellison v. State, 137 Ga. 193, 73 S.E. 255 (1911) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, §§ 70, 71); Short v. State, 140 Ga. 780, 80 S.E. 8 (1913) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, §§ 70, 71); Elrod v. State, 27 Ga. App. 265, 108 S.E. 67 (1921) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, §§ 70, 71); Martin v. State, 36 Ga. App. 288, 136 S.E. 324 (1927) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, §§ 70, 71).

Fear in reasonable man justifying deadly force is jury question.

- Applicable standard under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21 is whether circumstances of case are such that the circumstances would excite fears of a reasonable man, and whether the circumstances did so to the point that it would have been necessary to use deadly force, is a question for the jury. Anderson v. State, 245 Ga. 619, 266 S.E.2d 221 (1980); Darden v. State, 271 Ga. 449, 519 S.E.2d 921 (1999).

Sufficiency of an alleged provocation by the victim and the questions of reasonableness of fears and "cooling time" are the jury's to determine. Hagans v. State, 187 Ga. App. 216, 369 S.E.2d 536 (1988).

Whether the circumstances are such to justify the defendant's response is a question for the jury. McMichael v. State, 194 Ga. App. 225, 390 S.E.2d 120 (1990); Nolley v. State, 240 Ga. App. 382, 523 S.E.2d 579 (1999).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the jury was not required to believe that the defendant acted in defense of the defendant's parent when the defendant picked up a cinder block and threw it at the victim; it is for the jury to decide whether the defendant reasonably believed that the use of deadly force was necessary to defend the defendant's parent from the victim. Smith v. State, 261 Ga. App. 781, 584 S.E.2d 29 (2003).

Unreasonable or delusory fear.

- Unreasonable or delusory fear, while not that of a reasonable man and therefore not sufficient to constitute justification, may negative idea of malicious and intentional wrongdoing. Perry v. State, 104 Ga. App. 383, 121 S.E.2d 692 (1961) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Offense of shooting at another may be committed by defendant who is acting under fears, although they are not fears of a reasonable man, and an unreasonable or delusory fear, while not that of a reasonable man and therefore not sufficient to constitute justification, may negative idea of malicious and intentional wrongdoing. Saylor v. State, 93 Ga. App. 895, 93 S.E.2d 196 (1956) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Psychologist's opinion irrelevant.

- State's motion in limine seeking to exclude the testimony of a defendant's psychologist was properly granted as the defendant claimed that the defendant shot the victim in self-defense; the defendant's psychological state was irrelevant. Lott v. State, 281 Ga. App. 373, 636 S.E.2d 102 (2006).

Evidence of victim's prior child molestation against defendant not admitted.

- In a defendant's trial for aggravated battery against a victim more than 65 years of age in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) and (d), evidence that the victim had fondled the defendant's genitals when the defendant was 15 was not admissible under O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2 to support the defendant's claim of justification under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21. Strozier v. State, 300 Ga. App. 199, 685 S.E.2d 743 (2009).

Mutual combat situation contemplated by section.

- Designed to simplify and give order to previously disparate points of law, former Code 1933, § 26-902 contemplates situation of mutual combat where the defendant reasonably believes that use of deadly force to prevent death or great bodily harm to self or a third person, is necessary. Trask v. State, 132 Ga. App. 645, 208 S.E.2d 591 (1974) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21).

What constitutes mutual combat.

- Mutual combat appears sufficiently where it is shown that there was a mutual intent to fight, and one or more blows were struck. Bailey v. State, 148 Ga. 401, 96 S.E. 862 (1918) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, §§ 70, 71).

Mutual combat exists where there is a fight and both parties are willing to fight. Slocumb v. State, 157 Ga. 131, 121 S.E. 116 (1923) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, §§ 70, 71).

Mutual combat exists where there is a fight with dangerous or deadly weapons, and when both parties are at fault and are willing to fight because of a sudden quarrel. Langford v. State, 212 Ga. 364, 93 S.E.2d 1 (1956) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

In order for mutual combat to exist in murder case, there must be mutual intent to fight on part of both parties. It is not necessary that mutual blows be exchanged, nor is it material who strikes the first blow or fires the first shot, nor is it necessary that both parties strike blows or fire shots. This intent, like any other intent, may be manifested by acts and conduct of parties and circumstances surrounding them at time of combat, as well as circumstances leading up to and culminating in such combat. Question of intent is peculiarly for the jury. Norris v. State, 93 Ga. App. 641, 92 S.E.2d 537 (1956) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Mutual combat is a mutual fight following mutual intention to fight with felonious purpose. Warnack v. State, 3 Ga. App. 590, 60 S.E. 288 (1908), later appeal, 5 Ga. App. 816, 63 S.E. 935 (1909) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, §§ 70, 71).

An essential element of mutual combat is that both parties intend to engage in fight. Roberts v. State, 189 Ga. 36, 5 S.E.2d 340 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Mutual combat requires willingness, readiness, and intent of both parties to fight.

- Essential ingredient, mutual intent, in order to constitute mutual combat, must be a willingness, a readiness, and intention upon part of both parties to fight. Reluctance, or fighting to repel unprovoked attack is self-defense and is authorized by the law, and should not be confused with mutual combat. Langford v. State, 212 Ga. 364, 93 S.E.2d 1 (1956) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Mutual combat requires intent to fight, but not that any blows actually be struck. Roberts v. State, 189 Ga. 36, 5 S.E.2d 340 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Mutual blows are not always necessary to make mutual combat. Tate v. State, 46 Ga. 148 (1872) (decided under former Code 1868, §§ 4264, 4265); Gresham v. Equitable Accident Ins. Co., 87 Ga. 497, 13 S.E. 752, 27 Am. St. R. 263, 13 L.R.A. 838 (1891) (decided under former Code 1882, §§ 4330, 4331).

Mutual combat involves agreement to fight with deadly weapons.

- Mutual combat usually arises when parties are armed with deadly weapons and mutually agree or intend to fight with them. Mutual combat does not mean a mere fist fight or scuffle. Loudermilk v. State, 129 Ga. App. 552, 200 S.E.2d 302 (1973); Flowers v. State, 146 Ga. App. 692, 247 S.E.2d 217 (1978).

If parties draw guns upon sudden quarrel, and one kills the other, it is manslaughter upon theory that the parties engaged with each other in a mutual fight on equal terms. Williams v. State, 68 Ga. App. 558, 23 S.E.2d 205 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Homicide committed during mutual combat.

- If a killing is not in self-defense, or for some circumstances of justification, but in the course of an encounter in which participants engage with mutual intention to fight, the offense may be voluntary manslaughter as related to mutual combat. Shafer v. State, 191 Ga. 722, 13 S.E.2d 798 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

When homicide is committed during mutual combat, since defendant willingly engaged in the affray, defendant is in equal fault with deceased, and, under such circumstances, it is not justifiable for defendant to slay adversary without more. Accordingly, killing under such circumstances is voluntary manslaughter. Cribb v. State, 71 Ga. App. 539, 31 S.E.2d 248 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Defense of withdrawal is applicable only in true cases of mutual combat.

- Exercise of right of self-defense does not make one a mutual combatant. Otherwise the principle would be applicable in every case when a person unjustifiably and feloniously attacked undertook to defend oneself. Hill v. State, 211 Ga. 683, 88 S.E.2d 145 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Defendant must have attempted to decline further struggle.

- Before defendant can rely upon defense of mutual combat defendant must have declined further struggle. McDowell v. State, 78 Ga. App. 116, 50 S.E.2d 633 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

When there is mutual fault, and mutual combat, in order for killing to be justified it must appear that slayer had really and in good faith endeavored to decline any further struggle before the mortal blow was given. Gordy v. State, 93 Ga. App. 743, 92 S.E.2d 737 (1956) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Person is not justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm when such person is the aggressor or was engaged in combat by agreement unless the person withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person an intent to do so. Lancaster v. State, 250 Ga. 871, 301 S.E.2d 882 (1983).

Defendant's use of defensive force was not justified when the evidence demonstrated that defendant engaged in mutual combat for several minutes from which defendant did not withdraw until injured. Roberts v. State, 215 Ga. App. 881, 452 S.E.2d 570 (1994).

Court must charge on voluntary manslaughter as related to mutual combat where required by evidence.

- Where participants engage with mutual intention to fight, offense may be voluntary manslaughter as related to mutual combat. If evidence authorizes an inference that killing occurred in circumstances last mentioned, it is the duty of judge, even without request, to give in charge the law of voluntary manslaughter as related to mutual combat. Loudermilk v. State, 129 Ga. App. 552, 200 S.E.2d 302 (1973).

Requirement for self-defense charge.

- When there was some evidence supporting defendant's claim of self-defense, defendant's sole defense, the trial court erred in refusing to give a self-defense charge, even absent a written request. Printup v. State, 217 Ga. App. 495, 458 S.E.2d 662 (1995).

As an instruction on unjustified self defense closely tracked the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21, giving that instruction was not harmful, even when the exceptions described by O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b) did not apply. Reese v. State, 270 Ga. App. 522, 607 S.E.2d 165 (2004).

Defendant pleading self-defense is not entitled to instruction on involuntary manslaughter.

- Defendant who seeks to justify homicide under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21 is not entitled to an additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter in the course of a lawful act, whatever the implement of death. Thomas v. State, 174 Ga. App. 560, 330 S.E.2d 777 (1985).

Charge that self-defense inapplicable when in process of committing felony.

- Trial court was authorized to instruct the jury pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(2) that self-defense was inapplicable when the defendant was attempting to commit or was committing a felony because the defendant made an affirmative choice to engage in a dangerous and potentially violent criminal activity when the defendant participated in a drug transaction. Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 757, 725 S.E.2d 280 (2012).

Proper statement of law not impermissible comment on evidence.

- Trial court gave the jury a proper statement of the law advising the jury that if the jury found that the defendants were fleeing after committing a felony, justification would not be an available defense for the defendants; thus, the trial court's statement was not a comment on the evidence, and the trial court was not implying in any way that an actual felony had taken place. Ballard v. State, 297 Ga. 248, 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015).

Self-defense instruction not warranted.

- In a prosecution for various offenses committed against an officer involving the defendant and the defendant's mother, because self-defense was not their only defense and both denied ever touching the officer, the trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury on self-defense; moreover, aside from the aforementioned, an oral request for the instruction was insufficient to require that instruction. Curtis v. State, 285 Ga. App. 298, 645 S.E.2d 705 (2007).

Because no construction of the evidence would support a finding that the defendant shot in self-defense pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), the trial court properly refused to charge on that issue; the defendant pointed to no evidence that the defendant entered a fracas between the victim and the victim's friend in defense of the friend, and the unarmed victim was shot three times in the back as the victim was attempting to flee after the defendant assaulted the victim with a firearm. Hicks v. State, 287 Ga. 260, 695 S.E.2d 195 (2010).

Trial court did not err by failing to charge the jury on the defense of justification under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a) because the evidence did not support the giving of the charge; there was no evidence presented at trial that the victim's act of opening the front door was in any way an unlawful entry into or attack upon the victim's mother's house, that the victim opened the door in a violent and tumultuous manner, or that the defendant could have reasonably believed that the victim intended to attack or offer personal violence toward anyone inside the house. Reese v. State, 289 Ga. 446, 711 S.E.2d 717 (2011).

Trial court did not err by refusing to charge the jury on the affirmative defense of self-defense because the defendant never admitted to the crimes alleged and, in fact, denied even being present during the assault of the victim; therefore, there was no evidence to support the giving of the requested charge. Ransom v. State, 318 Ga. App. 764, 734 S.E.2d 761 (2012).

Appellant failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to emphasize certain testimony from an investigator that supported a claim of self defense because co-indictees testified that they did not see appellant and the victim fight or the victim with a weapon and trial counsel testified that they agreed to focus on appellant's character instead of self-defense and a jury instruction that deadly force was not justified during a felony would have been required. Jones v. State, 294 Ga. 501, 755 S.E.2d 131 (2014).

In the defendant's trial for cruelty to a child and false imprisonment, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-70(c) and16-5-41(a), respectively, based on the defendant's locking the defendant's seven-year-old son in a wooden box the defendant built for the purpose and also binding the child in a sleeping bag, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense, defense of habitation, and defense of property other than habitation, nor was counsel ineffective in failing to request these instructions. Leslie v. State, 341 Ga. App. 731, 802 S.E.2d 674 (2017).

Trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense because the defendant did not point to any evidence to support a reasonable belief that shooting the victim was necessary to defend the defendant or the defendant's girlfriend from any imminent use of unlawful force as the victim agreed to meet the defendant to apologize for hitting the defendant and taking the defendant's shotgun weeks earlier; the defendant did not point to any evidence that the defendant was in fear of suffering harm during the encounter with the victim; and there was no evidence that the victim was reaching for a weapon; rather, the evidence showed that the defendant was the aggressor, and was not entitled to a self-defense instruction. Garner v. State, 303 Ga. 788, 815 S.E.2d 36 (2018).

Justification instruction not warranted.

- Trial court did not err by declining to charge the jury on the defense of justification under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a) because defendant declined to testify at trial or present any defense witnesses to support a justification defense, and the defendant's cross-examination of the state's witnesses did not reveal any evidence that would support such a defense. Jackson v. State, 316 Ga. App. 588, 730 S.E.2d 69 (2012).

There was no evidence to support the giving of a jury charge on justification, because the defendant hit the defendant's wife in the face with a trophy, requiring sutures, while the defendant did not even appear to have been in a fight. Hudson v. State, 325 Ga. App. 657, 754 S.E.2d 626 (2014).

In a case where the defendant, an inmate, was convicted of the aggravated assault and aggravated battery of the victim, another inmate, the trial court did not commit any error in declining to charge the jury on the defense of justification because there was no evidence to support the defense as the defendant declined to testify at trial or present any defense witnesses to support a justification defense; the defendant's cross-examination of the state's witnesses did not reveal any evidence that would support a defense of justification; and the detention officer's testimony that the defendant had a mild abrasion or a cut over one eye, without more, clearly was insufficient to support a justification charge. Boutier v. State, 328 Ga. App. 869, 763 S.E.2d 255 (2014).

Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on justification as the defendant was not justified in using force in self-defense as to the charge of harming the police dog even if the defendant had an involuntary reaction to the dog's bite. Bynes v. State, 336 Ga. App. 223, 784 S.E.2d 71 (2016).

Jury charge on defense of habitation.

- In a prosecution for aggravated assault, while the trial court charged the jury regarding the details of the defense of justification, because the evidence did not authorize the charge of defense of habitation, the instruction was properly denied; moreover, no evidence was presented to suggest that the victim used coercion or threats to gain entry into the defendant's residence. Brimidge v. State, 287 Ga. App. 23, 651 S.E.2d 344 (2007).

Charging language of Code section sufficient.

- When the trial court has charged on self-defense in the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a) and has also charged on the presumption of innocence and the state's burden of proving every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court does not err by refusing defendant's request to charge that once the issue of self-defense is raised, the state has the burden of proving that defendant was not justified in using force likely to cause death or great bodily harm. Hudson v. State, 171 Ga. App. 181, 319 S.E.2d 28 (1984).

Although the defendant contended the trial court erred by failing to give defendant's requested charge on self-defense, since the court charged the jury on self-defense in the language of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-21 and16-3-23, which is the law in Georgia, and those code provisions cover the same principles requested by defendant, it was not error to deny defendant's request to charge. Cade v. State, 180 Ga. App. 314, 348 S.E.2d 769 (1986).

Trial court did not err in charging the jury on self-defense even though the charge related to matters not in evidence since the charge to the jury was almost verbatim the pattern jury instruction contained in the Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions and was also almost verbatim to the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21. Washington v. State, 194 Ga. App. 756, 391 S.E.2d 718 (1990).

When a defendant was charged with malice murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the charge given to the jury clearly provided a legal theory upon which the jury could acquit. Cauley v. State, 260 Ga. 324, 393 S.E.2d 246 (1990).

Charge containing nearly precise language of O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21 and covering same principles as requested charge is adequate, and contention that the trial court did not give defendant's requested charge on the justifiable use of force in the defense of self or others is without merit. Strickland v. State, 250 Ga. 624, 300 S.E.2d 156 (1983).

In a case charging malice murder and felony murder, where the court instructed the jury in almost the exact language of O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21 and instructed that, if the defendant raised the issue of self-defense, the state would have the burden of proving that the accused did not act in self-defense and also that the state had the burden of proof and responsibility to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, it was not error for the court not to instruct the jury that if they believed the accused to have been justified, it would be their duty to acquit the accused. Doss v. State, 262 Ga. 499, 422 S.E.2d 185 (1992).

Trial court did not improperly instruct the jury on self-defense and using force to prevent a forcible felony in defendant's aggravated battery case, as the trial court gave defendant's requested instruction, which tracked the statutory language, and a defendant could not complain that an instruction that the defendant requested was improper. Colbert v. State, 263 Ga. App. 193, 587 S.E.2d 300 (2003).

In an aggravated assault case, contrary to defendant's assertion that the trial court's jury instruction on the law of self-defense erroneously imposed a requirement of absolute necessity, rather than reasonable necessity, the instruction, taken as a whole, was not reversible error because it included the statutory language of O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), regarding justification. Bailey v. State, 263 Ga. App. 614, 588 S.E.2d 807 (2003).

Trial court did not err in charging the jury on self-defense in the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(3) because assuming that there was no evidence that the defendant was the aggressor, the charge was at most merely irrelevant, being one of a number of stated exceptions to the rule concerning the use of force in self-defense. Neal v. State, 290 Ga. 563, 722 S.E.2d 765 (2012).

Jury charge that a person is not justified in using force if that person initially provokes the use of force was supported by the evidence because the evidence showed that appellant, possessing a firearm and believing that the victim did not want to speak with the appellant, stopped a truck at the residence, and a reasonable jury could infer that the appellant did so to provoke a confrontation with the victim about the affair. Anthony v. State, 298 Ga. 827, 785 S.E.2d 277 (2016).

Charging entire Code section where only part is applicable.

- When evidence would have authorized jury finding that O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(1) is applicable, the trial court did not commit reversible error by charging entirety of section, which sets out circumstances upon which defendant's use of force could not be said to have been justified. Guevara v. State, 151 Ga. App. 444, 260 S.E.2d 491 (1979).

Trial court's charging jury as to the entire language of O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21, even though the exceptions in subsection (b) were inapplicable under the facts of the case, did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to defendant to disprove the existence of those exceptions. Jolley v. State, 254 Ga. 624, 331 S.E.2d 516 (1985).

It was not reversible error for the trial judge to give a charge on O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21, parts of which were applicable to the factual situation, even though a portion thereof was not specifically pertinent. Diaz v. State, 194 Ga. App. 577, 391 S.E.2d 140 (1990).

In a prosecution for felony murder, it was not error for the trial court to instruct the jury on all subsections of O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21 even though a part of the charge may have been inapplicable under the facts in evidence. Lee v. State, 265 Ga. 112, 454 S.E.2d 761 (1995).

Even though there was no evidence or contention that defendant initially provoked the victim's use of force with intent to use that force as an excuse to shoot the victim, inclusion of the instruction on that principle in the context of the entirety of the charge on justification did not mislead the jury or violate defendant's due process rights. Lowe v. State, 267 Ga. 410, 478 S.E.2d 762 (1996).

Charge on self-defense and accident appropriate.

- In a murder case, the trial court did not err in charging the jury on both self-defense and accident because the evidence supported both charges. The defendant testified that the victim was threatening the defendant and that the defendant used a knife to force the victim to get back; the defendant also testified that the defendant did not mean to stab the victim and that the defendant did not understand how the knife became lodged in the victim's chest. Hudson v. State, 284 Ga. 595, 669 S.E.2d 94 (2008).

When testimony shows appellant was aggressor, charge of justification is unnecessary absent request. Corder v. State, 134 Ga. App. 316, 214 S.E.2d 404 (1975).

Lack of evidence to support jury charge on justification.

- Because the defendant was on the victim's premises unlawfully and initiated violence by lunging at the victim, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23 and16-3-24, the victim's efforts to defend the house and a mail truck were entirely legal; consequently, there was no evidence to support a jury charge on justification under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a). Robinson v. State, 270 Ga. App. 869, 608 S.E.2d 544 (2004).

Trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on the defense of justified use of force in self-defense as defendant did not request the instruction and the trial court was not required to sua sponte instruct the jury on the defense as it was not defendant's sole defense; further, the evidence did not support giving the charge as the officers were making a lawful arrest based on probable cause, they had the right to use force reasonably necessary to make the arrest, and defendant had no right to resist the use of such reasonable force. Mayfield v. State, 276 Ga. App. 544, 623 S.E.2d 725 (2005).

When there was no evidence of any second encounter between the defendant and a victim involving a handgun, either in a codefendant's testimony or in another victim's testimony, and there was no evidence of any threat so as to have given rise to a reasonable belief that the defendant must shoot the victim in the back of the head to avoid death or great bodily harm, the trial court did not err by not charging the jury on justification during the defendant's trial for malice murder. Hunter v. State, 281 Ga. 693, 642 S.E.2d 668 (2007).

Trial court did not err in refusing to give a jury charge on justification because there was no evidence of any imminent threat of harm; although the defendant argued that the defendant's actions were justified because the defendant was trying to prevent the victim from using methamphetamine, which could cause harm to the victim and their unborn baby, the defendant pointed to no evidence that the victim used or threatened to use methamphetamine while the victim was pregnant with the child or to otherwise harm herself or the baby. Morgan v. State, 303 Ga. App. 358, 693 S.E.2d 504 (2010).

Defendant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to request jury charges on the excessive use of force or on lack of justification under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(1) and (b)(3) because two corrections officers did not use excessive force as a matter of law in subduing the defendant when, while incarcerated in a county jail, the defendant took two dinner trays, refused to put one back, and fought and choked an officer who took the trays away. Williams v. State, 309 Ga. App. 688, 710 S.E.2d 884 (2011).

Trial court did not err by failing to charge the jury on the defense of justification under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a) because the requested charge, which contrasted justification, voluntary manslaughter, and murder, was an inaccurate statement of the law; the definition of "justifiable homicide" contained in the defendant's request was inconsistent with and had been superseded by the current statutory scheme for the affirmative offense of justification; the existence of "reasonable fears" is irrelevant to the consideration of voluntary manslaughter. Reese v. State, 289 Ga. 446, 711 S.E.2d 717 (2011).

Trial court did not err by failing to charge the jury on the defense of justification under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-21(a) and16-3-23 because counsel for the defendant characterized the defense as an "imperfect self-defense," a form of voluntary manslaughter that was not recognized in Georgia. Reese v. State, 289 Ga. 446, 711 S.E.2d 717 (2011).

Although the defendant indicated that the defendant believed a civilian code enforcement officer and a police officer were "stealing" the defendant's vehicles, that belief was unfounded because the vehicles were being removed after the defendant failed to clean up property; thus, there was no evidence of any imminent threat of harm to justify the defendant's use of force under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a). Adcock v. State, 317 Ga. App. 468, 731 S.E.2d 365 (2012).

With regard to the defendant's domestic violence convictions, because the defendant acquiesced to the trial court's decision not to charge on justification, the issue of the trial court's refusal to give the requested charge was waived on appeal. Palmer v. State, 330 Ga. App. 679, 769 S.E.2d 107 (2015).

Charge on mutual combat not adjusted to the evidence.

- Trial court's refusal to give the defendant's requested jury instruction on mutual combat, O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(3), did not constitute plain error under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-58(b) because a charge on mutual combat was not adjusted to the evidence; there was no evidence of intent to engage in a mutual fight or combat by agreement. Carruth v. State, 290 Ga. 342, 721 S.E.2d 80 (2012).

Defendant could not challenge requested instruction.

- Defendant's challenge to the instruction on justification failed as counsel did not object to the portion of the self-defense instruction tracking O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(2), and indeed requested that the trial court give the pattern charge including that language. Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 771 S.E.2d 362 (2015).

Instruction on retreat not required.

- Trial court's instruction thoroughly covered the law of justification and self-defense such that all of the first defendant's defenses could be properly considered, and any lack of additional specific instructions by the trial court on the duty to retreat were unnecessary. Ballard v. State, 297 Ga. 248, 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015).

Request to charge on mutual combat was not ineffective assistance.

- In a murder case in which the lawyers pursued not only a justification defense, but also voluntary manslaughter as an alternative to murder, it was not unreasonable to request a charge on mutual combat, even though the request might have impaired the justification defense because the request aided the voluntary manslaughter alternative. State v. Mobley, 296 Ga. 876, 770 S.E.2d 1 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 535, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 7570, 193 L. Ed. 2d 431 (U.S. 2015).

Trial counsel not ineffective.

- Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to request a jury instruction on specific forcible felonies since even assuming that trial counsel was deficient, the defendant could not show prejudice as the trial court charged the jury on the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, the burden of proof, and the defense of justification, including that the definition of a forcible felony; the jury was fairly informed as to when a homicide was justified and there was not a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result if an instruction on specific forcible felonies had also been given. Lott v. State, 281 Ga. App. 373, 636 S.E.2d 102 (2006).

Because there was no evidence to support a justification defense pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), including defense of habitation under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23, trial counsel's performance could not be considered deficient for failure to pursue those defenses. Reese v. State, 289 Ga. 446, 711 S.E.2d 717 (2011).

Defendant was not entitled to a new trial due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to conduct a pre-trial consultation with an expert witness to utilize the evidence of the trajectory of the fatal bullet to support the defense because the defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the trial result would have been different if counsel had made such a consultation as the undisputed evidence established that the defendant fired the first shot and was the aggressor who started the gunfight; and the fact that the defendant fired the fatal shot while trying to get away from the gunfight the defendant started did not change the analysis regarding the lack of justification as the defendant was the aggressor. Mosby v. State, 300 Ga. 450, 796 S.E.2d 277 (2017).

Defendant was not entitled to a new trial due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to present the testimony of an expert witness who could have established that, based upon the video, the defendant could not have inflicted the muzzle wound to the victim's right leg and that the victim accidentally shot the victim's own leg because the jury was able to determine for itself whether the defendant was ever close enough to the victim to cause a muzzle contact wound; and it was undisputed that the shot to the victim's leg was not the fatal wound. Mosby v. State, 300 Ga. 450, 796 S.E.2d 277 (2017).

Defendant was not entitled to a new trial due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to consult with or retain a crime scene reconstruction or firearms expert to explain the events the video portrayed because the jury could draw the jury's own conclusions about the events shown on the video; the defendant failed to show that the testimony of an expert witness with respect to what the expert observed on the video would have been admissible or that the jury would have accepted the expert's testimony over what the jurors observed; and, even if admissible, the jurors could have disregarded the expert's testimony about what the expert saw in the video if the testimony conflicted with what the jurors saw for themselves. Mosby v. State, 300 Ga. 450, 796 S.E.2d 277 (2017).

Erroneous version of charge.

- Defendant was not entitled to a new trial on the basis that the court charged the jury with a garbled version of O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(1) and (b)(2), which addresses the circumstances under which a person is not justified in using force, since just before giving the garbled charge the trial court gave the defendant's requested charge on justification and the court's misstatement could not have harmed the defendant. Boxer X v. State, 237 Ga. App. 526, 515 S.E.2d 668 (1999).

Charge covering elements of justifiable homicide need not include language of this section and O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24. - When the charge given sufficiently instructed the jury on elements of justifiable homicide, in absence of any request to charge, or objection to charge, it was not error to fail to charge in language of former Code 1933, §§ 26-902 and 26-904. Brooks v. State, 227 Ga. 339, 180 S.E.2d 721 (1971) (see O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-21 and16-3-24).

Failure to define "felony" as used in section.

- Failure to define word "felony", in jury charge in absence of request, is not such error as requires grant of new trial. Fountain v. State, 207 Ga. 144, 60 S.E.2d 433 (1950), overruled on other grounds, Lavender v. State, 234 Ga. 608, 216 S.E.2d 855 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Word "excusable" should not be used in instruction on justifiable homicide. Mixon v. State, 123 Ga. 581, 51 S.E. 580, 107 Am. St. R. 149 (1905) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, §§ 70, 71).

Instruction which incorrectly imposed a higher threshold for justification of the killing, i.e., that the necessity for it be "absolute," prejudiced defendants. Gerald v. State, 189 Ga. App. 155, 375 S.E.2d 134 (1988); Bracewell v. State, 243 Ga. App. 792, 534 S.E.2d 494 (2000).

Charge on preponderance of evidence to support defense under former Code 1933, § 26-902, although authorized, is not required. Smith v. State, 232 Ga. 99, 205 S.E.2d 188 (1974) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21).

Charge need not instruct jury that it must acquit if it finds homicide justifiable.

- It is not error, in charging as to justifiable homicide, to fail to tell jury in general or specific terms that, if they find homicide justifiable, it is their duty to acquit. Lavender v. State, 234 Ga. 608, 216 S.E.2d 855 (1975).

Self-defense killing need not be "absolutely necessary."

- It is error to add to the charge of self-defense that the killing must have been "absolutely necessary" to save the slayer's life. Murray v. State, 254 Ga. 351, 329 S.E.2d 485 (1985).

Charge requiring flight or retreat and fear for own life.

- Trial court's charge places a heavier burden on defendant than the law requires when it limits defense to consideration of whether defendant was in fear of own life and imposes a requirement of flight or retreat. Scott v. State, 141 Ga. App. 848, 234 S.E.2d 685 (1977).

Defense entitled to jury charge as to retreat.

- When self-defense is the sole defense, and the issue of retreat is raised by the evidence or placed in issue, the defense is entitled to a charge on the principles of retreat even though O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21 is silent on the duty to retreat. Johnson v. State, 253 Ga. 37, 315 S.E.2d 871 (1984).

Trial court committed reversible error in failing to charge the jury on the lack of a duty to retreat under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23.1 because self-defense, O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), was the defendant's sole defense, and the issue of retreat was squarely placed in issue by the prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant, by the defendant's explanation of why the defendant did not drive away from the victim, whom the defendant characterized as the aggressor, and by the prosecutor's closing argument; the evidence of the defendant's guilt was not overwhelming, given that the case turned solely on the credibility of the defendant, the victim, and the other witnesses. Hill v. State, 310 Ga. App. 695, 713 S.E.2d 891 (2011).

Instruction on retreat not required absent evidence.

- Instruction on the principle that a person who is not the original aggressor is under no duty to retreat was not required since "self-defense" was not the "sole defense" and the issue of retreat was not raised by the evidence or placed in issue. Wainwright v. State, 197 Ga. App. 43, 397 S.E.2d 456 (1990).

Since the issue of retreat was not raised by the evidence or placed in issue, the trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury on the duty to retreat. Ellis v. State, 245 Ga. App. 807, 539 S.E.2d 184 (2000).

Neither the prosecution nor the evidence raised the issue of retreat; thus, the trial court's excessive force instruction without a no duty to retreat charge did not unduly stress the state's contentions. Dukes v. State, 256 Ga. App. 236, 568 S.E.2d 151 (2002).

Charge may include exceptions to justification.

- Even though justification can be a defense to felony murder in some situations, it was not error to include the exceptions of O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(2) in the jury charge where the court also charged the jury that "the defense of justification applies to each of the counts alleged ... except that charge dealing with theft by taking." Williams v. State, 274 Ga. 371, 552 S.E.2d 814 (2001).

Because an instruction recited the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21, giving that charge was not harmful, even when the exceptions described by § 16-3-21(b) did not apply. Hayles v. State, 287 Ga. App. 601, 651 S.E.2d 860 (2007).

Instruction that justification was possible defense unwarranted.

- Since the Supreme Court has ruled that prevention of adultery does not justify the killing of an illicit lover by a spouse, and the Court of Appeals has ruled that mental anguish does not rise to the level of "great bodily harm" as it is used in O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21, an instruction that justification was a possible defense under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-20(6) was not authorized, and the trial court committed no error in refusing to give it. Chancellor v. State, 165 Ga. App. 365, 301 S.E.2d 294 (1983).

Trial court was not obligated to instruct the jury as to a justification defense where the defendant tried to remain locked in defendant's prison cell and injured a corrections officer when the officer tried to get defendant out of the cell after the officer threatened to place the defendant in a padded cell if the defendant did not quit yelling. Grant v. State, 257 Ga. App. 678, 572 S.E.2d 38 (2002).

In a malice murder prosecution, the defendant's testimony that an unarmed person approached the defendant aggressively with the person's hands up did not establish that the defendant had a reasonable belief that stabbing the person in a manner likely to, and which did, cause death was necessary to prevent the defendant's own death or great bodily injury. Thus, the defendant was not entitled to a justification instruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a). Boyd v. State, 284 Ga. 46, 663 S.E.2d 218 (2008).

Defendant entitled to justification charge.

- Where the defendant's testimony provided "some" evidence in support of defendant's justification defense based on a claim of self-defense, the trial court's refusal to charge the jury on defendant's sole defense was reversible error, even though the defendant was a convicted felon and not authorized by law to possess a firearm. Jones v. State, 220 Ga. App. 784, 470 S.E.2d 326 (1996).

In a murder prosecution, the defendant was not entitled to a charge on self-defense, under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21, because the trial court gave a complete charge on justification, much of which was in the language the defendant requested. Gabriel v. State, 280 Ga. 237, 626 S.E.2d 491 (2006).

Charge fairly represented issue of justification.

- Trial court did not err in failing to include certain language in the court's charge on justification because the charge as a whole fairly represented the issue of justification; inasmuch as the charge as a whole was not an incorrect statement of the law, and the charge instructed the jury that the defendant was justified in using self defense against the "imminent use of unlawful force and against great bodily injury", the trial court's omission of the phrase "or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony" did not undermine the legal adequacy of the charge. Milinavicius v. State, 290 Ga. 374, 721 S.E.2d 843 (2012).

Defendant entitled to justification charge under

§ 16-3-20(6). - Even though the trial court charged the jury on justification in the specific context of defense of self or a third person as provided in O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a) and defense of property as provided in O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24, such instruction alone failed to fairly present to the jury the law on defendant's theory of the case and defendant's defense of justification. The trial court erred in failing to charge justification under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-20(6) and in failing to charge the jury on the state's burden of proving the absence of the elements of a justification defense. Nelson v. State, 213 Ga. App. 641, 445 S.E.2d 543 (1994).

Defendant not entitled to justification charge.

- Without any evidence that defendant's actions were justified, the trial court's obligation to instruct the jury on the defendant's sole defense of justification dissolved. The defendant must present some evidence justifying the use of deadly force and only then must the state disprove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Porter v. State, 272 Ga. 533, 531 S.E.2d 97 (2000).

Jury charge on self-defense, which informed the jury that an accused was not justified in committing an assault to avenge past wrongs, was adjusted to the evidence that the defendant had previous confrontations with the victim over a person of the opposite sex and that the defendant had threatened the victim via that person's cell phone before driving to the scene and confronting them; the trial court correctly instructed the jury that to the extent that the defendant's subsequent acts might have been motivated by resentment over the perceived slight, justification was not a viable defense. Hall v. State, 273 Ga. App. 203, 614 S.E.2d 844 (2005).

Based on the evidence supporting the defendant's participation in a felony drug transaction at the time of the fatal shooting of the victim, the trial court was authorized to instruct the jury pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(2) that a person was not justified in using force in defense of self or others if the person was attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission or attempted commission of a felony; the defendant affirmatively chose to engage in the potentially dangerous and violent criminal business of a felony drug deal before the fatal confrontation with the victim took place. Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 768, 723 S.E.2d 915 (2012).

Because the evidence showed that the defendant was the initial aggressor, breaking into the defendant's girlfriend's house and confronting her family, the defendant was not entitled to the defense of justification. Bryson v. Jackson, 299 Ga. 751, 791 S.E.2d 43 (2016).

When evidence indicated that defendant was aggressor, charge on justification was gratuity to which defendant was not entitled, and the defendant could not therefore complain of any alleged error in the charge on justification. Montgomery v. State, 173 Ga. App. 570, 327 S.E.2d 770 (1985); Park v. State, 230 Ga. App. 274, 495 S.E.2d 886 (1998).

Law of justifiable homicide and voluntary manslaughter need not be connected in charge.

- When law of voluntary manslaughter is involved under evidence, or is charged without exception by the defendant, and when law of justifiable homicide is involved, and instructions are given as to it, it is not error to fail to charge law of justifiable homicide in immediate connection with charge on general law of voluntary manslaughter. Fann v. State, 195 Ga. 368, 23 S.E.2d 399 (1942) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, §§ 70, 71).

Charge covering self-defense, although inapplicable, is not erroneous if not tending to destroy other defenses. Adams v. State, 214 Ga. 131, 103 S.E.2d 550 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Although evidence would not have authorized verdict of justifiable homicide, where cross-examination of state's witnesses unsuccessfully attempted to show that deceased had a weapon, charge on justifiable homicide gave defendant benefit of defense to which defendant was not entitled and did not tend to destroy other defenses, and court did not err in so charging. Jones v. State, 197 Ga. 604, 30 S.E.2d 192 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Erroneous charge on justifiable homicide not cured by verdict of lesser grade of murder.

- Erroneous charge or failure to charge on accused's defense or defenses of justifiable homicide is not cured by verdict finding accused guilty of some lesser grade of offense than murder. McKibben v. State, 88 Ga. App. 466, 77 S.E.2d 86 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Charge on justifiable homicide not reversible error.

- When the defendant was charged with murder by shooting the deceased, and defendant denied any knowledge or connection therewith, thus making an issue of murder or nothing, it was error to submit by charge the question of justifiable homicide, but this was not reversible error as defendant was not injured thereby. Claybourn v. State, 190 Ga. 861, 11 S.E.2d 23 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

When, in trial for murder, state proves killing as alleged in indictment, and accused defends upon ground that the accused did not commit the crime, and was not present at time of the crime's commission, it is not reversible error for the court to charge the law of justifiable homicide, when no injury is shown as a result thereof. Williams v. State, 199 Ga. 504, 34 S.E.2d 854 (1945) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Charge on mutual combat authorized by evidence.

- See McMichael v. State, 252 Ga. 305, 313 S.E.2d 693 (1984).

Charge regarding mutual combat when there is no evidence of mutual combat is reversible error. Bivins v. State, 200 Ga. 729, 38 S.E.2d 273 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Defendant's claim of error in a mutual combat charge was rejected as the charge redounded to the defendant's advantage as the charge enabled the jury to find a criminal defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter in lieu of murder. Hall v. State, 273 Ga. App. 203, 614 S.E.2d 844 (2005).

Erroneous charge on mutual combat related to self-defense not cured by verdict of voluntary manslaughter.

- If under facts of case a charge on mutual combat as applied to self-defense is required, and court fails so to charge or charges erroneously, verdict of voluntary manslaughter will not cure error. McKibben v. State, 88 Ga. App. 466, 77 S.E.2d 86 (1953); Patton v. State, 93 Ga. App. 575, 92 S.E.2d 219 (1956) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Failure to charge mutual combat and self defense.

- The trial court did not err by failing to charge the jury on mutual combat and self defense where the defendant and three other men entered a barber shop, demanded money, and started fighting with people in the barber shop resulting in one of the other men shooting and killing a person when the person attempted to flee and the defendant shooting and seriously wounding another person who threw a radio at the defendant in an attempt to prevent the defendant from injuring the person's nephew. Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. 630, 570 S.E.2d 309 (2002).

Charge to jury on self-defense in relation to mutual combat was incorrect where it did not set forth the standard by which the jury was to judge the defendant's behavior if mutual intention to fight was present. McCord v. State, 176 Ga. App. 505, 336 S.E.2d 371 (1985).

Evidence supported decision to instruct jury on self-defense.

- Evidence that a person who was engaged to marry the mother of the defendant's child got into a fight with the defendant was sufficient to warrant an instruction on self-defense, even though the defendant testified that the defendant did not fire the shot that struck the mother's fiance, and the trial court did not err because it instructed the jury on self-defense, even though the defendant did not request that instruction. Hendrix v. State, 268 Ga. App. 455, 602 S.E.2d 133 (2004).

Court's refusal to charge on involuntary manslaughter not erroneous.

- See Lancaster v. State, 250 Ga. 871, 301 S.E.2d 882 (1983); Rhodes v. State, 170 Ga. App. 473, 317 S.E.2d 285 (1984).

Charge on specific forcible felony.

- When prevention of a forcible felony is charged as justification and defendant requests a charge on the specific forcible felony of which there is evidence, it is error to fail to charge the elements of such a felony as it relates to justification. Wiseman v. State, 249 Ga. 559, 292 S.E.2d 670 (1982).

When the defendant did not testify that the fatal shot was fired to prevent the commission of a forcible felony against the defendant, this legal concept was not reasonably raised by the evidence, and the trial court, in omitting the words "or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony" from the court's charge to the jury, did not err, since a court can decline to give a charge that is misleading, confusing, or not adequately raised or authorized by the evidence. Brown v. State, 236 Ga. App. 166, 511 S.E.2d 276 (1999).

On appeal from a conviction for voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of malice murder, the appeals court found that no error or prejudice resulted from the trial court's denial of the defendant's request for an aggravated battery charge as a forcible felony in support of the defendant's justification claim, and affirmed the trial court's choice to charge on aggravated assault and rape as the defendant failed to present evidence of any reasonable belief that the use of force was necessary to prevent the commission of an aggravated battery. Wicker v. State, 285 Ga. App. 294, 645 S.E.2d 712 (2007).

In an aggravated assault case in which the defense was justification under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a charge defining aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), as a forcible felony for which the use of force was justified. Also, there was no showing that the outcome of the trial would have been different if such a charge had been given. Lewis v. State, 302 Ga. App. 506, 691 S.E.2d 336 (2010).

Charge as to felony after charge that force is not justified before, at, or after felony.

- The trial court did not err in charging the jury that the sale of marijuana is a felony after charging that a person is not justified in using force if the person "is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission of a felony." The latter portion of the charge tracks O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(2). Howard v. State, 165 Ga. App. 555, 301 S.E.2d 910 (1983).

Defense of third party charge not justified.

- Trial court did not err in failing to give a jury charge on the defense of a third party; as defendant was a party to an armed robbery, the evidence did not show that defendant was justified in the use of deadly force and the evidence did not warrant such charge. Reynolds v. State, 275 Ga. 548, 569 S.E.2d 847 (2002).

Family violence or child abuse.

- Modified jury instruction on justification should be given in all battered person syndrome cases, when authorized by the evidence and requested by defendant, to assist the jury in evaluating the battered person's defense of self-defense. Smith v. State, 268 Ga. 196, 486 S.E.2d 819 (1997), reversing Smith v. State, 222 Ga. App. 412, 474 S.E.2d 291 (1996).

Jury instruction based on domestic violence report statute was error.

- Jury charge based on O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20.1(a) and (b) was not supported by the evidence because only one of the two parties involved in a domestic dispute reported the incident to law enforcement, and the error was not harmless because it could have led the jury to conclude that the defendant, who was arrested, was the primary aggressor, and undermined the defense of self-defense, which was not permitted under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21 if the defendant was the aggressor. Dean v. State, 313 Ga. App. 726, 722 S.E.2d 436 (2012).

Charge on battered person syndrome.

- Because the evidence showed that defendant had been abused by the victim, defendant's stepfather, and an expert witness testified that defendant suffered from battered person syndrome, the requirements for requesting a charge on battered person syndrome were met. Freeman v. State, 269 Ga. 337, 496 S.E.2d 716 (1998).

Defendant who sought to justify killing a victim by battered person syndrome was not entitled to an additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter resulting from the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-3(b) because if the act was justified, it was not a crime, and if not justified, it was not a lawful act. Demery v. State, 287 Ga. 805, 700 S.E.2d 373 (2010).

Defendant not entitled to instruction on defense of others as not protecting sibling.

- Trial court did not err when the court refused the defendant's request to charge the jury on defense of others because there was no evidence that the defendant killed the victim in defense of the defendant's sister as the defendant explicitly testified that, after the defendant began fighting with the victim, the defendant was worried about the defendant's own safety and not the safety of the defendant's sister; that the victim wrestled the defendant to the kitchen and away from the defendant's sister in the living room; and that the victim was stabbed to defend the defendant and not the defendant's sister. Cotton v. State, 297 Ga. 257, 773 S.E.2d 242 (2015).

A "first aggressor" charge was justified by evidence that the victim's verbal tirade was delivered from the victim's own property, a substantial distance from defendant's home, and that defendant drove to a location adjacent to the victim's property and gestured the victim to come to where the defendant was located. Johnson v. State, 229 Ga. App. 586, 494 S.E.2d 382 (1997).

Jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter not erroneous.

- When there is evidence raising doubt, however slight, as to whether a homicide was murder or voluntary manslaughter, it is not error for the court to instruct the jury upon the law of voluntary manslaughter. Lee v. State, 167 Ga. App. 59, 306 S.E.2d 57 (1983).

Fact that the defendant claimed self-defense under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21 did not preclude a charge on voluntary manslaughter. The defendant was in effect asking the court to re-weigh the evidence to give greater credence to the defendant's self-defense justification than did the jury. Branford v. State, 299 Ga. App. 890, 685 S.E.2d 731 (2009).

Defendant not entitled to instruction on involuntary manslaughter.

- Defendant who seeks to justify homicide under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21 is not entitled to an additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter in the course of a lawful act, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-3(b), whatever the implement of death. For if defendant is justified in killing under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21, defendant is guilty of no crime at all. If defendant is not so justified, the homicide does not fall within the "lawful act" predicate of § 16-5-3(b), for the jury, in rejecting defendant's claim of justification, has of necessity determined thereby that the act is not lawful. Saylors v. State, 251 Ga. 735, 309 S.E.2d 796 (1983); Thompson v. State, 257 Ga. 481, 361 S.E.2d 154 (1987); Kennedy v. State, 193 Ga. App. 784, 389 S.E.2d 350, cert. denied, 193 Ga. App. 910, 389 S.E.2d 350 (1989); Nobles v. State, 201 Ga. App. 483, 411 S.E.2d 294, cert. denied, 201 Ga. App. 904, 411 S.E.2d 294 (1991).

Defendant in a murder trial who argued that defendant's actions were lawful in defending self with an ax but did so in an unlawful manner, in that the force used was excessive, and who received a self-defense instruction, was not entitled to an additional charge of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner. Jordan v. State, 171 Ga. App. 558, 320 S.E.2d 395 (1984); Wilson v. State, 176 Ga. App. 322, 335 S.E.2d 888 (1985).

In a murder prosecution, as defendant claimed the defendant killed the victim in self-defense, the defendant was not entitled to an additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter in the course of a lawful act under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-3(b) since if the defendant was justified in killing under the self-defense statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21, the defendant was guilty of no crime at all; but if the defendant was not so justified, the homicide did not occur in the course of a lawful act. Hooper v. State, 284 Ga. 824, 672 S.E.2d 638 (2009).

Defendant's requested charge on misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter was not justified by the defendant's statement to police that the victim attacked the defendant and that the defendant accidentally strangled the victim in an attempt to restrain the victim because one who sought to justify homicide as having been committed in self-defense was not entitled to an additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter resulting from the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner. Moore v. State, 325 Ga. App. 749, 754 S.E.2d 792 (2014).

Failure to charge on self-defense when it constitutes defendant's only defense is reversible error. Jackson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 867, 270 S.E.2d 76 (1980).

Failure to charge on defense of others constituted error.

- Trial court erred in failing to give a requested charge on the right to use force in the defense of others, where a jury question existed as to whether defendant reasonably believed it was necessary to shoot the victim in order to prevent "great bodily injury" to the defendant's sons, which was the defendant's principal defense at trial. Wainwright v. State, 197 Ga. App. 43, 397 S.E.2d 456 (1990).

Charge on self-defense unauthorized where defendant returned to scene after imminent danger had passed.

- When any imminent danger justifying self-defense passed by the time the defendant returned to the scene of the altercation, the evidence was insufficient to authorize a requested charge on self-defense. Loggins v. State, 147 Ga. App. 122, 248 S.E.2d 191 (1978).

Defendant not entitled to instruction on self-defense or mutual combat.

- See Penn v. State, 224 Ga. App. 616, 481 S.E.2d 602 (1997).

Court need not charge paragraph (b)(3) absent withdrawal or communication of intent to withdraw.

- Court is not required to charge former Code 1933, § 26-902 when there was never any withdrawal by defendant, nor any communication from defendant that defendant so intended when defendant continued to hold a gun aimed at another party and that party, in obedience to defendant's command, had put the gun in that party's pocket. Hall v. State, 124 Ga. App. 381, 183 S.E.2d 917 (1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(3)).

Error in including language in charge was harmless.

- Any error that occurred when the trial court included language from O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(2) in the charge was harmless given the defendant's testimony that the defendant shot the victim because the victim previously said the victim was going to get the victim's "tool," the evidence the victim was unarmed, and the fact that the trial court charged the jury on the defense of self and habitation. Mullins v. State, 299 Ga. 681, 791 S.E.2d 828 (2016).

Recharge.

- Trial court did not err in failing to recharge the entire Suggested Pattern Jury Charge on justification. The jury asked the trial court to redefine justification, not to repeat the entire charge. Branford v. State, 299 Ga. App. 890, 685 S.E.2d 731 (2009).

Burden of proof.

- When the defense of self-defense is made, the better practice is to specifically advise the jury that the burden of proof with regard to the offense is on the state and is not on the defendant to prove the defense. Jolly v. State, 164 Ga. App. 240, 296 S.E.2d 784 (1982).

Because the defendant failed in the burden of proving that the evidence of specific acts of violence by the victim should be admitted, and testimony did not establish that the event occurred before the defendant's attack on the victim, the trial court's ruling that there was no evidence to support a defense of justification was not clearly erroneous. Cross v. State, 285 Ga. App. 518, 646 S.E.2d 723 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 680 (Ga. 2007).

Trial court did not err by granting the defendant's motion for immunity from prosecution pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 because the court's determination that the defendant was immune from prosecution since the defendant acted in self-defense under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a) in discharging the defendant's service weapon, although based upon conflicting evidence, was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Bunn, 288 Ga. 20, 701 S.E.2d 138 (2010).

Justifiable homicide may exist when one kills another other than in defense of own life.

- Smith v. State, 215 Ga. 51, 108 S.E.2d 688 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

One may kill to protect sister from death or serious bodily injury, real or apparent, and may be justified. Willingham v. State, 72 Ga. App. 372, 33 S.E.2d 721 (1945) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

No justification for use of force when fleeing felony.

- Defendant's concession that the defendant's actions as to the victim at least constituted voluntary manslaughter, a felony, precluded the defendant from claiming self defense because the defendant was not justified in using force when fleeing the commission or attempted commission of a felony. Soto v. State, 303 Ga. 517, 813 S.E.2d 343 (2018).

Killing in defense of another requires same danger as killing in self-defense.

- To justify homicide in defense of relative, danger must be impending. Hill v. State, 64 Ga. 453 (1880) (decided under former Code 1873, §§ 4330, 4331).

In order for defendant to be justified in killing deceased to protect defendant's sister, the sister's life or person would have to be in same sort of peril that defendant's own life would be in if defendant was killing in defense of self. Moody v. State, 47 Ga. App. 1, 169 S.E. 541 (1933) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, §§ 70, 71).

Failure to make prima facie showing of self-defense.

- Because the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the defendant acted in self-defense and evidence of the victim's propensity for violence could not be introduced, the defendant could not satisfy the requirement of demonstrating a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime, and there was no need to address the defendant's contention that the court incorrectly applied the rule regarding the methods of proving character. Oliver v. State, 329 Ga. App. 377, 765 S.E.2d 606 (2014).

Former Code 1933 § 26-1015 was inapplicable where facts show that danger to relative was not impending. Ingram v. State, 204 Ga. 164, 48 S.E.2d 891 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Absolute necessity to kill is not test by which to determine whether homicide was justifiable when defense of justifiable homicide under fears of a reasonable man is involved. McCray v. State, 134 Ga. 416, 68 S.E. 62, 20 Ann. Cas. 101 (1910) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, §§ 70, 71).

It is unnecessary that slayer retreat where the slayer is free from fault and acts under fears of a reasonable man. Glover v. State, 105 Ga. 597, 31 S.E. 584 (1898) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, §§ 70, 71).

Assertion of self-defense by provoker.

- When it was the defendant who began hitting the victim, pinned the victim to the floor, and continued to administer a beating, the evidence presented was sufficient to prove defendant did not act in self-defense in subsequently stripping victim of the unloaded shotgun and employing the shotgun upon the victim as a club. Syfrett v. State, 210 Ga. App. 185, 435 S.E.2d 470 (1993).

Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant's convictions for aggravated assault because the defendant was involved with other members of a rap group in settling a previous altercation with a rival rap group, the defendant and others drove into an assigned park where the meeting was to be held, the defendant admitted to firing gunshots, and although others also had guns and fired shots, the defendant was liable under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 for injuries and a death to bystanders; the defendant could not assert self-defense under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(3) because the defendant was the aggressor. Taylor v. State, 296 Ga. App. 212, 674 S.E.2d 81 (2009).

Evidence that the defendant, possessing a firearm and believing that the victim did not want to speak with the defendant, stopped the defendant's truck at the defendant's estranged spouse's residence while the victim was present could be viewed by a jury as being intended to provoke the victim's use of force, justifying the trial court's instruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(3). Anthony v. State, 298 Ga. 827, 785 S.E.2d 277 (2016).

When the defendant was convicted of murder and other offenses arising out of the shooting death of the victim, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant did not act in self-defense and was not otherwise justified when the defendant shot the victim because the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant's version of the events was not supported by a security video and other evidence as the defendant fired the first shot; a witness, who was previously involved in a relationship with the defendant, testified that the altercation started when the defendant verbally threatened the witness; and the video showed a short gun battle between the defendant and the victim. Mosby v. State, 300 Ga. 450, 796 S.E.2d 277 (2017).

To deliberately kill in revenge for past injury, however heinous, cannot be justifiable after reason has had time to resume its sway. Mize v. State, 135 Ga. 291, 69 S.E. 173 (1910) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, §§ 70, 71); Ward v. State, 25 Ga. App. 296, 103 S.E. 726 (1920) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, §§ 70, 71).

Aggressor may defend himself where provoked party responds with disproportionate force.

- One who provokes a difficulty may yet defend self against violence on part of one provoked, if violence is disproportionate to seriousness of provocation or greater in degree than the law recognizes as justifiable under the circumstances. Sams v. State, 124 Ga. 25, 52 S.E. 18 (1905) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, §§ 70, 71); Bennett v. State, 19 Ga. App. 442, 91 S.E. 889 (1917) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, §§ 70, 71).

Homicide to prevent serious personal injury not amounting to felony upon person killing is not justified. Carter v. State, 92 Ga. App. 68, 87 S.E.2d 655 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Killing committed under fears of injury less than a felony is manslaughter.

- If one kills another, under fears of a reasonable man, that deceased was manifestly intending to commit a personal injury upon the defendant, amounting to felony, the killing is justifiable homicide; if one is under similar fears of some injury less than a felony, the offense is manslaughter, and not murder. McDaniel v. State, 209 Ga. 827, 76 S.E.2d 500 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-1011, 26-1012).

Words, threats, and other verbal menaces may be sufficient to justify homicide. Cumming v. State, 99 Ga. 662, 27 S.E. 177 (1896); Holland v. State, 3 Ga. App. 465, 60 S.E. 205 (1908); Fallon v. State, 5 Ga. App. 659, 63 S.E. 806 (1909); Davis v. State, 7 Ga. App. 822, 68 S.E. 319 (1910); Griggs v. State, 17 Ga. App. 301, 86 S.E. 726 (1915).

Words, threats and other verbal menaces must be accompanied by immediate danger to justify homicide. Roberts v. State, 65 Ga. 430 (1880).

Killing must stem from reasonable fears and not from spirit of revenge.

- It must appear that circumstances were sufficient to excite fears of a reasonable man, and that party killing really acted under influence of those fears, and not in a spirit of revenge. Gordy v. State, 93 Ga. App. 743, 92 S.E.2d 737 (1956).

Unreasonable apprehension or suspicion of harm.

- Juvenile defendant was not authorized to stab the victim under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), where defendant was attacked by the victim from behind with the victim's fists, and could see that the victim did not have a weapon; defendant's belief that defendant's own life was in danger was a mere unreasonable apprehension or suspicion of harm which was insufficient to justify the use of deadly force, and defendant was properly adjudicated a delinquent for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and for carrying a weapon onto a school bus under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1(b). In the Interest of Q.M.L., 257 Ga. App. 22, 570 S.E.2d 92 (2002).

Battered woman syndrome does not stand as a separate defense but rather is evidentiary support for a claim of justification under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(d). Adame v. State, 244 Ga. App. 257, 534 S.E.2d 817 (2000).

Since the evidence did not rise to the level of battering necessary to rely on the battered person syndrome as a basis for a self-defense claim, the trial court did not err in preventing defendant's expert from giving an opinion that defendant suffered from the battered person syndrome. Adame v. State, 244 Ga. App. 257, 534 S.E.2d 817 (2000).

When presence of spirit of revenge does not preclude justification.

- When one contends that one acted under fears of a reasonable man, it must appear that one did act under such fears, and not in a spirit of revenge. However, if one must take one's adversary's life in order to save one's own or to prevent commission of a felony upon one's person, property, or habitation, then it matters not what feelings of malice or revenge one may also entertain. Crolger v. State, 88 Ga. App. 566, 77 S.E.2d 98 (1953).

Section applies to force used in making lawful arrest.

- One making a lawful arrest is justified in killing under fears of a reasonable man that a felony is about to be committed upon self or a fellow officer. Gordy v. State, 93 Ga. App. 743, 92 S.E.2d 737 (1956).

Section applies to force used in resisting unlawful arrest.

- Citizen upon whom an unlawful arrest is attempted has a right to resist force with force proportionate to that being used to arrest that citizen, and if, in exercise of such right of resistance, the citizen kills an officer who is unlawfully attempting to arrest the citizen, then the citizen is guilty of no offense. Perdue v. State, 5 Ga. App. 821, 63 S.E. 922 (1909), later appeal, 134 Ga. 300, 67 S.E. 810; 135 Ga. 277, 69 S.E. 184 (1910).

If arrest sought to be made is unlawful, person sought to be arrested has right to resist, and, if such person is in the right, and under fears of a reasonable man expects a felony to be committed upon self, then the person has the right to resist up to point of slaying those seeking unlawfully to arrest the person. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943); Gordy v. State, 93 Ga. App. 743, 92 S.E.2d 737 (1956).

Homicide in defending self against robbery may be justified.

- Violent taking of money or property from person of another by force or intimidation for purpose of applying same to payment of debt, to which money or property taker has no bona fide claim of title or right of possession, constitutes offense of robbery. Resistance by armed force of an actual attempt to commit such a robbery would be justifiable provided that "the circumstances were sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable man" that such an offense was about to be committed, and that the party killing really acted under influence of those fears, and not in a spirit of revenge. Daniel v. State, 187 Ga. 411, 1 S.E.2d 6 (1939).

When blow with fist may be repelled by stabbing.

- Unless there is great superiority in physical strength of assailant, who strikes another a blow with the assailant's fist, or ill-health in the assailed at the time, or other circumstance producing relatively great inequality between them in combat, the assailed party cannot justifiably repel the blow by stabbing the assailant. The general rule is, that whether stabbing is in self-defense depends on nature and violence of assault made on the person who stabs. Hix v. State, 48 Ga. App. 845, 174 S.E. 157 (1934).

Admissibility of uncommunicated threat by deceased against defendant.

- Threat made by deceased against defendant, uncommunicated before homicide, is not admissible on trial of case involving question whether or not slayer was justified in taking life of deceased, unless there is evidence tending to show that deceased began mortal conflict, and that defendant killed in self-defense. Slater v. State, 76 Ga. App. 209, 45 S.E.2d 106 (1947).

Previous, uncommunicated threats are not admissible to show justification. Hoye v. State, 39 Ga. 718 (1869).

Evidence of bar's reputation for violent incidents inadmissible.

- When the defendant was convicted of, inter alia, malice murder and attempted murder, the trial court did not err in excluding the proffered evidence of 10 incidents at a bar because the evidence was not relevant to show that the dangerous, violent environment at the bar influenced the defendant's state of mind and made the defendant's extreme reaction to perceived threats from the victims reasonable as the defendant did not contend that the defendant knew about any of the proffered occurrences at the time of the shooting; none of the incidents showed a propensity for violence in either of the victims; and the evidence did not tend to make it more likely that the defendant reasonably believed that deadly force was necessary. Ramirez v. State, 303 Ga. 232, 811 S.E.2d 416 (2018).

Admissibility of conduct and condition of deceased and its influence upon accused.

- Conduct and condition of deceased shortly before fatal encounter, and influence of this conduct or condition upon mind of accused, are relevant as being illustrative not only of reasonableness of the accused's fears, but also as indicating the motive of deceased, although previous difficulty may have been between deceased and a third person. Dunn v. State, 16 Ga. App. 9, 84 S.E. 488 (1915).

Victim's character admissible only after prima facie showing of self-defense.

- There is no reason to construe the rules regarding the admission of character evidence as a modification of Georgia's long-standing requirement that a defendant must first make a prima facie showing of self-defense before requiring a trial court to determine whether evidence pertaining to the victim's character is admissible. Oliver v. State, 329 Ga. App. 377, 765 S.E.2d 606 (2014).

Jury might consider size and physical condition of parties, but it would be erroneous for judge to instruct them that they should consider such disparity. Alexander v. State, 118 Ga. 26, 44 S.E. 851 (1903).

Defenselessness of person whose life is in danger may be considered. Gillis v. State, 8 Ga. App. 696, 70 S.E. 53 (1911).

Whether fists and feet can be dangerous weapons under certain circumstances is not material to the issue of self-defense. The determining factor in self-defense is not whether the victim was using a deadly weapon, but whether the actor reasonably believed the amount of force used was necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to self. Ellis v. State, 168 Ga. App. 757, 309 S.E.2d 924 (1983).

Defendant may establish self-defense with same type evidence that prosecution uses in establishing guilt.

- If state can exhibit victim's ear to jury, and can exhibit gruesome pictures of victim to jury, then defendant should be allowed to show jury a picture of defendant's chest. If state can prove defendant's prior crimes to show defendant's intent and motive, then defendant should be allowed to prove crimes previously committed against the defendant to show defendant's intent and motive in defending self. The jury can decide, when informed of all circumstances surrounding attack, whether defendant's actions meet "reasonable man" standard. Daniels v. State, 248 Ga. 591, 285 S.E.2d 516 (1981).

Evidence of specific acts of violence of victim known to defendant admissible.

- Defendant on trial for murder of stepfather was entitled to introduce evidence of specific acts of violence of defendant's stepfather, directed at defendant's mother, of which defendant had knowledge. Strickland v. State, 250 Ga. 624, 300 S.E.2d 156 (1983).

Evidence of victim's alleged violent acts against third parties inadmissible.

- Court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's order refusing to allow the defendant to testify about a previous incident of violence the victim allegedly committed against third parties in support of a justification defense under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a) because the defendant sought to introduce alleged evidence in the form of unsupported assertions by the defendant as to what was in the defendant mind at the time the defendant killed the victim. State v. Hodges, 291 Ga. 413, 728 S.E.2d 582 (2012).

When use of force not justified.

- Person is not justified in using force if the person initially provokes the use of force against self with the intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; or if the person was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement unless the person withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other person an intent to do so and the other, notwithstanding, continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful force. Lee v. State, 167 Ga. App. 59, 306 S.E.2d 57 (1983).

Defendant convicted of aggravated assault was not entitled to a new trial based on self-defense because a jury could find that: (1) the defendant had no reasonable belief that it was necessary to shoot the victim to protect the defendant; (2) the defendant started the argument and used it as an excuse to shoot the victim; or (3), the two were engaged in mutual combat from which the defendant did not withdraw, each of which negated a self-defense claim. Giddens v. State, 276 Ga. App. 353, 623 S.E.2d 204 (2005).

The defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the defendant acted in self-defense when the defendant shot the victim because the defendant was the aggressor and the victim would have been justified in using force to subdue the defendant; the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in excluding evidence of the victim's propensity for violence. Oliver v. State, 329 Ga. App. 377, 765 S.E.2d 606 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because the defendant, the homeowner, and at least three other people were sitting outside the house drinking alcohol and talking; the people saw the 16-year-old victim walking toward them waving a pistol in the air; although the victim did not direct a threat toward the defendant or those in the defendant's party and did not point a weapon or behave aggressively toward anyone, the defendant retrieved a rifle from the trunk of the defendant's car and approached the victim when the victim arrived in front of the house; the defendant then shot the victim and fled; and the defendant's actions were not justified in self-defense. Howard v. State, 298 Ga. 396, 782 S.E.2d 255 (2016).

Lawful arrest.

- Where the arrest of the defendant's spouse is legal, the defendant's actions in obstructing an officer in "defense" of the spouse are not "justified." Perano v. State, 167 Ga. App. 560, 307 S.E.2d 64 (1983).

When force used exceeds that necessary for self-defense, the law considers the defender the aggressor and if the defensive act results in homicide the offense is at least manslaughter. Spradlin v. State, 151 Ga. App. 585, 260 S.E.2d 517 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Bangs v. State, 198 Ga. App. 404, 401 S.E.2d 599 (1991), overruled on other grounds, Stewart v. State, 262 Ga. App. 426, 585 S.E.2d 622 (2003).

Continued firing on fatally wounded person.

- Person who fatally wounds another, even in self-defense, is not entitled to hasten the victim's death by continuing to pump bullets into the victim's body. Brown v. State, 249 Ga. 805, 294 S.E.2d 510 (1982).

From evidence, jury could believe defendant provoked victim's attack as an excuse to kill her.

- See Taylor v. State, 252 Ga. 125, 312 S.E.2d 311 (1984).

Admissibility of evidence of deceased's prior use of weapons in assailing defendant.

- When the defendant has made a prima facie showing of basis for reasonable belief that defendant had to use deadly force to defend self, defendant is entitled to introduce in evidence own testimony and that of defendant's witnesses to prove specific instances in which deceased had used a firearm or other weapons or object to assail defendant, even in cases of doubt. The lapse of time between prior occurrences and homicide, conduct of parties toward each other during intervals between occurrences, and other such matters go to weight and credit to be accorded testimony by jury and not to its admissibility. Milton v. State, 245 Ga. 18, 262 S.E.2d 789 (1980).

Exclusion of tape-recorded threats by victim held harmless error.

- Erroneous exclusion of a tape recording in which the victim allegedly made threats against defendant and defendant's girl friend was harmless, where the victim appeared to have been intoxicated and it was doubtful whether the victim's statements would have aroused the fears of a reasonable man. McDonald v. State, 182 Ga. App. 509, 356 S.E.2d 264 (1987).

There is no substantial difference between phrases "serious personal injury" and "great bodily injury." Williams v. State, 126 Ga. App. 454, 191 S.E.2d 100 (1972).

Stabbing of victim not self-defense.

- The state presented sufficient evidence that defendant did not act in self-defense and that defendant was guilty of aggravated assault, where defendant attempted to justify stabbing the victim by stating that on a previous occasion, the victim displayed a sawed-off shotgun and that on the night of the assault, defendant thought the victim had a knife. Parham v. State, 204 Ga. App. 659, 420 S.E.2d 356 (1992).

Despite the defendant's claim that the state failed to disprove a claim of self-defense, the appeals court upheld the defendant's aggravated assault conviction, because sufficient evidence was presented by the state to allow the jury to decide that the defendant's act of stabbing the weaponless victim amounted to excessive force. Thus, the defendant's motion for a new trial on the issue was properly denied. Richards v. State, 288 Ga. App. 814, 655 S.E.2d 690 (2007).

Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on a voluntary manslaughter count predicated on the defendant's claim of self-defense, O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), because the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of voluntary manslaughter in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a) and to enable a rational trier of fact to find that the defendant's stabbing of the victim was not justified as an act of self-defense; under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) a neighbor's eyewitness testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was the aggressor, continued to use force after any imminent danger posed by the victim had passed, or used excessive force, and the jury also was entitled to rely upon evidence that the defendant lied to the police about the stabbing and hid the knife. Muckle v. State, 307 Ga. App. 634, 705 S.E.2d 721 (2011).

Homicide resulting solely from resentment of provoking threats is not justified.

- Provocation by threats is insufficient to free person killing from crime of murder, nor will it reduce homicide from murder to manslaughter, when killing is done solely for purpose of resenting provocation thus given. Davenport v. State, 245 Ga. 845, 268 S.E.2d 337 (1980).

Trespass amounts only to a misdemeanor and does not justify killing the trespasser. Washington v. State, 245 Ga. 117, 263 S.E.2d 152 (1980).

When one intentionally shoots at another in self-defense, defense of accidental killing is generally not involved. Henderson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 801, 266 S.E.2d 522 (1980).

Evidence authorized jury to believe that the defendant did not act in self-defense.

- See Steele v. State, 166 Ga. App. 24, 303 S.E.2d 462 (1983); Knight v. State, 271 Ga. 557, 521 S.E.2d 819 (1999); Williams v. State, 245 Ga. App. 670, 538 S.E.2d 544 (2000).

Whether defendant was justified in using force that was intended or likely to cause death or great bodily injury to defend another or oneself, under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), was a matter for the jury to determine, and it reasonably found that defendant was not justified in using such force. Gray v. State, 257 Ga. App. 393, 571 S.E.2d 435 (2002).

Jury was free to accept the evidence that the shootings were not done in self-defense or in defense of another person, including the defendant's own inculpatory statements, and to reject any evidence offered by the defendant in support of a justification defense. Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 304, 612 S.E.2d 789 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury to reject the defendant's claim of self-defense and to support the defendant's aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime conviction because, inter alia, two witnesses yelled at the defendant to put the gun away, but the defendant shot the victim a second time, the defendant testified that the defendant believed that the victim was holding a weapon behind the victim's leg when the victim got out of the car and that the defendant heard someone yell "bust," which the defendant understood to mean "shoot," and another witness heard no such statement and did not see anything in the victim's hands when the victim exited the car. Hill v. State, 276 Ga. App. 874, 625 S.E.2d 108 (2005).

While the defendant and the codefendant insisted that their victim had a gun, no other witness saw the victim with a gun, and no such gun was found at the scene of the victim's shooting death; there was evidence that the defendant chased the victim as the victim ran away and shot the victim from behind, so the jury was entitled to reject the defendant's claims of self-defense and defense of another, and the evidence supported the defendant's convictions of voluntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-3, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106. Windham v. State, 278 Ga. App. 663, 629 S.E.2d 837 (2006).

When the unarmed victim advanced on the defendant, who had a baseball bat, and the defendant swung twice at the victim, then hit the victim on the head with the bat after the victim lost the victim's balance, the jury at the defendant's aggravated assault trial was entitled to conclude that the defendant was not justified in using force greater than that necessary for self-defense; the evidence, including the defendant's bragging at a party that night about the incident and telling an acquaintance a few days later that the acquaintance was "riding with a murderer," supported the conviction. Fields v. State, 285 Ga. App. 345, 646 S.E.2d 326 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find the defendant guilty of felony murder and of aggravated assault and to reject the defendant's self-defense claim; the defendant, who had broken up with the victim, followed the victim as the victim left defendant's apartment, stabbed the victim twice with a nine-inch knife when the victim turned to face defendant without the victim striking the defendant, pulling a weapon, or yelling at the defendant, and the defendant claimed that the defendant had retrieved the knife in self-defense, then followed the victim out of the apartment, down the stairs, and into a parking lot where the defendant stabbed the victim. Ganaway v. State, 282 Ga. 297, 647 S.E.2d 590 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to support a jury's determination that the defendant's fatal shooting of a victim following the parties' altercation and the victim's subsequent punch in the defendant's face constituted voluntary manslaughter, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a), as there was no evidence that the victim had a gun at the time of the shooting incident and the defendant gave conflicting versions of the incident; the jury acted within the jury's province in rejecting the defendant's claim of self-defense pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a). Thomas v. State, 296 Ga. App. 231, 674 S.E.2d 96 (2009).

Evidence plainly was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(a) because the state presented more than ample evidence that the defendant's use of force was not justified under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a); based upon the victim's testimony and the victim's prior statement to the responding officer, the jury clearly was authorized to find that the defendant's acts of grabbing the victim by the hair, throwing the victim to the ground, and choking the victim to the point of unconsciousness constituted excessive force, and the prior and subsequent difficulties evidence and the similar transaction evidence the state presented supported the jury's decision to give little credence to the defendant's self-defense claim. Whitley v. State, 307 Ga. App. 553, 707 S.E.2d 375 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter because the defendant's testimony that the initial shot to the victim's head was an accident and that the defendant kept shooting because the victim threatened to kill the defendant was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not justifiably use deadly force to protect oneself, after the victim already had been shot in the head, from the victim's assault pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a); or the jury simply could have disbelieved the defendant's claim of self-defense, given the number of gunshots fired. Davis v. State, 309 Ga. App. 831, 711 S.E.2d 324 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a) because, even if the jury accepted the defendant's version of events preceding the shooting of the two victims, the jury was authorized to conclude that, having wrestled control of one of the victim's gun, the defendant used excessive force in shooting the two unarmed victims and/or in continuing to fire at the victims after the victims had fallen to the ground. Jimmerson v. State, 289 Ga. 364, 711 S.E.2d 660 (2011).

Rational jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the state disproved the defendant's self-defense claim; the jury was entitled to reject the defendant's version of events, and even if the jury found that the victim threw a bottle at the defendant's car, the jury could have concluded that the defendant struck the victim after any danger had passed and that the defendant's response was excessive. Hill v. State, 310 Ga. App. 695, 713 S.E.2d 891 (2011).

Trial court did not err in refusing to grant the defendant's motion for a new trial under O.C.G.A. § 5-5-21 because the evidence establishing that the defendant and the victims engaged in a heated argument, which escalated to preparations for a physical altercation, was sufficient to sustain the defendant's voluntary manslaughter conviction, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a); given the heated exchange and the defendant's belief that the defendant was in serious danger, there was sufficient provocation to excite the passion necessary for voluntary manslaughter, and the jury was authorized to reject the defendant's claim of self-defense under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a) and conclude that the defendant was so influenced and excited that the defendant reacted passionately, rather simply in self defense, when the defendant shot an unarmed victim. White v. State, 312 Ga. App. 421, 718 S.E.2d 335 (2011).

Because the evidence showed that the victim was shot and killed by a caliber of gun different from that which the victim was known to carry, and the defendant was seen checking the chamber of a gun which a witness thought was of the same caliber used to shoot the victim, the jury was entitled to disbelieve the defendant's claim of self-defense. Murray v. State, 295 Ga. 289, 759 S.E.2d 525 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of murder and other crimes in connection with the fatal stabbing of the victim because the defendant intervened and fought with the victim in the living room of the apartment after the victim and defendant's sister got into an argument that escalated into a physical altercation; the defendant pushed the victim into a lamp, went into the kitchen, returned to the living room with a knife, and stabbed the victim in the chest; the victim later died; and the jury was free to accept the evidence that the stabbing was not done in self-defense and to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense. Cotton v. State, 297 Ga. 257, 773 S.E.2d 242 (2015).

As the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant fired the gun not out of a reasonable belief that the defendant's life was in danger but rather out of aggression towards the victim, the evidence supported the defendant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and firearm possession during the commission of a crime. Amos v. State, 298 Ga. 804, 783 S.E.2d 900 (2016).

Defendant did not present sufficient evidence to show justification for the victim's murder because multiple witnesses testified that the defendant came out from the defendant's hiding place behind the victim and loudly taunted the victim as the defendant fired the defendant's weapon; the defendant admitted surreptitiously following the victim and then taunting the victim as the defendant fired; several witnesses testified the victim was standing with the victim's back to the defendant when shots rang out and before the victim fired a shot; and the jury could conclude the defendant pursued the victim and the victim's friend, laid in wait to shoot the victim, and commenced shooting when the victim's back was turned to the defendant. McCray v. State, 301 Ga. 241, 799 S.E.2d 206 (2017).

Evidence authorized jury to believe defendant used excessive force.

- In a case in which the only issue was whether, under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), the defendant was justified in shooting the victim, the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant used excessive force because the defendant shot the victim in response to the victim having punched the defendant; thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's felony murder conviction based on the underlying felony of aggravated assault. Nelson v. State, 283 Ga. 119, 657 S.E.2d 201 (2008).

Evidence of the dangerous environment surrounding defendant's apartment complex, offered to prove defendant's defense of justification when defendant fired at police officers who were serving a warrant, was properly excluded absent testimony showing defendant had the requisite state of mind to support a self-defense theory. Bowman v. State, 222 Ga. App. 893, 476 S.E.2d 608 (1996).

Evidence did not support defense of habitation.

- Trial counsel's withdrawal of the defense of habitation did not constitute deficient performance as the record contained no evidence that the victim entered violently, unlawfully, forcibly, or with the intent to commit a felony, the victim was there as a guest of the defendant, who was a resident of the house, and the trial court found that the victim attacked the defendant rather than the defendant's habitation. Harris v. State, 339 Ga. App. 30, 793 S.E.2d 417 (2016).

Actions deemed attempt to escape not self-defense.

- Defendant's use of force that damaged a police car and which was not against another person and occurred sometime after the alleged unlawful arrest could not be said to have been in self-defense, but was actually an attempt to escape. Hack v. State, 168 Ga. App. 927, 311 S.E.2d 211 (1983).

No evidence of confrontation.

- In a prosecution for malice murder, evidence that the murder victim refused to remove the victim's hand from pants pocket upon request and possibly threw a paper cup at defendant is not evidence of a confrontation between the two men sufficient to support a charge on justification. Burgess v. State, 264 Ga. 777, 450 S.E.2d 680 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1133, 115 S. Ct. 2559, 132 L. Ed. 2d 813 (1995).

Evidence of justification.

- Trial court properly held that the defendant, who was charged with family violence battery and simple battery under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-23.1(f) and16-5-23, was immune from prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2. The testimony of the defendant's friend that the defendant restrained the friend after the friend broke the defendant's windshield and kicked a car seat, knocking the defendant into the steering wheel, provided some evidence that the defendant's actions were justified under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a). State v. Yapo, 296 Ga. App. 158, 674 S.E.2d 44 (2009).

As defendant showed a threat of force from the victim and reasonably believed that the defendant needed to defend oneself from a violent attack by the victim that could have caused the defendant great bodily injury, the defendant was justified in using deadly force against the victim to protect the defendant under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21; consequently, the defendant was immune from prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2. State v. Green, 289 Ga. 802, 716 S.E.2d 194 (2011).

Prima facie showing of justification.

- Defendant, who claimed to have acted in self-defense when the defendant beat the victim with a pipe, made a prima facie showing of justification. The defendant testified that the victim approached the defendant, uttered a racial epithet, and threatened to shoot the defendant, and the defendant claimed that the defendant feared for the defendant's life because the defendant knew of the victim's reputation and had previously seen the victim with a pistol in the victim's jeans. Bennett v. State, 298 Ga. App. 464, 680 S.E.2d 538 (2009).

Evidence sufficient to disprove justification defense.

- See Andrews v. State, 267 Ga. 473, 480 S.E.2d 29 (1997); Silas v. State, 247 Ga. App. 792, 545 S.E.2d 358 (2001).

Trial court properly instructed the jury as to defendant's justification defense under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21 and the state's burden to show the lack of justification beyond a reasonable doubt; there was ample evidence from which the jury could reject defendant's justification defense and find defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter where: (1) defendant and the victim fought earlier in the evening, during which the victim disarmed defendant; (2) defendant returned to the tavern later in the evening with an assault rifle, and pointed it at the occupants; (3) the occupants fled to the kitchen, and defendant demanded to see the victim; (4) the victim grabbed a knife and lunged at the defendant; and (5) when the victim came within defendant's sight again, defendant shot the victim, twice. Cameron v. State, 262 Ga. App. 296, 585 S.E.2d 209 (2003).

There was no showing of ineffective assistance in counsel's failure to pursue a justification defense pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a) because, although the defendant claimed that the defendant shot the victim to protect the defendant's father, inter alia, the facts did not show that the father was in imminent danger, and the victim's threat against the father was made 30 minutes before the fatal shooting; at the time of the shooting, both men had fought in the street outside the father's home, the father was inside the home and not with them, and the victim was running away from the defendant. Even if the victim, who may have been carrying a knife, was going towards the father's house, the victim was shot before reaching the front yard. Carter v. State, 285 Ga. 565, 678 S.E.2d 909 (2009).

Evidence failed to support the defendant's claim of justification or self-defense although the defendant and the victim engaged in a fight before the defendant shot the victim because the fight had ended at the time the defendant retrieved a gun. Willis v. State, 316 Ga. App. 258, 728 S.E.2d 857 (2012).

Denial of a defendant's pretrial motion for immunity, based on a claim of justification, was proper because the evidence showed that the shooting was motivated by gang rivalry and a desire for revenge, rather than self-defense. Sifuentes v. State, 293 Ga. 441, 746 S.E.2d 127 (2013).

Self defense claim rejected.

- Evidence that, after a fistfight, the defendant pursued and shot the defendant's victim in the back while the victim was unarmed and attempting to flee to safety authorized a jury to reject the defendant's self-defense claim and find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault. Aldridge v. State, 267 Ga. App. 489, 600 S.E.2d 439 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because the state presented evidence that the defendant stabbed the defendant's love interest's child several times with a butcher knife. Even though the defendant argued that the defendant was merely defending the defendant against the child's attack with a bat, the jury was authorized by O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(2) to reject the defendant's justification claim; the evidence showed that the love interest's son hit the defendant with a bat to protect the defendant's love interest from the defendant, who forcefully entered their house and then charged the love interest's child, pushed the child down, and stabbed the child. Williams v. State, 268 Ga. App. 384, 601 S.E.2d 833 (2004).

Evidence presented by the state was sufficient to convict a defendant of felony murder despite the defendant's evidence of justification and battered person syndrome pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-21(d) and19-13-1, including testimony that the defendant had been the victim of acts of violence and expert testimony that the defendant suffered from the syndrome. The jury could disbelieve the defense witnesses. Demery v. State, 287 Ga. 805, 700 S.E.2d 373 (2010).

Defendant's claim of self-defense failed because the evidence was sufficient to support the state's theory that the defendant provoked the victim's use of force, including evidence that the defendant participated in the robbery of the victim, pursued the victim, and then laid in wait for the victim. Mingledolph v. State, 324 Ga. App. 157, 749 S.E.2d 757 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder as the defendant admitted to firing two shots from the passenger's side of the car while leaning over the roof; a bullet hit the first victim in the neck, severing the first victim's spine and spinal cord; the first victim died several days later after being removed from life support; the first victim died as a result of the injuries inflicted by defendant as the first victim's injuries were such that the first victim could not live once life support systems were removed; and the defendant did not act in self defense. Browder v. State, 294 Ga. 188, 751 S.E.2d 354 (2013).

Claims of self-defense raised by codefendants.

- In a prosecution for aggravated assault, arising out of a fight outside a restaurant, although both codefendants claimed they had acted in self-defense it was not incumbent upon the jury to decide which of the defendants was the aggressor and which acted in self-defense rather than disbelieving both and convicting both. The jury could have concluded, from the evidence about the acts and the circumstances surrounding the fight, that both codefendants intended to fight and agreed to fight, and thus neither was entitled to the defense of justification. Pendergrass v. State, 199 Ga. App. 467, 405 S.E.2d 297 (1991).

Self-defense applicable to delusional compulsion defense.

- General law of self-defense was properly applied to determine whether the defendant had met the justification criteria for delusional compulsion defense. Dutton v. State, 225 Ga. App. 67, 483 S.E.2d 305 (1997).

Child molestation is a forcible felony.

- Child molestation constitutes a forcible felony for the purpose of establishing the defense of justification pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a). Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 154, 486 S.E.2d 178 (1997).

Motion for directed verdict of acquittal based on justification defense was properly denied.

- When the defendant was tried on two counts of battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(a) in relation to an altercation in a movie theater, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, which was based on the defendant's claim of justification under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), even though the defendant presented the testimony of two witnesses who said that the defendant only struck the victim after the victim grabbed the defendant's throat as the victim denied choking the defendant and the defendant had earlier entered into a written restitution agreement with the victim in which the defendant had admitted that the defendant approached and struck the seated victim, inflicting a forehead laceration; the conflicting testimony on the justification defense presented credibility issues for the jury to resolve and there was ample evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Tahantan v. State, 260 Ga. App. 861, 581 S.E.2d 373 (2003).

Victim's violent acts.

- Evidence of violent acts committed by the victim against either the defendant or against third parties may be introduced by a criminal defendant claiming justification because the key showing must be that the victim was the aggressor in the fatal encounter. State v. Hodges, 291 Ga. 413, 728 S.E.2d 582 (2012).

Evidence of bar's reputation for violent incidents inadmissible.

- When the defendant was convicted of, inter alia, the malice murder of the first victim and the attempted murder of the second victim, to the extent that the bar's reputation for violent incidents influenced the defendant's state of mind, that reputation and its effect on the defendant was well established through other evidence admitted at trial; thus, even if the proffered incidents had some marginal relevance to the defendant's self-defense claim, any slight probative value was substantially outweighed by considerations of a waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence, and the trial court acted within the court's discretion in excluding the evidence. Ramirez v. State, 303 Ga. 232, 811 S.E.2d 416 (2018).

Insufficient evidence to support instruction on self-defense.

- Trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of self-defense because the record showed that the victim moved towards the defendant because the defendant threatened the victim with a revolver and both eyewitnesses testified that the victim grabbed the arm of the hand holding the gun and pointed the gun away from everyone. Brunson v. State, 293 Ga. 226, 744 S.E.2d 695 (2013).

Immunity properly found.

- Evidence was sufficient for the trial court to determine that the defendants met the defendants' burden of proving that the defendants were entitled to immunity from prosecution pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 because the defendants' testimony provided some evidence that the defendants' actions were justified, and the state chose to present no contrary testimony. State v. Cooper, 324 Ga. App. 32, 749 S.E.2d 35 (2013).

Motion to dismiss the indictment was properly granted as the defendant acted in self-defense in shooting the deceased and was thus immune from prosecution because the evidence showed that the defendant received a threatening voicemail from the deceased; at the time of the shooting, the defendant knew of three prior acts of violence committed by the deceased; on the morning of the shooting, the defendant was at the apartment of the defendant's mother when the defendant saw the deceased enter the doorway of the mother's apartment; the defendant repeatedly told the deceased not to come any closer, but the deceased nevertheless continued to proceed through the doorway; and the defendant then fired a weapon once, killing the deceased. State v. Sutton, 297 Ga. 222, 773 S.E.2d 222 (2015).

Trial court did not err in granting in part the defendant's motion to bar the prosecution on immunity grounds because the defendant presented sufficient evidence to carry the defendant's burden of proving the reasonableness of the defendant's belief in the necessity of deadly force with respect to the first victim because the first victim punched and choked the defendant, and threatened to kill the defendant; and the defendant's testimony, which was corroborated in part by the second victim, provided some evidence that the defendant's actions with respect to the first victim were justified. State v. Jennings, 337 Ga. App. 164, 786 S.E.2d 545 (2016).

Immunity motion properly denied.

- Defendant failed to show that the defendant was entitled to immunity as the defendant did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant reasonably believed that the defendant was in imminent danger of being subjected to unlawful force when the defendant shot the victim because, although the defendant testified that the defendant shot the victim only after the victim grabbed a gun from the victim's car, two guests at the gathering in the defendant's front yard testified that they never saw the victim with a gun; and the jury was authorized to reject the defendant's claim that the victim was the aggressor and to conclude that the defendant did not reasonably believe that it was necessary to shoot the victim in self-defense. Arnold v. State, 302 Ga. 129, 805 S.E.2d 94 (2017).

Trial counsel not ineffective.

- In a murder case, trial counsel was not ineffective for arguing that the defendant was not guilty of attempting to violate the Georgia Controlled Substances Act because the defendant had abandoned the drug deal at time of the shooting and that the shooting was in self-defense in light of limited defense options that were available and the evidence against the defendant. Moore v. State, 294 Ga. 453, 754 S.E.2d 344 (2014).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assault and Battery, §§ 57, 60 et seq. 40A Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide, §§ 134 et seq., 170 et seq.

Self Defense, 33 POF2d 211.

Self-Defense in Homicide Cases, 42 Am. Jur. Trials 151.

C.J.S.

- 40 C.J.S., Homicide, §§ 151, 172 et seq., 184 et seq.

ALR.

- Duty to retreat to wall as affected by illegal character of premises on which homicide occurs, 2 A.L.R. 518.

Acquittal on charge as to one as bar to charge as to the other, where one person is killed or assaulted by acts directed at another, 2 A.L.R. 606.

Civil liability growing out of mutual combat, 6 A.L.R. 388; 30 A.L.R. 199; 47 A.L.R. 1092.

Right of self-defense as affected by defendant's violation of law only casually related to the encounter, 10 A.L.R. 861.

Homicide: duty to retreat when not on one's own premises, 18 A.L.R. 1279.

Wanton or willful misconduct by person killed or injured as defense to an action based on wanton or willful misconduct of defendant, 41 A.L.R. 1379.

Evidence of improper conduct by deceased toward defendant's wife as admissible in support of plea of self-defense, 44 A.L.R. 860.

Right of self-defense by officer attempting illegal arrest, 46 A.L.R. 904.

Self-defense by one who has rightfully entered on premises of his assailant, 53 A.L.R. 486.

Danger or apparent danger of death or great bodily harm as condition of self-defense in prosecution for assault as distinguished from prosecution for homicide, 114 A.L.R. 634.

Admissibility on issue of self-defense (or defense of another), on prosecution for homicide or assault, of evidence of specific acts of violence by deceased, or person assaulted, against others than defendant, 121 A.L.R. 380.

Proof to establish or negative self-defense in civil action for death from intentional act, 17 A.L.R.2d 597.

Danger or apparent danger of great bodily harm or death as condition of self-defense in civil action for assault and battery, personal injury, or death, 25 A.L.R.2d 1215.

Homicide: extent of premises which may be defended without retreat under right of self-defense, 52 A.L.R.2d 1458.

Pleading self-defense or other justification in civil assault and battery action, 67 A.L.R.2d 405.

Admissibility of evidence of uncommunicated threats on issue of self-defense in prosecution for homicide, 98 A.L.R.2d 6.

Civil liability for use of firearm in defense of habitation or property, 100 A.L.R.2d 1021.

Admissibility of evidence as to other's character or reputation for turbulence on question of self-defense by one charged with assault or homicide, 1 A.L.R.3d 571.

Relationship with assailant's wife as provocation depriving defendant of right of self-defense, 9 A.L.R.3d 933.

Homicide: duty to retreat where assailants and assailed share the same living quarters, 26 A.L.R.3d 1296.

Homicide: modern status of rules as to burden and quantum of proof to show self-defense, 43 A.L.R.3d 221.

Unintentional killing of or injury to third person during attempted self-defense, 55 A.L.R.3d 620.

Right to resist excessive force used in accomplishing lawful arrest, 77 A.L.R.3d 281.

Modern status: right of peace officer to use deadly force in attempting to arrest fleeing felon, 83 A.L.R.3d 174.

Homicide: duty to retreat where assailant is social guest on premises, 100 A.L.R.3d 532.

Construction and application of statutes justifying the use of force to prevent the use of force against another, 71 A.L.R.4th 940.

Standard for determination of reasonableness of criminal defendant's belief, for purposes of self-defense claim, that physical force is necessary - modern cases, 73 A.L.R.4th 993.

Admissibility of evidence of battered child syndrome on issue of self-defense, 22 A.L.R.5th 787.

Admissibility of threats to defendant made by third-parties to support claim of self-defense in criminal prosecution for assault or homicide, 55 A.L.R.5th 449.